Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 6635 Cal
Judgement Date : 24 December, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APELLATE SIDE
The Hon'ble JUSTICE SUVRA GHOSH
W.P.A. 2045 of 2017
The West Bengal Power Development Corporation Limited
Vs.
Union of India & Others.
For the Petitioner: Mr. Ranajay De, Adv.,
For the P.F. Authority: Mr. S.C. Prasad, Adv.
Mr. N.K. Gupta, Adv.,
Hearing concluded on: 14.12.2021
Date: 24.12.2021
SUVRA GHOSH, J. :-
1. The petitioner pleads violation of principles of natural justice.
2. The contention of the petitioner, in a nutshell, is that by Notification No.
558-Power/IV dated 28th June 2001 issued by the Secretary to the
Government of West Bengal, Department of Power (the petitioner herein)
took over M/s. Bandel Thermal Power Station (hereinafter referred to as
BTPS) with all its assets and liabilities as on 1st April, 2001 with effect
from the said date. On 30th July, 2015/31st July 2015 respondent no. 3
issued summons under section 14B of the Employees Provident Funds
and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 against BTPS for the period April
1996 to December 2003. A demand of Rs. 9,60,683/- was made against
respondent no. 4 for the period 1st April, 1996 to 31st December, 2013
under section 14B/7Q of the Act of 1952 by way of penalty and interest
upon observation that during the said period certain payments were made
beyond time. The claim was subsequently revised to a period from 1st
March, 1995 to 14th November, 2000. The petitioner submitted a
representation before respondent no. 3 stating that it has no knowledge
as to when and in respect of which persons contribution was deposited
and also, no record was available to the petitioner with regard to strength
and identification of the employees for the relevant period. The petitioner
requested respondent no. 3 to direct respondent no. 4 to provide
necessary records and particulars to enable the petitioner to place its case
before the authority. By an order dated 16th November, 2016 revised claim
to the tune of Rs. 9, 52,863/- was slapped upon the petitioner who was
directed to deposit the said amount within 10 days from the date of
receipt of the order.
3. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed the present writ
petition.
4. The prayer of the writ petitioner is set out hereunder:-
(a) Issue of a Writ of Mandamus and/or
Writ in the nature thereof commanding
the Respondent No.2 and 3 or each one
of them forthwith cancel, set aside,
withdraw and/or rescind the impugned
order dated 16.11.2016 (being
Annexure- P/8) passed by the
Respondent No. 3.
(b) Issue of a Writ of Certiorari and/or Writ
in the nature thereof commanding the
Respondent No.2 and 3 or each one of
them to produce records relating to the
impugned order dated 16.11.2016 being
Annexure-P/8 passed by the
Respondent No. 3 for their examination
and for quashing the same if found
illegal, void and contrary to law and for
doing conscionable justice to the parties;
(c) Issue of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Writ
in the nature thereof commanding the
Respondents not to take any steps or
any further step pursuant to the
impugned order dated 16.11.2016 being
Annexure-P/8 till the disposal of the
instant Application.
5. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the liability of the petitioner
begins only from 1st April, 2001 when the petitioner took over M/s. BTPS.
The notice under section 14B of the 1952 Act issued against BTPS was
handed over to the petitioner following which the petitioner submitted the
representation before the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner
(damage) on 18th May, 2016 requesting the authority for providing the
relevant records along with particulars of the employees including proper
identification from 1st March, 1995 to 14th November, 2000 for taking
appropriate steps in the matter. The finding arrived at by the authority
that the petitioner who is the principal employer, used to deduct 18%
from the work contract bills towards provident fund which was never
deposited, has no basis. The order impugned is also silent as to why
highest penalty was imposed upon the petitioner despite such penalty
being the discretion of the authority, moreso, as there was no observation
of malice of any manner against the petitioner. The amount of damages
and interest payable by the petitioner was decided by the authority
arbitrarily and the innocuous claim of the petitioner for production and
inspection of documents was not acceded to.
