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Smt. Sabita Pal & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr
2023 Latest Caselaw 958 Cal

Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 958 Cal
Judgement Date : 6 February, 2023

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Smt. Sabita Pal & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 6 February, 2023
                IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

                 (Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction)

                         APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)



                            CRR 931 of 2019



                      Smt. Sabita Pal & Ors.

                                Vs

                  The State of West Bengal & Anr.



For the Petitioners               : Mr. Sourav Chatterjee,
                                    Mr. Satadru Lahiri,
                                    Mr. Safdar Azam.




For the State                     : Mr. Swapan Banerjee,
                                    Mr. Suman De.




Heard on                          : 16.01.2023

Judgment on                       : 06.03.2023
                                        2


Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:



         The present revision has been preferred praying for

quashing of the proceeding being SC and ST Case No. 04 of 2016

arising out of GR Case No. 2655/11 corresponding to Hare Street

Police Station Case No. 516 of 2011 dated 28.07.2011 and the

Charge Sheet being No. 426 of 2011 dated 27.11.2011 under

Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention    of        Atrocities)       Act,   and     under     Sections

341/353/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as well as all

orders passed       in    connection       with   the   instant   proceeding,

presently pending before the Learned Special Judge, Bench-1,

(NDPS Act), Calcutta.


         As per report submitted by Hare Street, P.S. along with

the copy of the death certificate which shows that the Petitioner

No.2/accused Barun Chakraborty has expired on 23rd January,

2022. And as such the present case abates against the said

Accused/Petitioner No. 2, Barun Chakraborty.


         In Rashida       Kamaluddin Syed & Anr. Vs. Shaikh

Saheblal Mardan, on 2nd March, 2007, the Supreme Court held

that:-


           "The Code of Criminal Procedure provides only for
           the death of an accused or an appellant but does
                                       3


            not expressly provide for the death of a complaint.
            The Code also does not provide for the abatement
            of inquiries and trials although it provides for the
            abatement of appeals on the death of the
            accused, in respect of appeals under Sections
            411A(2) and 417 and on the death of an appellant
            in all appeals except an appeal from a sentence of
            fine. Therefore, what happens on the death of a
            complainant in a case started on a complaint has to
            be inferred generally from the provisions of the
            Code".



        The petitioner's case is that the Accuseds/Petitioners state

that the Accuseds/Petitioners No. 1, 3 and 4 are the employees of

the office of Joint Director General of Foreign trade, Government

of India.


        Pursuant to a Letter of Complaint lodged by one P. Halder,

Zonal Joint Director General of Foreign Trade, of 4, Esplanade

East,       Kolkata       (hereinafter      referred    to      as   the

Complainant/Opposite Party no. 2) with the Officer-in-Charge of

Hare Street Police Station, the instant case being Hare Street

Police Station Case No. 516 of 2011 dated 28.07.2011, was

registered for investigation against the Accuseds/Petitioners and

others for commission of the alleged offences punishable under

Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention    of     Atrocities)   Act,   1989   and   Under    Sections

341/353/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
                                   4


       It is submitted that, after completion of perfunctory

investigation in connection with the instant case, the investigating

agency submitted Charge Sheet vide Charge Sheet No. 426 of

2011 dated 27.11.2011 against the Accused/Petitioners and

others for commission of the alleged offences punishable under

Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention    of   Atrocities)       Act   and   Under    Sections

341/353/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.


       The instant case is a counter case to a criminal proceeding

being GR Case No. 2858/11 arising out of the Hare Street Police

Station Case No. 572 dated 12.08.2011 under Section 354 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 initiated against Pranabananda Halder

i.e. the Complainant/Opposite Party of the impugned criminal

proceeding at the instance of one Anjana Biswas Charaborty i.e.

the wife of the Accused/Petitioner No. 2 herein and the protest

made by the Accuseds/Petitioners against such illegal activities of

the Complainant/Opposite Party.


       The Complainant/Opposite Party of the instant case over

the self same issue, which is the subject matter of investigation of

the instant case maliciously, lodged another complaint against the

Accuseds/Petitioners and others with the Officer-in-charge of

Hare Street Police Station. On the basis of said Letter of
                                    5


Complainant another specific case being Hare Street Police

Station case No. 521 of 2011 dated 29.07.2011 was registered for

investigation under Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The mala-fide

intention of the Complaint/Opposite Party is palpable from the

fact that he initiated the subsequent successive FIR over the self

same subject matter by suppressing all material facts and

representing the entire situation in a distorted manner, as well as

for forcing Accused/Petitioner No. 2 and his wife i.e. Anjana

Biswas Chakraborty for not pursuing the case initiated by her

against    the   Complainant/Opposite      Party for    outraging   her

modesty.


