M/S. South Bengal Automobiles And ... vs Union Of India And Others
2022 Latest Caselaw 5287 Cal

                            In the High Court at Calcutta
                           Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
                                    Appellate Side

     The Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

                               W.P.A. No. 22570 of 2016
                                         With
                                    CAN 2 of 2021

                    M/s. South Bengal Automobiles and another
                                     Vs.
                            Union of India and others



         For the petitioners            :     Mr. Sarajit Sen,
                                              Mr. Sasanka Kr. Mandal
                                              Mr. Anirudha Lahiri

         For the State                  :     Mr. Billwadal Bhattacharyya,
                                              Mr. Amal Kumar Datta

         Hearing concluded on           :     05.08.2022

         Judgment on                    :     11.08.2022



         Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J:-



1.

The writ petitioners have challenged a General Notice for eviction of

commercial plots over Kharagpore Division of the South Eastern Railway dated

November 23, 2015. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits, at the outset

that the Notice was apparently issued under Section 147 of the Railways Act,

1989 (for the sake of brevity, "the 1989 Act"). It is submitted, at the outset,

that the said provision confers unbridled power on the railway-authorities to

evict occupants arbitrarily without following due process of law. As such, the

said provision ought to be declared ultra vires the Constitution. It is not only

violative of the Natural Justice principle of audi alterem partem but also

contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution of India since parallelly, the Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred

to as, "the 1971 Act") provides for a detailed procedure and right of show cause

to the occupants prior to such eviction, even if an unauthorized occupant.

2. It is submitted that such disparity between otherwise similarly placed

occupants, both in respect of Government property, shall create an anomaly

inasmuch as the authority may take out proceedings duly under the 1971 Act

against some occupants and a summary procedure, without any due process

of law under Section 147 of the 1989 Act against others.

3. Section 147 of the 1989 Act, it is argued, has no non-obstante clause to

exclude Sections 4, 5 and 7 of the 1971 Act. Hence, parallel proceedings are

maintainable under both Acts, which gives rise to the possibilities of unequal

usage of the two in respect of different occupants.

4. Learned counsel then argues that sub-section (2) of Section 147 makes itself

subservient to sub-section (1) thereof by using the expression "subject to" sub-

section (1). Hence, unless it is determined upon giving opportunity of hearing

to the occupant that the said occupant is in illegal or unlawful occupation of

the premises, no proceedings for eviction or removal can be undertaken within

the contemplation of the said Act.

5. In the present case, it is argued, the petitioners have been occupying the

disputed premises by virtue of leave and licence granted by the Railway-

Authorities for quite a long time. Occupation charges have been paid by the

petitioners and received by the Railway-Authorities, much after the issuance of

the impugned notice and even five years into pendency of the present writ

petition. As such, it cannot be said that the petitioners are unlawful

occupants. Hence, neither Section 147 of the 1989 Act nor Sections 4, 5 and 7

of the 1971 Act are applicable to them.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the 1971 Act, being a special

statute in respect of eviction of unauthorised occupants, prevails over the 1989

Act, which is general vis-à-vis unauthorised occupants.

7. It is next argued that the impugned notice was bad in law, as the same was

issued by the Senior Divisional Manager of the South Eastern Railway without

any authority to represent the Railways for the purpose of Section 147.

8. That apart, a change of user has been alleged in the notice, which is palpably

incorrect. The property was originally taken on leave and licence for carrying

on trade. Although the trade which was originally carried on is different from

the present one, the use of the premises remains the same inasmuch as it is

being used still for the purpose of trading.

9. Full payment of occupation charges have been made up to the year 2021, that

is, much after the filing of the writ petition itself in the year 2016, and

accepted by the Railway-Authorities from the petitioners. As such, any right to

evict the petitioner, even if available to the Railway by virtue of the notice, has

been subsequently waived.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contends that under the provision of

Section 147 of the 1989 Act, "any railway servant" or "any person" (even if a

rank outsider) called by him, even if unauthorised by the Railways to do so,

may evict a person summarily without giving any opportunity of hearing or

representation to the occupant. In the garb of such eviction, authorised

occupants like the petitioner may also be sought to be evicted as in the present

case.

