Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Bishnu Chandra Rajak vs State Of West Bengal & Anr on 4 October, 2024

                     IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

                     (Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction)

                             APPELLATE SIDE



Present:

The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)



                            CRR 3904 of 2014


                          Bishnu Chandra Rajak

                                    Vs

                        State of West Bengal & Anr.



For the Petitioner                       : Mr. Pradip Kumar Roy,
                                           Mr. T. Roy Chowdhury.



For the State                            : Ms. A. Begum.




Hearing concluded on                     : 23.09.2024

Judgment on                              : 04.10.2024
                                         2


Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:

1. The present revision has been preferred against a Judgment and order

dated 22.01.2014 passed by the Learned District and Sessions Judge,

Uttar Dinajpur at Raiganj in Criminal Revision No. 17 of 2013,

affirming the Order dated 30.04.2013 passed by the Learned Judicial

Magistrate, 1st Court, Raiganj, Uttar Dinajpur in G.R. Case No. 1229 of

2010 under Section 279/338 of the Indian Penal Code, arising out of

Raiganj Police Station Case No. 562 of 2010 dated 19.12.2010.

2. The case of the petitioner/defacto complainant is as follows :-

i) The petitioner is a Constable of Uttar Dinajpur District and his

wife is working as a Lady Constable under Uttar Dinajpur

District Police.

ii) That on 16th December, 2010 the petitioner and his wife Mrs.

Jayanti Sarkar were proceeding to Karnajora Police Lines from

Bogram riding the petitioner's bicycle, when one Maruti Car

Bearing No. WB-60D/3020 driven by one Nirjhar Sarkar,

lecturer of Raiganj College dashed them badly near the

Banglow of Savadipati, Uttar Dinajpur Zilla Parishad and the

petitioner and his wife were seriously injured and were

admitted to Raiganj District Hospital and got released on 19th

December, 2010.

iii) That while the petitioner and his wife were in the Hospital,

Assistant Sub-Inspector Binod Chandra Hisabia, who was very

well known to the petitioner asked the petitioner to sign on a

blank paper and stated that he will lodge the complaint on

behalf of the petitioner and the petitioner signed and the case

was registered for investigation being Raiganj Police Station

case No. 562 of 2010 dated 19.12.2010 under Section

279/338 of the Indian Penal Code corresponding to G.R. Case

No. 1229 of 2010.

iv) After completion of the impugned investigation, the

investigating officer submitted charge sheet under Section

279/338 of the Indian Penal Code being charge sheet No. 545

of 2010 dated 31.12.2010.

v) The Petitioner states that the investigating Officer has not

properly investigated the matter and being influenced by some

person has submitted a false, fabricated charge sheet against

one Shambhu Kahar. The real fact is that the car by which the

accident occurred was driven by Nirjhar Sarkar, Lecturer of

Raiganj College and inspite of repeated requests, the

investigating officer has not taken any step against Mr. Nirjhar

Sarkar and made some persons well known to him as charge

sheet witnesses in place of those persons who were actually

present at the spot of accident.

vi) The petitioner submits that without getting the injury report

from the Hospital, the investigating officer had filed the charge

sheet, without making the actual culprit of the case namely

Mr. Nirjhar Sarkar as accused person and making one

innocent person, Shambhu Kahar as the accused person

instead.

vii) The petitioner states that the investigating officer with some ill

motive investigated the case and submitted its charge sheet

and at the time of seizure, he has not seized the petitioner's

bicycle which is also necessary in the present case and made

two persons as seizure list witnesses, who can give evidence to

hide the actual culprit of the case.

viii) On 20.02.2012 the petitioner made a petition before the

Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, Rajganj, Uttar

Dinajpur, raising objection to the charge sheet filed by the

Investigating Officer and for passing necessary order.

ix) The petition dated 20.02.2012 was taken up for hearing by the

Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, Rajganj, Uttar Dinajpur

of 30.04.2013 and after hearing the Learned Magistrate was

pleased to reject the petition.

3. In revision, the Learned District and Sessions Judge, Uttar Dinajpur,

at Raiganj, after hearing the Learned Judge was pleased by the order

impugned dated 22.01.2014 to dismiss the revisional application of

the petitioner for giving objection to the purported charge sheet filed by

the Investigating Officer on 31.12.2010 being No. 545 of 2010.

4. Hence the present revision praying for setting aside of the said order

dated 22.01.2014 passed in Criminal Revision 17/2013.

5. The State has placed the case diary, where in it appears that on a

notice being served (at page 10 of the case diary), the owner of the

offending vehicle, Debasri Das Sarkar informed the I/C concerned

(page 20 of the case diary) that the driver of the vehicle was one

Sambhu Kahar (Charge sheeted accused).

