Calcutta High Court
Ram Nath Jhunjhunwala vs Saha & Company on 12 April, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction)
ORIGINAL SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Krishna Rao
IA No: GA 2 of 2022
In CS 156 of 2017
Ram Nath Jhunjhunwala
Versus
Saha & Company
Mr. Debnath Ghosh
Mr. Sarosij Dasgupta
Ms. Saheli Bose
Mr. Biswaroop Mukherjee
Ms. Smita Mukherjee
... for the plaintiff.
Mr. Rishad Medora
Mr. Abhirup Chakraborty
... for the defendant.
Hearing concluded on : 27.03.2023
Judgment on : 12.04.2023
Krishna Rao, J.:
The plaintiff has filed the instant application for pronouncement of
final Judgment against the defendant under Chapter XIIIA of the Original
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Side Rules of this Court for recovery of vacant, peaceful, khas and physical
possession of the suit premises being premises No. 207, Maharshi Debendra
Road, Kolkata - 700007. The trustees of one Ganpatrai Khemka Charitable
Trust, granted lease to Radha Kishan Jhunjhunwala (since deceased) i.e. the
predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, by an indenture of lease dated 23rd
April, 1962, which was duly registered before the Registrar of Assurance,
Calcutta in the year 1962, in consideration of monthly rent, reserved and
secured therein, in respect of suit property for a period of 51 years, with the
option for renewal for a further period of 20 years, from the date of expiry of
the said term of 51 years, with the condition that the said Radha Kishan
Jhunjhunwala shall build a permanent structure upon such demised
premises. Plaintiff has exercised his option to extend its original lease for
another 20 years, and the same is still subsisting.
The Trustees of Ganpatrai Khemka Charitable Trust transferred the
ownership right of the said premises to one Jhunjhunwala Resorts Limited
by way of four Deed of Conveyances in the year 1992. Radha Kishan
Jhunjhunwala continued as lessee under the Jhunjhunwala Resorts
Limited, on the same terms and conditions as contemplated in the lease of
1962. Radha Kishan Jhunjhunwala entered into an oral agreement with the
defendant, for a sub-lease and sub-demise open space, being the suit
premises for a period of 21 years commencing from 31st December, 1994.
The said Radha Kishan Jhunjhunwala died on 13th October, 1996. In
terms of the Will dated 30th March, 1981, the plaintiff being the sole
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executor is managing the entire estate, including the premises left behind by
the Radha Kishan Jhunjhunwala.
The plaintiff herein had executed a formal registered Indenture of
Lease Deed dated 21st January, 1997 in favour of the defendant for a period
of 21 years from 31st December, 1994. The sub-lease dated 21st January,
1997 was given effect and the period of 21 years was completed on 1st
January, 2016 and thus the lease terminated by efflux of time. Before expiry
of lease period, the plaintiff had issued a notice dated 5th October, 2015 to
the defendant calling upon the defendant to vacate the suit premises and to
hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff upon completion of
the period of 21 years. In the said notice, the plaintiff also informed to the
defendant, that in default, suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted.
Inspite of receipt of notice and termination of lease, the defendant has not
vacated the suit property.
Mr. Debnath Ghosh, Learned Advocate, representing the plaintiff
submits that the defendant has no defence whatsoever to the claim of the
plaintiff. He further submits that the defendant has not filed written
statement till date.
Mr. Ghosh submits that the defence raised by the defendant with
regard to the overvaluation of the suit cannot deter this Hon'ble Court from
passing a summary judgment. He further submits that acceptance of plea of
overvaluation alleged by the defendant would encourage the tenant to
permit him to carry on a dilatory litigation without compensating the
landlord for the loss suffered by the landlord.
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Mr. Ghosh submits that the defendant has raised the ground that the
suit property is a Thika property but the said plea will not stand as both
applications filed by the defendant before the Thika Controller as well as the
notice for spot verification issued by the Thika Controller are subsequent to
the institution of the instant suit for eviction.
Mr. Ghosh submits that the defendant has relied upon an Indenture
of Lease Deed dated 14th January, 1974 which also reveals that the
defendant has inducted in the suit property as lessee by the plaintiff and the
defendant has made payment of rent to the plaintiff.