       Ms.       Anjana   Biswas       Chakraborty     i.e.   the   wife

Accused/Petitioner No. 2 and another accused namely Subrata

Mondal under such circumstances preferred two revisional

application being CRR No. 3146 of 2014 and CRR No. 3643 of

2017 before the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta in connection with

Hare Street Police Station case No.521 of 2011 dated 29.07.2011

as well as Hare Street Police Station Case No. 516 of 2011

respectively, and ultimately both the proceedings were quashed by

the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta vide a judgment and orders

dated 18th May, 2017 and 06th March, 2019 as passed by His
                                    6


Lordship Hon'ble Justice Siddhartha Chatterjee and Hon'ble

Justice Asha Arora respectively.


       Two other Accused Persons of the instant case namely

Kamala Chatterjee and Asis Kumar Basu also preferred revisional

application being CRR No. 2988 of 2011 before this Hon'ble Court,

praying for quashing of the instant proceeding against them.

Ultimately, on 24th June, 2016 after hearing the Learned

Advocates appearing for the respective parties His Lordship

Hon'ble Justice R.K. Bag vide an order dated 24th June, 2016 was

pleased to quash the impugned proceeding so far as the

Petitioners of the said revisional application is concerned on the

ground of compromise.


       The instant case was registered on the basis of Complaint

lodged by the Complainant/Opposite Party against the Accused

Persons to the effect that on 22nd September, 2011 at 14.30 hours

the Accused Persons being the staff of office of Joint Director

General of Foreign Trade (complainant), entered into the chamber

of the Complainant/Opposite Party and wrongfully restrained him

and intentionally insulted with the intention to humiliate him as

he belongs to the member of Scheduled Caste and restrained him

from discharging his government duties.
                                  7


       The Accuseds/Petitioners state the upon receipt of the

Charge Sheet as well as its accompaniments, the Learned Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta was pleased to transfer the case

record before the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th Court,

Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as 'the Learned Magistrate') for

further enquiry, trial and disposal of the same.


       The Learned Magistrate upon receipt of the case record by

way of transfer from the Learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Calcutta and upon perusal of the Charge Sheet and its

accompaniments, was pleased to observe that since the case is

punishable under Section 3 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the same is exclusively

triable by the Special Court. In spite of making such observation,

the Learned Magistrate was pleased to take cognizance against

the Accused/Petitioners and others for commission of the alleged

offences punishable under Sections 341/353/506/34 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 as well as 3 of the Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and issued

warrant of arrest against the Accused Persons.


       Pursuant to the order passed by the Learned Chief Judge,

City Sessions Court, Bichar Bhawan, Calcutta in Criminal

Revision No. 55 of 2016, the case record of the instant case was
                                  8


transferred to the Court of the Learned Special Judge, Bench-1,

(NDPS Act), Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as 'the Learned

Judge') as the said Learned court is designated as Special Court

within the scope and ambit of Scheduled Castes and Schedule

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act       and instant case was

renumbered as SC and ST Case No. 04 of 2016. Upon receipt of

the case record, the Learned Judge was pleased to take

cognizance   of   the   complained    offences.   Subsequently,   the

Accuseds/Petitioners and others surrendered before the Learned

Judge on respective dates and were enlarged on bail.


       The Learned Judge erroneously took cognizance of the

alleged offences without appreciating that true and proper

appreciation of the Charge Sheet as well as the materials collected

during the course of investigation.


       The Accuseds/Petitioners further state that there is also

no material to show that they ever threatened him either to cause

harm to his person or property. Rather instant case is nothing but

a ploy of the Complainant/Opposite Party to save himself from the

clutches of law for his wrongful acts.


       The Accuseds/Petitioners state that although they have

been implicated as accused in connection with the instant case

for commission of the alleged offences but true and proper
                                     9


appreciation of the materials on record especially the allegations

levelled in the Letter of Complainant which is treated as First

Information Report of the instant case as well as the Charge Sheet

and its accompaniments would make it palpable that there is no

specific allegation against the Accuseds/Petitioners, as to that

what role they had played on the alleged date of incident at the

time of commission of the alleged offences.


