Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Tarak Nath Uthasini vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 6 January, 2023

                     IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

                     (Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction)

                             APPELLATE SIDE



Present:

The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)



                             CRR 1120 of 2019

                           Tarak Nath Uthasini

                                    Vs

                      The State of West Bengal & Ors.




For the Petitioner                 : Mr. T. Samanta.




For the State                      : Mr. B. Banerjee.




Heard on                           : 08.12.2022

Judgment on                        : 06.01.2023
                                     2


Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:

     The petitioner's (defacto complaint) case in this revision is against

an order dated 14.06.2017, where cognizance was taken by the learned

Magistrate on submission of charge sheet and against the order dated

25.03.2019 when the case has been fixed for evidence.


     On 08.04.2017 the petitioner/defacto complainant lodged a written

complaint    with    Panskura   Police   Station   against   the   accused

person/opposite parties 2 to 7 to the effect that on 07.04.2017 at about

12 noon, when his wife Tapasi was on way to bring water from the tap

situated near their house with a brass Metal Jug, the opposite parties no.

2 to 7 abused her by wrongfully restraining her and outraged her

modesty and some of them committed sexual intercourse by opening her

clothes. When Tapasi cried for help and local people came, the accused

persons fled away.


     On his complaint Panskura P.S. Case no. 175 of 2017 under

Sections 341, 323, 325, 354, 376, 511, 379, 506 and 34 IPC was started

against the accused persons.


     Initially a charge sheet was filed for offences under Sections

341/323/506/34 IPC. Subsequently on a further Investigation being

directed Sec. 354 IPC was added. But the petitioner/husband of the

alleged victim is aggrieved.
                                       3


     The grievance of the petitioner is that the 2nd charge sheet has been

filed only under Sections 341, 323, 354, 506 and 34 IPC. Sections 325,

376/511, 379 of the IPC has been omitted. It is the case of the

petitioner/defacto complainant that the Investigating Officer has done so

in collusion with the accused persons and the learned Magistrate without

considering the materials in proper perspective, has taken cognizance

thus causing grave miscarriage of justice to the petitioner/the victim.


     It is further submitted that the I.O. without spot investigation

without seizure of wearing apparels of the victim, without seizure of the

brass   metal    jug   submitted     charge    sheet   by   deleting   Section

325,376/511,329 IPC inspite of the ingredients being present in the FIR.

Presently the trial has commenced and the case is fixed for evidence.


     Mr. T. Samanta, learned Counsel for the petitioner has

submitted that the learned Magistrate without notice to the defacto

complainant received the charge sheet and took cognizance, which is

clear violation of principle of natural justice.


     Mr. B. Banerjee, learned Counsel for the State/opposite party is

present. Admittedly the petitioners did not file a petition under

Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate taking cognizance

praying for further investigation. There being no prayer before the

learned Magistrate, the trial commenced and case has been fixed for

evidence.
                                      4


        A Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court decided the power of

a Magistrate to order further investigation U/s 173(8) Cr.P.C. in Vinubhai

Haribhai Malaviya Vs. The State of Gujarat on 16th October, 2019 in

Criminal Appeal No. 478-479 of 2017, wherein the Court held:-


           "9. The question of law that therefore arises in this
           case is whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the
           police, the Magistrate has the power to order further
           investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a
           criminal proceeding.

           38. However, having given our considered thought
           to the principles stated in these judgments, we are of
           the view that the Magistrate before whom a report
           under Section 173(2) of the Code is filed, is
           empowered in law to direct "further investigation"
           and require the police to submit a further or a
           supplementary report. A three-
           Judge Bench of this Court in Bhagwant Singh
           [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC
           537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] has, in no uncertain
           terms, stated that principle, as aforenoticed.
           40. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and
           the various judgments as aforeindicated, we would
           state the following conclusions in regard to the
           powers of a Magistrate in terms of Section
           173(2) read      with Section   173(8) and Section
           156(3) of the Code:
           40.1. The Magistrate has no power to direct
           "reinvestigation" or "fresh investigation" (de novo) in
           the case initiated on the basis of a police report.
           40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct "further
           investigation" after filing of a police report in terms
           of Section 173(6) of the Code.
           40.3. The view expressed in Sub-para 40.2 above is
           in conformity with the principle of law stated in
           Bhagwant Singh case [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of
           Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] by a
           three- Judge Bench and thus in conformity with the
           doctrine of precedent.
                           5