Mr. Ghosh relied upon Section 116 of the Evidence Act and submits
that rule of estoppel between the landlord and the tenant has three main
features that is (i) the tenant is estopped from disputing the title of his
landlord over the tenanted premises at the beginning of the tenancy, (ii)
such estoppel continues to operate so long as tenancy continues and unless
the tenant has surrendered possession of the tenanted premises to the
landlord and (iii) Section 116 of the Evidence Act is not the whole law of
estoppel between the landlord and the tenant. The principles emerging from
Section 116 can be extended in their application and also suitably adapted
to suit, the requirement of an individual case.
Mr. Ghosh submits that defendant has paid rent to the plaintiff in
respect of the suit property as per lease deed and by reasons whereof,
cannot deny the title of the plaintiff in the suit property subsequently. He
further submits that the assessment book of the Central Record Department
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of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation reveals that the suit property was
described as house and shop.
Mr. Ghosh relied upon following judgments :
i. (1976) 1 SCC 295 (M/s Mulavi Abdur Rub Firoze & Co. -vs- Jay
Krishna Arora).
ii. (2002) 2 SCC 50 (Vashu Deo -vs- Balkishan).
iii. (1987) 3 SCC 705 (Nandita Bose -vs- Ratanlal Nahata).
iv. 2015 (4) CHN 213 (Amala Palit and Others -vs- Ratna Bose and
Others).
v. 2006 SCC Online Cal 441 (Prakashwati Chopra -vs- Sibaji Mitra).
vi. (Nimai Chandra Kumar (D) Through LRS & Ors. -vs- Mani Square
Ltd. & Ors.).
Per contra, Mr. Rishad Medora, learned Advocate representing the
defendant submits that this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain,
try, determine or adjudicate the present suit. He further submits that this
Court does not have any pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by
the plaintiff and thus the application filed by the plaintiff is required to be
dismissed.
Mr. Medora submits that the defendant is a Thika tenant of the suit
property and any dispute whether the defendant is a Thika tenant or not is
the subject matter of the Thika Controller under the provisions of WBTT (A
&R) Act, 2001 as amended. He submits that the subject property of the
present suit is within the area of Posta Market whereas most of the
businesses structures have already been approved by the Learned Thika
Controller.
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Mr. Medora submits that the fact of construction of the structure on
the subject land on the southern side of premises No. 207, Maharshi
Debendra Road, Kolkata was within the knowledge of the erstwhile landlord
at all material point of time. That the defendant complied with all legal
requirements as laid down in Section 2(5) and 3(8) of the Calcutta Thika
Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 respectively and the
defendant comes within the purview of Thika Act. Mr. Medora submits that
the plaintiff has valued the suit on the basis of the existing market value of
the premises but the plaintiff has filed the suit for eviction on the ground of
efflux of time and thus the suit ought to have been valued under the
provisions of Section 7(XII) of the West Bengal Court fees Act, 1970. He
submits that the monthly rent of the premises is Rs. 2000/- per month
inclusive of maintenance charges at the time of filing of the suit and thus
the valuation of the suit ought to have been Rs. 24,000/- but the plaintiff
has overvalued the suit property as per market rate.
Mr. Medora submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred under
Section 21 of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (A&R) Act, 2001 and thus no
order can be passed in the present application.
Mr. Medora relied upon following judgments:
i. (2022) 10 SCC 1 (Patil Automation -vs- Rakheja Engineers).
ii. AIR 1930 Cal 42 (Govinda Kumar Sur & Ors. -vs- Mohini Mohan
Sen & Ors.).
iii. 1999 SCC Online Cal 464 (Nellimarla Jute Mills Company Ltd. -
vs- Rampuria Industries & Investments Ltd.).
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iv. 2017 SCC Online Cal 19153 (Prabash Aich and Another -vs- Sri
Shiv Shankar Aich and Others).