       The Learned Judge erred in law and fact without

considering   that   because   of       continuous   misuse/malicious

prosecution under the respective provision of the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,

the Hon'ble Apex Court is of the specific opinion that to avoid

false implication of innocent persons as well as to prevent using

the provisions of the said act for satisfying unbridled envy and/or

for settling any private disputes, before registering any case for

investigation under respective provision of Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 a preliminary

enquiry may be conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of police

of the concerned area to find out whether the allegations make

out a case under the Atrocities Act and that the allegations are

not frivolous or motivated. The Hon'ble Apex court also intended

such opinion to be followed as direction and/or as mandate of the

law of the land as such also made necessary provision for
                                   10


initiation of disciplinary provision in case of violation of such

direction. It is needless to state that such direction of the Hon'ble

Apex Court literally extended the scope of judicial discretion

available to the Learned Judge at the time of taking cognizance in

connection with any prosecution under respective provision of

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)

Act, 1989.


       The Accuseds/Petitioners state that while allowing the

impugned proceeding to continue against them for commission of

the alleged offences the Learned Judge erred in law and fact

without   appreciating    that   the   Complainant/Opposite     Party

allowed the impugned proceeding to be quashed against two of

the Accused Persons who does not belong to Scheduled Caste and

Scheduled Tribes as per Clause 24 and 25 of Article 366 of the

Constitution of India, on the ground of compromise and/or

withdrew the proceeding against those two Accused Persons on

his sweet will. The manner in which the Complainant/Opposite

Party has withdrawn the case against two of the accused persons

of the instant case who are standing in similar footing with the

Accuseds/Petitioners so far as the nature of allegations are

concerned     and    is    pursuing     the   case    against    the

Accuseds/Petitioners, clearly postulates the mala-fide intention of

the Complainant/Opposite Party i.e. to wreck vengeance against
                                   11


the Accuseds/Petitioners as they dare to protest against the

criminal Activities of the Complainant/Opposite Party and/or the

wife of     the Accused/Petitioner No. 2 initiated a        criminal

proceeding against the Complainant/Opposite Party for outraging

her modesty in the office premises. The instant case is nothing

but a ploy of the Complainant/Opposite Party to force the

Accuseds/Petitioners to succumb to his illegal demand as well as

to compel the wife of the Accused/Petitioner No. 2 to withdraw the

case, which she initiated against him for his criminal activities

That withdrawal of prosecution for criminal offence, which is a

social wrong in a piece-meal manner, is unheard in the realm of

law.


          Mr.   Sourav   Chatterjee    Learned   counsel   for   the

petitioner has submitted that further continuance of the

impugned proceeding is against the established principles of law

as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and by this Hon'ble Court

as also in total violation of the expressed provisions of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 and thus the interference of this

Hon'ble Court is highly solicited in the interest of justice and

equity.


          Further continuance of the aforesaid proceeding is glaring

example of the abuse of the process of Court which if allowed to
                                   12


continue for a single day beyond the state it has already reached,

will degenerate itself into a weapon of harassment and as such is

liable to be quashed forthwith.


         The instant case is a counter case to a criminal proceeding

being GR Case No. 2858/11 arising out of Hare Street Police

Station Case No. 572 dated 12.08.2011 under Section 354 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 initiated against Pranabananda Halder

i.e. the Complainant/Opposite Party of the impugned criminal

proceeding at the instance of one Anjana Biswas Chakraborty i.e.

the wife of the Accused/Petitioner No. 2 and the protest made by

the Accuseds/Petitioners against such illegal activities of the

Complainant/Opposite Party.


         That manner in which the Complainant/Opposite Party

withdrew the case against two of the Accused Persons of the

instant case who are standing in similar footing with the Accuseds

/Petitioners so far as the nature of allegations are concerned and

is pursuing the case against the Accuseds/Petitioners, that clearly

postulates the mala-fide intention of the Complainant/Opposite

Party.


         The Learned Judge erroneously took cognizance of the

alleged offences without appreciating that true and proper

appreciation of the Charge Sheet as well as the materials collected
                                   13


during the course of investigation of the instant case, fails to

make out any criminal offence against the Accuseds/Petitioners,

for which they could be asked to face the ordeal of criminal trial in

connection with the impugned proceeding.


       That there is also no material to show that they ever

threatened him either to cause harm to his person or property

rather the instant case is nothing case is nothing but a ploy of the

Complainant/Opposite Party to save him from the clutches of law

for his wrongful acts.


       The ends of justice being higher than mere ends of law, the

continuation of the proceeding against the Petitioners would

severely and seriously defeat the interest of justice as the

materials collected in course of investigation of the instant case

fails to make out any case for which the Accuseds/Petitioners

could be asked to face the ordeal of criminal trial.


       The impugned proceeding is otherwise bad in law and

ought to be quashed.


       Mr Arijit Ganguly Learned advocate for the state has

produced the case diary and submitted that there is sufficient

material and evidence to make out a prima facie of cognizable

offences having been committed by the petitioners and the such

the revision is liable to be dismissed.
                                  14


       In spite of due service there is no representation on

behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2 complainant has not

appeared.