40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any
specific provision therein bars exercise of such
jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language
of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively
as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers
particularly in face of the provisions of Section
156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In
fact, such power would have to be read into the
language of Section 173(8).
40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it
must receive a construction which would advance
the cause of justice and legislative object sought to
be achieved. It does not stand to reason that the
legislature provided power of further investigation to
the police even after filing a report, but intended to
curtail the power of the court to the extent that even
where the facts of the case and the ends of justice
demand, the court can still not direct the
investigating agency to conduct further investigation
which it could do on its own.
40.6. It has been a procedure of propriety that the
police has to seek permission of the court to continue
"further investigation" and file supplementary
charge- sheet. This approach has been approved by
this Court in a number of judgments. This as such
would support the view that we are taking in the
present case." xxx xxx xxx
48. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the
expression "fair and proper investigation" in criminal
jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose: Firstly, the
investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in
accordance with law; secondly, the entire emphasis
on a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth
of the case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
Once these twin paradigms of fair investigation are
satisfied, there will be the least requirement for the
court of law to interfere with the investigation, much
less quash the same, or transfer it to another
agency. Bringing out the truth by fair and
investigative means in accordance with law would
essentially repel the very basis of an unfair, tainted
investigation or cases of false implication. Thus, it is
inevitable for a court of law to pass a specific order
as to the fate of the investigation, which in its
                           6


opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation of the
settled principles of investigative canons.
49. Now, we may examine another significant
aspect which is how the provisions of Section
173(8) have been understood and applied by the
courts and investigating agencies. It is true that
though there is no specific requirement in the
provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to conduct
"further investigation" or file supplementary report
with the leave of the court, the investigating agencies
have not only understood but also adopted it as a
legal practice to seek permission of the courts to
conduct     "further     investigation"      and    file
"supplementary report" with the leave of the court.
The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken
a similar view. The requirement of seeking prior
leave of the court to conduct "further investigation"
and/or to file a "supplementary report" will have to
be read into, and is a necessary implication of the
provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine
of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid
of such interpretation as the matters which are
understood and implemented for a long time, and
such practice that is supported by law should be
accepted as part of the interpretative process.
50. Such a view can be supported from two different
points of view: firstly, through the doctrine of
precedent, as aforenoticed, since quite often the
courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the
investigating agencies which have also so
understood and applied the principle. The matters
which are understood and implemented as a legal
practice and are not opposed to the basic rule of law
would be good practice and such interpretation
would be permissible with the aid of doctrine of
contemporanea expositio. Even otherwise, to seek
such leave of the court would meet the ends
of justice and also provide adequate safeguard
against a suspect/accused.
51. We have already noticed that there is no specific
embargo upon the power of the learned Magistrate to
direct "further investigation" on presentation of a
report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. Any
other approach or interpretation would be in
                           7


contradiction to the very language of Section
173(8) and the scheme of the Code for giving
precedence to proper administration of criminal
justice.   The    settled     principles    of  criminal
jurisprudence would support such approach,
particularly when in terms of Section 190 of the
Code, the Magistrate is the competent authority to
take cognizance of an offence. It is the Magistrate
who has to decide whether on the basis of the record
and documents produced, an offence is made out or
not, and if made out, what course of law should be
adopted in relation to committal of the case to the
court of competent jurisdiction or to proceed with the
trial himself. In other words, it is the judicial
conscience of the Magistrate which has to be
satisfied with reference to the record and the
documents placed before him by the investigating
agency, in coming to the appropriate conclusion in
consonance with the principles of law. It will be a
travesty of justice, if the court cannot be permitted to
direct "further investigation" to clear its doubt and to
order    the    investigating     agency     to  further
substantiate its charge-sheet. The satisfaction of the
learned Magistrate is a condition precedent to
commencement of further proceedings before the
court of competent jurisdiction. Whether the
Magistrate should direct "further investigation" or
not is again a matter which will depend upon the
facts of a given case. The learned Magistrate or the
higher court of competent jurisdiction would direct
"further investigation" or "reinvestigation" as the
case may be, on the facts of a given case. Where the
Magistrate can only direct further investigation, the
courts of higher jurisdiction can direct further,
reinvestigation or even investigation de novo
depending on the facts of a given case. It will be the
specific order of the court that would determine the
nature of investigation. In this regard, we may refer
to the observations made by this Court
in Sivanmoorthy v. State [(2010) 12 SCC 29: (2011) 1
SCC (Cri) 295]."
    34. A Bench of 5 learned Judges of this Court
    in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors.
    (2014) 3 SCC 92 was faced with a question
    regarding the circumstances under which the
                      8


