Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Mahadeb Chandra Paul vs Union Of India & Ors on 18 April, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present :-
Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Sen
W.P.A No. 30914W of 2017
Mahadeb Chandra Paul
-Versus-
Union of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arup Kumar Lahiri, Adv.,
Mr. Udayan Datta, Adv.
For the Respondent : Mr. Kumar Jyoti Tewari, Adv.
Heard on: : 11.04.2023
Judgment on. : 18.04.2023
PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J. : -
1. By filing the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India the writ petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order of removal dated
September 6, 2016 as issued by the office of the Commandant-167, CRPF,
47, Stand Road, Calcutta, West Bengal and as approved by the Appellate
Authority vide its order dated October 27 , 2016 and by the Reviewing
Authority by its order dated March 9, 2017. On perusal of the entire
materials as placed before this Court it reveals that the present writ petitioner
was charged with guilt of misconduct on two scores namely:-
i. That the writ petitioner joined CRPF on the basis of a
discharge certificate issued by the Army in which his date of
discharge has been written as 20.02.1993 whereas it reveals
during enquiry that he was actually discharged from the
Army on 20.02.1991;
ii. At the time of joining in CRPF he had changed the date of
joining in the Army to 14.08.1986 and the date of discharge
from the army on 20.02.1993 whereas in course of enquiry it
reveals that the writ petitioner joined the Army on 14.08.1984
and discharged from Army on 20.02.1991.
2. It reveals that during disciplinary proceeding both the aforementioned two
charges have been duly proved as against the present writ petitioner and
accordingly by an order dated September 6, 2016 he was awarded
punishment of removal from service along with other allied punishments.
3. The writ petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal before the Appellate
Authority but the Appellate Authority by its order dated October 27, 2016
dismissed the said appeal which was also affirmed by the Reviewing Authority
by its order dated March 9, 2017.
4. Mr. A.K Lahiri, learned advocate for the writ petitioner at the very outset
draws attention of this court to the charges as framed against the writ
petitioner. Attention of this Court is also drawn to the enquiry report as
submitted by the respondents/authorities as against the writ petitioner. Mr.
Lahiri also draws attention of this Court to the three impugned orders as
passed respondent/authorities against the writ petitioner.
5. It is submitted by Mr. Lahiri that from the findings of the disciplinary
authority it would reveal that the said disciplinary authority has assigned no
reason whatsoever as to how the charges have been proved against the
present writ petitioner. It is further argued that the disciplinary authority
being a quasi-judicial authority is bound to disclose in clear terms as to how
it has arrived at a decision as against the present writ petitioner and in not
doing so the principles of natural justice has been violated.
6. Mr. Lahiri further contended that in absence of any cogent material, the
disciplinary authority is not supposed to come to a finding that the charges
as framed against the writ petitioner have been proved. It is argued further
that after putting 22 years of service in CRPF, the respondents/authorities be
debarred from raising the issue that the entry of the writ petitioner in CRPF
was not valid. It is further argued by Mr. Lahiri that on account of long
silence on the part of the respondents/authorities over the alleged
misconduct of the present writ petitioner, if there be any, it can be presumed
that the respondents /authorities had knowledge of the alleged misconduct of
the present writ petitioner and since no disciplinary proceeding has been
initiated immediately after getting knowledge of such misconduct it can be
safely be presumed that the respondents/authorities has actually acquiesced
to the alleged misconduct, of the present writ petitioner.
7. It is further argued by Mr. Lahiri, learned advocate for the present writ
petitioner that it is a fit case for allowing the instant writ petition quashing
the findings of the disciplinary authority dated September 6, 2016, findings of
the Appellate Authority dated October 27, 2016 and the decision of the
Reviewing Authority dated March 9, 2017.
8. Mr. Lahiri in course of his argument places his reliance upon the
following reported decisions:-
1. Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs The Collector, District Raigad & Ors
reported in AIR 2012 SC 1339;
2. P.D Agarwal vs. State Bank of India and Ors reported in (2006) 5
SCC715;
3. Anil Kumar vs, Presiding Officer and Ors. reported in (1985) 3 SCC
378;
4. The Nayagarh Co-Operative vs. Narayan Rath And Anr. Reported
in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 112; and
5. Joint Collector Ranga Reddu District and Anr. Vs. D. Narsing Rao
and Ors. reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695.
