Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 4847 Cal
Judgement Date : 8 August, 2023
08.08. 2023
item No.7
n.b.
ct. no. 551 FMA 75 of 2013
With
IA No. CAN 2 of 2015(Old No. CAN 4664 of 2015)
+
CAN 3 of 2023(not in the file)
Sri Drub Saw
Vs.
Basanti Garain & Ors.
Mr. Rajdeep Biswas,
.....for the appellant.
Mr. Rajesh Singh,
...... for the respondent no.5.
Mr. Amal Kumar Banerjee, ...... for the claimant/respondent.
The appeal has been preferred against the judgment
and award dated June 27, 2012 passed by the learned
Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Purulia in MAC
Case No.2 of 2010.
The brief fact of this case is that the claimant
preferred an application under Section 166 of the M. V.
Act before the learned Tribunal for getting compensation
on the ground that their predecessor has died in a road
traffic accident. The Insurance Company contested the
claim case by filing the written statement. The owner of
the truck i.e. opposite party before the learned Tribunal
did not contest the case. The learned Tribunal on perusal
of the rival pleadings of the parties has framed six issues
to decide the claim case. During the trial the evidences
were adduced on behalf of the claimants as well as the
Insurance Company and after hearing the parties, the
learned Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.9,26,000/- in
favour of the claimant towards the compensation and
directed the opposite party no.2/Insurance Company to
pay the same through the Account Payee Cheque and the
Insurance Company was given a liberty to recover the
same from the owner of the Truck on the ground that at
the time of the alleged accident, the offending vehicle had
no valid route permit to ply at the place of accident.
The owner of the truck being aggrieved by and
dissatisfied with the impugned award has preferred this
appeal.
Learned advocate for the appellant (owner) has
submitted that the Insurance Company has raised the
issue by submitting the written statement with the effect
that the alleged offending vehicle had no route permit.
The I.O. has deposed before the learned Tribunal as P.W.
4, who stated before the learned Tribunal that he did not
make investigation in respect of the route permit of the
offending vehicle and during the course of investigation,
the route permit was not seized.
He also argued that the pleadings of the Insurance
Company was not sufficiently proved by the Insurance
Company itself. The Insurance Company should have
produced necessary witnesses to prove the fact that the
offending vehicle had no valid route permit at the time of
accident on the alleged place of occurrence. He again
argued that the Insurance Company has the onus to prove
his pleadings but it was not proved in respect of which the
learned Tribunal has passed the impugned order directing
the Insurance Company to recover the compensation
amount from the owner, which is completely erroneous.
In support of his contention he cited the decision of
Kamala Mangalal Vayani & Ors. Vs. UnitedIndia
Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2010 ACJ 1441,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has decided the issue
with the finding the claimants are not expected to prove
that the vehicle had a valid permit, nor prove that the
owner of the vehicle did not break any of the terms-
insurer open to the concerned transport authority for a
certificate to show that the vehicle did not have a permit
and produce the same as evidence which it failed to do so.
He also cited the decision of Swaran Singh & Ors.
regarding the same issue in respect of fake valid driving
licence. He also cited decisions of Amrit Paul Singh &
Ors. and Laxmi Narain Dhut. By citing the above case
laws of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is argued by the
learned advocate for the appellant that the pleadings as
preferred by the Insurance Company must have to be
proved by producing evidences. The Insurance company
though contested the matter before the learned Tribunal,
but has not produced any document or has not produce
any oral witness to substantiate the claim that the
offending vehicle had no valid route permit on the alleged
date of accident.
On that score, he submitted that the impugned
order passed by the learned Tribunal need be set aside
and the Insurance Company may solely be liable to pay
the compensation amount.
