Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 33 Cal
Judgement Date : 3 January, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay
C.R.A No.720 of 2012
Basudeb Das & Anr.
Vs.
State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Appellants : Mr. Arnab Chatterjee,
: Ms. Dhanasree Biswas.
For the State : Mr. Pravas Bhattacharya,
: Ms. Ayantika Bose.
Hearing concluded on : 16/11/2022
Judgment on : 03/01/2023
Rai Chattopadhya,J.
(1) Appellants are the son and his mother respectively who are
convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment by the Trial
Court for the offence under sections 498A and 306 of the Indian
Penal Code. The appellants are aggrieved with the judgment
and order of the Trial Court dated 27th September 2012 and
28th September 2012 respectively and they challenge the said
judgment in this appeal.
(2) Appellants faced trial in Sessions Trial No. 3(11) of 2004 arising
out of Sessions Case No. 27(6) of 2004. The unfortunate
suicidal death of the wife of the Appellant No.1 prompted
initiation of the criminal case against both the appellants. The
death occurred on 1st January 2000. FIR was lodged on 2nd
January 2000 by the mother of the deceased. The complainant
narrated in the FIR that her daughter Shila Mullick was
married to the appellant No.1 on 1st May 1999. That the
marriage was never a happy one. Her daughter has always been
subjected to mental and physical cruelty and torture
perpetrated by the appellant No.1. She was subjected to
physical assault. Dowry was provided to the appellant No 1 and
his family as per their demand, comprising of cash and gold
ornaments, though however the appellants were not satisfied
with that. The victim during her lifetime and in her matrimonial
life was constantly pressurized to bring more money from her
paternal house. 20 days before her death an amount of
Rs.10,000/- was provided by the complainant to the appellant
and his family on their demand. In spite of every endeavor
made by the complainant to satisfy the demand of the appellant
and his family, they did not seize torturing the victim. The
complainant has stated that due to such continuous and
incessant mental torture and physical assault perpetrated by
the appellant No.1, the victim was forced to commit suicide by
taking poison.
(3) On the basis of the FIR as mentioned above, a police case was
registered being Bagda Police Station Case No. 4/2000 dated
2.1.2000, under sections 498A and 306 IPC. Investigation was
done and the same ultimately culminated into filing of charge
sheet by police against both the appellants under the afore
stated provisions of law. Case was committed to the Sessions
Judge by the Magistrate and upon framing of charge on 24th
November 2004, the trial commenced. Charges were framed
against both the appellants under sections 498A IPC and 304B
alternatively 306 IPC.
(4) In trial, the Prosecution cited 15 witnesses. Witnesses may be
categorized as mentioned here in bellow:
Witnesses No. 1 & 6 Relations of the victim, including the complainant mother.
Witness No. 13 Relation of the appellants.
Witnesses No. 3 and 5 Police personnel.
Witnesses No. 4, 7, 8 to 12, 14 Neighbours and co villagers (Nos. 8 and 15 and 9 were declared as hostile)
(5) Documents and signatures exhibited in trial court may be
categorized as here in bellow :
Exhibit 1/1 Written Complaint.
Exhibit 2/1 Carbon copy of dead body challan.
Exhibit 3 Inquest Report.
Exhibits 1, 2 and 4 Signatures of the complainant in the
FIR (Ext-1), of the constable on
dead body challan (Ext-2) and
of the witness in seizure list
(Ext-4), respectively.
(6) The Trial Court scrutinized the evidence on record, examined
the appellants under section 313 Cr.P.C and ultimately has
come to the finding that the prosecution in this trial has been
able to prove the charges against both the appellants under
sections 498A and 306 IPC. Upon such finding the Trial Court
has convicted the present appellants and sentenced them to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of
Rs.4000/-. It was also stipulated that in default of payment of
fine they would undergo a further period of six months of
rigorous imprisonment.
(7) Being aggrieved with the said judgment and order of conviction
and sentence passed by the Trial Court, the appellants are now
before this court, to challenge the same in this appeal.
(8) Mr. Arnab Chatterjee, who is defending the appellants in this
appeal has taken up the first point for his clients that non
examination of the vital witnesses like the autopsy surgeon or
the investigating officer would be fatal for the prosecution case.
Prosecution did not cite those witnesses in this trial therefore
depriving the appellants of their vital right to cross examine
those witnesses. According to him this ground alone would
render the trial vitiated. He submits that the trial court has
erred and failed to appreciate this point.
