[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Premnath Eknath Patil vs Prism Johnson Ltd on 13 March, 2026
2026:BHC-OS:6575
Neeta Sawant FINAL-1650 OF 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 1650 OF 2023
Premnath Eknath Patil & Ors. .....PETITIONERS
: VERSUS :
Prism Johnson Limited & Ors. ....RESPONDENTS
Mr. S.C. Naidu with Mr. Manoj Gujar and Mr. Pradeep Kumar i/b. C.R.
Naidu & Co., for the Petitioners.
Mr. Avinash Jalisatgi with Mr. T.R. Yadav, Ms. Divya Wadekar and Mr.
Narendra Dube, for Respondent No.1.
Mr.Shamrao Gore, AGP for Respondent Nos.2 and 3.
Ms. Neeta Karnik, Senior Advocate with Mr. Piyush Todkar, for
Respondent No.4.
Ms. Pavitra Manesh, for Respondent No.5.
CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
Reserved On: 25 FEBRUARY, 2026.
Pronounced On: 13 March 2026.
Judgment:
1) By this Petition, 61 Petitioners have challenged the order
dated 20 January 2023 passed by the Specified Authority rejecting the
Review Application preferred by them. Petitioners had sought review of
the order dated 7 September 2020 passed by the Specified Authority under
the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
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(ID Act) granting permission for retrenchment of the workmen. Sub-
section (6) of Section 25-N of the ID Act provides for remedy of seeking
review of the order granting permission for retrenchment. By the
impugned order, the Specified Authority has held Review Application to
be barred on the ground of multiplicity of proceedings and has
accordingly rejected the same as not maintainable.
2) Briefly stated, facts of the case are that Respondent No.1
Prism Johnson Ltd. is a company incorporated under the provisions of the
Companies Act, 1956 which is engaged in the business of manufacturing
of tiles, RMC liquids, distilled water, raw material required for battery
cells, ceramic colours etc. Respondent No.1 operates a factory at village
Khar Devli, Post-Gadab, Taluka-Pen, District-Raigad. According to the
Petitioners, the company had employed about 183 permanent workers,
1000 contract workers apart from 400 staff members at its factory. The
company filed application dated 10 July 2020 before Respondent No.2,
who is the Commissioner of Labour, Maharashtra state and also the
Specified Authority under Section 25-N of the ID Act. By that application,
company sought permission to retrench 85 permanent workmen
employed in the factory. According to the Petitioners, the Respondent
No.1 did not serve copy of the said application on the Petitioners.
Respondent No.4 is the recognized union (Mumbai Labour Union) of
which Petitioners were members. According to the Petitioners, they were
not given work or wages since March 2020 on account of imposition of
lockdown due to Covid-19 pandemic. On 11 August 2020, 27 employees
addressed representation for payment of wages which were subsequently
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endorsed by 22 more workmen vide letter dated 17 August 2020.
According to the Petitioners 48 workers including some of the Petitioners
addressed letter dated 21 August 2020 to Respondent No.4 herein stating
that they had resigned from the membership of Respondent No.4 and had
enrolled themselves as members of Respondent No.5-Kamgar Bharati
Mathadi Transport and General Kamgar Union. Petitioners also rely upon
letters dated 21 August 2020 and 28 August 2020 in support of their
contention of having accepted membership of Respondent No.5-Union.
According to the Petitioners, 37 permanent workmen made an appeal to
Respondent No.2 to intervene and direct the company to allot work and
pay wages contending that the work was being executed from outsiders.
Another letter dated 2 September 2020 was allegedly addressed to the
Respondent No.1 for allotment of work and payment of wages.
3) Petitioners allege that they were shocked and surprised to
learn that the Specified Authority passed order dated 7 September 2020
granting permission to retrench 67 workers employed with Respondent
No.1-Company. Pursuant thereto, Respondent No.1 issued individual
letters of termination dated 8 September 2020 to 67 workmen including
the Petitioners. The Respondent No.5-Union protested against the
termination vide letter dated 11 September 2020. The Respondent No.5-
Union applied for information under the Right to Information Act, 2005.
Petitioners filed Complaint (ULP) No. 167 of 2020 under the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices
Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act) challenging the termination orders.