Mr. Singh, learned advocate appearing on behalf of
the Insurance Company submitted before this Court that
the owner of the offending vehicle never appeared before
the learned Tribunal after having received the notice of the
said proceeding. He chose not to appear. Thus, the
Insurance Company has filed the written statement and
the application under Section 170 of the M.V. Act was filed
to contest the claims on all available grounds. The
pleadings was preferred by the Insurance Company by
way of written statement specifically contending, inter
alia, that offending vehicle had no valid route permit. He
submitted before this Court that the ground stated in the
pleadings i.e. written statement is available as a statutory
defence under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. He
submitted before this Court that Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Pappu & Ors. Vs. Vinod Kumar Lamba & Ors.
reported in 2018 SC 592 has specifically held the onus to
prove the existence of a specific document under the
custody of a person otherwise Insurance Company has to
be produced initially by that person. He referred
paragraph 11 of the said judgment read as follows:-
"11. The question is: whether the fact that the offending vehicle bearing No.DIL-5955 was duly insured by Respondent No.2 Insurance Company would per se make the Insurance Company liable? This Court in the case of
National Insurance Co. Ltd. (Supra), has noticed the defences available to the Insurance Company Under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Insurance Company is entitled to take a defence that the offending vehicle was driven by an unauthorised person or the person driving the vehicle did not have a valid driving licence. The onus would shift on the Insurance Company only after the owner of the offending vehicle pleads and proves the basic facts within his knowledge that the driver of the offending vehicle was authorised by him to drive the vehicle and was having a valid driving licence at the relevant time. In the present case, the Respondent No.1 owner of the offending vehicle merely raised a vague plea in the Written Statement that the offending vehicle DIL - 5955 was being driven by a person having valid driving licence. He did not disclose the name of the driver and his other details. Besides, the Respondent No.1 did not enter the witness box or examine any witness in support of this plea. The Respondent No.2 Insurance Company in the Written Statement has plainly refuted that plea and also asserted that the offending vehicle was not driven by an authorised person and having valid driving licence. The Respondent No.1 owner of the offending vehicle did not produce any evidence except a driving licence of one Joginder Singh, without any specific stand taken in the pleadings or in the evidence that the same Joginder Singh was, in fact, authorised to drive the vehicle in question at the relevant time. Only then would onus shift, requiring the Respondent No.2 Insurance Company to rebut such evidence and to produce other evidence to substantiate its defence. Merely producing a valid insurance certificate in respect of the offending Truck was not enough for the Respondent No.1 to make the Insurance Company liable to discharge his liability arising from rash and negligent driving by the driver of his vehicle. The Insurance Company can be fastened with the liability on the basis of a valid insurance policy only after the basic facts are pleaded and established by the owenr of the offending vehicle-that the vehicle was not only duly insured but also that it was driven by an authorised person having a valid driving licence. Without disclosing the name of the driver in the Written Statement or producing any evidence to substantiate the fact that the copy of the driving licence produced in support was of a person who, in fact, was authorised to drive the offending vehicle at the relevant time, the owner of the vehicle cannot be said to have extricated himself from his liability. The Insurance Company would become liable only after such foundational facts are pleaded and proved by the owner of the offending vehicle."
On that score, he argued before this Court that the
Insurance Company has raised the plea, thereafter, the
onus is shifted upon the owner of the offending vehicle to
submit some evidence or document so that the burden
can be shifted back to the Insurance Company to
disapprove the said document. In this case, the owner has
not appeared before the learned Tribunal. The owner has
preferred this appeal. No any specific application was filed
alone with valid route permit by the owner before this
Appellate Court. On this score, it is evident that the
offending vehicle had no valid route permit at the time of
alleged accident. Thus, the impugned award passed by
the learned Tribunal is not perverse. He argued before this
Court that the Learned Tribunal has passed the award on
the basis of the law laid down in the Hon'ble Supreme
Court passed in Challa Bharathamma but the
procedure for execution of the said award need be
categorically followed by the said judgment. He argued
that the owner of the offending vehicle is before this
Appellate Court, so instead of order of pay and recovery
the owner may be directed to pay the compensation.
