Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 2444 Cal/2
Judgement Date : 1 September, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction
ORIGINAL SIDE
(Commercial Division)
Present :
Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya.
A.P. 387 of 2023
SREI Equipment Finance Limited
vs
Avarsekar Realty Private Limited
For the petitioner : Mr. Jishnu Saha, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Reetobrata Mitra, Adv.
Mr. Aditya Kanodia, Adv.
Mr. Sourajit Dasgupta, Adv.
Mr. Nilkanta Basak, Adv.
For the respondent : Mr. Krishnaraj Thaker, Adv.
Ms. Aasia Hasan, Adv.
Ms. Anjana Banerjee, Adv.
Ms. Swagata Roy, Adv.
Last heard on : 28.08.2023
Delivered on : 01.09.2023.
2
Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.
1. The petitioner seeks an order of injunction on the respondent
from dealing with or taking any step in creating any interest over 13
flats together with 13 car parking spaces with each flat and an
additional 66 car parking spaces and undivided proportionate share of a
piece of land measuring 3337.34 square meters in the building
proposed to be constructed by the respondent. The petitioner has
sought for the aforesaid and other orders by way of the present
application filed under section 9 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996.
2. The petitioner is presently under an Administrator appointed by
the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) exercising powers similar to
that of a Resolution Professional under the provisions of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The petitioner had granted a loan of Rs.
200 crores to the respondent on easy terms. The respondent defaulted
in its repayment obligations. The present application arises out of the
loan agreement executed between the parties on 15th December, 2017
along with a supplementary agreement of 31st December, 2019. The
respondent was under an obligation to repay the loan in 36 instalments
but was granted a moratorium during the pandemic. The loan was
therefore rescheduled and the respondent was to finally repay the loan
by 15th May, 2021.
3. The petitioner says that the respondent's default led the petitioner
to issue a Notice dated 7th November, 2022 calling upon the respondent
to make payment of the outstanding amount. The petitioner thereafter
terminated the agreement on 14th March, 2023. The petitioner claims
that the respondent is indebted to the petitioner for a total sum of Rs.
4,94,97,40,898.76/-.
4. According to learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the
respondent has already dealt with part of the 13 flats owing to failure in
completion of the Project. Counsel submits that one of the 13 flats has
already been attached in execution of an order passed by the
Maharashtra Real Estate Regulation Authority (MAHRERA). Counsel
also relies on the restraint orders passed by the Bombay High Court on
the respondent's failure to comply with its directions.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the
security interest claimed by the petitioner is in the form of mortgage of
the flats and car parking space and that the present application is for
protection of the petitioner's rights as mortgagee of the flats and car
parking spaces. Counsel relies on the pleadings in the application to
urge that the petitioner has sought for interim protection for the
security interest in respect of the flats and car parking spaces and relies
on the Supreme Court decision in Booz Allen and Hamilton INC. v. SBI
Home Finance Limited; (2011) 5 SCC 532 to say that a suit for
enforcement of a mortgage should be decided by a Court and not by an
arbitral tribunal. It is also submitted that the power to grant interim
relief by way of an injunction is conferred in aid of the final relief; hence
if the final relief cannot be granted, temporary relief in the same terms
cannot also be granted. Counsel submits that any reliefs arising out of a
document of mortgage or mortgage agreement would have to be decided
by a Court of law and not by the arbitral tribunal.
6. The dispute in the present application relates to the Supreme
Court decision in Booz Allen and Hamilton INC. v. SBI Home Finance
Limited; (2011) 5 SCC 532, wherein it was held that a mortgage is a
transfer of a right in rem and the suit for sale of the mortgage property is
an action in rem for enforcement of the right. Hence, a suit for
enforcement of a mortgage being enforcement of right in rem will have to
be decided by a Court of law and not by an arbitral tribunal. In any
event, the view of the Supreme Court in paragraph 46 of the Report in
Booz Allen was on a suit for enforcement of a mortgage which is
inherently and procedurally different from the nature of the present
application.
7. The question to be decided is whether the petitioner is seeking to
enforce any mortgage in the present application. The application does
not disclose any such pleadings or prayers. The words used in the
application are to the effect that the petitioner would lose security
interest over the assets as the respondent is indebted to several other
creditors and is unable to pay its dues. The only prayer is for a restraint
on the respondent from dealing with or creating any interest over the 13
flats together with car parking spaces and other car parking spaces as
specified in prayer (a) of the application.
