Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 958 Cal
Judgement Date : 6 February, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction)
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 931 of 2019
Smt. Sabita Pal & Ors.
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Sourav Chatterjee,
Mr. Satadru Lahiri,
Mr. Safdar Azam.
For the State : Mr. Swapan Banerjee,
Mr. Suman De.
Heard on : 16.01.2023
Judgment on : 06.03.2023
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Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
The present revision has been preferred praying for
quashing of the proceeding being SC and ST Case No. 04 of 2016
arising out of GR Case No. 2655/11 corresponding to Hare Street
Police Station Case No. 516 of 2011 dated 28.07.2011 and the
Charge Sheet being No. 426 of 2011 dated 27.11.2011 under
Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and under Sections
341/353/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as well as all
orders passed in connection with the instant proceeding,
presently pending before the Learned Special Judge, Bench-1,
(NDPS Act), Calcutta.
As per report submitted by Hare Street, P.S. along with
the copy of the death certificate which shows that the Petitioner
No.2/accused Barun Chakraborty has expired on 23rd January,
2022. And as such the present case abates against the said
Accused/Petitioner No. 2, Barun Chakraborty.
In Rashida Kamaluddin Syed & Anr. Vs. Shaikh
Saheblal Mardan, on 2nd March, 2007, the Supreme Court held
that:-
"The Code of Criminal Procedure provides only for
the death of an accused or an appellant but does
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not expressly provide for the death of a complaint.
The Code also does not provide for the abatement
of inquiries and trials although it provides for the
abatement of appeals on the death of the
accused, in respect of appeals under Sections
411A(2) and 417 and on the death of an appellant
in all appeals except an appeal from a sentence of
fine. Therefore, what happens on the death of a
complainant in a case started on a complaint has to
be inferred generally from the provisions of the
Code".
The petitioner's case is that the Accuseds/Petitioners state
that the Accuseds/Petitioners No. 1, 3 and 4 are the employees of
the office of Joint Director General of Foreign trade, Government
of India.
Pursuant to a Letter of Complaint lodged by one P. Halder,
Zonal Joint Director General of Foreign Trade, of 4, Esplanade
East, Kolkata (hereinafter referred to as the
Complainant/Opposite Party no. 2) with the Officer-in-Charge of
Hare Street Police Station, the instant case being Hare Street
Police Station Case No. 516 of 2011 dated 28.07.2011, was
registered for investigation against the Accuseds/Petitioners and
others for commission of the alleged offences punishable under
Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Under Sections
341/353/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
4
It is submitted that, after completion of perfunctory
investigation in connection with the instant case, the investigating
agency submitted Charge Sheet vide Charge Sheet No. 426 of
2011 dated 27.11.2011 against the Accused/Petitioners and
others for commission of the alleged offences punishable under
Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Under Sections
341/353/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The instant case is a counter case to a criminal proceeding
being GR Case No. 2858/11 arising out of the Hare Street Police
Station Case No. 572 dated 12.08.2011 under Section 354 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 initiated against Pranabananda Halder
i.e. the Complainant/Opposite Party of the impugned criminal
proceeding at the instance of one Anjana Biswas Charaborty i.e.
the wife of the Accused/Petitioner No. 2 herein and the protest
made by the Accuseds/Petitioners against such illegal activities of
the Complainant/Opposite Party.
The Complainant/Opposite Party of the instant case over
the self same issue, which is the subject matter of investigation of
the instant case maliciously, lodged another complaint against the
Accuseds/Petitioners and others with the Officer-in-charge of
Hare Street Police Station. On the basis of said Letter of
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Complainant another specific case being Hare Street Police
Station case No. 521 of 2011 dated 29.07.2011 was registered for
investigation under Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The mala-fide
intention of the Complaint/Opposite Party is palpable from the
fact that he initiated the subsequent successive FIR over the self
same subject matter by suppressing all material facts and
representing the entire situation in a distorted manner, as well as
for forcing Accused/Petitioner No. 2 and his wife i.e. Anjana
Biswas Chakraborty for not pursuing the case initiated by her
against the Complainant/Opposite Party for outraging her
modesty.