Heard the learned advocates and perused the
materials on record with entire paper book. It is true that
the owner has not contested the case before the learned
Tribunal. The Insurance Company has submitted written
statement, wherein it has been specifically pleaded that
the vehicle in question had no valid permit on the date of
accident. The claimant being the third party has
produced the evidences to prove the rash and negligent
driving of the offending vehicle and the police papers also
produced before the learned Tribunal, which was
exhibited. The I.O. appeared before the learned Tribunal
as P.W.4, specifically stated that no seizure has been
effected regarding the permit of the offending vehicle and
he also not conducted any investigation to ascertain
whether the offending vehicle had the valid permit at the
alleged time of accident or not.
Now, considering the question before this Court that
whether the pleading filed by the Insurance Company is to
be proved by him or whether the Insurance Company has
no initial burden to prove this fact in the pleading.
It appears to me that the defence available to the
Insurance Company under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act
is the statutory defence by which the Insurance Company
may file written objection/statement on the ground that
the offending vehicle had no valid route permit or the
driver of the offending vehicle did not possess any valid
licence. The route permit was not seized by the police
during the course of investigation that tantamount the
route permit was not there in the offending vehicle at the
time of accident.
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, emumarated
as under:
"106. Burden of proving fact especially within
knowledge.- When any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is
upon him."
The person have a special knowledge must have to
be proved by that person Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
The route permit is within the special knowledge of the
owner. It is true that the owner was not appeared before
the learned Tribunal but it appears that owner is the
appellant in the appeal, which was filed in the year 2013.
The owner had the opportunity to file necessary
application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil
Procedure along with route permit before this Appellate
Court, but the owner has not adopted the procedure. The
appellant kept himself mum, when he has a duty to
speak. This conduct raises the adverse presumption
against the appellant. Consequently, it is apparently
correct that the owner had no valid route permit at the
time of accident. The question regarding the proof of the
pleadings, it appears to me that the route permit is within
the special knowledge of the owner of the vehicle. Thus,
the owner of the vehicle must have to produce the
document initially to disprove the statutory defence of the
Insurance Company. The owner has not adopted the
procedure to file the document and the owner also not
filed an application before this Appellate Court along with
valid route permit that is why the owner could not shifted
the burden initially lies upon him.
Considering the same, it appears to me that
impugned award passed before the learned Tribunal
suffers no illegality. The FMA is dismissed. Furthermore,
the learned Tribunal has passed the impugned award on
the basis of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Challa Bharathamma and directed the
insurance Company to pay the compensation and recover
it from the owner. The Insurance Company has argued
that the owner may be ordered directly to pay the
compensation to the claimant as the claimant is suffering
much for the compensation since the date of accident.
Now, it is necessary to set out the direction to
Supreme Court in Para 13 of Challa Bharathamma.
"13. The residual question is what would be the appropriate direction. Considering the beneficial object of the Act, it would be proper for the insurer to satisfy the award, though in law it has no liability. In some cases the insurer has been given the option and liberty to recover the amount from the insured. For the purpose of recovering the amount paid from the owner, the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the concerned Executive Court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the offending vehicle shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises the Executive Court shall take assistance of the concerned Regional Transport Authority. The Executing Court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default it shall be open to the Executing Court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle i.e. the insured. In the instant case considering the quantum involved we leave it to the discretion of the insurer to decide whether it would take steps for recovery of the amount from the insure."
Considering the same, I think it necessary that the
procedure as enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Challa Bharathamma is to be strictly followed and the
procedure for submission of security must also have to be
followed by the appellant within 8 weeks before the
Tribunal. The Insurance Company shall pay the
compensation to the claimant within 10 weeks from the
date of passing of this order through the office of the
Tribunal; failing which, the Tribunal is directed to proceed
against the owner of the vehicle on the basis of an
application of this Insurance Company by freezing the
Bank Account, or by seizing moveable or immovable of the
owner.
Accordingly, the instant appeal is disposed of.
Connected all applications, if any, are also disposed
of.
All parties shall act on the server copy of this order
duly downloaded from the official website of this Court.
(Subhendu Samanta, J.)
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