(9) He has further pointed out to the fact that materials and
witnesses in this case have not indicated about any
involvement of the appellant No 2. He has referred to the FIR
and also to the relevant portion of the disposition of the
witnesses, which shall be discussed later, to submit that
allegations if any are only directed against the appellant No.1
husband and not against the other appellant. According to him
while delivering judgment the trial court has also failed to
notice this fact.
(10) He has also disputed the findings of the trial court regarding
involvement of the appellant No.1 husband by referring to
certain documents exhibited in trial and submitting on the
basis of the same that the mala fide or culpable intention of the
husband is absent in this case. He submits that according to
the records exhibited by the prosecution in this case the
husband all alone attended the victim after her death, which
would have been otherwise, had the husband any culpability in
his mind and had he been actually involved in the offence
alleged against him to have been committed by him. According
to him non consideration of such a fact is also an error on part
of the Trial Court.
(11) He further says that the Trial Court misled itself in considering
the evidence on record in its proper perspective. He says that
the co-villagers who have been cited by the prosecution as the
independent witnesses have turned to be hostile during trial.
He also says that the relations of the victim who have been
cited as witnesses are interested witnesses and no credibility
should have been attributed to their versions. The appellants
have made out a case that by relying on the disposition of the
interested witnesses the Trial Court has committed error and
ultimately reached to a wrong finding as regards the guilt of the
accused persons.
(12) While arguing the case for the appellants Mr. Arnab Chatterjee
has relied on the following judgments :
(13) Gurcharan Singh vs State of Punjab reported in (2020) 10 Supreme
Court Cases 200 on the proposition and as held by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in that case " As in all crimes, mens rea has to be
established. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under
section 107 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime
must be visible, to determine the culpability. In order to prove
mens rea, there has to be something on record to establish or
show that the appellant here in had a guilty mind and in
furtherance of that state of mind, abetted the suicide of the
deceased. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be
ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous."
(14) Sujit Biswas vs State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 Supreme Court
Cases 406 on the proposition that the circumstances which are
not put to the accused in his examination under section 313
CrPC, cannot be used against him.
(15) Mr. Chatterjee has also made out an alternative argument that
so far as the appellant No. 2 is concerned, keeping in mind her
matured age, the Court can take a lenient view in her case. On
this point he has relied on the following judgment :
Meera vs. State reported in (2022) 3 Supreme Court Cases 93.
(16) Appellants have prayed that the impugned judgment and order
of sentence may be set aside.
(17) Mr. Pravas Bhattacharya along with Ms. Ayantika Bose, on
behalf of the State has however strongly resisted these
arguments and submissions by the appellants. According to
him evidence of the witnesses are unblemished and sacrosanct.
Those are sufficient to infer guilt of the accused persons of the
said offences, which the trial court has rightly determined and
has held them convicted. He urges that no interference of this
Appeal Court would be warranted as to the said impugned
judgment and order of sentence. State has prayed that the
appeal may be dismissed.
(18) Penalty has been provided under section 306 IPC for a person
whoever abets commission of suicide by any other person.
'Abetment of a thing' is provided under section 107 IPC which
reads as follows :
"A person abets the doing of a thing, who--
First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.-- .....................
Illustration ...........................
Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
(19) In the judgment of Gurcharan Singh, as referred to on behalf of
the appellants and mentioned above, the Hon'ble Apex Court
was adjudicating an appeal involving offence under section 306
IPC. In doing so the Court laid down as to what would be the
ingredients of offence under section 306 IPC. The Court held :
"15. As in all crimes, mens rea has to be established. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Section 107 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. In order to prove mens rea, there has to be something on record to establish or show that the appellant herein had a guilty mind and in furtherance of that state of mind, abetted the suicide of the deceased. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. However, what transpires in the present matter is that both the trial court as well as the High Court never examined whether the appellant had the mens rea for the crime he is held to have committed. The conviction of the appellant by the trial court as well as the High Court on the theory that the woman with two young kids might have committed suicide possibly because of the harassment faced by her in the matrimonial house is not at all borne out by the evidence in the case. Testimonies of the PWs do not show that the wife was unhappy because of the appellant and she was forced to take such a step on his account."
(20) In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to two
other judgments, which may profitably be relied on in this case
too.