11. As opposed to Sections 4, 5 and 7 of the 19671 Act, Section 147 provides no

specific procedure to determine whether the occupation is unauthorised and

for eviction.

12. Learned counsel places reliance on the order dated October 3, 2016 passed by

a co-ordinate bench in the present writ petition to strengthen his arguments.

It is submitted that although such findings were prima facie in nature, the

same could be borrowed for the purpose of deciding the writ petition as well.

13. Learned counsel appearing for the Railway-Authorities submits that Section

2(e) of the 1971 Act clearly defines "public premises", which are taken on lease

or requisitioned or belong to the Central Government. However, the Railways

Act categorically confines the operation of the statue to railway property.

14. Entry No.22 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution stipulates

railways as one of the topic on which the Central Government may legislate

exclusively, since List I is the Union List.

15. Hence, it is argued, inasmuch as railway properties are concerned, the 1989

Act is a special statute while the 1971 Act is general in nature.

16. Learned counsel next places reliance on Section 17 of the 1971 Act, which

provides for delegation of the power of the Central Government to the State

Government. The significance thereof, it is argued, is that the 1971 Act is a

general law inasmuch as railway properties are concerned, whereas there is no

such provision of delegation under the 1989 Act.

17. On vires, learned counsel for the Railways contends that presumption has to

be in favour of the Constitutionality of an Act. Modalities of eviction and/or

natural justice cannot be read into a statute by the Courts of law.

18. A public purpose is revealed in the impugned notice. The larger public interest

would be sub-served in evicting unauthorized occupants from the Railway

properties. Hence, such exercise is not mechanical or arbitrary but pertains to

a Policy matter. Moreover, there is reasonable classification insofar as the

categories of people covered by the notice are concerned. That apart, 30 days'

time was provided in the notice for vacating the premises. Hence, it cannot be

termed as an arbitrary or mindless exercise.

19. Courts generally do not interfere with the Policy matters of the Executive, it is

argued.

20. Learned counsel for the Railways further argues that the argument of violation

of Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be sustained in law since there

was reasonable classification in categorizing the particular types of persons

who would be labelled as 'unauthorized occupants' for the purpose of the

impugned notice. Moreover, no negative equality can be claimed in law. Hence,

such argument of the petitioner, it is contended, is negated.

21. Learned counsel for the Railways argues that the Railways Act, 1989 is a self-

sufficient code and provides a complete mechanism for evicting unauthorized

occupants upon following due process of law and inquiry. Certain powers of

the civil court have also been conferred in that regard on the Railway

Authorities. Learned counsel places reliance on Sections 180A to 180D as well

as Section 179 of the 1989 Act to argue that the said provisions clearly provide

the modality and procedure for undertaking an eviction under the said Act.

22. Learned counsel for the Railways places reliance on a Co-ordinate Bench

judgment in Dhurjyati Prasad Das Vs. Union of India and others, reported at

(2013) 5 CHN 93, a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in

Arjun Babloo Tukaral Vs. G.V. Javalkar and others, reported at AIR 1981 Bom

72 and another Co-ordinate Bench decision of this Court in Subrata Ghosh vs.

Union of India and others, reported at (2019) 2 CHN 62, in support of his

proposition that Section 147 is a self-sufficient Code and can be resorted to for

undertaking eviction of unauthorized encroachers and occupants on Railway

property without taking recourse under the 1971 Act.

23. Learned counsel next cites a Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court

rendered in G. Phalaguna and others Vs. The General Manager and others,

reported at (2005) 3 Cal LT 404 (HC). In the said judgment, it was held, inter

alia, that in face of the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 147(2) of

the 1989 Act, there is no scope at all to hold that without initiating necessary

proceedings against all the occupants of the area under the provisions of the

1971 Act, the Railway Authorities would not be entitled or empowered to evict

or remove all or any of such unauthorized occupants. It was further held that

neither can the scope of provisions of Section 147(2) of the 1989 Act be

enlarged or curtailed, nor can a fundamental right of the unauthorized

occupants be canvassed and enforced. The courts must not encourage

perpetuation of illegal activities of citizens in the name of protection of their

fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, it was held.

24. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in reply, submits that Dhurjyoti

Prasad Das's case (supra) pertained to an entirely different set of facts than the

present case. In the said case, the occupant was a fruit vendor squatting on

the platform of the Railways. The said occupant was unauthorized, whereas

the present petitioners are authorized, in view of their rent being accepted at

least five years after filing of the writ petition. In paragraph no.19 of the said

judgment, it was pointed out that the 1971 Act may be a special statute.

Inasmuch as Arjun Babloo Tukaral's case is concerned, the same dealt with

special class of premises, that is, those occupied by Railway servants. Hence, it

could be argued that the 1989 Act operated as a special statute in that case.

Section 138 of the old Act of 1989 was equivalent in scope to Section 147 of

the present Railways Act, 1989, it is argued.

25. Inasmuch as Subrata Ghosh's case is concerned, learned counsel for the

petitioner argues that the same relied on Dhurjyoti Prasad Das (supra) and, as

such, the facts were not interpreted in similar light as in the present case. In

the said case, a licensee's son was in unauthorized occupation of the premises,

whereas in the present case, the petitioners are lawful lessees. In G.

Phalaguna (supra), the occupants were unauthorized, as opposed to the

present case, where the petitioners are authorized lessees.

26. It is further reiterated that Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act contains specific

provisions for issuance of summons and confers on an Estate Officer the

powers of a Civil Court in dealing with such proceedings. In the present case,

however, Section 147 empowers any and every individual, not only being a

railway employee of any level but also any person whom he calls for help, to

exercise such uncontrolled power of eviction, which cannot survive the

Constitutional test of legality and justness. Learned counsel for the petitioners

seeks to analyse the definition of "railway" as given in Section 2(31) of the 1989

Act to propose that the same only relates to properties near the railway tracks

or within the boundary of the compound of a railway track. In the present

case, however, it is argued that the disputed property is a bus stand and not in

the close vicinity of Railway tracks. Hence, the 1989 Act could not be applied

as a special statute inasmuch as the present property is concerned.

27. Thus, learned counsel for the petitioners renews his prayer for setting aside

the impugned notice, which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 4

and 5 of the 1971 Act and also submits that Section 147 of the 1989 Act ought

to be declared ultra vires the Constitution.

28. Thus, the moot questions which fall for consideration in the present case, are

as follows:

(i) Whether an occupant of property belonging to the Railways can be

evicted without due process of law and without being given any prior

opportunity of hearing, under Section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989.

(ii) Whether Section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989 is ultra vires the

Constitution.

29. Addressing the first question first, we are required to consider the scope of

operation of Section 147 of the Indian Railways Act in the context of the

scheme of the 1989 Act, as compared to its predecessor statute, the Railways

Act, 1890.

30. The said provision appears under Chapter XV of the Act, which has the

heading "Penalties and Offences". In the said Chapter, different penal offences

and their punishments with regard to Railways are enumerated.

31. The caption of Section 147 is "Trespass and refusal to desist from trespass".

32. Section 138 of the Railways Act 1890, however, appears in Chapter X of the

Old Act, which has the heading "Supplemental Provisions". As per Section

138, if a railway servant is discharged or suspended or dies, absconds or

absents himself, and he or his family members refuse to deliver up to the

Railway Administration any station, dwelling house, office or other building,

with its appurtenances, or books, papers etc., any Magistrate of the First Class

may, on application may by the Railway Administration, order any Police

Officer to enter upon the building and remove any person found therein and

take possession thereof and to deliver the same to the Railway Administration.

33. The Section corresponding to Section 138 of the old Act is, in fact, Section 190

of the new Act, which appears under Chapter XVI (Miscellaneous) of the new

Act. The caption of Section 138 says "Procedure for summary delivery to

railway administration of property detained by railway servant". The substance

of the Section is the same as Section 190 of the 1989 Act, apart from the

cardinal distinction that any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of

the First Class may, on similar application made by the Railway

Administration as in Section 138, pass a similar order.

34. However, both the said Sections pertain to illegal continuation in occupation of

railway servants and do not affect third party occupiers. It is also relevant that

both the said Sections specifically refer to eviction in respect of any building of

the railway administration, including a station, office or other building, with its

appurtenances.

35. In fact, the Section in the old Act pari materia with Section 147 of the new Act

is Section 122 of the former. Section 122(1) stipulates that if a person

unlawfully enters upon a railway, he shall be punished with fine up to Rs.20/-.