power under Section 319 of the Code could be
exercised to add a person as being accused of
a criminal offence. In the course of a learned
judgment answering the aforesaid question,
this Court first adverted to the constitutional
mandate under Article 21 of the Constitution
as follows:
      "8. The constitutional mandate under
      Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution
      of India provides a protective
      umbrella       for     the     smooth
      administration of justice making
      adequate provisions to ensure a fair
      and efficacious trial so that the
      accused does not get prejudiced after
      the law has been put into motion to
      try him for the offence but at the
      same time also gives equal protection
      to victims and to society at large to
      ensure that the guilty does not get
      away from the clutches of law. For
      the empowerment of the courts to
      ensure       that     the     criminal
      administration of justice works
      properly, the law was appropriately
      codified and modified by the
      legislature under CrPC indicating as
      to how the courts should proceed in
      order to ultimately find out the truth
      so that an innocent does not get
      punished but at the same time, the
      guilty are brought to book under the
      law. It is these ideals as enshrined
      under the Constitution and our laws
      that have led to several decisions,
      whereby innovating methods and
      progressive tools have been forged to
      find out the real truth and to ensure
      that the guilty does not go
      unpunished." In paragraph 34, this
      Court adverted to Common Cause v.

Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 775, and dealt
with when trials before the Sessions Court;
trials of warrant-cases; and trials of
                      9


summons-cases by Magistrates can be said to
commence, as follows:
     "34. In Common Cause v. Union of
     India [(1996) 6 SCC 775 : 1997 SCC
     (Cri) 42 : AIR 1997 SC 1539] , this
     Court while dealing with the issue
     held: (SCC p. 776, para 1) "1. II (i) In
     cases of trials before the Sessions
     Court the trials shall be treated to
     have commenced when charges are
     framed under Section 228 of the Code
     of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the
     cases concerned.

     (ii) In cases of trials of warrant cases
     by Magistrates if the cases are
     instituted upon police reports the
     trials shall be treated to have
     commenced when charges are framed
     under Section 240 of the Code of
     Criminal Procedure, 1973 while in
     trials of warrant cases by Magistrates
     when cases are instituted otherwise
     than on police report such trials shall
     be treated to have commenced when
     charges are framed against the
     accused concerned under Section
     246 of     the    Code     of   Criminal
     Procedure, 1973.

     (iii) In cases of trials of summons
     cases by Magistrates the trials would
     be considered to have commenced
     when the accused who appear or are
     brought before the Magistrate are
     asked under Section 251 whether
     they plead guilty or have any defence
     to make." (emphasis supplied) The
     Court then concluded:
     "38. In view of the above, the law can
     be summarised to the effect that as
     "trial" means determination of issues
     adjudging the guilt or the innocence of
     a person, the person has to be aware
     of what is the case against him and it
                      10


      is only at the stage of framing of the
      charges that the court informs him of
      the same, the "trial" commences only
      on charges being framed. Thus, we
      do not approve the view taken by the
      courts that in a criminal case, trial
      commences on cognizance being
      taken."
35. Paragraph 39 of the judgment then
referred to the "inquiry" stage of a criminal
case as follows:
      "39. Section 2(g) CrPC and the case
      laws referred to above, therefore,
      clearly envisage inquiry before the
      actual commencement of the trial, and
      is an act conducted under CrPC by
      the Magistrate or the court.

The word "inquiry" is, therefore, not any
inquiry relating to the investigation of the case
by the investigating agency but is an inquiry
after the case is brought to the notice of the
court on the filing of the charge-sheet. The
court can thereafter proceed to make inquiries
and it is for this reason that an inquiry has
been given to mean something other than the
actual trial." A clear distinction between
"inquiry" and "trial" was thereafter set out in
paragraph 54 as follows:
      "54. In our opinion, the stage of
      inquiry does not contemplate any
      evidence in its strict legal sense, nor
      could     the     legislature     have
      contemplated this inasmuch as the
      stage for evidence has not yet
      arrived. The only material that the
      court has before it is the material
      collected by the prosecution and the
      court at this stage prima facie can
      apply its mind to find out as to
      whether a person, who can be an
      accused, has been erroneously
      omitted from being arraigned or has
      been deliberately excluded by the
                      11


      prosecuting agencies. This is all the
      more necessary in order to ensure
      that the investigating and the
      prosecuting agencies have acted
      fairly in bringing before the court
      those persons who deserve to be tried
      and to prevent any person from being
      deliberately shielded when they
      ought to have been tried. This is
      necessary to usher faith in the
      judicial system whereby the court
      should be empowered to exercise
      such powers even at the stage of
      inquiry and it is for this reason that
      the legislature has consciously used
      separate terms, namely, inquiry or
      trial in Section 319 CrPC."