(21) In the case of S.S.Cheena vs Vijay Kumar Mahajan reported in
(2010) 12 SCC 190, the Hon'ble Court held :
"25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide."
(22) The other case is of Amalendu Pal vs. State of West Bengal
reported in (2010) 1 SCC 707, where the Hon'ble Court held that :
"12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable."
(23) There are a plethora of judgments by the Apex Court and
different High Courts of the country, delineating principles of
law to be followed in these kind of cases and the judgments
mentioned above encompass those principles.
(24) Abetment of suicide would be doing certain act or playing an
active role by instigating that is to say, facilitating or pushing
forward the other person to commit suicide. As held and
discussed above, the state of mind of the offender to instigate
the other person to do that particular act is the precondition
upon which finding of guilt of the accused person should be
based. Object of the guilty should be to make the other person
commit suicide. A conscious effort on his part with the definite
intention to make the other person to do a particular act would
determine if the person has abated doing that act. Not only the
allegations of harassment or torture would suffice to bring
home the charges against the accused person in such a case
unless direct or indirect acts of incitement by him to the
commission of suicide can be proved. It is required to be
surfaced by the evidence that the victim was left with no other
alternative than to put an end to her life. A clear and definite
mens rea and also an overt positive action that too proximate to
the time of occurrence would constitute an offence under
section 306 IPC.
(25) Section 498A IPC was added in the statute by Act 46 of 1983,
with the view to punish the husband and his relatives who
harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to
satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. Subjecting the wife to
cruelty by the husband or his relatives would be the
constituent ingredients for an offence under the afore stated
provision of law. What the word cruelty occurring in the said
section shall mean, has been enumerated under the
'Explanation' appended to the said section, which is as below :
"Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "cruelty means"--
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."
(26) Now, in this appeal this court shall consider first as to whether
the prosecution has been able to prove by evidence, the
aforestated necessary ingredients, to prove the offence with
which the appellants have been charged in this trial. Secondly,
whether non examination of the autopsy surgeon and the
investigating officer in the trial should be fatal to the
prosecution case or not. Next is whether the trial court is right
and proper in finding guilt of the appellants in the impugned
judgment. And finally, whether the impugned judgment shall be
set aside as prayed for by the appellants or shall it be upheld
being just and proper.
(27) PW 1 and 6 are the complainant/mother of the deceased and
her other relation respectively. Upon scrutinising their
evidence, the following facts emerge. PW. 1/mother, namely
Bina, says that after marriage, Shila went to her matrimonial
house for leading a conjugal life with the appellant No. 1 but
could not live peacefully there. She was subjected to ill
treatment and torture by her in-laws. She was not maintained
properly, was deprived of proper and regular food and was
subjected to physical torture. There are incidents of driving her
out from her matrimonial house too. There was a constant
demand by the in-laws for more dowry as, that provided at the
time of marriage was not satisfactory. PW.1 says that such an
information was first transmitted to her by a friend of her son-
in-law Shambhu, i.e, PW.6 in this trial. The said friend is not
named by the witness. The said friend advised to provide more
dowry to Shila's in-laws for the sake of her peaceful living in her
matrimonial house. Later on this witness says to have gathered
information of torture made by her in-laws upon her, from the
deceased herself. Shila informed regarding threat to her life
unless dowry demands of the appellants are fulfilled. Witness
says that her deceased daughter also suggested sometimes that
in case something untoward would happen to her, the present
appellants should not be let scot free. PW.1 has deposed about
informing the entire matter to the local Gram Panchayat and
commissioning of a meeting by the Panchayat over the issue of
dowry demand. Following the meeting, a sum of Rs.10,000/-
was remitted to the appellants by the parents of Shila. On 1
January, 2000, the witness was informed by her sister's son-in-
law about Shila's hospitalisation in a serious condition. She
went to the hospital along with PW.6 and found Shila's dead
body lying there unattended. On the next day FIR was lodged.
PW.6 scribed the same as per PW.1's instructions. PW.1 signed
the FIR and identified her signature on FIR (her signature on
FIR was marked as Exhibit-1).