       On hearing the Learned Counsels for the petitioner and

the state and considering the materials on record, including the

case diary, the following facts are before the court.


          a) Hare Street P.S. Case No. 572 of 2011 dated

              12.08.2011 under Section 354 of the Indian Penal

              Code has been filed by Anjana Biswas Chakraborty

              wife of accused Barun Chakraborty (now deceased)

              against the complainant in the present case, P.

              Halder on basis of a complaint petition dated

              22.07.2011 and 12th August 2011 signed by 120

              employees alleging that said P. Halder, who was then

              the zonal joint DHFT, Kolkata has shown arrogance

              by saying that "Ami kono jabab dite badhya nai...

              Karor kono katha sunbo na. Apnara Ekhuni ekhan

              theke berie jaan noile apnader Daler SC/ST Member

              er mathader Police Deke Ene Arrest Korabo Ebong

              Chakri Khabo".


              The said statements include threat to the SC/ST

              members also.
                        15


   Proceedings against Anjana Biswas Chakraborty has

   been quashed in a separate criminal revision as she

   too belongs to the same category.


b) The complaint in this case by Sri P. Halder filed with

   Hare Street police station on 28th of July 2011 is

   numbered 516/11 under the sections are stated

   above.


c) By   a   letter   dated   2nd   September   2011,   the

   complainant       withdrew      the    complaint    (on

   compromise) against Mr. Ashish Kumar Basu and

   Mrs. Kamala Chatterjee as department enquiry did

   not reveal any act by the said persons.


d) Statement recorded under Section 161 CR.P.C. of

   the complainant reveals that the primary allegations

   are all against accused Barun         Chakraborty (now

   deceased).


e) The petition of complaint dated 25th July, 2011 filed

   by the complainant here in is against the petitioners

   along with others, who have had the proceedings

   against them quashed.
                         16


f)   The complainant/opposite party also stated

     that:-


         "Additionally I too made a complaint as
        stated earlier to the Hare Street Police Station
        in my capacity as the Zonal Joint Director
        General Foreign Trade on July 19, 2011
        under General Diary 1821 against Mr. Barun
        Chakraborty for repeated use of filthy, crass,
        intimidating,     unconstitutional     language
        against me, for openly threatening me and
        making me feel vulnerable as a member of
        SC community by Mr. Barun Chakraborty. As
        stated earlier a copy of the complaint
        ("Complaint") is attached hereto as
        Annexure B.

        B. Incident on July 22, 2011

        Following the incidents as stated in part A of
        this complaint on July 22, 2011 as I had
        returned to office after a meeting at around
        2.30 pm the employees led by one Mr. Bulbul
        Banerjee including but not limited the
        following employees:-

              1.

Asit Sarkar.

2. Apurva Mukherjee.

3. Ashish Kumar Bose.

4. Subrata Mandal.

5. Kamala Chatterjee.

6. Anjana Chakraborty.

7. Sabita Pal.

8. Kaberi Dey.

Forcibly entered my office and demanded that I drop all charges made by me against Mr. Barun Chakraborty. They were narrating dharnas and threatening me of dire

consequences in the event that I do not withdraw the charges."

g) The dispute between the complainant and the

accused persons started when they were given

election duty by the District Election Commissioner

through the complainant.

h) Other petition of complaints filed by the

representatives of the SC and ST association show

that the complaints have been filed only in respect of

accused Barun Chakraborty.

From the above facts it is evident that accused Barun

Chakraborty being a union leader had led a team, which also

included members of SC and ST members protesting against

being allotted election duty. The main allegation is only against

Barun Chakraborty. Subsequent complaint is against the other

accused persons who had agitated before the complainant,

requesting him to withdraw the complaint against Barun

Charkaborty. The complainant then filed the complaint against

other accused persons alleging offence under the SC/ST Act. The

primary allegation against Barun Chakraborty also includes

offence under SC/ST Act.

The other offences alleged include Sections

341/353/506//34 of the Indian Penal Code, But the ingredients

required to constitute the said offences are clearly absent in

respect of all the accused persons. The statements in the

complaint do not say anything from which it can be prima facie

evident that the offences as alleged were committed by the

petitioners/accuseds. Nor is there any materials in the case diary

to make out a prima facie case of cognizable offence as alleged

against any of the accused persons.

The main allegation under Section 3 of the SC and ST Act

is against Barun Chakraborty, the person who allegedly led the

other employees who were protesting against election duty.

Admittedly all the petitioners/accused persons are also public

servants. The parties in this case, work in the same office.