9. Per contra, Mr. Kumar Jyoti Tewari, learned advocate for the
respondent/State at the very outset draws attention of this Court to the
Annexure P8 to the writ petition i.e. the finding of the Reviewing Authority
dated March 9, 2017. It is argued by Mr. Tewari that from the materials as
placed before this Court it would reveal that the present writ petitioner was
recruited in CRPF in ex-service men quota and one of the prime conditions for
his appointment was that his reappointment shall have to be within 24
months from the date of discharge from Army service.
10. It is submitted by Mr. Tewari that in course of disciplinary proceeding, it
reveals that the present writ petitioner could not come under the
consideration zone for his recruitment in CRPF since he was actually
discharged from the Army on February 20, 1991 whereas he was recruited in
the CRPF in ex-service men quota on 02.09.1994 which is beyond two years.
It is submitted by Mr. Tewari that in course of enquiry it reveals that the
present writ petitioner joined Indian Army on 14.08.1984 and was discharged
from the Indian Army on 20.02.1991 as evident from his discharge book as
issued by the Indian Army while in the discharge certificate as submitted by
the writ petitioner during his induction in CRPF the date of joining of the writ
petitioner in the Army has been written as 14.08.1986 and his date of
discharge from the Indian Army was written as 20.02.1993
11. It is argued by Mr. Tewari that the writ petitioner for the reason best
known to him suppressed his actual date of joining and date of discharge
in/from the Indian Army and the same was detected when the present writ
petitioner after completing 22 years of service in CRPF made an application
for going on VRS for getting VQS of his service to be done in the Head Office
167 Battalion . It is thus argued by Mr. Tewari that since the very entry of the
present writ petitioner in the CRPF was based on fraud, misrepresentation
and malafideness on the part of the present writ petitioner the disciplinary
authority , the Appellate Authority as well as the Reviewing Authority are
justified in imposing the punishment upon the present writ petitioner. It is
further argued by Mr. Tewari that as soon as the misconduct of the present
writ petitioner was detected, appropriate departmental action has been taken
by the respondents/authorities and therefore under no stretch of imagination
it can be said that there was acquiescence on the part of the respondents/
authorities to the misconduct of the present writ petitioner. It is further
argued by Mr. Tewari that it is a fit case for dismissal of the instant writ
petition. In course of his argument Mr. Tewari places his reliance upon the
following reported decisions namely; Ram Saran vs. I.G of Police CRPF
reported in (2006) 2 SCC 541.
12. Before entering into the merit of the instant writ petition I propose to look
to the law of the land with regard to the power and authority of the Writ
Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in interfering with the decision of the departmental authorities. In the
reported decision of High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shaskikant
S. Patil and Anr. reported in (2000)1 SCC 416 the Hon'ble Apex Court
expressed the following view:-
"16...................................................................................
Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be
permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the
principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations
prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the
authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on
the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no
reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or
grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of
the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been
properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some
legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or
even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before
the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution.."
13. It thus reveals to this Court that a Writ Court while dealing with a case
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking interference with the
decisions of the disciplinary authorities ought to have kept into mind that the
role of a Writ Court is not that of a Court of Appeal and therefore a Writ Court
while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
is not permitted to scan the evidence like an Appellate Court however
interference to the decision of the Disciplinary Authority is permitted only
when it is found that in course of disciplinary proceeding there occurred
gross violation of principle of natural justice or Disciplinary Authority acted
in such a manner which is impermissible in the eye of law or that the
delinquent had not given an opportunity of hearing or that the Disciplinary
Authority acted in an arbitrary manner which is apparent on the face of the
record.