Ms. Anjana Biswas Chakraborty i.e. the wife
Accused/Petitioner No. 2 and another accused namely Subrata
Mondal under such circumstances preferred two revisional
application being CRR No. 3146 of 2014 and CRR No. 3643 of
2017 before the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta in connection with
Hare Street Police Station case No.521 of 2011 dated 29.07.2011
as well as Hare Street Police Station Case No. 516 of 2011
respectively, and ultimately both the proceedings were quashed by
the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta vide a judgment and orders
dated 18th May, 2017 and 06th March, 2019 as passed by His
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Lordship Hon'ble Justice Siddhartha Chatterjee and Hon'ble
Justice Asha Arora respectively.
Two other Accused Persons of the instant case namely
Kamala Chatterjee and Asis Kumar Basu also preferred revisional
application being CRR No. 2988 of 2011 before this Hon'ble Court,
praying for quashing of the instant proceeding against them.
Ultimately, on 24th June, 2016 after hearing the Learned
Advocates appearing for the respective parties His Lordship
Hon'ble Justice R.K. Bag vide an order dated 24th June, 2016 was
pleased to quash the impugned proceeding so far as the
Petitioners of the said revisional application is concerned on the
ground of compromise.
The instant case was registered on the basis of Complaint
lodged by the Complainant/Opposite Party against the Accused
Persons to the effect that on 22nd September, 2011 at 14.30 hours
the Accused Persons being the staff of office of Joint Director
General of Foreign Trade (complainant), entered into the chamber
of the Complainant/Opposite Party and wrongfully restrained him
and intentionally insulted with the intention to humiliate him as
he belongs to the member of Scheduled Caste and restrained him
from discharging his government duties.
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The Accuseds/Petitioners state the upon receipt of the
Charge Sheet as well as its accompaniments, the Learned Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta was pleased to transfer the case
record before the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th Court,
Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as 'the Learned Magistrate') for
further enquiry, trial and disposal of the same.
The Learned Magistrate upon receipt of the case record by
way of transfer from the Learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Calcutta and upon perusal of the Charge Sheet and its
accompaniments, was pleased to observe that since the case is
punishable under Section 3 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the same is exclusively
triable by the Special Court. In spite of making such observation,
the Learned Magistrate was pleased to take cognizance against
the Accused/Petitioners and others for commission of the alleged
offences punishable under Sections 341/353/506/34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 as well as 3 of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and issued
warrant of arrest against the Accused Persons.
Pursuant to the order passed by the Learned Chief Judge,
City Sessions Court, Bichar Bhawan, Calcutta in Criminal
Revision No. 55 of 2016, the case record of the instant case was
8
transferred to the Court of the Learned Special Judge, Bench-1,
(NDPS Act), Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as 'the Learned
Judge') as the said Learned court is designated as Special Court
within the scope and ambit of Scheduled Castes and Schedule
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and instant case was
renumbered as SC and ST Case No. 04 of 2016. Upon receipt of
the case record, the Learned Judge was pleased to take
cognizance of the complained offences. Subsequently, the
Accuseds/Petitioners and others surrendered before the Learned
Judge on respective dates and were enlarged on bail.
The Learned Judge erroneously took cognizance of the
alleged offences without appreciating that true and proper
appreciation of the Charge Sheet as well as the materials collected
during the course of investigation.
The Accuseds/Petitioners further state that there is also
no material to show that they ever threatened him either to cause
harm to his person or property. Rather instant case is nothing but
a ploy of the Complainant/Opposite Party to save himself from the
clutches of law for his wrongful acts.
The Accuseds/Petitioners state that although they have
been implicated as accused in connection with the instant case
for commission of the alleged offences but true and proper
9
appreciation of the materials on record especially the allegations
levelled in the Letter of Complainant which is treated as First
Information Report of the instant case as well as the Charge Sheet
and its accompaniments would make it palpable that there is no
specific allegation against the Accuseds/Petitioners, as to that
what role they had played on the alleged date of incident at the
time of commission of the alleged offences.
The Learned Judge erred in law and fact without
considering that because of continuous misuse/malicious
prosecution under the respective provision of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,
the Hon'ble Apex Court is of the specific opinion that to avoid
false implication of innocent persons as well as to prevent using
the provisions of the said act for satisfying unbridled envy and/or
for settling any private disputes, before registering any case for
investigation under respective provision of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 a preliminary
enquiry may be conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of police
of the concerned area to find out whether the allegations make
out a case under the Atrocities Act and that the allegations are
not frivolous or motivated. The Hon'ble Apex court also intended
such opinion to be followed as direction and/or as mandate of the
law of the land as such also made necessary provision for
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initiation of disciplinary provision in case of violation of such
direction. It is needless to state that such direction of the Hon'ble
Apex Court literally extended the scope of judicial discretion
available to the Learned Judge at the time of taking cognizance in
connection with any prosecution under respective provision of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989.