Simultaneously, On 17 December 2020, Petitioners preferred application
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under Section 25-N (6) of the ID Act seeking review of the order dated 7
September 2020. Respondent Nos.1 and 4 appeared in the Review
Application before the Specified Authority. By order dated 20 January
2023, the Specified Authority has proceeded to reject the Review
Application on the ground of multiplicity of proceedings.
4) In the above factual background, Petitioners have filed the
present Petition challenging the order dated 20 January 2023 passed by
the Specified Authority rejecting the Review Application.
5) Mr. Naidu, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners
submits that the Specified Authority has erred in not adjudicating the
Review Application on merits. That the workmen have a statutory right
to seek review of retrenchment permission granted by the Specified
Authority under Section 25-N(6) of the ID Act. That the Specified
Authority has erroneously relied on provisions of Section 59 of the MRTU
and PULP Act for rejecting the Review Application. That Section 59 bars
proceedings under the ID Act (Central Act) or Bombay Industrial
Relations Act, 1996 (Bombay Act) if a complaint on the same matter or
identical cause of action is already instituted or pending under the MRTU
and PULP Act. That the provision creates an estoppel based on the
election of forum prohibiting a party from pursuing the same claim in
multiple, overlapping jurisdiction. However, in the present case, the
subject matter of ULP proceedings before the Industrial Court and Review
Application before Specified Authority are separate, distinct and
independent of each other. He demonstrates as to how the subject matter
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and cause of action agitated in the ULP proceedings relate to threatening
of employees with discharge/dismissal for joining Respondent No.5-
Union, threatening of lockout/closure, discharging or punishing
employees in urging other employees to join or organise a union, showing
favoritism/partiality, failure to implement award, indulging in acts of
force/violence. That on the other hand, Review Application filed under
Section 25-N(6) of the ID Act involved subject matter beyond the limited
jurisdiction and provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act. Thirdly, the
Specified Authority under the ID Act lacks the mandate to adjudicate
complaint of unfair labour practices, which falls exclusively in the domain
of Courts under the MRTU and PULP Act. That therefore the Specified
Authority and the Courts under MRTU and PULP Act do not share
concurrent jurisdiction, and that they operate in the distinct spheres and
are not 'parallel courts'. That therefore jurisdictional bar under Section 59
of the MRTU and PULP Act is inapplicable. That the emphasis is on the
word 'same subject matter' appearing in provisions of Section 59 of the
MRTU and PULP Act.
6) Mr. Naidu further submits that the findings of the Specified
Authority in paragraph 18 of the impugned order is ipse dixit wherein the
authority has observed that there are some common identical and similar
issues before both the authority. That the said finding is perverse.
Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. He
submits that the Petitioners are seeking review of order dated 7
September 2020 and period of more than five years have elapsed. That
Section 25-N(6) empowers the Specified Authority to review the order
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passed under Section 25-N(3) or to refer the matter for adjudication to the
Industrial Tribunal. That therefore it would be appropriate to refer the
subject matter for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal or in the
alternative, the Specified Authority be directed to decide the Review
Application on merits expeditiously.
7) Mr. Jalisatgi, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent
No.1 opposes the Petition submitting that the Specified Authority has
rightly rejected the Review Application as not maintainable. That
Petitioners have already exercised the remedy of filing complaint under
the MRTU and PULP Act and cannot be permitted to seek review of order
passed under Section 25-N(3) of the ID Act. That Section 59 of the MRTU
and PULP Act covers all proceedings in respect of a 'matter'. That in the
present case, proceedings under Section 25-N(6) would be covered by the
expression 'any matter' and that the word 'matter' is of wide amplitude
and encompasses all pleadings and grounds. That therefore one cannot be
guided by the 'object' with which the complaint was filed before the
Industrial Court and the 'purpose' of the Review application. That Section
59 is akin to Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908. That the
pleadings for challenging the termination are the same as pleadings in
the Review Application and therefore the Review Application is clearly hit
by the provisions of Section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act. That
therefore there is possibility of conflict if both the authorities are
permitted to render findings on merits in parallel proceedings involving
the same subject matter.
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8) Mr. Jalisatgi submits that the Specified Authority has
compared both the proceedings and has thereafter arrived at the
conclusion that the same pleas are raised in the complaint and the Review
Application. He takes me through the comparative chart to demonstrate
similarity in pleadings in the ULP Complaint and in the Review
Application.