14. On perusal of the entire materials as placed before this Court and after
hearing the learned advocates for the contending parties it appears to this
Court that from the service book of the present writ petitioner it would reveal
that the date of joining of the writ petitioner in the Army was 14.09.1984 and
the date of discharge from the Army was 20.02.1991 and since he joined in
CRPF in ex-service man quota on 02.09.1993 which is beyond two years, he
could not have come under the consideration zone unless he filed the
incorrect certificate of discharge from where it appears that his date of
joining has been written as 14.09.1986 and date of discharge has been
written as 20.02.1991 and such discrepancy was detected when the writ
petitioner had applied for VRS after serving in CRPF for 22 years.
15. Being a member of disciplined force it is expected that the present writ
petitioner must know his actual date of joining and date of discharge from the
Army and therefore it is expected that he was duty bound to bring to the
notice of the discrepancy of his date of joining in the Army and date of
discharge from the Army as mentioned in the certificate as issued to him and
in not doing so, in considered view of this Court he had deliberately violated
the discipline of the CRPF and inspite of getting opportunity he failed to
discharge his onus to explain the irregularity in the certificate as produced by
him during his entry in CRPF.
16. This Court considers that since the very entry of the writ petitioner in the
CRPF is illegal and since before this Writ Court nothing could be placed by
the writ petitioner to show that violation of principles of natural justice or
violation of statutory regulations regarding the mode of enquiry as held
against him has occurred, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the
order of removal of the present writ petitioner from CRPF.
17. In this regard reliance can be placed upon the reported decision of Ram
Saran (supra) as cited from the side of the respondents wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court expressed the following views:-
"8. The Courts should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless
it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral
standards. In view of what has been stated in (CA) Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223: [1947] 2 All
ER 680(CA) commonly known as Wednesbury's case the Court would not go
into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him
and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator.
The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making
process and not the decision. (See: V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC and Ors.,
[2005] 7 SCC 338).
9. In R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala and Ors., [2004] 2 SCC 105 it
was observed as follows:
It was then contended by Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant that since the appellant has rendered about 27 years of service,
the order of dismissal be substituted by an order of compulsory retirement
or removal from service to protect the pensionary benefits of the appellant.
We do not find any substance in this submission as well. The rights to
salary, pension and other service benefits are entirely statutory in nature in
public service. The appellant obtained the appointment against a post
meant for a reserved candidate by producing a false caste certificate and
by playing a fraud. His appointment to the post was void and non est in the
eye of the law. The right to salary or pension after retirement flows from a
valid and legal appointment. The consequential right of pension and
monetary benefits can be given only if the appointment was valid and legal.
Such benefits cannot be given in a case where the appointment was found
to have been obtained fraudulently and rested on a false caste certificate. A
person who entered the service by producing a false caste certificate and
obtained appointment for the post meant for a Scheduled Caste, thus
depriving a genuine Scheduled Caste candidate of appointment to that post,
does not deserve any sympathy or indulgence of this Court. A person who
seeks equity must come with clean hands. He, who comes to the court with
false claims, cannot plead equity nor would the court be justified to exercise
equity jurisdiction in his favour. A person who seeks equity must act in a
fair and equitable manner. Equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the
case of a person who got the appointment on the basis of a false caste
certificate by playing a fraud. No sympathy and equitable consideration can
come to his rescue. We are of the view that equity or compassion cannot be
allowed to bend the arms of law in a case where an individual acquired a
status by practising fraud."
Though the case related to a false caste certificate, the logic indicated
clearly applies to the present case."
18. In considered view of this Court the cited decisions from the side of the
writ petitioner are of no use since those reported decisions have been
delivered in a completely different circumstances.
19. On perusal of the entire materials as placed before this Court, this Court
finds no inordinate delay in initiating the departmental proceeding against
the writ petitioner at the instance of the respondents/authorities.
20. This court also finds no acquiescence on the part of the
respondents/authorities to the misconduct of the present writ petitioner.
21. This court thus finds no merit in the instant writ petition and accordingly
the instant writ petition is dismissed.
22. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be given
to the parties on completion of usual formalities.
(Partha Sarathi Sen, J.)