6. The writ petition was filed on 24th January, 2017 and notice of the same
was served upon the provident fund authority on 25th January, 2017. On
27th January, 2017 notice under section 8F (3) (X) of the 1952 Act was
issued upon the State Bank and the State Bank had to remit the entire
amount of Rs. 9,52,,863/- on the same date. Upon intimating this court
of the said development, the court directed the provident fund authorities
to keep the recovered amount in a short term fixed deposit with any
nationalised bank within a period of 7 days from the date of order and to
continue to renew the same from time to time until further orders of the
court.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that though there
is a provision for appeal under section 7(I) of the Act, the petitioner is
entitled to claim relief in the writ petition on the ground of violation of
principles of natural justice.
8. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance on several authorities. The authority in Arambagh Hatcheries Ltd
v/s. Employees Provident Fund Organisation reported in LAWS(CAL) 2011
9 166 observes that damages under section 14B of the Employees'
Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 may be
recovered from the employer for delayed payment of contribution under
the scheme. But the term "may" used in the provision cannot be
construed as "shall". Learned counsel has next placed reliance on
Paramount Leathers v/s. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner reported
in LAWS(CAL) 2010 12 72. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Division
Bench of this Court held that an order in which the authority fails to
exercise its jurisdiction or decide the dispute by a speaking order is
amenable to writ jurisdiction. Reliance is also placed in the authority in
Mangal Keshav Securities Limited v/s. Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner reported in 2021 LLR 974 which observes that though the
Provident Fund Authority has the power to make coercive recovery of
unpaid provident fund dues, powers of garnishee recovery must be
exercised with due care and caution and after affording reasonable
opportunity to the company to prefer an appeal unless it is pointed out
that the company/employer would divert its fund lying in the bank
account to frustrate recovery.
9. On the issue of delay in initiation of the proceedings under section 14B of
the Act, learned counsel has relied upon the authority in Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner, Jalpaiguri v/s. Darjeeling Dooars
Plantation (Tea) Limited reported in LAWS(CAL) 2015 6 40. In the said
judgment, a coordinate bench of this court has observed that though
section 14B of the Act does not provide for any limitation for initiation of
proceedings, the power should be exercised within a reasonable period.
The next authority referred to by learned counsel is Assistant Provident
Fund Commissioner, Epfo And Anr. v/s. The Management Of Rsl Textiles
India Pvt. Ltd. reported in LAWS(SC) 2017 1 27 wherein it is held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that the presence or absence of mens rea and/or
actus reus would be a determining factor in imposing damages under
section 14B.
10. In opposing the contention of the petitioner, learned counsel for the
provident fund authority, respondent nos. 2 and 3 herein, has submitted
that alternative remedy under section 7(I) of the Act is available to the
petitioner and the present writ petition is not maintainable. Notice under
section 14B was issued on 31st July, 2015 stating that the petitioner
being the principal employer failed to deposit the proportionate provident
fund of the employees to the tune of 18% from their bill. It was recorded
and is also not in dispute that BTPS was the exclusive contractor at the
relevant time. As the present management is a logical continuity of the
erstwhile management, it cannot be said that the documents relating to
the period under consideration were not in custody or within the
knowledge of the petitioner. The production of Form-6A indicates that the
beneficiaries were identified and the provident fund dues quantified.
According to the learned counsel, the principal employer, i.e. the
petitioner used to deduct provident fund to the tune of 18% from the
salary of employees till respondent no. 4 got its separate provident fund
code number. The matter was extensively heard by the provident fund
authority upon giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and
respondent no. 4 and upon consideration of the documents produced
before it, the authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner was
liable to pay the damages and interest from 1st March, 1995 to November
2000. Ample opportunity was given to the parties for taking any objection
to the revised calculation but no such objection was raised. Damage was
calculated in terms of para-32A of the Employees' Provident Fund
Schemes, 1952. Dues under section 7A which was assessed by the
authority were paid belatedly for which damages and interest have
accrued. The identification of employees does not apply in such a case.
