Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 355 Cal/2
Judgement Date : 7 April, 2021
1
IA No.: GA/3/2020
(Old No.: GA/113/2020)
In
CS / 174/2019
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction
COMMERCIAL DIVISION
MD MOFAZZULAR RAHMAN & ORS.
V.
MD. SARFARAZ ALAM& ORS.
For the Plaintiffs : Mr. S.K. Kapur, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rudraman Bhattacharya, Adv.
Ms. Pooja Chakraborty, Adv.
Mr. Somdutta Bhattacharyya, Adv.
Ms. Radhika Misra, Adv.
Mr. Atreyo Banerjee, Adv.
Ms. Priyanka Prasad, Adv.
For the Defendants : Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, Sr. Adv.
No.1 Mr. AbhrajitMitra, Sr.Adv.
Mr. Jishnu Choudhury, Adv.
Mr. Amitabh Roy, Adv.
Mr. AritraBasu, Adv.
Mr. Ratul Das, Adv.
For the Respondent : Mr. RajanBachawat, Sr. Adv.
Nos. 2 & 3 Mr. D. N. Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Rai, Adv.
Mr. AnunayBasu, Adv.
Hearing concluded on : March 15, 2021
Judgment on : April 07, 2021
DEBANGSU BASAK, J. :-
1. In a suit amongst the partners of a partnership firm, the
defendant No. 1 has applied for rejection of the plaint under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
2. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1
has submitted, that the suit is barred under Section 69(1) of the
Partnership Act, 1932. He has contended that, two criteria are
required to be fulfilled under Section 69(1) of the Act of 1932 for
it to be attracted. Firstly, the plaintiffs must have sued as
partners of the partnership firm. The defendants have also to be
sued as partners of such firm. Secondly, the suit has to be for the
enforcement of the rights arising from the contract of
partnership.
3. Referring to the pleadings in the plaint, learned senior
advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1 has submitted that,
the plaint discloses that the plaintiffs have filed the suit as
partners of the partnership firm of Md.Sirajuddin& Company.
Therefore, the first criterion under Section 69(1) of the Act of
1932 has been satisfied. The second criteriaalso stands satisfied
according to him,as the plaint has been for the enforcement of
alleged rights arising from the provisions of the deed of
partnership. According to the plaintiffs, the partnership firm can
never be dissolved and that, the defendant No. 1 has been acting
in violation of the terms of Clauses 11, 19 and 21 of the
partnership firm. The plaintiffs having claimed reliefs against the
defendants on the basis of the partnership between the parties
both the criteria stand satisfied.
4. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1
has submitted that, although, the suit is within the ambit of
Section 69(1) of the Act of 1932, there is no averment in the
plaint that the partnership firm is a registered partnership firm.
He has submitted that, the same is a jurisdictional fact. Unless
the partnership firm has been registered, the Court's jurisdiction
to entertain the plaint would be barred by law and the plaintiffs
will have no cause of action unless they pleaded in the plaint that
the firm has been registered under the Act of 1932. He has
submitted that, the plaint must aver the jurisdictional fact that
the partnership firm is registered under the Act of 1932. In
support of such contentions, he has relied upon All India
Reporter 2003 AP 418 (The A.P. Co-op. Wool Spinning Mills
Ltd. &Anr. v. G.Mahanadi & Co. Wool Merchants &Ors.) and
(2016) 1 CHN 357 (Sri. Jagadamba Singh v. Smt. Kalawati
Devi & Ors.).Relying upon1977 Volume 1 Supreme Court
Cases 379 (Seth LoonkaranSethiya & Ors. v. Mr. Ivan E.
John & Ors.) learned senior advocate appearing for the
defendant No. 1 has submitted that it is mandatory to dismiss
the suit if the partnership firm is not registered. According to
him, the Court has no discretion in that regard.
5. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1
has relied upon (1947-48) 52 CWN 15 (Guno Prosad Kundu v.
Abhoy Hari Sreemani & Anr.) for the proposition that, the
expression contract means the partnership agreement.