6. It also appears from the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC

that the investigation in this case and thereby the charge sheet is in

accordance with law.

7. The main contention of the petitioner/defacto complainant is

that the accused person charge sheeted has been made a

scapegoat (though no such prayer has been made by the charge

sheeted accused himself) and the actual offender has been

shielded and there has been grave injustice caused.

8. The petitioner has reiterated his case in the written notes filed and has

relied upon the following judgments:-

i) Dharam Pal Vs State of Haryana & Ors., Criminal Appeal

No. 85 of 2016 (@SLP (Criminal) No. 6298 of 2015), on

29.01.2016.

ii) Kashmeri Devi Vs Delhi Administration and Anr., AIR

1988 SC 1323.

iii) Ramachandran Vs. R. Udhayakumar and Ors., (2008) 2 C

Cr LR (SC) 365.

9. Keeping in mind the view of the Apex Court in the said judgments

relied upon, and the offences in this case, this court finds the

investigation in the present case has been fair and just, thus giving

rise to no ground for any suspicion/doubt.

10. But the petitioner/defacto complainant is always at liberty to

take recourse to Section 301 and 302 of the CrPC.

11. Both, Sections 301 and 302 Cr.P.C. cover two different situations.

Section 301 envisages a situation where the Public Prosecutor is in

charge of a case and a private person instructs his pleader to

intervene. In such cases, it is the Public Prosecutor under whose

overall conduct and supervision the prosecution is carried on.

However, Section 302 is concerned with a situation, where any person

not being a police officer below the rank of inspector, can prosecute a

case, with the permission of the court, either himself or through his

pleader. This amply signifies that CrPC contemplates a situation where

the whole conduct of the case is with a private person. Thus two

levels of intervention by private persons are envisaged under

CrPC. One is under the supervision and control of the Public

Prosecutor and the other independent of the Prosecutor.

12. In Dhariwal Industries Limited Vs. Kishore Wadhwani and Ors.,

(2016) 10 SCC 378, the Supreme Court held:-

"3. After the charge-sheet was filed, the accused persons filed an application under Section 239 CrPC seeking discharge. At that juncture, the appellant made an oral prayer before the learned Magistrate seeking permission to be heard along with the Assistant Public Prosecutor. The learned Magistrate after hearing the learned counsel for the parties observed that the original complainant is not alien to the proceeding and, therefore, he has a right to be heard even at the stage of framing of charge and, accordingly, granted the permission.

4. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the respondent-accused preferred the criminal writ petition before the High Court. The High Court referred to Section 301 CrPC and certain authorities of this Court and came to hold thus: (Kishore Wadhwani case [Kishore Wadhwani v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 211 : (2012) 5 Mah LJ 252] , SCC OnLine Bom para 16)

"16. Undoubtedly the first informant now enjoys a role higher than earlier as already seen in the preceding paragraphs. In fact perusal of the petition shows that the petitioners also not wish to deny participation of the first informant altogether. They only want his role to be limited as under Section 301 CrPC. An application for discharge can result into putting an end to the prosecution either partly or fully. This stage is in that respect similar to the stage of consideration of the police report by the Magistrate under Section 173(2) CrPC and the proceedings for quashing of the complaint filed by the accused person. The first informant, therefore, is likely to be interested in seeing that the matter reaches the stage of trial and is disposed of after recording of evidence. If by judicial pronouncements, he is now granted hearing at the earlier two stages, he can be granted hearing at the stage of discharge also, though the Criminal Procedure Code does not make provision for hearing to him at that stage. If the first informant appears before the court and desires to participate in the application, opportunity cannot be refused to him. Now the next question would be about the nature of the hearing to be given to the first informant. Should the hearing be independent to the hearing to the Public Prosecutor or it be

through the Public Prosecutor. In my opinion, his role will have to be limited as under Section 301 CrPC for the same reasons, as given in Anthony D'Souza case [Anthony D'Souza v. Radhabai Brij Ratan Mohatta, (1984) 1 Bom CR 157 : 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 257] and keeping in focus the role of the Public Prosecutor. He cannot be allowed to take over the control of prosecution by allowing to address the court directly. ... Therefore, the petition is partly allowed. The impugned order is modified to the extent that the counsel engaged by Respondent 2 shall act under the directions of the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case."

5. Questioning the legal propriety and the approach of the High Court, it is submitted by Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the High Court has gravely erred by placing reliance on Section 301 CrPC and completely ignoring the stipulations inherent in Section 302 CrPC. According to Mr Tulsi, there is a distinction between a trial before a Magistrate and a sessions trial and Section 302 CrPC has exclusive application to a magisterial trial and hence, the complainant can address the Court directly, if permitted by the Court. To strengthen the said submission, he has commended us to the authorities in J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2001) 3 SCC 462 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 547] and Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra [Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 558] .