(28) PW.6 is the husband of PW.1's other daughter and deceased
Shila's sister. His name is Shambhu. He corroborated evidence
of PW.1 regarding marriage of the deceased, payment of dowry
at the time of her marriage and perpetration of mental torture
and physical assault inflicted on the deceased by the appellants
on demand of more dowry. He says that he derived such
information from Shila herself at the time of her visit at
paternal home. Regarding payment of money about 20 days
prior to the death of Shila, this witness state that Shila
procured the same from her paternal house to be given to the
appellants for the purpose of banana plantation. He elaborates
that he had discussions with his parents-in-law, that is, the
parents of Shila, regarding handing over money to Shila for
agricultural purposes of the appellants. He was informed by his
father-in-law, that is, father of Shila of the fact of giving the
money to her. He further says that Shila's father had sold some
trees to collect Rs. 10,000/- as consideration which Shila's
mother went to give to the appellants at Shila's matrimonial
house, being accompanied by Shila. He also deposed that Shila
committed suicide being physically and mentally tortured by
the appellants. His further evidence is corroboration of that of
the PW.1, regarding date of death, his visit with PW.1 to the
hospital after receipt of information, finding the dead body,
talking to doctor, lodging FIR on the following day, his scribing
the FIR as per instruction of PW.1 etc. (FIR was marked as
Exhibit-1/1).
(29) It is pertinent to note that this witness has not deposed in his
examination in chief regarding any conciliation meeting to be
held at the behest of Gram Panchayat between the parties on
the issue of demand of dowry.
(30) PW.13 namely Reeta is the sister and daughter respectively of
the two appellants, sister-in-law of the deceased and a seizure
witness. She has brought in a different set of facts in her
evidence. She says, frequent visit of the husband of Shila's
sister to her matrimonial house made the appellants to raise
objections as to the same. The appellants did not like his visit
to Shila once or twice every week and resisted that. This
witness has stated that a Panchayat meeting was held
concerning this matter. She concedes to have witnessed seizure
of poison oil container by police from the room of the deceased
and having signed in the seizure list. She has identified her
signature on the seizure list. (Signature of this witness on the
seizure list has been marked as Exhibit-4 though objected to-
by the defence side). This witness has not corroborated
evidence of the previous two witnesses, PW.1 and PW.6
regarding infliction of any physical or mental torture by the
appellants to the deceased on demand of any dowry. This
witness has also not confirmed regarding transaction of any
dowry/money either at the time of marriage or at any later
stage, as claimed by PW.1 or PW.6 earlier.
(31) Therefore it appears that substantive evidence of these three
witnesses being relatives of the deceased and the appellants
including her mother are full of contradictions on the points
whether at all the deceased was subjected to any physical or
mental cruelty before her death by the appellants, as to
whether any village panchayat meeting was held at all, if so
whether it was to conciliate the issue of demand of dowry as
alleged or to resolve the issue of frequent visit of the sister's
husband of the deceased to her matrimonial home which was
resisted by the appellants. There are differences and
discrepancy in deposition of PW2.1 and 6, concerning payment
of Rs.10000/- whereas PW.13 has not at all asserted any such
fact.
(32) PW 2 is a resident of the village where the complainant resides.
He is a barber by profession and performed rituals at the time
of marriage of the deceased with the appellant No.1. Whatever
minor additions he has made to the prosecution case, can be
discarded being hearsay evidence. PW 4 is also a resident of
complainant's village. He was the priest of the marriage
between the deceased and the appellant No.1. His information
as regards the deceased being subjected to physical and mental
torture by the members of his matrimonial house was derived
from the parents of the deceased. Thus the same can also be
discarded to be accredited in any way in this trial being hearsay
evidence.
(33) PW 7, namely Kartick, is the co-villager of the appellants who
negotiated for the marriage to happen. This witness was known
to the parents of the deceased also. By profession this witness
is a businessman supplying spraying machines to be used in
cultivation. He has deposed about Shila's marriage with the
appellant No.1, her leading conjugal life with him after such
marriage and her suicidal death on 1st January, 2000, by
consuming poison. He has deposed that as a neighbour living
nearby, he was informed by the deceased during her lifetime
about marital discord between her and the appellant No.1 over
the issue of demand of more dowry. He deposes about getting
information from the parents of the deceased also. He deposes
that the appellants were no more desirous to allow Shila to live
in their house. This witness has corroborated PW.1 regarding
the fact of occurrence of a village conciliation meeting over the
issue of demand of dowry and inflation of torture upon the
deceased by the appellants. He affirms to have attended the
said meeting where he says that the appellants undertook to
treat the deceased properly in her matrimonial home. However
unlike PW.1, this witness has not stated about settlement in
the said village conciliation meeting regarding payment of Rs.