6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1
has contended that, only the plaint has to be looked into for the
purpose of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Even the written statement
cannot be looked into. Consideration of the contentions of the
defendant is impermissible. He has relied upon 2003 Volume 1
Supreme Court Cases 557 (Saleem Bhai & Ors v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors.) and 2017 Volume 13 Supreme Court
Cases174 (Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed
Jalal) in this regard. Relying upon All India Reporter 1986 Cal
134 (In the matter of Abani Kanta Pal) and All India
Reporter 1976 Cal 471 (Sunderlal& Sons v. Yagendra Nath
Singh & Anr. ), learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
defendant No. 1 has submitted that a plaint that is barred under
Section 69 of the Act of 1932 is a void plaint. He has submitted
that, the same view has been followed in All India Reporter
2003 AP 418 (The A.P. Co-op. Wool Spinning Mills Ltd. &Anr.
v. G.Mahanadi& Co. Wool Merchants &Ors.) and All India
Reporter2012 MP 9 (Ashish Verma v. Neeraj Vyas &Ors). He
has relied upon 2005 Volume 5 Supreme Court Cases 548
(N.V. Srinivasa Murthy & Ors. v. Mariyamma (dead) by
proposed LRS. &Ors.)to contend that, it is impossible to claim
other reliefs to get around a bar of law.
7. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1
has relied upon 2019 SCC Online SC 372 (Raghwendra
Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh (dead) by LRs) and
2017 Volume 13 Supreme Court Cases Page 174 (Madanuri
Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal) as instances where
an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 have been allowed.
8. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1
has referred to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the plaint and submitted
that, the plaintiffs have admitted that Md. Sirajuddin and
Company was a registered firm. He has submitted that, the
dispute is whether the firm Md. Sirajuddin and Company
constituted by a deed of partnership dated October 1, 2011 is a
partnership at will or not. He has submitted that, the defendant
No. 1 received a copy of the certificate of registration of such firm
from the Chief Financial Officer of the firm and believed the same
to be genuine. The plaintiffs have disputed the contents of the
certificate of registration.
9. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1
has submitted that, registration of the partnership firm is not an
issue in the suit. No dispute has been raised by the plaintiffs
about the registration of the partnership firm. According to him,
the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have admitted that
the partnership firm is not registered. The defendant No. 1 has
not stated in his written statement as whether the partnership
firm is registered or unregistered. Therefore, according to him,
the suit should be dismissed.
10. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiffs has
submitted that, the plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 only on the basis of the
statements made in the plaint. No other pleading or application
or petition are relevant and ought not to be looked into at all. He
has relied upon AIR 1953 Calcutta 222 (Sreedam Chandra
Bhur v. Tincore Mukherjee &Ors.) and 2004 (3) Supreme
Court Cases 137( Sopan Sukhdeo Sable & Ors. v. Assistant
Charity Commissioner &Ors.)in support of such contention.
11. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff has
submitted that, the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not refer to any pleadings in
the plaint to justify any bar based on Order VII Rule 11. The
defendant No. 1 has not alleged that the plaint does not disclose
any cause of action. The contentions of the defendant No. 1 are
based upon statements not contained in the plaint. According to
him, inviting the Court to look into the documents other than the
plaint is not permissible in a proceeding under Order VII Rule 11
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the application of
the defendant No. 1 is not maintainable.
12. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiffs has
submitted that, the partnership firm is admittedly registered. The
defendant No. 1 has himself relied upon a photo copy of the
certificate of registration. Such certificate dated October 16, 2007
has been issued by the Registrar of firms. Therefore, the firm
stands registered since then. Reconstitution of a firm either by
way of death or retirement or expulsion or for any other reason
does not affect the registration of the firm. In support of such
contention, he has relied upon 1998 Volume 2 Supreme Court
Cases Page 171 (Sharad Vasant Kotak &Ors. v.
RamniklalMohanlalChawda&Anr.) and ILR 1940 Bombay
715 (Pratapchand Ramchand & Company v. Jhangirji
Bomanji Chinoy).
13. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiffs has
submitted that the defendant No. 1 admitted that the registration
certificate of the firm as authenticated by Chief Financial Officer
establishes the registration of the firm. Such being the position,
all ingredients under Section 69 have been fulfilled. He has relied
upon 2009(5) LW 422 (M/s. S. B. Steel Industries rep. by its
Partner Mr. Rattanlal Tantia v. M/s. India Re-Rolling Mills )
in support of his contentions.
