Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 3111 Cal/2
Judgement Date : 7 October, 2024
In the High Court at Calcutta
Original Civil Jurisdiction
Commercial Division
The Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
E.C. No.52 of 2024
AB Enterprises
Vs
Union of India
With
AP-COM No.522 of 2024
Union of India, represented by General Manager,
South Eastern Railway
-Vs-
AB Enterprises
For the decree-holder in
EC No.52 of 2024
&
for the respondent in
AP-COM No.522 of 2024 : Ms. Noelle Banerjee, Adv.
Ms. Rashmi Singhee, Adv.
Mr. Dipanjan Dey, Adv.
Ms. Sucheta Mitra, Adv.
For the judgment-debtor
&
for the petitioner in
AP-COM No.522 of 2024: Mr. Mohit Gupta, Adv.
Ms. Sarda Sha, Adv.
Hearing concluded on : 01.10.2024
Judgment on : 07.10.2024
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J:-
1. The present challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, bearing AP-COM No. 522 of 2024, has been
preferred by the South Eastern Railway against an award directing the
petitioner/Railway to reimburse Service Tax to the respondent to the
tune of Rs.49,53,763/- along with interest paid by the respondent to
the Tax Authorities.
2. The short background of the case is that the respondent participated
in a tender floated on April 14, 2015 by the petitioner/Railway for
escorting job of coach attendant for bed-roll distribution for various
trains at Santragachi Coaching Depot for a period of one year. The
respondent participated and came out successful. Accordingly, a
Letter of Award (LoA) was issued to the respondent on June 25, 2015
and consequentially an agreement was executed between the parties
on September 26, 2015. The respondent completed the work and
raised invoices and was paid the dues for such work by the petitioner.
3. On November 17, 2017, a show-cause notice was issued by the Tax
Authorities to the respondent claiming Service Tax on the work done
under the contract, along with interest. The respondent ultimately
paid the dues at a discounted rate under the Sabka Vishwas Legacy
Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2019 and made a demand for such
amount from the petitioner. The petitioner having not acceded to such
claim, the matter was referred to arbitration, the respondent claiming
the entire amount of Service Tax and interest paid thereon.
4. The Arbitral Tribunal granted such claim by its award dated November
28, 2023, against which the present challenge has been preferred by
the Railway.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner/Railway argues that in terms of
Clause 2.2 of the contract, the rates quoted by the tenderer shall
include all incidental charges, inter alia including VAT, Sales Tax,
Excise Duty, Octroi and other taxes and duties, etc.
6. As per the Tax Authorities, the nature of services provided by the
respondent became liable to service tax since July, 2012. However, by
a subsequent Notification dated May 27, 2014, Service Tax was made
inapplicable for work done for the Railways. Such exemption was
again withdrawn by a Notification dated March 1, 2015. The said
Notification was implemented by a further Notification dated May 26,
2015. Thus, as on the date of opening of the bids in the tender-in-
question, Service Tax had been reimposed in respect of works done for
the Railways.
7. It is contended that the Arbitral Tribunal deviated from the contract
between the parties, particularly Clause 2.2 thereof, by directing
Service Tax plus interest to be borne by the petitioner-Railway,
although the rates quoted by the bidders, as per Clause 2.2, were to
include all incidental charges, including taxes and duties. Thus, the
award violated Section 28(3) of the 1996 Act and is accordingly
vitiated by patent illegality, which is a ground of challenge under
Section 34 of the said Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner/Railway
cites State of Chhattisgarh and another v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd., reported
at (2022) 2 SCC 275 in support of such proposition.
8. The respondent has relied on a purported Estimate which is not a part
of the contract between the parties, nor a part of the tender document.
9. Also, there was no correspondence between the parties at any point of
time to cast liability on the Railway to pay Service Tax in the teeth of
Clause 2.2 of the contract.
10. Thus, it is argued that the impugned award directing the
petitioner/Railway to reimburse Service Tax and interest ought to be
set aside on the ground of patent illegality.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent controverts the said arguments of
the petitioner and contends that the Estimate of Costs issued by the
petitioner/Railway itself was the premise of the price for work reflected
in the tender document. The said Estimate did not include Service
Tax as one of the components of the costs to be incurred for the work.
As such, it is argued that the Service Tax component was not included
in Clause 2.2 of the contract.
12. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the
respondent raised bills for Service Tax which were accepted without
demur by the petitioner/Railway, although no payment was made on
such account. It is argued that since the scope of work was
manpower supply, the work does not attract VAT, Sales Tax, Excise
Duty or Octroi as mentioned in Clause 2.2, nor does it involve lifting,
descent, insurance, etc., mentioned as incidental charges in the said
Clause. Thus, the general terms included in Clause 2.2 of the
contract have no applicability to the instant case.
13. It is argued that the Arbitral Tribunal took into consideration the
approximate cost of work as mentioned in the tender, the break-up of
which was to be found in the detailed Estimate annexed to the
Affidavit-in-Opposition of the respondent. The said breakup did not
contain Service Tax. The Arbitral Tribunal further found that Service
Tax was nowhere mentioned in the agreement and could not have
been considered by the petitioner while quoting its price. Learned
counsel argues that even the Railway was not aware about the
potential liability of Service Tax and as such, the inclusion of Service
Tax in the price quoted could not have been contemplated in Clause
2.2 of the contract.
14. Since the Arbitral Tribunal proceeded on a logical basis on the
premise of the materials on record and came to a plausible
conclusion, there is no scope of interference under Section 34 of the
1996 Act.
15. Learned counsel for the respondent cites Associate Builders v. Delhi
Development Authority, reported at (2015) 3 SCC 49 and National
Highways Authority of India v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.,
reported at (2024) 6 SCC 809 for the proposition that the
correspondence exchanged between the parties as well as the material
placed before the Arbitral Tribunal are to be considered for the
purpose of construing the contract. In the present case, the Arbitral
Tribunal rightly considered the estimate and other materials before it
while passing the impugned award.
16. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent next cites UHL Power
Co. Ltd. v. State of Himchal Pradesh, reported at (2022) 4 SCC 116,
where the Supreme Court took the view that the interpretation of the
relevant clauses of the agreement by the Tribunal, if possible or
plausible, could not be interfered with merely because another view
could have been taken.
17. In K. Sugumar v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., reported at (2020)
12 SCC 539, the Supreme Court held that when the parties have
chosen to avail of an alternative mechanism for dispute resolution,
they must be left to reconcile themselves to the wisdom of the decision
of the Arbitrator and the role of the Court should be restricted to the
bare minimum. A Section 34 Court cannot re-appreciate the findings
returned by the Arbitral Tribunal by taking an entirely different view
in respect of the interpretation of the relevant clauses of the
agreement governing the parties.
18. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., reported at
(2019) 20 SCC 1, it was held that if the reasoning provided in the
award is implied, unless the award portrays unpardonable perversity,
the court needs to be cautious in differing from the view taken by the
Tribunal.
19. It is argued that the authorities cannot pick and choose, for which
proposition, learned counsel for the respondent cites Shivappa v. Chief
Engineer and others, reported at 2023 SCC OnLine SC 2027.
20. Thus, it is argued that the tests of Section 34 of the 1996 Act are not
satisfied and the present challenge ought to be dismissed.
21. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Court arrives at the
following conclusions:
22. The pivot of the arguments is Clause 2.2 of the "Instructions to
Tenderers and Terms & Conditions of Tendering" which finds place in
Part I of the tender document, which comprises the contract between
the parties.
23. Clause 2.2 is set out below:
"2.2 UNIT PRICES:
The Rates quoted by the Tenderer and accepted by the purchaser shall hold good till the completion of the work and no additional individual claim will be admissible on account of fluctuation in market rates etc. The rate quoted by the Tenderer shall include all incidental charges like, freight transport, loading/unloading handling of material, lifting, descent, insurance overage of Bankers charges, Indemnity Bond, VAT, Sale Tax, Excise Duty, Octroi and other taxes and duties etc. Tenderer should carefully read as clearly explained in the explanatory schedule."
24. Certain relevant dates are also to be taken note of while adjudicating
the issues at hand.
25. The tender was floated on April 14, 2015 and the bids were opened on
May 27, 2015. LoA was issued to the respondent on June 25, 2015,
pursuant to which an agreement was entered into between the parties
on September 26, 2015.