9) Mr. Jalisatgi further submits that the doctrine of election
clearly applies to the present case. That after order under Section 25-N is
passed, the concerned workers have two options viz. to challenge the
termination or to challenge the order granting permission by seeking
review/reference or by Writ Petition. That workers cannot take recourse
to both the remedies. That in the present case, the workers have elected
the remedy of filing complaint of unfair labour practice which is done at a
prior point of time. That the complaint is still not withdrawn and
therefore the Specified Authority has rightly refused to entertain the
Review Application on merits.
10) Mr.Jalisatgi then highlights the conduct of the Petitioners in
support of his contention that equitable jurisdiction of this Court cannot
be permitted to invoked by the Petitioners. That Petitioners have come
out with a totally false case that they have resigned from the membership
of Respondent No.4 and that they did not have any knowledge or notice of
application filed under Section 25-N. That none of the letters produced by
the Petitioners indicate any acknowledgements. That only two letters
bear acknowledgements, which were issued for raising the dispute about
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nonpayment of wages. That the company has specifically denied receipt
of those letters, which are false and fabricated. All Petitioners were
members of Respondent No.4-Union as on the date of passing of order
dated 7 September 2020. That the said order indicates presence of
Petitioner No. 60 during the course of hearing, who never claimed that he
had resigned from membership of Respondent No.4-Union. That
otherwise the pleadings in the complaint show that Petitioners acquired
knowledge of proceedings under Section 25-N in August 2020. That there
were two general body meetings convened by Respondent No.4-Union
wherein majority of the workers, including Petitioners, participated and it
was resolved that the Company should be asked to pay the workers
proposed to be retrenched, higher compensation than legally due. That
this fact is also collaborated by the affidavit of Respondent No.4. That
therefore the plea of absence of knowledge of retrenchment proceedings
is totally false. That the plea of 67 workers allegedly becoming members
of Respondent No.5-Union (raised in letter dated 2 September 2020) is
false as nobody could have predicted that on 7 September 2020
permission would be granted for retrenching only 67 employees. That this
shows that the letter is subsequently prepared.
11) Mr. Jalisatgi further submits that Petitioners were paid 45
days extra compensation in addition to their legal dues. He relies on
judgment of the Apex Court in Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others
Versus. Vikram Cement and Others.1 and Man Singh Versus. Maruti
Suzuki India Private Limited and Another 2 in support of the contention
1 2008 12 SCC 58
2 2011 14 SCC 662
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that the Petition cannot be entertained unless Petitioners refund the
excess compensation received by them without any demur.
12) Mr. Jalisatgi further submits that the life of order passed
under Section 25-N(3) is only 1 year and that therefore Review
Application otherwise losses significance after expiry of one year. He
relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Vazir Glass Works Limited
Versus. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and another 3.
13) Mr. Jalisatgi relies on judgment of the Apex Court in
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Versus. Yadao and
others4 in support of the contention that legislative intention behind
Section 59 is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, possibly on
contradictory verdicts and wastage of judicial time. That the view is
approved by the Full Bench in C.S. Dixit Versus. Bajaj Tempo Limited,
Pune5 and by the Division Bench in M/s. Consolidated Pneumatic Tool
Company India Limited 6.
14) Ms. Neeta Karnik learned Senior Advocate appearing for
Respondent No.4 also opposes the Petition. She submits that the
Petitioners have approached the Court with unclean hands. That they
have produced false and fabricated documents. That the documents at
Exhibits D, E, F and G to the Petition are subsequently prepared to make
out a false case. That none of the Petitioners have resigned from
3 1996 2 SCC 118
4 1985 2 LLN 332
5 2000 (4) Mh.L.J. 261
6 1986 52 FLR 467(Bom)
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membership of Respondent No.4-Union on 21 August 2020 as falsely
alleged. That the Respondent No.4-Union received letter dated 9
September 2020 by post on 29 January 2021, which contained purported
resignation letters by 31 workers. That the concerned workers were
members of Respondent No.4-Union on the date when order dated 7
September 2020 was passed. Ms. Karnik further submits that the
Petitioners were fully aware of pendency of application filed by the
Company for closure. That two General Body Meetings were held for
discussing retrenchment which was attended by majority of the workmen
including several Petitioners. That the Meeting was held under CCTV
surveillance. That order dated 7 September 2020 records presence of Mr.