In paragraph 21 of the plaint, the plaintiff had specified the value of
the suit property at Rs. 3.57 crores being the market value of the suit
property. The plaintiff has shown the said value as per the valuation report
of Talbot & Co. In the case of M/s Maulavi Abdur Rub Firoze Ahmed &
Co. (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that :
"4. Under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887,
except in few exceptions mentioned therein, the value of the
suit for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction is the same
Under Section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 the amount
of court fee payable in a suit for the recovery of immovable
property from a tenant is on the amount of rent for the suit
premises payable for the year next before the date of
presenting the plaint. If the suit were to be instituted in a court
to which the two acts would apply the value of the suit both
for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fee will be the
amount of rent payable during the preceding 12 months. But
on the original civil side of the Calcutta High Court the
procedure followed and the law applicable is different.
5. In the instant case the rental was about Rs 110 per
month. On that basis the value of the suit ought to have been
Rs 1320 only. That being so the suit, according to the
contention of the appellant, was entertainable only by the city
civil court and not by the High Court. The argument so
presented does not, however, stand scrutiny. Within the local
limits of ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Calcutta High
Court the legislature thought to provide that if the value of the
suit exceeded Rs 10,000 it was only entertainable by the High
Court at Calcutta. If the value was below Rs 10,000 the city
civil court only will have the jurisdiction. But apart from the
value of the suit if the value of the suit premises of which the
recovery of possession is claimed exceeds Rs 10,000 then the
city civil court will have no jurisdiction to try such a suit. Only
the High Court can entertain such a suit. The intention of the
legislature seems to be that if the value of the premises
exceeds Rs 10,000 then irrespective of the value of the suit,
the suit can be entertained only by the High Court and not by
the city civil court.
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6. But that apart, we may also rest our judgment on a
simple basis. Assuming the plaintiff could have valued his suit
at Rs 1320 but he chose to value it in accordance with the
value of the suit premises, there was nothing in law to compel
him to put the lower valuation and not the higher. The value of
the suit premises mentioned in the plaint cannot be said to be
contrary to law and the plaintiff is not obliged to put the 12
months' rental value. In the instant case the plaintiff asserted
in his plaint that the value of the suit premises exceeded Rs
10,000. The defendant asserted in its written statement that
the suit was "under-valued"; it ought to have been valued at
the amount of one year's rent. Perhaps the use of the word
"under-valued" is a mistake for the word "over-valued". The
statement in the plaint being squarely in accordance with the
law and not contrary to it, the High Court was the proper
forum for the institution and trial of the suit. The plaint could
not be instituted in the city civil court."
In the case of Nellimarla Jute Mills Company Ltd. (Supra), the
Division Bench of this Court held that:
"7. It has been stated that the suit has been valued on
the basis of the market value of the property under Section
7(vi)(a) of the West Bengal Court Fees Act, 1970 which reads
thus:--
"(vi)--In a suit for recovery of possession of immovable
property form--
(a) a trespasser, where no declaration of title to property
is either prayed for or necessary for disposal of the
suit--according to the amount at which the relief
sought is valued in the plaint subject to the
provisions of Section 11."
8. Under the Court Fees Act law as also under the West
Bengal Court Fees Act suit has to be valued in terms of the
provision thereof. A suit for recovery of immovable property
from a tenant including tenant holding over after the
determination of the tenancy, a suit for eviction of tenant
would still be a suit between the Landlord and Tenant, not a
suit between the owner and a rank trespasser.
18. It is true that for the purpose of valuation of a suit for
determination of the Court fees payable thereon, the
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averments made and the reliefs sought for in the plaint
determines the character of the suit. Clause (v)(a) of Section 7
of the West Bengal Court Fees Act cannot, thus, be said to be
applicable in this case as the same is applicable where a suit
is filed against the defendant who was a trespasser from the
very beginning. The word 'trespasser' has a variable meaning
and it is used in different context in different statutes. So far
as the West Bengal Court Fees Act is concerned, the word
'trespasser' must mean a trespasser from the very beginning
and not a trespasser who had original title but lost the title
because of efflux of time by reason of an agreement between
the parties of by operation of law."
Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court while deciding the case of
Nellimarla Jute Mills Company Ltd. (supra), the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Maulavi Abdur Rub Firoze
Ahmed (Supra), was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Division
Bench. In view of the settled position of law, this Court finds that the
plaintiff has properly valued the suit property.