10000/- by the parents of the deceased to the appellants.
Instead he has deposed that after the said meeting a fresh
demand of Rs. 10000/- was again raised by the appellants and
procured the sum from the parents of the deceased, indicating
thereby that the appellants had diverted from the terms of
settlement made at the village conciliation meeting. He asserts
to have derived this information from the deceased. This
witness have stated against appellant No. 2 to have disallowed
the deceased to cohabit with appellant No.1, her husband and
also to have threatened her to be thrown out from her
matrimonial home for the sake of second marriage of the
appellant No.1. This witness has categorically asserted that the
deceased was subjected to gradually increasing torture by the
appellants on demand of more dowry and such torture
including physical assault has compelled her to commit suicide
by consuming poison.
(34) PW. 10 is also a neighbourhood resident of the appellants. He
has disposed about death of the deceased due to consumption
of poison and he along with others to have taken her to the
hospital. He denied any knowledge about the family life of the
deceased or as to why the deceased consumed poison. So did
PW. 11 and 12, who are also residents of the village where the
appellants live.
(35) PW 14 a neighbouring villager of the appellants, has deposed
about her knowledge of the trouble, dispute and differences in
the matrimonial life of the deceased and the appellant No. 1.
She has deposed the dispute was with regard to the frequent
visits of husband of the sister of the deceased to her
matrimonial home. However the witness has conceded that she
deposed in the court for the first time and was never
interrogated by police during investigation. In her case, this
assertion of the witness is enough not to attribute any credence
to her deposition in this trial. It is also same with the next
witness that is PW. 15 who deposed about illicit relationship
with the deceased and her brother in law but his such evidence
cannot be taken into consideration due to the fact that he has
deposited in court for the first time without being interrogated
by police earlier during investigation.
(36) Two of the prosecution witnesses have been declared hostile by
the prosecution in this trial, that is, PW 8 and PW 9. Both of
these witnesses have stated in their examination in chief that
the deceased was living in her matrimonial home happily and
peacefully. While recording evidence of PW 8, it is recorded that
"at this stage Ld. Defence declares this witness hostile".
Unfortunately such recording by the court appears to be
erroneous in so far as the defence side would not have an
opportunity to declare a prosecution witness as hostile. The
prosecution has not cross examined PW.8. This witness, who
happened to be the Pradhan of Bagda Gram Panchayat at the
relevant point of time, have asserted that a village conciliation
meeting was held to resolve dispute between the deceased and
the appellants though he has denied that the same was held
concerning the issue of torture alleged to be meted out to the
deceased or that she was compelled to commit suicide by
consumption of poison due to the torture meted out upon her.
In his cross examination this witness have stated that the
village conciliation meeting was held to conciliate the dispute
which arose pursuant to the illicit relationship of the deceased
with her brother-in-law and as the said brother-in-law, that is,
PW.6 was threatened by the villagers and resisted to enter into
the village.
PW.9, when cross-examined by prosecution has denied about
making any statement to the police regarding the deceased
being tortured by the present appellants and also that the
deceased committed suicide due to such torture. When cross
examined by the defense this witness stated that the deceased
consumed poison pursuent to her illicit relationship with her
brother-in-law Shambhu, that is, PW.6.
(37) Rest witnesses are two police personnel, that is, PW. 3 and 5.
PW.3 is the police constable who removed the dead body from
Bagda Rural Hospital Morgue. He identified his signature on
the 'dead body challan' (signature of this witness on the dead
body challan has been marked as Exhibit- 2). PW.5 has done
inquest of the dead body and prepared report thereof. He
identified the said report and his signature thereon. (Inquest
report is marked as Exhibit-3).
(38) PWs 1, 6, and 7 have deposed in this trial in support of the
prosecution case. All of them have stated about information
derived from the deceased about ill treatment and physical and
mental cruelty inflicted by the appellants to her on demand of
dowry. It is noted that excepting the autopsy report, no other
medical document has been exhibited in this trial. No ocular
evidence is also forthcoming regarding any assault or treatment
thereof of the victim during her lifetime. As already discussed,
different reasons for holding the village conciliation meeting are
apparent from evidence of different witnesses. Noticeably PW.6
is silent about any meeting held by Panchayat. Instead he
submits that the deceased asked for Rs.10,000/- for the
purpose of plantation to be done by the appellant No.1. He
stated about having discussions regarding this with PW.1 and
her husband, that is, his parents-in-law, though PW.1 has kept
absolute silence about any such purpose for giving money or
having any discussion with PW.6 about this. Recovery of poison
container from the room of appellant No.1 has been proved by
exhibiting seizure list showing its recovery and seizure.