R.D. Mahtre Mr. Sachin Mahtre before Respondent No.2 along with
General Secretary of Respondent No.4-Union. She submits that
Respondent No.4-Union successfully ensured that separation package was
enhanced from 15 days wages to 45 days wages per year. She submits that
some of the workmen whose names came to be dropped from
retrenchment proceedings voluntarily approached Respondent No.1
merely seeking compensation and accordingly Respondent No.1 floated
VRS which was accepted by 45 workmen. That therefore Petitioners have
come out with a false narrative of victimization. On above broad
submissions, Ms. Karnik would pray for dismissal of the Petition.
15) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my
consideration.
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16) Petitioners are 67 retrenched workers of the first
Respondent-Company. Their services are retrenched pursuant to the
order dated 7 September 2020 passed by the Specified Authority. Under
Section 25-N(6) of the ID Act, the Petitioners sought review of the order
dated 7 September 2020, which has been rejected by order dated 20
January 2023, which is subject matter of challenge in the present Petition.
17) For examining the validity of the impugned order dated 20
January 2023, it is necessary to consider the statutory claim of
retrenchment under Section 25-N of the ID Act. Chapter-VB of the ID Act
provides for special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and
closure in certain establishments. The provision of Chapter-VB applies to
an industrial establishment in which not less than 100 workmen are
employed. Under Section 25-N, no workmen employed in an industrial
establishment, to which Chapter-VB applies, and who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year, shall be retrenched until (i)
the workman has been given 3 months' notice in writing indicating the
reasons for retrenchment or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of notice and (ii) prior permission of
appropriate Government or of authority as specified by the Government
has been obtained on an application made in that behalf. Sub-section (2)
of Section 25-N prescribes the manner in which application seeking
permission for retrenchment can be made. Sub-section (3) of Section 25-
N provides for grant of reasonable opportunity of hearing to the
employer, the workman concerned and the person interested in the
retrenchment after which the Specified Authority can grant or refuse to
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grant such permission. Sub-section (4) of Section 25-N provides for
deemed permission on expiry of period of 60 days from date of
application, if the same remains undecided. Under sub-section (5) of
Section 25-N, the order granting or refusing to grant permission operates
for a period of one year from the date of the order. Under sub-section (6)
of Section 25-N, the Appropriate Government or the Specified Authority
can, on its own motion, or an application made by the employer or
workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under
Section 25-N(3) or refer the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication. This
is the broad statutory scheme of Section 25N of the ID Act, which
provides thus:
25-N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen
(1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this
Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than
one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,-
(a) the workman has been given three months notice in writing
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has
expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for
the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such
authority as may be specified by that Government by notification in the
Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf.
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by
the employer in the prescribed manner stating clearly the reasons for
the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be
served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed
manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been
made, the appropriate Government or the specified authority, after
making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and
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the person interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to the
genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the
interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for
reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such
permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the
employer and the workmen.
(4) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-
section (1) and the appropriate Government or the specified authority
does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant
permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date
on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be
deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of
sixty days.
(5) An order of the appropriate Government or the specified authority
granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions
of sub-section (6), be final and binding on all the parties concerned and
shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order.
(6) The appropriate Government or the specified authority may, either
on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any
workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission
under sub-section (3) or refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it
to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication:
Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this
sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from
the date of such reference.
(7) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made,
or where the permission for any retrenchment has been refused, such
retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the
notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman
shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in
force as if no notice had been given to him.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of
this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that
owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the
establishment or death of the employer or the like, it is necessary so to
do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply
in relation to such establishment for such period as may be specified in
the order.
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(9) Where permission for retrenchment has been granted under sub-
section (3) or where permission for retrenchment is deemed to be
granted under, sub-section (4), every workman who is employed in that
establishment immediately before the date of application for permission
under this section shall be entitled to receive, at the time of
retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part
thereof in excess of six months.]
18) In the present case, the provisions of Chapter-VB apply to
the establishment of Respondent No.1-Company. It desired to retrench
services of 85 permanent workmen w.e.f. 9 September 2020 mainly on
account of fall in the production and sales. Accordingly, Respondent No.1
applied for permission to retrench 85 workmen by submitting application
to Specified Authority on 10 July 2020. The Specified Authority issued
notices to the concerned parties. Accordingly, hearing took place, which
was attended by the representatives of the company and General
Secretary of Respondent No.4-Union and 2 workmen-Ramchandra D.