26. Insofar as the applicability of Service Tax to work done for the
Railways is concerned, a Notification dated May 27, 2014 made
Service Tax inapplicable to Railway works. Such exemption was,
however, withdrawn by a subsequent Notification dated March 1,
2015 with effect from April 1, 2015, by which the Railways were made
liable to pay 100 per cent of Service Tax. However, the said
Notification was implemented only by a further Notification of May 26,
2015.
27. Thus, Service Tax was again made applicable to work done for the
Railways on May 26, 2015, with effect from April 1, 2015.
28. In respect of the tender-in-question, the bids were opened on May 27,
2015, the day after the implementation of the Notification for Service
Tax was published. The LoA was issued in favour of the respondent a
month thereafter on June 25, 2015 and the agreement was entered
into between the parties in pursuance thereof after three months on
September 26, 2015. Hence, as on the date of issuance of the LoA
and the subsequent agreement, the parties ought to have been aware
of applicability of Service Tax to Railway works.
29. Thus, the respondent was well aware that Service Tax was payable in
respect of the work to be done by it for the Railway under the contract
when the respondent took up the LoA and entered into the agreement,
incorporating the tender clauses and the associated terms and
conditions, with its eyes wide open.
30. Clause 2.2 does not restrict itself only to the taxes and duties
mentioned therein such as VAT, Sales Tax, Excise Duty and Octroi
but also supplements the same with the expression "and other taxes
and duties, etc.", thus, covering all other taxes and duties even apart
from those specifically mentioned in the said clause. Since on the
date of the contract between the parties Service Tax was already
payable for Railway works, the expression "and other taxes and
duties, etc." included Service Tax.
31. Clause 2.2 of the contract is unambiguous on such score. Hence, no
external aid of any other document is required for interpreting the
said clause.
32. An internal Estimate of the petitioner-Railway was relied on by the
Arbitral Tribunal for interpreting Clause 2.2 of the contract. However,
such approach was patently perverse for three reasons.
33. First, the Estimate was dated March 27, 2015, that is, much prior to
the LoA being issued to the respondent. As on the date of the
Estimate, Service Tax was not made applicable to Railway works.
Thus, there cannot arise any question of the Estimate including the
Service Tax component.
34. Secondly, and more importantly, the Estimate was merely a wage
calculation, which is self-evident, and no tax component was
incorporated in it. The Estimate was only for the purpose of
calculation by the Railway Authorities themselves in order to arrive at
a rough estimated cost of the work for the purpose of issuing the
tender. Neither was the Estimate communicated to the respondent,
nor was it incorporated in any manner either in the tender or the
contract itself or referred to any subsequent correspondence between
the parties.
35. The bidders were to raise quotations by taking into account not only
the Estimate of the Railway, which was its own internal document
and restricted to the wages payable for the work, or the cost of work
mentioned in the tender, but also taking into account estimated taxes
and/or duties or other similar liabilities which they would have to
incur in order to do the work. The bidders took a calculated
commercial risk and it was their prerogative to raise their quotations
in such a manner so as to cover probable expenses on account of
taxes and duties and nothing compelled the bidders to restrict the
quotation only to the estimated amount. Since the applicability of
Service Tax was already public knowledge prior to the agreement
being entered into part by the parties, nothing prevented the
respondent from seeking clarification or recusing from the work if it
had any objection to paying Service Taxes.
36. Thirdly, when the Estimate was drawn up on March 27, 2015, it was
never the intention of the Railway Authorities to include any
component of tax therein. It was merely a working basis for
calculating the rough Estimate of the wages payable to the workmen
by the contractors.
37. Hence, the Estimate was not a reflection, nor was it intended to be so,
of the actual prices to be quoted by the bidders. The Estimate was, as
it suggests, merely a calculation of the probable wages payable to the
workmen in terms of the Minimum Wages Act. It was entirely for the
bidders to take into account the probable tax components to arrive at
their respect quotation of rates. Hence, the Estimate was a perverse
basis for interpreting the contract, since it had no connection
whatsoever with the contract nor was it a part of the contract.
38. Taking resort to such external aid where there was no ambiguity
whatsoever in Clause 2.2 is in itself a patent illegality which vitiates
the impugned award.
39. It is an entrenched principle of Indian law that the courts cannot
rewrite a contract between the parties. The said concept is an integral
part of the fundamental policy of Indian law. Violating the same
tantamounts to contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law and being in conflict with the most basic notions of justice. Hence,
such contravention affords a ground under Section 34(2)(b)(ii),
including its Explanations.