6. Mr Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel, in his turn, contends that Section 301 CrPC is applicable to all categories of cases and therefore a complainant is entitled to assist the Court under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. That apart, submits Mr Singh, he has the only other liberty to file the written arguments with the permission of the Court. Mr Singh would vehemently urge that the appellant had never sought to conduct the case under Section 302 CrPC and as envisaged, no application in that regard was filed and, therefore, no fault can be found with the order of the High Court. It is his further submission that as the factual matrix

would exposit, the learned Magistrate allowed the prayer on the basis of an oral submission which is one under Section 301 CrPC and, in such a situation, no laxity should be given to him to take the benefit of Section 302 CrPC. Additionally, propones Mr Singh, that there is slight disharmony in the pronouncement in J.K. International [J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2001) 3 SCC 462 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 547] and Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand [Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467 :

1999 SCC (Cri) 1277] which needs to be reconciled.

7. Section 301 CrPC reads as follows:

"301. Appearance by Public Prosecutors.--(1) The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may appear and plead without any written authority before any court in which that case is under inquiry, trial or appeal.

(2) If in any such case any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any court, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and may, with the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case."

8. In Shiv Kumar [Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1277] , the Court has clearly held that the said provision applies to the trials before the Magistrate as well as the Court of Session.

9. Section 302 CrPC which is pertinent for the present case reads as follows:

302. Permission to conduct prosecution.--(1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than police officer below the rank of Inspector; but no person, other than

the Advocate General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such permission:

Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted.

(2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader."

10. In Shiv Kumar [Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1277] interpreting the said provision, the Court has ruled: (SCC pp. 471-72, paras 8-9 & 11-12)

"8. It must be noted that the latter provision is intended only for Magistrate Courts. It enables the Magistrate to permit any person to conduct the prosecution. The only rider is that Magistrate cannot give such permission to a police officer below the rank of Inspector. Such person need not necessarily be a Public Prosecutor.

9. In the Magistrate's Court anybody (except a police officer below the rank of Inspector) can conduct prosecution, if the Magistrate permits him to do so. Once the permission is granted the person concerned can appoint any counsel to conduct the prosecution on his behalf in the Magistrate's Court.

* * *

11. The old Criminal Procedure Code (1898) contained an identical provision in Section 270 thereof. A Public Prosecutor means "any person appointed under Section 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor" [vide Section 2(u) of the Code].

12. In the backdrop of the above provisions we have to understand the purport of Section 301 of the Code. Unlike its succeeding provision in the Code, the application of which is confined to Magistrate Courts, this particular section is applicable to all the courts of criminal jurisdiction. This distinction can be discerned from employment of the words "any court" in Section 301. In view of the provision made in the succeeding section as for Magistrate Courts the insistence contained in Section 301(2) must be understood as applicable to all other courts without any exception. The first sub-section empowers the Public Prosecutor to plead in the court without any written authority, provided he is in charge of the case. The second sub-section, which is sought to be invoked by the appellant, imposes the curb on a counsel engaged by any private party. It limits his role to act in the court during such prosecution "under the directions of the Public Prosecutor". The only other liberty which he can possibly exercise is to submit written arguments after the closure of evidence in the trial, but that too can be done only if the court permits him to do so."

11. It is apt to note here that in the said decision in Shiv Kumar case [Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1277] it has also been held that from the scheme of CrPC, the legislative intention is manifestly clear that prosecution in a Sessions Court cannot be conducted by anyone other than the Public Prosecutor. It is because the legislature reminds the State that the policy must strictly conform to fairness in the trial of an accused in a Sessions Court. The Court has further observed that a Public Prosecutor is not expected to show the thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts involved in the case.

12. In J.K. International [J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2001) 3 SCC 462 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 547] , a three-Judge Bench was adverting in detail to Section 302 CrPC. In that context, it has been opined that (SCC pp. 466- 67, para 12) the private person who is permitted to conduct prosecution in the Magistrate's Court can engage a counsel to do the needful in the court in his behalf. If a private person is

aggrieved by the offence committed against him or against any one in whom he is interested he can approach the Magistrate and seek permission to conduct the prosecution by himself. This Court further proceeded to state that it is open to the court to consider his request and if the court thinks that the cause of justice would be served better by granting such permission the court would generally grant such permission. Clarifying further, it has been held that the said wider amplitude is limited to the Magistrate's Court, as the right of such private individual to participate in the conduct of prosecution in the Sessions Court is very much restricted and is made subject to the control of the Public Prosecutor.