14. Relying on All India Reporter 1961 Odisha 1994
(Chiman Ram Bhatar&Ors. v. Ganga Saha&Anr.) and ILR
1943 (22) Patna 513 (Krishna Prasad Singh v.
AdyanathGhatak), learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
plaintiffs has submitted that, a pleading of registration is not a
sine qua non for maintaining a suit or filing a suit. It is a
procedural requirement. The cause of action is not affected by the
registration.
15. Relying on 1920 (1) Ch. 567(Gates v. W. A. & R. J.
Gacobs, Limited) and 1971 (84) L.W. 523(S. A. Henry v. J. V.
K. Rao.)learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiffs has
submitted that, all conditions precedent are implied even if not
pleaded. He has relied upon 1981 Mh. L. J. 706 (Vasant
AmbadasPandit v. Bombay Municipal Corporation &Ors.)
and submitted that, where, service of notice is a condition
precedent for instituting a suit, the same is a procedural
requirement and does not go to the root of the jurisdiction in the
true sense of the term.
16. Relying upon 2000 Volume 3 Supreme Court Cases 250
(Haldiram Bhujiawala & Anr. v. Anand Kumar Deepak
Kumar & Anr.), learned senior advocate appearing for the
plaintiff has submitted that, the plaintiffs have claimed various
reliefs under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and have claims on
account of tort. Therefore, since other causes of action arising
out of common law are present in the suit, it cannot be said that
the instant suit is barred under Section 69 of the Act of 1923.
17. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant Nos. 2
and 3 has submitted that, the application of the defendant No. 1
has been verified by an affidavit of a person who has not
disclosed his authority to make such application on behalf of the
defendant No. 1. He has submitted that, the defendant No. 1
himself has disclosed the certificate of registration of the
partnership firm and that such documents will establish that the
firm was registered on October 16, 2007.
18. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant Nos. 2
and 3 has relied upon 1998 Volume 2 Supreme Court Cases
171 (Sharad Vasant Kotak &Ors. v. Ramniklal Mohanlal
Chawda & Anr.) for the proposition that the firm stands
registered. He has also relied upon the authorities cited on behalf
of the plaintiffs particularly 2011 SCC online Patna 84 (Modern
Food Industries (India) Limited &Anr v. M/s Nandlal&
Company &Ors), ILR 1943 (22) Patna 513 (Krishna Prasad
Singh V. AdyanathGhatak), All India Reporter 1961 Odisha
1994 (Chiman Ram Bhatar & Ors. v. Ganga Saha & Anr.),
AIR 1981 Bom 394 (Vasant Ambadas Pandit v. Bombay
Municipal Corporation &Ors.)and 1998 (7) SCC 184
(Raptakis Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property).
19. The plaintiffs have filed the instant suit against the
defendants seeking declaratory decree and decree for perpetual
and mandatory injunctions. The plaintiffs have pleaded in
paragraph 1 of the plaint that, by and under a deed of
partnership dated October 1, 2011, the plaintiffs and the
defendants began to carry on business of a partnership with each
other under the name and style of Md. Serajuddin& Co. The
plaintiffs have claimed that the partnership is not at will and
therefore, the notice of dissolution dated July 13, 2019 issued by
the defendant No. 1 is illegal and invalid. The plaintiffs have
claimed that the defendant No. 1 stands expelled from the firm.
The plaintiffs have also claimed perpetual injunction restraining
the defendant No. 1 from holding out and/or representing in any
manner whatsoever as a partner of the firm subsequent to his
expulsion. All reliefs that the plaintiffs have claimed relate to and
emanate out of the deed of partnership between the parties. The
deed of partnership dated October 1, 2011 forms the
foundational basis for the cause of action of the plaintiffs and the
reliefs sought for in the plaint.
20. Interim orders have been passed in the suit at the instance
of the plaintiffs. The Court has been informed that, there are
appeals pending against one of the interim orders passed by
Court. The defendant No. 1 has filed a written statement
containing a counterclaim. The defendant No. 1has thereafter
applied for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by way of the present application.