The Accuseds/Petitioners state that while allowing the
impugned proceeding to continue against them for commission of
the alleged offences the Learned Judge erred in law and fact
without appreciating that the Complainant/Opposite Party
allowed the impugned proceeding to be quashed against two of
the Accused Persons who does not belong to Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribes as per Clause 24 and 25 of Article 366 of the
Constitution of India, on the ground of compromise and/or
withdrew the proceeding against those two Accused Persons on
his sweet will. The manner in which the Complainant/Opposite
Party has withdrawn the case against two of the accused persons
of the instant case who are standing in similar footing with the
Accuseds/Petitioners so far as the nature of allegations are
concerned and is pursuing the case against the
Accuseds/Petitioners, clearly postulates the mala-fide intention of
the Complainant/Opposite Party i.e. to wreck vengeance against
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the Accuseds/Petitioners as they dare to protest against the
criminal Activities of the Complainant/Opposite Party and/or the
wife of the Accused/Petitioner No. 2 initiated a criminal
proceeding against the Complainant/Opposite Party for outraging
her modesty in the office premises. The instant case is nothing
but a ploy of the Complainant/Opposite Party to force the
Accuseds/Petitioners to succumb to his illegal demand as well as
to compel the wife of the Accused/Petitioner No. 2 to withdraw the
case, which she initiated against him for his criminal activities
That withdrawal of prosecution for criminal offence, which is a
social wrong in a piece-meal manner, is unheard in the realm of
law.
Mr. Sourav Chatterjee Learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that further continuance of the
impugned proceeding is against the established principles of law
as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and by this Hon'ble Court
as also in total violation of the expressed provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 and thus the interference of this
Hon'ble Court is highly solicited in the interest of justice and
equity.
Further continuance of the aforesaid proceeding is glaring
example of the abuse of the process of Court which if allowed to
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continue for a single day beyond the state it has already reached,
will degenerate itself into a weapon of harassment and as such is
liable to be quashed forthwith.
The instant case is a counter case to a criminal proceeding
being GR Case No. 2858/11 arising out of Hare Street Police
Station Case No. 572 dated 12.08.2011 under Section 354 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 initiated against Pranabananda Halder
i.e. the Complainant/Opposite Party of the impugned criminal
proceeding at the instance of one Anjana Biswas Chakraborty i.e.
the wife of the Accused/Petitioner No. 2 and the protest made by
the Accuseds/Petitioners against such illegal activities of the
Complainant/Opposite Party.
That manner in which the Complainant/Opposite Party
withdrew the case against two of the Accused Persons of the
instant case who are standing in similar footing with the Accuseds
/Petitioners so far as the nature of allegations are concerned and
is pursuing the case against the Accuseds/Petitioners, that clearly
postulates the mala-fide intention of the Complainant/Opposite
Party.
The Learned Judge erroneously took cognizance of the
alleged offences without appreciating that true and proper
appreciation of the Charge Sheet as well as the materials collected
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during the course of investigation of the instant case, fails to
make out any criminal offence against the Accuseds/Petitioners,
for which they could be asked to face the ordeal of criminal trial in
connection with the impugned proceeding.
That there is also no material to show that they ever
threatened him either to cause harm to his person or property
rather the instant case is nothing case is nothing but a ploy of the
Complainant/Opposite Party to save him from the clutches of law
for his wrongful acts.
The ends of justice being higher than mere ends of law, the
continuation of the proceeding against the Petitioners would
severely and seriously defeat the interest of justice as the
materials collected in course of investigation of the instant case
fails to make out any case for which the Accuseds/Petitioners
could be asked to face the ordeal of criminal trial.
The impugned proceeding is otherwise bad in law and
ought to be quashed.
Mr Arijit Ganguly Learned advocate for the state has
produced the case diary and submitted that there is sufficient
material and evidence to make out a prima facie of cognizable
offences having been committed by the petitioners and the such
the revision is liable to be dismissed.
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In spite of due service there is no representation on
behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2 complainant has not
appeared.