The said Barun Chakraborty has expired. The case has

abated only against him and not against other accused

persons in this case.

In The State of Tamil Nadu vs. Nirmala (2018 ALL MR

(Cri) 440 (SC), the Supreme Court held that:-

"5. Having considered the decisions of this Court and upon hearing the learned counsels for the parties we are of the view that the death of the main accused does not result in abatement of the trial..................."

Though Barun Chakreaborty was the principal accused in

the present case, the case has been initiated in respect of the

other petitioners too as co-accused.

The Supreme Court in Ramawatar Vs. The State of

Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1393 of 2011, the

Supreme Court held that:-

"9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length, we are of the opinion that two questions fall for our consideration in the present appeal. First, whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing of criminal proceedings arising out of a 'non- compoundable offence? If yes, then whether the power to quash proceedings can be extended to offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?

10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999)5 SCC 238, wherein, a two Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI & Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court under Section 320 Cr.P.C cannot be construed as a proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extraordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be to do complete justice.

Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective constitutional/inherent powers.

11. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminal proceedings involving nonheinous offences or offences which are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage of the proceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court, however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise through brute force, threats, bribes, or other such unethical and illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a settlement is struck postconviction, the Courts should, interalia, carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, as well as, the conduct of the accused before and after the incident in question. While concluding, the Court also formulated certain guidelines and held:

"19... Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."

[Emphasis Applied]

12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be

invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused.

13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in postconviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sinequanon to involve the superior court's plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow- hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).

14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and farreaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court's power to do "complete justice". However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power

and discretion accordingly. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr., (1998) 4 SCC 409 ¶ 48, has eloquently clarified this point as follows:

"48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice "between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it". The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by "ironing out the creases" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only disputesettling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely disputesettling. It is a "problemsolver in the nebulous areas" (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subjectmatter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject."

15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a

recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of uppercastes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twinfold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of castebased atrocities.

16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a 'special statute' would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.

17. Adverting to the case in hand, we note that the present Appellant has been charged and convicted under the unamended Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act7, which was as follows:

"3. Punishments for offences of atrocities- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-- xxxx

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

xxxx"

18. We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, the Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of coercion, and therefore ought to be accorded a higher level of protection. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accused party. What factors the Courts should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

19. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the aforestated principles, as well as having meditated on the application for compromise, we are inclined to invoke the powers under Article 142 and quash the instant Criminal proceedings with the sole objective of doing complete justice between the parties before us. We say so for the reasons that:

Firstly, the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to deter castebased insults and intimidations when they are used with the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to the Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe community. In the present case, the record manifests that there was an undeniable preexisting civil dispute between the parties. The case of the Appellant, from the very beginning, has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account of frustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis of the

deprecated incident was the aforestated civil/property dispute. Considering this aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle undertones of criminality, even though the provisions of a special statute have been attracted in the present case."

Thus keeping in mind the judgments of the Supreme

Court, the materials in the present case in respect of the

petitioners, do not make out a prima facie case against the

petitioners of committing offences as alleged and as such

permitting the case to proceed would amount to abuse of the

process of law/court. Accordingly, in the interest of justice, the

proceedings in this case is liable to be quashed.

In Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

and Ors., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993, Criminal Appeal No(s). 2060

of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 39 of 2022), the

Supreme Court held:-

"15. This Court has an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of criminal proceedings in Vineet Kumar and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 decided on 31st March, 2017. It may be useful to refer to paras 22, 23 and 41 of the above judgment where the following was stated:

"22. Before we enter into the facts of the present case it is necessary to consider the ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Section

482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated :

'7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper

realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.'

41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories as illustratively enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC

335. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 which is to the following effect :

'102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.' Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present case. Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 but did not advert to the relevant facts of the present case, materials on which final report was submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised its

jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal proceedings."

16. The exposition of law on the subject relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC are well settled and to the possible extent, this Court has defined sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. This Court has held in para 102 in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) 335 as under :

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate

within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

17. The principles culled out by this Court have consistently been followed in the recent judgment of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 315."

CRR 931 of 2019 is thus allowed.

The proceeding being SC and ST Case No. 04 of 2016

arising out of GR Case No. 2655/11 corresponding to Hare Street

Police Station Case No. 516 of 2011 dated 28.07.2011 and the

Charge Sheet being No. 426 of 2011 dated 27.11.2011 under

Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and under Sections

341/353/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is hereby

quashed.

There will be no order as to costs.

All connected Application stand disposed of.

Interim order if any stands vacated.

Copy of this judgment be sent to the Trial Court forthwith

for necessary compliance.

Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied

for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary

legal formalities.

(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)

 
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