However this ipso facto cannot be the reason for inferring
appellant's overt act of instigation, in absence of any supporting
evidence. On the contrary, the appellant No.1 being a cultivator
by profession, it would be only natural for him to store
adequate materials for cultivation. Evidence in this trial are
incoherent more so when there are glaring discrepancies in the
evidence of the witnesses regarding remittance of more dowry
as discussed above. There is no witness to depose about the
bustle and ruckus which might have been created in a village
household, if a member thereof is regularly subjected to
physical torture since in a normal village life people not only
reside very closely in a cluster form, but also are mostly aware
of the day to day living conditions of their neighbours. PW.7 of
course is an exception. However he has also not stated about
noticing any untoward situation to happen in the house of the
appellants but only to have gathered knowledge from the
deceased. Also that his statement as to the situation leading to
payment of Rs.10,000/- to the appellants stands differently
from that of PW.1, whereas PW.6 has an absolute different
version to tell in this regard as discussed earlier.
(39) Therefore the evidence which support the prosecution case
appear to be far away from proving existence of any wilful
conduct of the appellants of such a nature as was likely to drive
the victim to commit suicide. There may be allegations of
harassment and torture. However to prove charges against the
appellants there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of
incitement to the commission of suicide. It is the settled law
that the prosecution has to prove beyond all reasonable doubt
that the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had
left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her
life. Evidence in this trial as discussed above is far away from
reaching this standard. Doubts arise regarding alleged demand
of more dowry by the appellants in view of the discrepancies in
the deposition of witnesses as discussed above, doubts also
arise as to the facts of infliction of physical and mental torture
allegedly meted out to the victim and evidence in this trial do
not appear to be unimpeachable.
(40) The other point raised by the appellants is of being prejudiced
having been deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the
investigating officer as well as the autopsy surgeon in this trial
as both of them were not cited as witnesses in this trial. It is
true that as a part of fair trial, the investigating officer or the
autopsy surgeon should be examined specially when a serious
sessions trial was being held against the appellants. Section
174 CrPC provides for certain duties to be discharged by the
police officer upon receipt of information of suicide of any
person. That is, informing nearest Executive Magistrate to hold
inquest, proceeding to the place of occurrence and conducting
investigation, more importantly drawing up a report of the
apparent cause of death, describing such wounds, fractures,
bruises, and other marks of injury as may be found on the
body, and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or
instrument (if any); such marks appear to have been inflicted.
He has also the statutory duty of forwarding the dead body to
the nearest civil surgeon for examination. Similarly the
surgeon, who would examine the dead body is expected to find
other marks of injury, if any and other vital signs of the body.
In a trial like the present one, where a specific allegation of
physical torture has been made, and also witnesses have been
declared hostile having departed from their earlier statements
given to the investigation officer,- non examination of both
these persons have caused prejudice to the appellants, who
have been deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine them.
Withstanding cross-examination is as vital as the substantive
evidence given in examination-in-chief.
(41) Discussions as made above obviously enable to draw the
conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to prove the
guilt of the appellants in this trial to the standard of beyond all
reasonable doubts. The trial court has failed to note the glaring
discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It
has also not considered the prejudice of the appellants being
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine vital witnesses,
that is, the autopsy surgeon and the investigating officer. In
doing so the trial court has come to a finding which is based on
erroneous appreciation of the evidence and other attending
facts and circumstances of this trial. In view of this the
judgment passed by the trial court and impugned in this appeal
is found not to be sustainable. Hence the impugned judgment
and order of sentence dated 27 September 2012 and 28
September 2012 respectively passed by the Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Fast Track 1st Court at Bongaon, North
24Parghanas, in Sessions Trial No. 3(11) of 2004 is set
aside.
(42) Consequently the appeal succeeds. In the said Sessions Trial
both the appellants are found not guilty of the offence under
sections 498A and 306 IPC. Both of the appellants are
discharged from the bail bonds.
(43) The appeal being C.R.A No. 720 of 2012 is disposed of.
(44) Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon usual undertaking.
(Rai Chattopadhyay,J.)
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