13. Having carefully perused both the decisions, we do not perceive any kind of anomaly either in the analysis or ultimate conclusion arrived at by the Court. We may note with profit that in Shiv Kumar [Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1277] , the Court was dealing with the ambit and sweep of Section 301 CrPC and in that context observed that Section 302 CrPC is intended only for the Magistrate's Court. In J.K. International [J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2001) 3 SCC 462 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 547] from the passage we have quoted hereinbefore it is evident that the Court has expressed the view that a private person can be permitted to conduct the prosecution in the Magistrate's Court and can engage a counsel to do the needful on his behalf. The further observation therein is that when permission is sought to conduct the prosecution by a private person, it is open to the court to consider his request. The Court has proceeded to state that the court has to form an opinion that cause of justice would be best subserved and it is better to grant such permission. And, it would generally grant such permission. Thus, there is no cleavage of opinion.

14. In Sundeep Kumar Bafna [Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 558] the Court was dealing with rejection of an order of bail under Section 439 CrPC and what is meant by "custody". Though the context was different, it is noticeable

that the Court has adverted to the role of Public Prosecutor and private counsel in prosecution and in that regard, has held as follows: (SCC p. 651, para 30)

"30. ... in Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand [Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1277] , the question that was posed before another three- Judge Bench was whether an aggrieved has a right to engage its own counsel to conduct the prosecution despite the presence of the Public Prosecutor. This Court duly noted that the role of the Public Prosecutor was upholding the law and putting together a sound prosecution; and that the presence of a private lawyer would inexorably undermine the fairness and impartiality which must be the hallmark, attribute and distinction of every proper prosecution. In that case the advocate appointed by the aggrieved party ventured to conduct the cross-examination of the witness which was allowed by the trial court but was reversed in revision by the High Court [Hukam Chand v. State of Haryana, 1996 SCC OnLine P&H 1366 : (1997) 115 PLR 406] , and the High Court permitted only the submission of written argument after the closure of evidence. Upholding the view of the High Court, this Court went on to observe that before the Magistrate any person (except a police officer below the rank of Inspector) could conduct the prosecution, but that this laxity is impermissible in the Sessions by virtue of Section 225 CrPC, which pointedly states that the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor."

15. Mr Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel, has drawn inspiration from the aforesaid authority as Shiv Kumar [Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1277] has been referred to in the said judgment and the Court has made a distinction between the role of the Public Prosecutor and the role of a complainant before the two trials, namely, the Sessions trial and the trial before a Magistrate's Court.

16. As the factual score of the case at hand is concerned, it is noticeable that the trial court, on the basis of an oral prayer, had permitted the appellant to be heard along with

the Public Prosecutor. Mr Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel submitted such a prayer was made before the trial Magistrate and he had no grievance at that stage but the grievance has arisen because of the interference of the High Court that he can only participate under the directions of the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case which is postulated under Section 301 CrPC.

17. We have already explained the distinction between Sections 301 and 302 CrPC. The role of the informant or the private party is limited during the prosecution of a case in a Court of Session. The counsel engaged by him is required to act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. As far as Section 302 CrPC is concerned, power is conferred on the Magistrate to grant permission to the complainant to conduct the prosecution independently.

18. We would have proceeded to deal with the relief prayed for by Mr Tulsi but, no application was filed under Section 302 CrPC and, therefore, the prayer was restricted to be heard which is postulated under Section 301 CrPC. Mr Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that an application has to be filed while seeking permission. Bestowing our anxious consideration, we are obliged to think that when a complainant wants to take the benefit as provided under Section 302 CrPC, he has to file a written application making out a case in terms of J.K. International [J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2001) 3 SCC 462 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 547] so that the Magistrate can exercise the jurisdiction as vested in him and form the requisite opinion.

19. Mr Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that he intends to file an application before the learned Magistrate and hence, liberty may be granted. Mr Singh has seriously opposed the same. Regard being had to the rivalised submissions, we only observe that it would be open to the appellant, if so advised, to file an application under Section 302 CrPC before the learned Magistrate. It may be clearly stated here that the said provision applies to every stage including the stage of framing charge inasmuch as the

complainant is permitted by the Magistrate to conduct the prosecution. We have said so to clarify the position of law. If an application in this regard is filed, it shall be dealt with on its own merits. Needless to say, the order passed by the learned Magistrate or that of the High Court will not be an impediment in dealing with the application to be filed under Section 302 CrPC. It is also necessary to add that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the application to be filed."

13. Thus there is no materials before this court to justify a direction

for Re Investigation/further Investigation.

14. CRR No. 3904 of 2014 stands dismissed.

15. The Judgment and order dated 22.01.2014 passed by the Learned

District and Sessions Judge, Uttar Dinajpur at Raiganj in Criminal

Revision No. 17 of 2013 is affirmed.

16. Trial Court to proceed in accordance with law.

17. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.

18. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

19. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary

compliance.

20. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be