40. Section 28(3) of the 1996 Act provides that while deciding and making
an award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall, in all cases, take into account
the terms of the contract and trade usages applicable to the
transaction. Since the terms of the contract between the parties in the
present case were unambiguous, contravention of the same by the
Arbitral Tribunal tantamounts to a patent illegality within the
contemplation of Section 34(2-A) of the 1996 Act, as reiterated in the
State of Chhattisgarh (supra).
41. Insofar as the statutory payability of Service Tax is concerned, the
impact and incidence of such tax is segregated by the statute itself,
which impels the renderer of the service at the first instance to make
the payment which may be ultimately realizable from the recipient of
the service. If the impact and incidence of Service Tax were
simultaneous, it might still have been argued by the respondent that
the parties could not retract from a statutory liability by agreement
between themselves. However, the statute merely imposes Service Tax.
The payability, being divided into two components, impact on one
entity an incidence on another, the impact and incidence can be
segregated and one of the components may very well be waived by the
parties. Hence, Clause 2.2, insofar as its applicability to incidence of
Service Tax is concerned, does not tantamount to Estoppel against the
law.
42. Learned counsel for the respondent places reliance on Associate
Builders (supra) and National Highways Authority of India (supra) to
argue that the Arbitral Tribunal could very well have considered
materials on record and correspondence between the parties to
interpret the clauses of the contract. However, a judgment carries a
ratio in the context of its facts and cannot be blindly applied to all and
sundry cases. It is equally well-settled that when the terms of a
contract are unambiguous, no external aid need be resorted to for the
purpose of interpretation of the same. In the present case, the
expression "and other taxes and duties etc." in Clause 2.2, without
any iota of ambiguity and doubt, mandates that the rate quoted by the
tenderer has to include all taxes and duties and the like applicable to
the works under the contract. Therefore, there is no scope of taking
aid of any further document to interpret the same.
43. Also, the Estimate, which was relied on by the Arbitral Tribunal to
interpret the clause, is neither a part of the contract nor an agreement
between the parties but, as discussed above, is an internal document
of the petitioner/Railway for arriving at the estimated bare price of the
work. Furthermore, the estimate deals only with the wages of the
workmen in terms of the Minimum Wages Act and does not constitute
the rates to be quoted by the individual bidders. The estimate merely
provided the minimum rates, since if rates were quoted below the
same, it would imply that the workmen would be deprived of their
legitimate dues under the Minimum Wages Act. It was for the bidders
to take into account such minimum price and add to it their own
estimates of taxes payable, in the light of Clause 2.2 which mandates
that the rates must include all taxes and duties etc. which are
applicable to the work done under the tender. Hence, the reliance by
the Arbitral Tribunal on the Estimate to interpret Clause 2.2 was
patently perverse and illegal, vitiating the impugned award itself.
44. Insofar as the ratio UHL Power Company (supra) is concerned, the
reliance on the Estimate to cast duty on the Railway for payment of
Service Tax is palpably de hors the contract between the parties and
thus is a perverse view which is not "possible or plausible" from any
reasonable perspective.
45. Even going by the tests of interference laid down in K. Sugumar
(supra), the impugned award is vitiated on at least two counts
contemplated in Section 34 - violation of the fundamental policy of
Indian law and basic notions of justice as well as patent illegality,
which are contemplated respectively in sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of
Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
46. There is no question of the authorities picking and choosing, since
Clause 2.2 is universal in its application to all prospective bidders in
the tender. As such, the reliance on Shivappa (supra) by the
respondent is entirely misplaced.
47. Thus, in view of the above discussions, the Arbitral Tribunal acted
with patent illegality and against the fundamental policy of Indian law
and basic notions of justice in awarding reimbursement of Service Tax
along with interest to the respondent by the petitioner/Railway.
48. Accordingly, AP Com No. 522 of 2024 is allowed, thereby setting aside
the impugned award dated November 25, 2023.
49. As a necessary corollary to the award being set aside, nothing remains
to be executed. Thus, E.C. No. 52 of 2024 is hereby dismissed.
50. There will be no order as to costs.
51. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties
upon compliance of due formalities.
( Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. )
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