21. According to the defendant No. 1, the plaint is barred under
section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. In deciding an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, the Court has to proceed on the basis of a
meaningful reading of the plaint. As has been laid down
inSaleem Bhai &Ors(supra), Sreedam Chandra Bhur(supra),
SopanSukhdeo Sable(supra) and Madanuri Sri Rama
Chandra Murthy (supra) only the averments in the plaint are
germane and that, the pleas taken by the defendant in the
written statement would be wholly irrelevant while considering an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. In the facts of the present case therefore, the
stand of the respective parties to the suit in the various pleadings
and affidavits, apart from the plaint, in respect of the registration
of the partnership firm is immaterial and cannot be taken into
consideration while deciding the present application.
22. The plaint has 62 paragraphs. The plaintiffs have
complained about the dealings and misdeed of the defendant No.
1 in relation to the partnership firm. The plaintiffs have sought
reliefs against the defendant No. 1 in relation to the partnership
firm. In the plaint, the plaintiffs have not stated that the
partnership firm in respect of which the plaintiffs are seeking
relief as against the defendant No. 1 is registered or not. In other
words, the plaintiffs have remained silent on the issue of
registration of the partnership firm in respect of which, the
plaintiffs are seeking relief as against the defendant No. 1, in the
plaint. The plaintiffs have sought reliefs as against the defendant
No. 1 qua the jural relationship as partners of the partnership
firm. The plaintiffs have claimed that the partnership was not at
will and therefore the notice of dissolution of the firm issued by
the defendant No. 1 is invalid. The plaintiffs have also claimed
that the defendant No. 1 has been validly expelled as a partner of
such partnership firm and therefore he should be restrained from
holding himself out as a partner of such partnership firm. .
23. As has been noted above, the defendant No. 1 has
contended that, the plaint is barred under Section 69 (1) of the
Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Section 69 of the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932 is as follows: -
"69. Effect of non-registration.--
(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect,--
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or
(b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920) to realise the property of an insolvent partner. (4) This section shall not apply,--
(a) to firms or to partners in firms which have no place of business in the territories to which this Act extends, or whose places of business in the said territories, are situated in areas to which, by notification under section 5, this Chapter does not apply, or
(b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), or, outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim."
24. In Sunderlal& Sons (supra) the Calcutta High Court has
considered an application for execution. The Court has taken
note of the fact that, the execution petition had been filed by an
unregistered firm. The Court had looked into decree and found
that the firm was not registered. It has answered the question
whether a decree passed without the point of absence of
registration under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 being taken
at the trial of the suit, can be contended to be a nullity or not. It
has noticed various authorities on the subject and held that,
where the execution is in respect of a claim arising out of the suit
based on a contract, the prohibition indicated by Section 69 of
the Act of 1932 will apply. It has held that, the entitlement of the
Court to enter upon the enquiry can only arise from a competent
plaint being instituted by a plaintiff. If the plaint was
incompetent, there was no plaint. There was no suit. The decree
based on such an indisputable error would be an error of
jurisdiction and decree passed on such error would be a nullity.
25. Sunderlal& Sons (supra) has been considered by the
Division Bench in AbaniKanta Pal (supra). It has held as
follows: -
"9. In our opinion, it may be that S. 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act puts an embargo on the plaintiff and does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. A defendant in a suit for eviction may waive service of a notice under S. 13(6). Section 69(1) of the Partnership Act, however, stands on a different footing. The embargo that has been put on the plaintiff under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 69 is not for the purpose of protecting the interest of any party, but it is based on public policy. The requirements of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 69 cannot be waived by the defendant, and the Court is debarred from entertaining a
suit ignoring the fulfilment of such requirements. So, if a firm is not registered, excepting a suit as contemplated by S. 69 (3), the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in violation of S. 69(1). In other words, the plaint that has been filed by the plaintiff will be considered a void plaint, if it contravenes the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 69 of the Partnership Act. This view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in LoonkaranSethia v. Ivan E. John, AIR 1977 SC 336. In that case, sub-secs.
(1) and (2) of S. 69 were involved. The Supreme Court made thefollowing observations:
"A bare glance at the section is enough to show that it is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved, void. In other words, a partner of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of S. 69 of the Partnership Act........"
10. This Court in Sunderial and Sons v. YagendraNath Singh, AIR 1976 Cal 471 has held that in view of the language of S. 69 a plaint filed by an unregistered firm would not be a plaint at all and all proceedings thereunder will be proceedings without jurisdiction.