Sub-section (2) thereof says that if a person "so entering" refuses to leave the

railway on being requested, he shall be punished with fine up to Rs.50/- and

may be removed from the Railway by such servant or other person.

36. Notably, Section 122 of the 1890 Act appears under Chapter IV (Penalties and

Offences).

37. Section 147 of the 1989 Act also appears under Chapter XV (Penalties and

Offences) of the new Act. However, in contradistinction with Section 122 of the

old Act, Section 147 (1) includes an occupant who "...having lawfully entered

upon or into such part misuses such property or refuses to leave" to attract the

punishment provided in Section 147, including removal of the person.

38. It is noteworthy that in the case of a railway servant overstaying his tenure on

arailway property, under Section 190 a judicial authority, that is, the

Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of First Class may, only on an

application made by the railway administration, order a police officer to remove

any person in unlawful occupation and to take ancillary steps. However,

Section 147(2) gives an unbridled power of removal of the occupantto any

Railway servant or even any other person (who may not be a Railway servant)

whom such Railway servant may call to his aid.

39. Hence, no judicial authority or prior application is required for removal under

Section 147 of the 1989 Act.

40. Moreover, the primary punishment for trespass under Section 147 is

imprisonment and fine. Sub-section (2) thereof only provide a corollary thereof

by way of removal of the trespasser.

41. It is noteworthy that the caption of Section 147 clearly mentions not only

trespass but also "refusal to desist from trespass". Hence, the initial entry has

to be unlawful; even if the entry itself was lawful, at the juncture of removal,

the person must "desist from trespass", which signifies that at the point of

removal also, his stay must amount to 'trespass', due to overstay or whatever

other reason. The body of the section puts "misuses such property" and

"refuses to leave" on an equal footing to justify removal, which also indicates

that the stay at the property must have, after the initial lawful entry, turned

unlawful.

42. Moreover, as indicated earlier, Chapter XV of the 1989 Act, in its entirety,

deals with penalties and offences. Hence, Section 147 must also be intended

by the Legislature to be penal in nature and to stipulate criminal action,

removal being merely consequential to the main punishment.

43. The expression "trespasser" has distinct and different shades of connotations

in civil and criminal jurisprudence. Whereas 'trespass' in criminal law refers to

a discrete act inviting penal action as the primary remedy against the accused,

and has a whiff of transience, 'trespass' in civil law connotes a comparative

shade of continuity, that is, a continuance in occupation of a property

unlawfully, attracting the remedy of eviction as the primary relief against the

perpetrator.

44. Even otherwise, since Section 190 pertains only to railway servants, the said

Section is not applicable, in any event, in the circumstances of the present

case.

45. At the outset, we can eliminate the ratio laid down in the Division Bench

Judgment of the Bombay High Court in Arjun Babloo Tukaral (supra) for the

purpose of the case at hand, since the said judgment was rendered on Section

138 of the old Act, which corresponds to Section 190, and not Section 147, of

the new Act.

46. Inasmuch as Section 147 is concerned, apart from the cue available from the

Chapter in which it is appearing (Penalties and Offences), Section 179, under

the same Chapter, also provides sufficient indication for interpreting the scope

of Section 147. Under Section 179(2), the person committing an offence under

Section 147 of the 1989 Act is also included, as being subject to arrest,

without warrant or other written authority, by an officer authorised by a

notified order of the Central Government, as opposed to any Railway servant or

any third person called by him.

47. The other provisions which have been clubbed with Section 147 in Section

179(2), for the purpose of arrest without warrant, include Sections 137 to 139,

141 to 146, 153 to 157, 159 to 167 and 172 to 176 of the 1989 Act.

48. If we look into the said other provisions, they primarily pertain to criminal

offences and provide for punishment of a penal nature, in consonance with the

Chapter-heading "Penalties and Offences". Whereas Sections 137 to 139 deal

with travelling without pass or ticket, Sections 141 to 146 deal with offences

committed in Railway premises, including drunkenness, nuisance, hawking,

begging, unauthorised ticket transfer or ticket business, obstructing Railway

servants in discharging duty etc.