The defendant has enclosed an Indenture of Lease Deed dated 14th
January, 1974 which reveals that the defendant has been inducted in the
suit property as a lessee by the plaintiff and the defendant has paid rent to
the plaintiff. No tenant or lessee or licensee of an immovable property can be
permitted to deny the title of the landlord to such immovable property. In
the present suit admittedly, the defendant has made payment of rent to the
plaintiff for long period as a lessee in respect of the suit property and never
raised any dispute with regard to the title of the plaintiff. In the judgment
reported in the case of Vashu Deo (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that :
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"Section 116 of the Evidence Act, which qualifies
the common-law rule of estoppel between landlord and
tenant, provides that no tenant of immovable property or
person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the
continuance of the tenancy be permitted to deny that the
landlord of such tenant had at the beginning of the
tenancy, a title to such immovable property. The rule of
estoppel so enacted has three main features: (i) the
tenant is stopped from disputing the title of his landlord
over the tenancy premises at the beginning of the
tenancy, (ii) such estoppel continues to operate so long
as the tenancy continues and unless the tenant has
surrendered possession to the landlord and (iii) Section
116 of the Evidence Act is not the whole law of estoppel
between the landlord and tenant. The principles
emerging from Section 116 can be extended in their
application and also suitably adapted to suit the
requirement of an individual case. Rule of estoppel
which governs an owner of an immovable property and
his tenant would also mutatis mutandis govern a tenant
and his sub-tenant in their relationship inter-se. As held
by the Privy Council in Currimbhoy & Co. Ltd. -vs -L.A.
Creet and Bilas Kunwar -vs- Desraj Ranjit Singhthe
estoppel continues to operate so long as the tenant has
not openly restored possession by surrender to his
landlord. It follows that the rule of estoppel ceases to
have applicability once tenant has been evicted."
The defendant has filed applications before the Thika Controller and
the notice for a spot verification issued by the Thika Controller are
subsequent to the filing of the present suit for eviction by the plaintiff. In the
case of Amala Palit (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court held
that mere deposit of rent with the Thika Controller cannot ipso facto create a
Thika tenancy.
In the case of Nemai Chandra Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that:
"28. The suggestion that the expression "any structure",
in its plain meaning ought to be construed as inclusive of all
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structures whether kutcha or pucca, needs to be rejected for
a variety of reasons.
28.1. In the Act of 1949 as originally enacted, even
though the expression "any structure" had been used but, it
was consistently maintained by the Calcutta High Court with
reference to the object and purpose of Act of 1949 and its
frame that, the definition of "thika tenant" would not
include pucca structure because the enactment was
otherwise not dealing with the rights and liabilities of the
tenant, for which the provisions of Transfer of Property Act
were required to be referred to; and such a proposition was
also in accord with Section 2(6) of the Act of 1949; and per
Section 108(p) of the Transfer of Property Act,
a pucca structure was not permissible. In Jatadhari Daw
& Grandsons (supra), the Division Bench of the High Court,
even while construing the Act of 1981, proceeded on the same
lines and held that the expression "structure" in the statute
did not include permanent structure.
28.2. The Full Bench of the High Court in Lakshmimoni
Das (supra) meticulously examined variegated aspects of the
matter and various provisions of enactments and also
different pronouncements while holding that construction
of kutcha structure on the lease hold land was a sine qua
non for constituting thika tenancy. We find such
interpretation to be in accord with the very object and purpose
of these enactments, at least until the enforcement of the
Amendment Act of 2010 w.e.f. 01.11.2010; and the
submission of learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 based
on the doctrine of stare decisis deserves to be accepted that
the interpretation of this particular term "any structure", which
has been holding field for more than half a century ought not
to be disturbed or unsettled. In Shanker Raju (supra) this
Court had held that:--
"10. It is a settled principle of law that a judgment,
which has held the field for a long time, should not be
unsettled. The doctrine of stare decisis is expressed in
the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, which
means "to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is
settled". Lord Coke aptly described this in his classic
English version as "those things which have been so
often adjudged ought to rest in peace". The underlying
logic of this doctrine is to maintain consistency and
avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view
which has held the field for a long time should not be
disturbed only because another view is possible...."