11. Thus, there cannot be any doubt when a plaint is filed in infringement of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 69, It will be treated avoid plaint. In other words, the Court will ignore the existence of any such plaint."
26. Sunderlal& Sons (supra) has been noticed by the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in The A.P. Co-op. Wool Spinning Mills
Ltd.(supra). It has held that, the issue of maintainability of a suit
by a partnership without establishing that the firm is registered
is a point which can be raised even in appeal.
27. In Ashish Verma (supra) the Madhya Pradesh High Court
has dismissed a suit for want of registration under Section 69 of
the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. In Guno Prasad Kundu
(supra) the Division Bench has held that, in a suit seeking
declaration that the plaintiff is a partner of the unregistered
partnership it is impermissible to suggest that the suit has not
been instituted by the plaintiffsas a partner of such firm.
28. Jagadamba Singh (supra) has considered Section 69 of
the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and various authorities on the
subject. It has held that the suit under consideration was barred
by the provisions contained in Section 69 (1) of the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932.
29. Chiman Ram Bhatar (supra) has held that, registration
under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 is not a
part of the cause of action to file a suit. It has expressed the view
that, enforceability of the right relates to procedure. Viewed from
such aspect Section 69 is only a procedural bar to the plaintiff
taking recourse to a suit as a remedy and therefore Section 69
does not affect the substantive right of the plaintiff on the cause
of action. It has however not noticed Seth Loonkaran Sethiya
& Ors. (supra) where the Supreme Court has held that, Section
69 is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by
a plaintiff in respect of right vested in him or acquired by him
under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an
unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved, void.
30. Although Modern Food Industries (India) Limited (supra)
has noticed Loonkaran Sethiya (supra) but proceeded to
observe that, even if a suit is filed by an unregistered partnership
firm and it is treated to be incompetent under Section 69 of the
Indian Partnership Act, 1932, if pending the suit and before a
decree is obtained, the plaintiff gets itself registered, the defect in
the filing stands cured.
31. In view of the Supreme Court in LoonkaranSethiya(supra)
laying down that Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932
is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a
plaintiff in respect of right vested in him or acquired by him
under contract which he entered into as a partner of an
unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved, void, the ratio
expressed in Chiman Ram Bhatar(supra) and Modern Food
Industries (India) Limited (supra) cannot be applied in the facts
of the present case.
32. Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 is
mandatory. It prohibits institution of a suit by an unregistered
partnership firm under Section 69(2) and a suit amongst
partners of an unregistered partnership firm under Section 69(1)
unless the suit amongst the partners is for dissolution and
accounts of the firm. A suit instituted in breach of the bar under
Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 renders the plaint
of such suit void. An unregistered partnership firm can however
enforce a statutory right against a third party. Absence of
registration of the partnership firm renders a suit filed by a
plaintiff in respect of right vested in him or acquired by him
under contract which he entered into as a partner of an
unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved, void. A partner
of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit
to enforce a right arising out of contract falling within the ambit
of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The defect is
incurable. A plaint filed in respect of an unregistered partnership
firm falling within the ambit of Section 69 of the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932 would not be a plaint at all and all
proceedings thereunder will be proceedings without jurisdiction.
33. In order to ensure that the plaint filed by the plaintiff is not
treated as a void plaint, in an application under Order VII Rule
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the plaintiff has to
demonstrate from the pleadings in the plaint that, the embargo
under section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 is not
attracted to such plaint.In other words, in order to defeat a
challenge under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 the plaint has to contain the jurisdictional fact with regard
to Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 such as any
other jurisdictional fact so as to ensure that the plaint is not
rendered void due to lack of such pleading. In the facts of the
present case, the plaint is silent with regard to the registration of
the partnership firm. The jurisdictional fact of registration of the
partnership firm when the plaintiffs are claiming reliefs
emanating out of a contract of partnership being absent in the
plaint, the same is required to be treated as void.
34. The plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in the present
suit have relied upon the registration certificate of the
partnership firm as has been disclosed by the defendant No. 1.