On hearing the Learned Counsels for the petitioner and
the state and considering the materials on record, including the
case diary, the following facts are before the court.
a) Hare Street P.S. Case No. 572 of 2011 dated
12.08.2011 under Section 354 of the Indian Penal
Code has been filed by Anjana Biswas Chakraborty
wife of accused Barun Chakraborty (now deceased)
against the complainant in the present case, P.
Halder on basis of a complaint petition dated
22.07.2011 and 12th August 2011 signed by 120
employees alleging that said P. Halder, who was then
the zonal joint DHFT, Kolkata has shown arrogance
by saying that "Ami kono jabab dite badhya nai...
Karor kono katha sunbo na. Apnara Ekhuni ekhan
theke berie jaan noile apnader Daler SC/ST Member
er mathader Police Deke Ene Arrest Korabo Ebong
Chakri Khabo".
The said statements include threat to the SC/ST
members also.
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Proceedings against Anjana Biswas Chakraborty has
been quashed in a separate criminal revision as she
too belongs to the same category.
b) The complaint in this case by Sri P. Halder filed with
Hare Street police station on 28th of July 2011 is
numbered 516/11 under the sections are stated
above.
c) By a letter dated 2nd September 2011, the
complainant withdrew the complaint (on
compromise) against Mr. Ashish Kumar Basu and
Mrs. Kamala Chatterjee as department enquiry did
not reveal any act by the said persons.
d) Statement recorded under Section 161 CR.P.C. of
the complainant reveals that the primary allegations
are all against accused Barun Chakraborty (now
deceased).
e) The petition of complaint dated 25th July, 2011 filed
by the complainant here in is against the petitioners
along with others, who have had the proceedings
against them quashed.
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f) The complainant/opposite party also stated
that:-
"Additionally I too made a complaint as
stated earlier to the Hare Street Police Station
in my capacity as the Zonal Joint Director
General Foreign Trade on July 19, 2011
under General Diary 1821 against Mr. Barun
Chakraborty for repeated use of filthy, crass,
intimidating, unconstitutional language
against me, for openly threatening me and
making me feel vulnerable as a member of
SC community by Mr. Barun Chakraborty. As
stated earlier a copy of the complaint
("Complaint") is attached hereto as
Annexure B.
B. Incident on July 22, 2011
Following the incidents as stated in part A of
this complaint on July 22, 2011 as I had
returned to office after a meeting at around
2.30 pm the employees led by one Mr. Bulbul
Banerjee including but not limited the
following employees:-
1.
Asit Sarkar.
2. Apurva Mukherjee.
3. Ashish Kumar Bose.
4. Subrata Mandal.
5. Kamala Chatterjee.
6. Anjana Chakraborty.
7. Sabita Pal.
8. Kaberi Dey.
Forcibly entered my office and demanded that I drop all charges made by me against Mr. Barun Chakraborty. They were narrating dharnas and threatening me of dire
consequences in the event that I do not withdraw the charges."
g) The dispute between the complainant and the
accused persons started when they were given
election duty by the District Election Commissioner
through the complainant.
h) Other petition of complaints filed by the
representatives of the SC and ST association show
that the complaints have been filed only in respect of
accused Barun Chakraborty.
From the above facts it is evident that accused Barun
Chakraborty being a union leader had led a team, which also
included members of SC and ST members protesting against
being allotted election duty. The main allegation is only against
Barun Chakraborty. Subsequent complaint is against the other
accused persons who had agitated before the complainant,
requesting him to withdraw the complaint against Barun
Charkaborty. The complainant then filed the complaint against
other accused persons alleging offence under the SC/ST Act. The
primary allegation against Barun Chakraborty also includes
offence under SC/ST Act.
The other offences alleged include Sections
341/353/506//34 of the Indian Penal Code, But the ingredients
required to constitute the said offences are clearly absent in
respect of all the accused persons. The statements in the
complaint do not say anything from which it can be prima facie
evident that the offences as alleged were committed by the
petitioners/accuseds. Nor is there any materials in the case diary
to make out a prima facie case of cognizable offence as alleged
against any of the accused persons.
The main allegation under Section 3 of the SC and ST Act
is against Barun Chakraborty, the person who allegedly led the
other employees who were protesting against election duty.
Admittedly all the petitioners/accused persons are also public
servants. The parties in this case, work in the same office.
The said Barun Chakraborty has expired. The case has
abated only against him and not against other accused
persons in this case.