The writ petition is, therefore, devoid of merits and is liable to be rejected.
11. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment in Tirrihannah
Company Ltd. v/s. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-I & Ors. in
M.A.T. 42 of 2021 wherein an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has
held that the writ proceedings is concerned with the decision making
process and not the decision itself. In Employees' State Insurance
Corporation v/s. M/s. Harrison Malayalam Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 1993
Supreme Court 2655 it is held that the obligation to make contribution
does not depend on whether the particular employee ceases to be
employee after the contribution period and after the benefit period expire.
12. The legal proposition in Organo Chemical Industries And Another v/s.
Union of India And Others reported in (1979) 4 Supreme Court Cases 573
is that imposition of damages under section 14B is meant to penalise the
defaulting employer and also to provide reparation for the amount of loss
suffered by the employees.
13. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties.
14. It is on record that the petitioner, being the principal employer was
directed to pay an amount of Rs. 9, 52,863/- in the proceedings under
section 14B/7Q of the 1952 Act and during pendency of the writ petition
a notice under section 8F(3)(X) of the Act was issued upon the State Bank
which was constrained to remit the said amount on the same date. An
Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court directed the provident fund
authorities to keep the said amount in a short term fixed deposit with any
nationalised bank within a period of 7 days from the date of order and to
continue to renew the same from time to time until further orders of the
court.
15. At the outset, learned counsel for respondents no. 2 and 3 has challenged
the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that there is a
provision for appeal against the order impugned under section 7-I of the
Act of 1952 and as such, an alternative efficacious remedy is available to
the petitioner. In this connection, the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Whirlpool Corporation v/s. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai
and others reported in (1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases 1 may be relevant.
In the said report, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that existence of
alternative statutory remedy is not an absolute bar to High Court's
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Alternative
remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies:- (i)
where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any fundamental right; (ii)
where there is violation of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the
order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or; (iv) the vires of
an Act is challenged. In referring to the said report the Hon'ble Division
Bench of this Court has also made similar observations in Paramount
Leathers (supra).
16. In the case in hand, learned counsel for the petitioner is aggrieved with
the decision making process of the authority on the ground that relevant
documents relating to the claim were not supplied to him and the decision
was arrived at arbitrarily. A case of violation of principles of natural
justice prima facie being made out by the petitioner, the writ petition
cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. Also, affidavits
have been used in the writ petition and when such affidavit is used by the
respondents, dismissal of a writ petition on the ground of availability of
alternative remedy is not wholly just and proper. [Paramount Leathers
(supra)]. Therefore the writ petition is maintainable and shall be dealt
with on merits.
17. In dealing with the merits of the case, section 14B of the Act of 1952 is set
out:-
"[14-B. Power to recover damages.-
Where an employer makes default in
the payment of any contribution to the
Fund, the Pension Fund or the
Insurance Fund or in the transfer of
accumulations required to be
transferred by him under sub-section (2)
of Section 15 or sub-section (5) of
Section 17 or in the payment of any
charges payable under any other
provision of this Act or of any Scheme or
Insurance Scheme or under any of the
conditions specified under Section 17,
the Central Provident Fund
Commissioner or such other officer as
may be authorised by the Central
Government, by notification in the
Official Gazette, in this behalf may
recover from the employer by way of
penalty such damages, not exceeding
the amount of arrears, as may be
specified in the Scheme.
[Provided that before levying and
recovering such damages, the employer
shall be given a reasonable opportunity
of being heard:]"
18. Therefore the provident fund authority has discretionary power to recover
damages by way of penalty from the petitioner and such discretion has to
be exercised by way of application of mind by the authority. In exercise of
such discretion, the authority is at liberty to impose or waive the penalty
upon hearing the employer and upon application of mind [Arambagh
Hatcheries Limited (supra)].