49. Sections 150 to 152 primarily deal with damages caused to Railway property or

hurting Railway passengers.

50. Section 153 to 157, the next clubbed group, relate to endangering safety,

travelling on roof, defacing ticket, etc. Sections 159 to 167 relate to other

offences primarily committed on Railway carriages, including disobedience of

drivers and conductors, level crossing offences, entering into a female

compartment, carrying dangerous goods, smoking, etc.

51. Lastly, Sections 172 to 176, which have also been clubbed with Section 147 in

Section 179 of the new Act, speak about intoxication, level crossing offences,

etc. similar on footing with Sections 159 to 167.

52. Such association of Section 147 with only other penal Sections, as found in

Section 179, further indicates that Section 147 does not deal with

unauthorised occupation, which gives rise to disputes of a civil nature for the

purpose of eviction, but merely with offences and penalties of a criminal

nature.

53. Sections 180, 180A, 180B, 180C and 180D relate to arrest for offences under

Section 179, including a Section 147 offence.

54. However, such arrest is permitted not by any Railway official but an authorised

person only.

55. Furthermore, the expression used in Section 147 is "any part of a railway", as

opposed to Section 190, which relates to a building or any part thereof.

56. In contradistinction with any building owned by the railway, Section 2(31) of

the 1989 Act categorically defines the term "railway". The closest resemblance

with property comes in Clause (a) of sub-section (31) of Section 2, which

relates to all lines "within the fences or other boundary marks indicating the

limits of land appurtenant to a Railway". The other sub-sections primarily deal

with carriages, Railway equipment, ferries and ships used for the purpose of

traffic of the Railway or hired or worked by a Railway Administration, etc. but

exclude a tramway wholly within a municipal area and other lines of Railway

built in any exhibition ground, etc. designated solely for the purpose of

recreation.

57. It is evident from Section 2(31) that, to come within the definition of "railway",

a line has to be appurtenant to a Railway or within the fencing or boundary of

a railway which, obviously, pertains to the railway tracks themselves. A

broader meaning cannot be lent to the expression "railway".

58. Seen in such perspective, the justification of Section 147(2) is evident, since

the Railways convey goods and citizens across the country and is an essential

service. In fact, the railways have often been referred to as the 'backbone of

the Indian economy'. Thus, in order to save the penal clause in sub-section (1)

of Section 147 becoming toothless, sub-section (2) also incorporates the

essential ancillary right of removal of a trespasser.

59. However, nothing has been provided in the Railways Act specifically in respect

of eviction of occupants (unauthorised or otherwise) in buildings which are

Railway properties and may or may not be appurtenant to railway tracks or

within the compound and in the vicinity of such land, as in the present case.

It transpires from the pleadings that the property in dispute is situated near

the bus stand and may very well be in the vicinity of the Railway station, but

there is nothing to indicate that it falls within the definition of "railway" as

provided in Section 2(31) of the 1989 Act.

60. Again, the caption of Section 147 clearly refers to trespass. It is relevant to

note that sub-section (1) of Section 147 uses a distinction in unlawful and

lawful entry. The exact phrase used for "unlawful entry" is "without lawful

authority", whereas "lawful entries" are defined as "having lawfully entered

upon or into such part, misuses or refuses to leave such property".

61. Hence, the term "authority" is conspicuous by its absence in case of lawful

entries. Thus, in case of unlawful entry, the act itself is all-important, but not

the question of authority. Hence, if a person is in 'occupation' or 'possession'

of a railway property under lawful authority, unless such authority is lawfully

terminated, the occupant cannot be evicted without due process of law.

62. It is by now cliché that even a trespasser of property cannot be evicted there

from without due process of law. If law is taken in his own hand by any and

every railway employee or any outsider called by him, legitimate and lawful

occupants of railway properties can merrily be evicted without due process of

law, which is against all tenets of the Rule of Law.

63. Reading Section 147 in its proper perspective, in the context of the scheme of

the 1989 Act and the similar provisions in the 1890 Act, it cannot but be said,

with utmost humility, that the ratio laid down in G. Phalaguna (supra) and

repeated in Dhurjati Prosad Das (supra) and Subrata Ghosh (supra) is de hors

the law and, hence, in the nature of per incuriam. With all due respect to the

erudition and legal acumen of the learned Single Judges rendering such

judgments, the opinion expressed in the said decisions, in my humble view, is

patently contrary to the scheme of Section 147 in the context of the 1989 Act,

as juxtaposed with similar provision in the 1890 Act, that is, Section 122 of the

latter.