In The State of Tamil Nadu vs. Nirmala (2018 ALL MR
(Cri) 440 (SC), the Supreme Court held that:-
"5. Having considered the decisions of this Court and upon hearing the learned counsels for the parties we are of the view that the death of the main accused does not result in abatement of the trial..................."
Though Barun Chakreaborty was the principal accused in
the present case, the case has been initiated in respect of the
other petitioners too as co-accused.
The Supreme Court in Ramawatar Vs. The State of
Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1393 of 2011, the
Supreme Court held that:-
"9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length, we are of the opinion that two questions fall for our consideration in the present appeal. First, whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing of criminal proceedings arising out of a 'non- compoundable offence? If yes, then whether the power to quash proceedings can be extended to offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?
10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999)5 SCC 238, wherein, a two Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI & Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court under Section 320 Cr.P.C cannot be construed as a proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extraordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be to do complete justice.
Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective constitutional/inherent powers.
11. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminal proceedings involving nonheinous offences or offences which are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage of the proceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court, however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise through brute force, threats, bribes, or other such unethical and illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a settlement is struck postconviction, the Courts should, interalia, carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, as well as, the conduct of the accused before and after the incident in question. While concluding, the Court also formulated certain guidelines and held:
"19... Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."
[Emphasis Applied]
12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be
invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused.
13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in postconviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sinequanon to involve the superior court's plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow- hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).
14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and farreaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court's power to do "complete justice". However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power
and discretion accordingly. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr., (1998) 4 SCC 409 ¶ 48, has eloquently clarified this point as follows:
"48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice "between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it". The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by "ironing out the creases" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only disputesettling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely disputesettling. It is a "problemsolver in the nebulous areas" (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subjectmatter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject."
15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a
recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of uppercastes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twinfold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of castebased atrocities.
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a 'special statute' would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.
17. Adverting to the case in hand, we note that the present Appellant has been charged and convicted under the unamended Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act7, which was as follows:
"3. Punishments for offences of atrocities- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-- xxxx
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
xxxx"
18. We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, the Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of coercion, and therefore ought to be accorded a higher level of protection. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accused party. What factors the Courts should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
19. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the aforestated principles, as well as having meditated on the application for compromise, we are inclined to invoke the powers under Article 142 and quash the instant Criminal proceedings with the sole objective of doing complete justice between the parties before us. We say so for the reasons that:
Firstly, the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to deter castebased insults and intimidations when they are used with the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to the Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe community. In the present case, the record manifests that there was an undeniable preexisting civil dispute between the parties. The case of the Appellant, from the very beginning, has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account of frustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis of the
deprecated incident was the aforestated civil/property dispute. Considering this aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle undertones of criminality, even though the provisions of a special statute have been attracted in the present case."
Thus keeping in mind the judgments of the Supreme
Court, the materials in the present case in respect of the
petitioners, do not make out a prima facie case against the
petitioners of committing offences as alleged and as such
permitting the case to proceed would amount to abuse of the
process of law/court. Accordingly, in the interest of justice, the
proceedings in this case is liable to be quashed.
In Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ors., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993, Criminal Appeal No(s). 2060
of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 39 of 2022), the
Supreme Court held:-
"15. This Court has an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of criminal proceedings in Vineet Kumar and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 decided on 31st March, 2017. It may be useful to refer to paras 22, 23 and 41 of the above judgment where the following was stated:
"22. Before we enter into the facts of the present case it is necessary to consider the ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Section
482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated :
'7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper
realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.'
41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories as illustratively enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 which is to the following effect :
'102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.' Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present case. Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 but did not advert to the relevant facts of the present case, materials on which final report was submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised its
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal proceedings."
16. The exposition of law on the subject relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC are well settled and to the possible extent, this Court has defined sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. This Court has held in para 102 in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) 335 as under :
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
17. The principles culled out by this Court have consistently been followed in the recent judgment of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 315."
CRR 931 of 2019 is thus allowed.
The proceeding being SC and ST Case No. 04 of 2016
arising out of GR Case No. 2655/11 corresponding to Hare Street
Police Station Case No. 516 of 2011 dated 28.07.2011 and the
Charge Sheet being No. 426 of 2011 dated 27.11.2011 under
Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and under Sections
341/353/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is hereby
quashed.
There will be no order as to costs.
All connected Application stand disposed of.
Interim order if any stands vacated.
Copy of this judgment be sent to the Trial Court forthwith
for necessary compliance.
Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied
for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary
legal formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)
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