8. Moreover, the argument of the respondent that the Court is
denuded of its power to grant interim relief since no final relief can be
granted as the dispute is non-arbitrable cannot be accepted. This is by
reason of the fact that the petitioner has not filed its statement of claim
since arbitration is yet to commence. Therefore, it would be
presumptuous and speculative for the respondent to assume that the
petitioner would make a claim for enforcement of the mortgage in the
arbitration. The respondent's reliance on Cotton Corporation of India
Limited v. United Industrial Bank Limited; (1983) 4 SCC 625 is hence
misplaced in this regard.
9. There is also no evidence on record to show that the petitioner is
seeking enforcement of any mortgage. The respondent therefore cannot
resist the reliefs on a pre-supposition of the petitioner's claim in the
arbitration. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Aditya Birla
Finance Limited v. Carnet Elias Fernandes; 2015 (6) ARBLR 293 (Bom) on
the other hand assists the petitioner in the facts of the present case. The
Bombay High Court reiterated the power of a Court in a section 9
application to grant interim measures even where the property is not the
subject matter of the dispute in arbitration. It was further held that
interim measures can be granted under section 9 even if the petitioner
gives up its claim for enforcement of mortgage properties.
10. It is undisputed that the respondent is indebted to the petitioner
for a substantial amount of money in terms of the loan agreement and
the supplementary agreement; the former containing an arbitration
clause. It is also undisputed that the respondents created a charge on
the 13 flats together with 13 car parking spaces bundled with each flat
and an additional 66 car parking spaces and undivided proportionate
share of the land measuring 3337.34 square meters in the building. The
respondent also hypothecated its receivables to the petitioner. Both the
document of charge as well as the deed of hypothecation dated 31st
March, 2020 are a part of the records. Several restraining orders passed
by the Bombay High Court against the respondent for its defaults are
also part of records. The statement of accounts which is part of the
proceedings also shows a total sum of Rs. 4,94,97,898.76/- due and
owing from the respondents to the petitioner.
11. These facts alone would persuade this Court to agree with the
petitioner's contention that the respondent is in continuing breach of
the petitioner's rights arising out of the loan agreement. The
encumbrance of the respondent's properties is in continuation of that
breach. The hypothecation and charge are undisputed and the
petitioner's rights are therefore required to be protected.
12. Section 9(1) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, confers
almost unlimited powers on a Court to grant interim measures prior to,
pending or even after passing of the award but before its execution.
Section 9(1)(ii)(a) specifies that a party to a arbitration agreement can
apply to a Court for preservation of the subject matter of the arbitration
agreement or to secure the amount disputed in the arbitration
[section9(1)(ii)(b)]. Section 9(1)(ii)(d) permits interim injunction or
appointment of a receiver. The Court is also empowered to grant any
other interim measures of protection as it considers just under section
9(1)(ii)(e).
13. Section 9(1) contemplates interim measures of protection to a
party who approaches the Court for urgent relief or on an apprehension
that the subject matter of the dispute in the arbitration may be disposed
of even before the arbitration commences. Section 9(1) is simply a stop-
gap measure before the arbitration starts and the parties can have a
forum to have the remaining of their disputes adjudicated. Section 9(2)
therefore mandates that arbitration proceedings shall be commenced
within 90 days from the date of an interim measure of protection under
section 9(1) or within such further time as the Court may determine.
14. There is sufficient evidence that the petitioner's right on the
hypothecated and charged assets which is also the collateral for the loan
advanced to the respondent is at risk. The restraining orders on the
respondent by the Bombay High Court and other statutory authorities
have already been acted upon and there is hence every chance that the
petitioner's security may further be put at risk.
15. Having considered the relevant facts and the law on the subject,
this Court is of the view that the petitioner is entitled to an order of
injunction restraining the respondent from dealing with any further or
creating any interest over 13 flats/units together with 13 car parking
spaces bundled with each flats/units and an additional 66 car parking
spaces and undivided proportionate share of the land measuring
3337.34 square meters in the building to be constructed by the
respondent.
16. Mr. Rajratna Sen of the Bar Library Club is appointed as the
Receiver to take symbolic possession of the aforesaid properties either
by himself or through an agent as may be practicable. The remuneration
of Rs. 2 lakhs of the learned Receiver shall be borne by the petitioner
together with all his travel, accomodation and other expenses. The
petitioner shall also make payment and other arrangements for the
agent if appointed by the learned Receiver in the event the Receiver
seeks to act through an agent.
17. Since the parties have been heard at length, nothing further
remains to be decided in the application. Needless to say, the parties
shall act in terms of the mandate of section 9(2) of the Act and the time
frame envisaged therein.
18. AP 387 of 2023 is accordingly allowed and disposed of in terms of
this judgment.
Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for,
be supplied to the parties upon fulfillment of requisite formalities.
(Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.)
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