28.3. There are several indications which unfailingly lead
to the conclusion that "any structure" which was employed in
the Act of 1949 and was further employed in the Act of 1981
and also in the Act of 2001 for the purpose of creation
of thika tenancy referred only to kutcha structure until the
year 2010. The first and foremost indication comes from the
amendment of the Act of 1949 by Act of XXIX of 1969
whereby clause (4a) was inserted to Section 2 and then
Section 10A was inserted to the enactment which, in effect,
invested a right in the thika tenant to erect
a pucca structure when using the land in question for a
residential purpose but only with permission of the Controller.
If pucca structure was a part of the definition
of thika tenant in clause (5) of Section 2, Section 10A was
never required to be inserted to the Act of 1949. Then, in the
Act of 1981, even when the legislature provided for acquisition
of land comprised in thika tenancy and other lands, the
principal part of the definition of thika tenant remained the
same; only the other three exclusion conditions, as occurring in
clause (5) of Section 2 of the Act of 1949 were removed.
However, the Act of 1981, as originally enacted, never
provided for creation of thika tenancy by the event of tenant
erecting or acquiring by purchase or gift, any pucca structure.
28.4. Of course, by amendment of Section 5 by the
Amendment Act of 1993, it was introduced that even "other
land" under lease could be acquired but, the purpose and
object of the enactment did not provide for such a broad and
all-pervading legislative fiat. This aspect of the matter does
not require any further elaboration in the present case for the
fundamental reason that claim of the appellants had only
been of thika tenancy and when they do not answer to the
description of thika tenant, there would arise no question of
operation of Section 5 of the Act of 1981, whether in its
unamended form or in its amended form.
28.5. Significant it is to notice that even in the Act of 2001,
as originally enacted, the definition of thika tenancy in
clause (14) of Section 2 thereof retained more or less the same
expressions as were there in the Act of 1981; and the
expression "any structure including pucca structure" came to
be inserted to this clause only by the Amendment Act of 2010.
Moreover, the Amendment Act of 2010 was given only
prospective effect from 01.11.2010 and not the retrospective
effect, as was earlier given to the original Section 4 of the Act
of 2001. Thus, acquisition of the land
comprising thika tenancy with even erection or acquisition
of pucca structure by the thika tenant came to be provided
for in specific terms by the legislature only from 01.11.2010
and not before. As noticed, before 01.11.2010, so far as the
lease in question was concerned, the same had ceased to
subsist and there was no existing lease which could have
taken the appellants within the frame of thika tenancy on
01.11.2010."
In the present case, the building situated at the premises is a multi-
storied building and thus it cannot be said to Thika tenancy.
In the case reported in 2006 SCC Online Cal 441 (Prakashwati
Chopra -vs- Sibaji Mitra), the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has
decided the following three questions:
"22. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned Counsel appearing for the parties. We are of the view
that the questions which fall for consideration are:--
(a) "whether the defendant is a tenant within the meaning
of the provisions of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1997?"
(b) Whether application for summary judgment was
entertainable? and
(c) "Whether leave should have been granted to defend in
the facts and circumstances of the case?"
29. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in those cases
where the lease expired by efflux of time but the lessee is
continuing in possession he/she would not come within the
purview of the definition of a "tenant" under Section 2(g) of the
Act of 1997. The judgment in the case of Shyam
Charan (supra) does not really lend any assistance in
resolving the controversy involved in the present case because
the, Act of, 1997 has to be construed in its own background
and not in a syllogistical manner as suggested by Mr. Thorat.
The first point is thus answered in the negative. Once the first
question formulated above is answered the principal
contention of Mr. Thorat is taken care of, There is thus no
question of any bar being applicable to the entertainability of
the present suit and this Court was naturally competent to
receive, try and determine the suit.
30. The submission of Mr. Thorat that the learned Judge
was wrong in proceeding on the basis that the defendant is a
trespasser after expiry of the lease is not in our view
significant because that is a question of legal status of the
defendant/appellant after expiry of the, lease. What was
significant is whether the case comes within the purview of
Chapter-13A of the Original Side Rules. We already have
quoted Rule 1 of Chapter-XIIIA of the Original Side Rules. It
would appear that a suit for recovery of immovable property
with or without a claim for mesne profit by, a landlord against
tenant whose term has expired is specifically provided for. The
second question formulated above is thus answered in the
affirmative.