64. If a rational interpretation is lent to Section 147, there is no cause for declaring

the same to be ultra vires the Constitution, being violative of Article 14 and/or

violative of the principle audi alteram partem, a cardinal tenet of natural

justice.

65. However, if Section 147 is interpreted in terms of the judgments cited by the

Railway Authorities, it cannot but be deduced that the said provision would

have the potential to create a patent divide between different occupants of

public premises on an illogical and unlawful line of discrimination. Whereas,

according to its own sweet will, a railway servant can evict a person under

Section 147 of the 1989 Act, even with the help of a third party having no

connection with the Railways, Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act (if premises)or

the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of

Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962 (if land) would squarely come into play in

respect of 'unauthorised occupants', giving a prior right of hearing to such

occupant and adherence to due process of law before a quasi-judicial

authority, that is the Estate Officer or Collector, as the case may be, before

evicting such person. Such incongruity violates Article 14 of the Constitution,

which grants every citizen of India equal protection of law.

66. The next question which falls for consideration is as to that provisions should

be resorted to in evicting unauthorized occupants of railway properties.

67. The answer, as indicated earlier, lies in the 1971 and1962 Acts respectively, in

respect of premises and lands as defined in the said Acts. Since those acts are

indeed special statutes in respect of unauthorised occupants and the

modalities and incidents of their eviction, as opposed to the Railways Act,

1989, which exclusively governs matters relating to Railways, which fall within

the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.

68. Since there is no special provision for eviction of unauthorised occupants of

railway properties not being railway employees within the contemplation of

Section 190 of the Railways Act, 1989, particularly those beyond the precincts

of the railway tracks, the best available course is to adopt the procedure

provided in pari material provisions which specifically deal with eviction of

unauthorized occupants in respect of public premises or lands (within the fold

of which comes railway properties as well).

69. Hence, in the present case, the respondent-authorities acted palpably without

jurisdiction in issuing the impugned general notice dated November 23, 2015

(Annexure P-7 at pages 49 and 50 of the writ petition), granting thirty days'

time to all occupants to vacate the premises.

70. Moreover, in the present case, the petitioner has made out a prima facie of the

Railway-authorities having accepted occupation charges at least till five years

after the filing of the writ petition, that is, till the year 2021. Thus, the

question has to be dealt with by an appropriate quasi-judicial authority as to

whether the Railway-authorities acquiesced the right of occupation of the

petitioner, thereby rendering it authorised.

71. That apart, due process of law is required to be followed in the event the

railway authorities intend to evict the writ petitioners.

72. Hence, the impugned Notice cannot but be set aside.

73. Hence, the first question posed above is answered in the negative, in the light

of the above observations.

74. As far as the second question is concerned, in view of the interpretation

attributed to it in the present judgment, Section 147 of 1989 Act stands the

scrutiny of Constitutionality and legality and is intra vires the Constitution.

Thus, the second question is also answered in the negative.

75. However, for the sake of propriety, since three Hon'ble Single Judges of this

Court have been cited to have taken a contrary view to that which has been

expressed in the present judgment, the matter ought to be referred to a Larger

Bench on such issue.

76. Accordingly, let the matter be sent to the Hon'ble The Chief Justice for the

limited purpose of constituting a Larger Bench to answer the reference on the

following question:

Whether, under Section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989, the Railway

Authorities can evict an unauthorised occupant of property owned by

the Railways without resorting to the provisions of the Public Premises

(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, alternatively The West

Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962.

77. Pending such reference, the operation of this order and the impugned Notice

dated November 23, 2015 shall remain stayed. Accordingly, the final decision

in the present writ petition is also kept in abeyance, awaiting such reference.

78. Liberty is given to the parties to mention the writ petition for enlistment before

the appropriate Bench upon the reference being answered.

79. CAN 2 of 2021 is, thus, disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs.

80. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be issued by the department on

compliance of all requisite formalities.

( Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. )