Mhatre and Sachin Mhatre. The application was opposed by the
Respondent No.4-Union and the workers. However, during the course of
hearing, the Respondent No.4-Union showed willingness to discuss
settlement if additional separation package was made available to the
workers, who were proposed to be retrenched. Accordingly, Specified
Authority granted time to the parties to hold bilateral negotiations. By
letter dated 28 August 2020, the Respondent-Company informed the
Specified Authority that bilateral negotiations were held and a modified
separation package was given to the Respondent No.4-Union. The
Respondent No.4-Union took time to discuss and study the package. The
terms of the package were as under:
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13. The final separation package offer given by the Applicant by letter
dated 28th August 2020 is as below;(In applicants establishment
Workmen are termed as Team Members)
I. All Legal Dues including Notice pay as per rules, unpaid wages, Leave
with wages, LTA & Bonus. Statutory Deductions and recovery against
outstanding dues, if applicable, will be made as permissible.
II. Gratuity amount will be paid within 30 days from date of
retrenchment order into the bank account of the concerned workman.
III. Retrenchment compensation as per provisions of the act @ Gross
Wages/26 days x 15 days x Completed years of service.
IV. Additional compensation on Basic + DA/26 days @ 45 Days X No. of
Years of Completed years.
V. The average of total compensation amount payable and all other legal
dues that each. Team Member will receive upon retrenchment is
illustrated in the table below :-
19) The Specified Authority took into account the average of
legal dues, retrenchment compensation and additional compensation
payable to various workers as under :-
Years of (A) (B) (C) (D) TOTAL
Completed
Service
Legal Dues 1 Month Retrenchment Additional Avg. Amount
(Unpaid Notice Pay Compensation Compensation (A+B+C+D)
Wages, Bonus, @ 15 Days on @ 45 Days on
LTA, Leave Gross Wages Basic+DA for
and Gratuity) for each each
completed completed
year of service year of service
Years (Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.)
15 410330 37398 323637 556875 1328240
19 501895 39428 432192 773775 1747290
21 533789 40767 493908 893430 1961894
22 569043 41682 529038 956970 2096733
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23 596544 41266 547574 996148 2181532
20) By letter dated 4 September 2020, the Respondent No.4-
Union concurred with the offer made by the Company and consented for
retrenchment. After considering the material on record and after taking
into consideration the submissions canvassed by the Company and the
workers, the Specified Authority proceeded to dismiss Application by
order dated 7 September 2020 granting permission to retrench maximum
of 67 workmen, instead of 85 workmen as proposed, subject to payment of
additional retrenchment compensation over and above the statutory
retrenchment compensation and other legal dues as consented by the
Respondent No.4-Union .
21) Accordingly, services of 67 workmen were terminated by the
First Respondent-Company by letters dated 8 September 2020.
Petitioners have placed on record retrenchment order in respect of Mr.
Premnath Eknath Patil who is paid totally package of Rs.15,88,155/- in
addition to gratuity of Rs.3,28,122/-. There is no dispute to the position
that 67 workers have accepted the compensation paid to them. However,
after receipt of retrenchment orders and compensation, the 67 workers
turned around and filed a complaint of unfair labour practice bearing
Complaint (ULP) No. 167/2020 under Items-1(a), 1(b), 4(a), 4(c) and 6 of
Schedule II and Items-5, 9 and 10 of Schedule-IV before the Labour Court,
Thane on 9 December 2020.
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22) After filing of complaint of unfair labour practice, Petitioners
preferred application for review under Section 25-N(6) of the ID Act
before the Specified Authority on 17 December 2020. The Review
Application remained pending for a considerable point of time before the
Specified Authority and has been rejected by impugned order dated 20
January 2023.