33. Mr. thorat is justified in commenting that the probate
was obtained sometime in the years 2004-2005 whereas the
suit was filed in 2002, Therefore, the suit could have been
filed earlier by the executor. There is no gainsaying that the
plaintiff could have filed the suit earlier but the fact that the
plaintiff did not do so, that alone will not go to show that the
plaintiff assented to the continuance of the defendant's
tenancy. Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that huge
property in the heart of the city let out for Rs. 850/- per month
cannot be allowed to be continued by anyone if he can help it.
It is, therefore, all the more difficult to infer that the plaintiff
assented to the continuance of the possession of the
defendant. The requirement of Section 116 of the Transfer of
Property Act is actual acceptance of rent or otherwise assent.
Therefore, what is required is a bilateral transaction.
Unilaterally the defendant/tenant cannot make this to happen
nor is sufferance the same as an assent. There has to be
meeting of minds on the same point which was not even
alleged by the defendant in her affidavit-in-opposition on the
basis whereof leave to defend could have been granted. The
third question is thus answered in the negative."
In the present case, the defendant has taken three defences i.e (i) the
suit is overvalued and this Court is not having jurisdiction, (ii) the property
is a Thika Property and (iii) the defendant has already initiated proceeding
before the Thika Controller.
As regard the point of overvaluation, the plaintiff has assessed the
value of the suit property as per the market rate and not as per the
monthly rent stated by the defendant. In the case of M/s Maulavi Abdur
Rub Firoze Ahmed & Co. (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in
the instant case, the plaintiff asserted in his plaint that the value of the suit
premises exceeded Rs.10,000/-. The defendant asserted in its written
statement that the suit was "under-valued", it ought to have been valued at
the amount of one year's rent. Perhaps the use of the word "under-valued"
is a mistake for the word "over-valued". The statement in the plaint being
squarely in accordance with the law and not contrary to it, the High Court
was the proper forum for the institution and trial of the suit. The plaint
could not be instituted in the City Civil Court. Thus the defence of the
defendant is not sustainable.
As regard to the Thika Tenancy, the defendant has filed an application
under Section 5 (3) read with Section 9, 10 and 11 of the West Bengal Thika
Tenant (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001, the defendant has filed the
said application before the Rent Controller, Kolkata Thika Tenancy on 11th
October, 2017 i.e. after expiry of the lease period and even after institution
of the present suit. The defendant has not filed any documents which would
show the said premises are Thika property. The Assessment Book of the
Central Record Department of Kolkata Municipal Corporation reveals that
the suit property was described as house and shop. The plaintiff and
predecessors-in-interest have paid adequate tax in terms of the West Bengal
Multistoried Building Tax Act, 1975. In the case of Amala Palit & Ors.
(supra), the Hon'ble Court held that that mere deposit of rent with the Thika
Controller cannot ipso facto create a Thika tenancy.
The plaintiff, before expiry of lease period, had issued a notice dated
5th October, 2015 to the defendant calling upon the defendant to vacate the
suit premises and to handover possession of the premises to the plaintiff
upon completion of the period of 21 years. In the said notice, the plaintiff
also informed to the defendant that in default suit for recovery of possession
shall be instituted. In spite of receipt of notice and termination of lease, the
defendant has not vacated the suit property. It is also found from record
that the defendant though had received writ of summons but had not filed
written statement.
In view of the above, this Court finds that the defence set up by the
defendant is illusory and sham, thus the plaintiff is entitled to get decree in
terms of prayer (a) of the Masters Summons.
As regard to prayer (b) of the Masters Summons for mesne profit, an
enquiry is required to be conducted. Mr. Suddhastava Banerjee, Learned
Advocate is appointed as Special Officer to enquire into the mesne profit and
to submit report before this Court.
The remuneration of the Special Officer is fixed Rs. 4,00,000/-
(Rupees Four Lakhs only). Initially the plaintiff shall pay the remuneration
to the Special Officer and the same be recovered from the defendant.
G.A. No. 2 of 2022 is thus disposed of. Decree be drawn accordingly.
(Krishna Rao, J.)