36. Despite the aforesaid judgments, some
discordant notes were sounded in three recent
judgments. In Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel v.
Sumanbhai Kantibai Patel (2017) 4 SCC 177,
on     the   facts    in   that     case,  the
Appellant/Informant therein sought a direction
under Section 173(8) from the Trial Court for
further investigation by the police long after
charges were framed against the Respondents

at the culminating stages of the trial. The Court in its ultimate conclusion was correct, in that, once the trial begins with the framing of charges, the stage of investigation or inquiry into the offence is over, as a result of which no further investigation into the offence should be ordered. But instead of resting its judgment on this simple fact, this Court from paragraphs 29 to 34 resuscitated some of the earlier judgments of this Court, in which a view was taken that no further investigation could be ordered by the Magistrate in cases where, after cognizance is taken, the accused had appeared in pursuance of process being issued. In particular, Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) was strongly relied upon by the Court. We have already seen how this

judgment was rendered without adverting to the definition of "investigation" in Section 2(h) of the CrPC, and cannot therefore be relied upon as laying down the law on this aspect correctly. The Court therefore concluded:

"49. On an overall survey of the pronouncements of this Court on the scope and purport of Section 173(8) of the Code and the consistent trend of explication thereof, we are thus disposed to hold that though the investigating agency concerned has been invested with the power to undertake further investigation desirably after informing the court thereof, before which it had submitted its report and obtaining its approval, no such power is available therefor to the learned Magistrate after cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has been issued and the accused has entered appearance in response thereto. At that stage, neither the learned Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant can direct further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the life purpose of the adjudication in hand.

50. The unamended and the amended sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code if read in juxtaposition, would overwhelmingly attest that by the latter, the investigating agency/officer alone has been authorised to conduct further investigation without limiting the stage of the proceedings relatable thereto. This power qua the investigating agency/officer is thus legislatively intended to be

available at any stage of the proceedings. The recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41st Report which manifestly heralded the amendment, significantly had limited its proposal to the empowerment of the investigating agency alone.

51. In contradistinction, Sections 156, 190, 200, 202 and 204 CrPC clearly outline the powers of the Magistrate and the courses open for him to chart in the matter of directing investigation, taking of cognizance, framing of charge, etc. Though the Magistrate has the power to direct investigation under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage even after a charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted, once cognizance is taken and the accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be bereft of any competence to direct further investigation either suo motu or acting on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant. The direction for investigation by the Magistrate under Section 202, while dealing with a complaint, though is at a post-cognizance stage, it is in the nature of an inquiry to derive satisfaction as to whether the proceedings initiated ought to be furthered or not. Such a direction for investigation is not in the nature of further investigation, as contemplated under Section 173(8) of the Code. If the power of the Magistrate, in such a scheme envisaged by CrPC to order further investigation even after the cognizance is taken, the accused persons appear and charge is framed, is acknowledged or approved, the same would be discordant with the state of law, as enunciated by this Court and also the relevant layout of CrPC adumbrated hereinabove. Additionally had it been the intention of the legislature to invest such a power, in our estimate, Section 173(8) CrPC would have been worded accordingly to accommodate and ordain the same having regard to the backdrop of the incorporation thereof. In a way, in view of the three options open to the Magistrate, after a report is submitted by the police on completion of the investigation, as has been amongst authoritatively enumerated in Bhagwant Singh [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] , the Magistrate, in both the contingencies,

namely; when he takes cognizance of the offence or discharges the accused, would be committed to a course, whereafter though the investigating agency may for good reasons inform him and seek his permission to conduct further investigation, he suo motu cannot embark upon such a step or take that initiative on the request or prayer made by the complainant/informant. Not only such power to the Magistrate to direct further investigation suo motu or on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant after cognizance is taken and the accused person appears, pursuant to the process, issued or is discharged is incompatible with the statutory design and dispensation, it would even otherwise render the provisions of Sections 311 and 319 CrPC, whereunder any witness can be summoned by a court and a person can be issued notice to stand trial at any stage, in a way redundant. Axiomatically, thus the impugned decision annulling the direction of the learned Magistrate for further investigation is unexceptional and does not merit any interference. Even otherwise on facts, having regard to the progression of the developments in the trial, and more particularly, the delay on the part of the informant in making the request for further investigation, it was otherwise not entertainable as has been rightly held by the High Court."