19. A plethora of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court demonstrate that in
view of the punitive nature of the power exercised under section 14B, an
order under section 14B must be a speaking order containing the reasons
in support of it. In determining the damages to be imposed under section
14B, the mens rea or actus reus prevailing at the relevant time should be
given due consideration. [Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Epfo
and Another (supra)].
20. In the present case, the petitioner claims that a maximum of 12% of the
salary of the employee can be deducted as proportionate provident fund
contribution but the order impugned demonstrates that 18% was
deducted by the petitioner from the work contract bills towards provident
fund till the employer received its own provident fund code. It also
appears from the order that the authority had no knowledge whether copy
of Form-6A was supplied to the petitioner in course of the hearing. The
petitioner has denied receipt of the said form. During the hearing, the
petitioner submitted a representation before the authority on 15th
November, 2016, wherein he requested the authority to provide detailed
calculation regarding the revised claim. The order impugned is silent as to
whether such representation was dealt with and in fact, the order
impugned was passed on the same date, i.e., on 15th November, 2016.
The submission of the petitioner of not having the documents relating to
the period under consideration was brushed aside as an alibi taken by the
petitioner for absolving him of his responsibility. Payment of damages and
interest from March, 1995 to November 2000 was thrust upon the
petitioner on the anvil of submission made on behalf of the establishment,
i.e., respondent no. 4 who agreed to pay the dues after the period
November 2000. No explanation is offered as to the reason for reduction of
the claim amount by only Rs. 7,820/- thought the period of claim was
revised to 04/1996-11/2000 from 04/96-12/2013. The authority's
observation that the petitioner deducted provident fund @ 18% is not
supported by any document. No malice in the conduct of the petitioner in
not depositing the provident fund dues within the statutory period of time
has been inferred by the authority. In the order impugned itself the
authority has stated that several issues remained to be ascertained. But
the order is silent as to whether such issues were actually ascertained by
the authority.
21. It is trite law that the authority is under obligation to apply its mind
before imposing damages under section 14B. The power of imposing
damages being discretionary, the respondent authority ought to have
given cogent reasons for imposing the highest penalty. Consideration of
extent of penalty has not found place within the four corners of the order.
22. The petitioner submitted a representation before the authority on 18th
May, 2016 requesting the authority to provide the relevant records and
documents and also the deposits along with particulars of the employees
including proper identification from 1st March, 1995 to 14th November,
2000. The authority has shed its responsibility by holding that the
petitioner ought to possess the relevant documents as he is a logical
continuity of the erstwhile management. Admittedly the petitioner took
over the management of the fourth respondent with effect from
28/06/2001 and was not concerned with the administration thereof
earlier. Only because the petitioner is a logical continuity of the erstwhile
management, it cannot be ipso facto inferred that the petitioner was in
possession of all relevant documents pertaining to the company.
23. The order impugned was passed on 15th November, 2016. Even before
expiry of the statutory period of appeal, the provident fund authority
issued notice under section 8F (3) (X) of the Act of 1952 upon the State
Bank and caused the bank to remit the amount of Rs. 9,52,863/- on the
same date. Notice of the writ petition was also served upon the authority
prior to issuance of the notice under section 8F (3) (X) of the Act of 1952
despite which the amount was attached.
24. Upon consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the parties and
material on record, this court is of the view that the order impugned
should be set aside/quashed and the provident fund authority should
reconsider the issue upon due consideration of the representations
submitted by the petitioner and upon taking necessary steps for providing
all the relevant documents and records as required/requested by the
petitioner. The amount recovered from the State Bank of India should
continue to remain in the short-term fixed deposit account as directed
earlier till the matter is reconsidered by the provident fund authority as
directed hereinabove. The authority should also afford reasonable
opportunity of hearing to both the parties, in accordance with law.
25. With the above directions and observations, W.P.A. 2045 of 2017 is
allowed.
26. The order impugned dated 15th November, 2016 is hereby quashed/set
aside.
27. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
28. Urgent certified website copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied
to the parties expeditiously on compliance with the usual formalities.
(Suvra Ghosh, J)
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!