The plaintiffs have claimed that, the partnership firm is
admittedly registered. While considering an application under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Court
has to proceed on the basis of the meaningful reading of the
plaint. The Court is not permitted to look into any other pleading
including the written statement. Therefore, the jurisdictional fact
of registration of the partnership firm under section 69 of the
Indian Partnership Act, 1932 remaining absent in the plaint, the
plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 cannot be allowed to
take benefit of any pleadings elsewhere other than the plaint.
35. The plaintiffs have relied upon Krishna Prasad Singh
(supra) and Order VIRule 6 read with Order VIII Rule 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to contend that, all conditions
precedent are to be taken as impliedly complied with in the
pleading. It was for the defendant No. 1 to raise the point if he
wished to contest it. The ratio laid down therein has to be
understood in the context of the facts of that case. In that case, a
suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession was filed on
the ground of forfeiture of lease. The Court has considered the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and held that,
the amended Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
not having retrospective operation, the incident of tenancy was
not governed by it and therefore no notice to quit was necessary.
In such context, it has held that, a general averment of the
performance of all condition precedent is implied in every
pleading. The same cannot be extended to mean that, a statutory
bar would be overcome by the plaintiffs by silence.
36. In Gates (supra) the Court has considered section 14 of the
Conveyancing Act, 1881 and held that, the averment that the
notice was given, although not specifically pleaded, must be
implied. The provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership
Act, 1932 is not parimateria with that of Section 14 of the
Conveyancing Act, 1881.
37. Vasant Ambadas Pandit (supra) has held that, notice
under section 527 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act,
1888 was a procedural requirement and that the same does not
go to the root of the jurisdiction in truth sense of the term. As
has been noticed by the Supreme Court in Loonkaran Sethiya
(supra) provisions of section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act,
1932 are mandatory.
38. Relying upon Haldiram Bhujiawala (supra) the plaintiffs
have contended that, since a plaint cannot be rejected in part
and there being other reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs, the plaint
cannot be rejected. In the facts of the present case, such a
contention cannot be accepted. All reliefs that the plaintiffs have
claimed in the plaint emanate out of the contract of partnership
dated October 1, 2018. The reliefs prayed for are qua the
partners of the partnership firm.
39. The ratio as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in
Sharad Vasant Kotak (supra) is of no assistance to the
plaintiffs in view of the fact that, the plaintiffs have not pleaded
the jurisdictional fact of registration of the partnership firm in the
plaint. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, whether the
partnership firm remains registered subsequent to its
reconstitution or not has not fallen for consideration in the
present application under Order VII Rule11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. Similarly, the ratio of Pratapchand
Ramchand& Company (supra) has no applicability in the facts
of the present case.
40. M/s. S. B. Steel Industries (supra) has held that, the bar
contemplated under Section 69 (2) of the Indian Partnership Act,
1932 will apply only when the suit is filed to enforce a right
arising from a contract against a third party. In the facts of that
case, the plaintiff therein was a registered partnership firm. The
plaintiffs herein have sued the defendants qua partners of a
partnership firm without pleading in the plaint that the firm is
registered.
41. In Raptakis Brett & Co. Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court
has held that, in order to decide the question whether the suit is
hit by Section 69 (2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 one has
to see what the plaintiff claims as his cause of action. In the facts
of that case, the Supreme Court has held that, the plaintiff
therein was implementing the statutory right of the lessor and
the corresponding statutory obligation of the lessee for getting
peaceful possession from the defendant. It has held that, non-
compliance of the statutory obligation when made the subject
matter of corresponding legal right, cannot be said to be giving
rise to enforcement of any contractual right. A statutory right
therefore can be enforced by an unregistered firm. In the facts of
that case, the firm was registered subsequent to the filing of the
suit. In the facts of the present case, the plaintiffs are not
enforcing any statutory rights as against the defendants. The
rights that the plaintiffs are seeking to enforce have emanated
out of the contract of partnership.
42. In the facts of N. V. Srinivasa Murthy &Ors.(supra) the
Supreme Court has held that, the suit was cleverly drafted with a
view to get over limitation and payment of ad velorem Court fees.
In that case, the plaint had been rejected.
43. The suit is barred under section 69 (1) of the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932, as will appear from the averment made in
the plaint. The plaint is consequently rejected. IA No. GA/3/2020
is allowed without any orders to costs.
[DEBANGSU BASAK, J.]
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