37. This judgment was followed in a recent Division Bench judgment of this Court in Athul Rao v. State of Karnataka and Anr. (2018) 14 SCC 298 at paragraph 8. In Bikash Ranjan Rout v. State through the Secretary (Home), Government of NCT of Delhi (2019) 5 SCC 542, after referring to a number of decisions this Court concluded as follows:

"7. Considering the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and even considering the relevant provisions of CrPC, namely, Sections 167(2), 173, 227 and 228 CrPC, what is emerging is that after the investigation is concluded and the report is forwarded by the police to the Magistrate under Section 173(2)(i) CrPC, the learned Magistrate

may either (1) accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceedings, or (3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require the police to make a further report. If the Magistrate disagrees with the report and drops the proceedings, the informant is required to be given an opportunity to submit the protest application and thereafter, after giving an opportunity to the informant, the Magistrate may take a further decision whether to drop the proceedings against the accused or not. If the learned Magistrate accepts the objections, in that case, he may issue process and/or even frame the charges against the accused. As observed hereinabove, having not been satisfied with the investigation on considering the report forwarded by the police under Section 173(2)(i) CrPC, the Magistrate may, at that stage, direct further investigation and require the police to make a further report. However, it is required to be noted that all the aforesaid is required to be done at the pre-

cognizance stage. Once the learned Magistrate takes the cognizance and, considering the materials on record submitted along with the report forwarded by the police under Section 173(2)(i) CrPC, the learned Magistrate in exercise of the powers under Section 227 CrPC discharges the accused, thereafter, it will not be open for the Magistrate to suo motu order for further investigation and direct the investigating officer to submit the report.

Such an order after discharging the accused can be said to be made at the post-cognizance stage. There is a distinction and/or difference between the pre- cognizance stage and post-cognizance stage and the powers to be exercised by the Magistrate for further investigation at the pre-cognizance stage and post- cognizance stage. The power to order further investigation which may be available to the Magistrate at the pre-cognizance stage may not be available to the Magistrate at the post-cognizance stage, more particularly, when the accused is discharged by him. As observed hereinabove, if the Magistrate was not satisfied with the investigation carried out by the investigating officer and the report submitted by the investigating officer under Section 173(2)(i) CrPC, as observed by this Court in a catena of decisions and as observed hereinabove, it was always open/permissible for the Magistrate to direct the investigating agency for further investigation and may postpone even the framing of the charge and/or taking any final decision on the report at that stage. However, once the learned Magistrate, on the basis of the report and the materials placed along with the report, discharges the accused, we are afraid that thereafter the Magistrate can suo motu order further investigation by the investigating agency. Once the order of discharge is passed, thereafter the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo motu direct the investigating officer for further investigation and submit the report. In such a situation, only two remedies are available: (i) a revision application can be filed against the discharge or (ii) the Court has to wait till the stage of Section 319 CrPC. However, at the same time, considering the provisions of Section 173(8) CrPC, it is always open for the investigating agency to file an application for further investigation and thereafter to submit the fresh report and the Court may, on the application submitted by the investigating agency, permit further investigation and permit the investigating officer to file a fresh report and the same may be considered by the learned Magistrate thereafter in accordance with law. The Magistrate cannot suo motu direct for further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC or direct reinvestigation into a case at the post- cognizance stage, more particularly when, in

exercise of powers under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate discharges the accused.

However, Section 173(8) CrPC confers power upon the officer in charge of the police station to further investigate and submit evidence, oral or documentary, after forwarding the report under sub- section (2) of Section 173 CrPC. Therefore, it is always open for the investigating officer to apply for further investigation, even after forwarding the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 and even after the discharge of the accused. However, the aforesaid shall be at the instance of the investigating officer/police officer in charge and the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo motu pass an order for further investigation/reinvestigation after he discharges the accused." Realising the difficulty in concluding thus, the Court went on to hold:

"10. However, considering the observations made by the learned Magistrate and the deficiency in the investigation pointed out by the learned Magistrate and the ultimate goal is to book and/or punish the real culprit, it will be open for the investigating officer to submit a proper application before the learned Magistrate for further investigation and conduct fresh investigation and submit the further report in exercise of powers under Section 173(8) CrPC and thereafter the learned Magistrate to consider the same in accordance with law and on its own merits."

38. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as to why a Magistrate's powers to order further investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and

Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate's nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-

way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi

Administration) (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled."

In the present case, no evidence has yet been recorded. The proper

forum is before the learned Magistrate and not before this Court.

The proceedings are still in its initial stage and prayer under Section

173(8) of the Cr.P.C. if any filed before the trial court, may be considered

in accordance with law, without any delay.

The nature of relief prayed for before this Court and the facts and

circumstances of the case does not require the exercise of powers under

Section 482 Cr.P.C, as there is no apparent abuse of process of the Court

or law, the investigation and further investigation being prima facie in

accordance with law.

Accordingly, the criminal revisional application being CRR 1120 of