23) The Specified Authority has proceeded to reject the Review
Application by relying on provisions of Section 59 of the MRTU and PULP
Act and by holding that similar and identical issues are involved in
complaint of unfair labour practice filed by the Petitioner. The relevant
findings recorded by the Specified Authority in para-18 of the impugned
order, which also quotes provisions of Section 59 of the MRTP and PULP
Act, read thus:
18. After going through the review application and the contentions,
submissions and arguments made by all concerned parties, it will be
appropriate to first decide the maintainability of this review application
as the Opponent No. 1 and 2 have raised question about the
maintainability of the present review application on the ground of
multiplicity of proceedings before going into the other details of the
case. The record reveals that the applicant workmen have filed a
complaint under MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 before Hon'ble Industrial
Court prior to this review application. This shows that the applicant
workmen have already approached the Hon'ble Industrial Court prior to
this review application. Therefore, it will be proper and appropriate to
go through the contents of the ULP complaint as well as the contents of
this review application. After going through both ULP complaint and
review application, it seems that the applicants have raised some
common, identical and similar issues before both the Authorities. In
both cases, the applicants contended that the procedure under Section
25 (N) of the ID Act, 1947 was not followed. And that copy of application
seeking permission for retrenchment was not served upon the applicant
workmen and that an opportunity of being heard was not given to the
applicant workmen. The mandatory provision under Section 25 (N)
which provides for conditions precedent to retrenchment were not
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complied with and thus the order passed by the Specified Authority
granting permission to retrench workmen passed on 07.09.2020 is
illegal, unlawful and not binding upon the applicant workmen.
Further, the applicant workmen contended before both the authorities
that the Opponent No.1 Company has retrenched the workmen on
08.09.2020 without adhering to the seniority of the workers. In view of
this, the contention of the applicant workmen that the issues raised
before Hon'ble Industrial Court in the ULP complaint and the Specified
Authority in review application are different is not correct and have no
substance. In both the pending cases, the applicant workmen have
contended that the permission granted is illegal and unlawful and that
while terminating the services, the Opponent No.1 Company has not
adhered to the seniority of the workmen In view of this and perusal of
the records of both cases it appears that the contention of the opponent
that the applicants have already filed ULP complaint before the Hon'ble
Industrial Court involving, similar and identical issues prior to the
present review application is pending and that the present review
application is barred by multiplicity of proceedings has substance.
It is pertinent to consider the provision of Section 59 of the MRTU and
PULP Act, 1971 which is reproduced below;
"Section 59: Bar of proceedings under Bombay or Central Act:- If any
proceeding in respect of any matter falling within the purview Act is
instituted under this Act is instituted under this Act, then proceeding
shall at any time be entertained by any authority in respect of that
matter under the Central Act or, as the case may be, the Bombay Act:
and if any proceeding in respect of any matter within the purview of this
Act is instituted under the Central Act, or as the case may be, the
Bombay Act, then no proceedings shall at any time be entertained by the
Industrial or Labour Court under this Act."
(Central Act means Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Bombay Act means
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946- presently known as Maharashtra
Industrial Relations Act, 1946)
On the perusal of Section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971, it is very
clear that the provisions of this section is applicable to the present case,
since the applicants workmen have already filed ULP complaint under
MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 prior to filing this present review application
under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 involving similar and identical
issues as explained above.
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24) Under provisions of Section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act,
which are reproduced in the above quoted portions of the impugned order
passed by the Specified Authority, if any proceedings in respect of any
matter failing within the purview of the MRTU and PULP Act is instituted,
then no proceedings can be entertained by any authority in respect of that
matter under the Central Act (ID Act) or Bombay Act (Bombay Industrial
Relations Act, 1946). Conversely it is also provided that any proceedings
in respect of any matter within the purview of MRTU and PULP Act are
instituted under the ID Act or Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946,
then no proceedings can be entertained by the Industrial or Labour Court
under the MRTU and PULP Act.
25) The Specified Authority has relied on the provisions of
Section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act for the purpose of applying the bar
to file application under Section 25-N(6) of the ID Act on the ground that
complaint dealing with same 'matter' is pending before the Labour Court
under the MRTU and PULP Act.
26) In the light of the above position, the issue that needs to be
answered is whether filing of complaint of unfair labour practice
challenging termination orders issued in pursuance of permission granted
under Section 25-N(3) of the ID Act would act as a bar on entertainment
of application for review of retrenchment permission under Section 25-
N(6) of the ID Act.
27) In the present case, there is no dispute to the position that
termination orders dated 8 September 2020 are issued in pursuance of the
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retrenchment permission granted under Section 25-N(3) of the ID Act on
7 September 2020. The issue for consideration is whether the retrenched
workers can simultaneous adopt remedies of challenging retrenchment
orders before the Labour Court under Section 28 of the MRTU and PULP
Act and seek review of retrenchment permission under Section 25-N(6) of
the ID Act.
28) In the present case, Petitioners have questioned their
terminations before the Labour Court in the Complaint (ULP) No. 167 of
2020. The prayers in the said complaint are as under:
The Complainants, therefore, pray:
(A) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the Respondents to
reinstate the Complainant workers in their services with full back wages,
and continuity of service with consequential benefits w. e. f. 8.09.2020.
