Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 1334 Cal
Judgement Date : 22 February, 2023
SAT 2037 of 2001
Item-4. CAN 2 of 2014 (old CAN 5770 of 2014)
22-02-2023
CAN 3 of 2019 (old CAN 8329 of 2019)
sg CAN 4 of 2023
Ct. 8
Amal Mondal
Versus
Sankari Mondal & Ors.
Mr. Falguni Bandyopadhyay, Adv.
Mr. Debabrata Mondal, Adv.
Ms. Sreetama Neogi, Adv.
...for the appellant
In Re: CAN 4 of 2023 and CAN 3 of 2019 (old CAN
8329 of 2019)
There is a delay of 110 days in preferring the application
for restoration of the appeal.
We directed service of copy of the application for
condonation of delay upon the respondents. It seems that the
appellant has simply slept over the matter as the conduct of the
appellant would show that he was not interested in the hearing of
the second appeal. Almost 20 years no attempt was made to
move the second appeal until this matter was listed at the
instance of the Court by directing the Registry to list matters
which had remained unattended for long.
The learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that
in the application for condonation of delay in filing the
application for restoration could not be served upon the
respondent as all the envelopes sent to the respondents/appellants
have been reiterated with the postal remark 'left'. In fact, this
appeal was dismissed for default on 2 nd April, 2019 and the
application for restoration was filed on 31st January, 2023.
We could have dismissed this appeal on other grounds
but since we have decided to hear the matter on merits in order
to find out whether it involves any substantial question of law,
we allow the application for condonation of delay in preferring
the restoration application and the application for restoration of
the appeal.
The appellants states that the delay is of 101 days to
which we do not agree. The computation is erroneous.
In Re: SAT 2037 of 2001 and CAN 2 of 2014 (old CAN 5770 of 2014)
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. In a
suit for cancellation of a deed of gift admittedly executed by an
illiterate person was dismissed by the trial court and the said
decision was reversed by the first appellate court. We have
carefully read the judgements of the trial court as well as the first
appellate court.
In reversing the judgment, the first appellate court has
taken into consideration the fact that Netai the donor was an
illiterate person. The LTI in the impugned deed was attested by
the appellant. It further appears from the evidence that Netai was
mentally and physically unfit for the last 12 years prior to the
execution of the impugned deed. The grounds on which the deed
was challenged were misrepresentation of fact and fraud
committed by the appellant in relation to the execution of the
deed. The plaintiffs are the legal heirs of Netai. The plaintiffs
alleged that taking advantage of the illiteracy of their father and
on a representation being made that the said document would be
required to avail loan, his LTI was obtained form the said
document without the knowledge of the legal heirs of Netai.
When the plaintiff was able to establish the illiteracy of Netai
and his physical ailment, the onus to establish that Netai had
executed the said deed with full knowledge and understanding is
upon the appellant. Curiously, the deed written in vernacular
language did not mention that the contents of the deed were read
over and explained to Netai before execution, which ordinarily is
done by the Deed Writer in order to obtain the consent of the
executor with regard to the contents of the document. In other
words, the mind of the executor should carry with the document
which he is supposed to execute. On the teeth of such evidence,
it was incumbent upon the appellant to produce the Deed Writer
or other convincing evidences. It is submitted that the Deed
Writer possibly was unavailable by the time trial commenced.
However, we could not find any reflection of such submission in
the record of the case. There was no evidence to show that the
Deed Writer was unavailable and hence could not be produced.
There was no evidence of any attending witnesses who could
have proved due execution and mental alertness of the donor at
the time of execution of the said deed.
On such consideration, we do not find any reason to
interfere with the order passed by the first appellate court in
reversing the judgment of the trial.
The appeal fails. However, there shall be no order as to
costs.
CAN 2 of 2014 (old CAN 5770 of 2014) is, accordingly,
dismissed.
(Uday Kumar, J.) (Soumen Sen, J.)
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