(B) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the Respondents to
allow the complainant workers to resume on their duties with immediate
effect and to pay to them their wages regularly
(C) Ad-interim/interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (A) and (B) above
be granted.
(D) Any other relief or reliefs which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper as the facts and circumstances of the case.
(E) Costs and compensation be provided for.
29) Thus, the ULP complaint is filed essentially for questioning
the validity of termination and for seeking reinstatement. On the other
hand, in the Review Application filed under Section 25-N(6), the prayer
was for questioning the order dated 7 September 2020. The prayers in the
Review Application were as under :-
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The Applicants, therefore, pray:
(a) This Review Application may kindly be allowed;
(b) The Order No.CL/IDA/25 (N)/CR/1/2020 dated 7.09.2020 passed by
this Hon'ble Authority in an Application filed by the Company be
reviewed, quashed and set aside.
(c) Any other and further reliefs which this Hon'ble Authority may deem
fit and proper.
30) Thus, there is no dispute to the position that the termination
orders dated 8 September 2020 are issued only on account of permission
granted by the Specified Authority on 7 September 2020. Thus, what
Petitioners are seeking is to have multiple bites at the cherry. They first
filed complaint challenging the termination order. During pendency of
such complaint, they also sought review of retrenchment permission
order dated 7 September 2020.
31) It is sought to be contended by Mr.Naidu that the remit of
enquiry in the two proceedings is entirely different and that the Specified
Authority and the Labour Court do not exercise concurrent jurisdictions.
The scope of enquiry in application under Section 25-N(6) is whether
permission to retrench workers is validly passed or not. The scope of
enquiry is extremely narrow considering that the remedy is by way of
'review'. In the present case, the workers were duly represented by the
union representative, Sanjeev Poojary and 2 workers viz. Ramchandra
Mhatre and Sachin Mhatre. Even if the theory of Petitioners' resignations
from Respondent No.4-Union is to be momentarily accepted, it is seen
that the retrenched worker Mr. Sachin Mhatre was heard by the Specified
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Authority. The Specified Authority has not passed the order hurriedly and
permitted the company and the Respondent No.4-Union to negotiate. The
permission for retrenchment was ultimately issued after Respondent
No.4-Union conducted strenuous negotiations with the company and
successfully secured package of higher compensation of 45 days' wages
per year (which is thrice the statutory requirement of payment of
retrenchment compensation of 15 days' wages per year) for the
retrenched workers. Respondent No.4-Union thereafter consented for
retrenchment. It is thus the contention of Respondent No.1-Company
that permission for retrenchment was granted with the due consent of the
workers proposed to be retrenched for whom the recognized Union
(Respondent No.4) did hard bargaining. Faced with this difficulty,
Petitioners have adopted a stand that they had resigned from membership
of Respondent No.4-Union well before 7 September 2020. This is how
Petitioners seek an escape from the consequences of recognized union
bargaining on behalf of retrenched workers and in assisting them in
securing thrice the amount of compensation than the one statutorily
provided.
32) The interesting twist in the present case is that the workers
currently working with Respondent No. 1 do not support the litigation
spree of 67 retrenched workers. It is the case of the in-service workers
through their Union (Respondent No.4) that it is the recognized union,
who fought hard with the Management for securing extra benefits for the
retrenched workers. Respondent No. 4 has strictly denied having received
any resignation letters. It contends that documents at exhibits D, F and G
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are forged and subsequently manufactured. Respondent No. 1 has also
sung the same song. There appears to be some element of truth in the
allegations of Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.4-Union, who have
raised doubts about genuineness of documents at Exhibits D, E, F and G to
the Petition. The document at Exhibits D is letter dated 21 August 2020
shown to have addressed to the Company intimating it that 48 workers,
who have allegedly singed the said letter, had joined Respondent No.5-
Union. One of the signatures to that letter is of Shri. Sachin Mhatre. If he
had already resigned from the membership of Respondent No.4-Union,
why did he appear before the Specified Authority during the course of
hearing upto 7 September 2020 (along with the recognised Union) has not
been explained in any manner by the Petitioners. The so-called letter
dated 21 August 2020 at Exhibit D does not bear any acknowledgment of
Respondent No.1-Company. The document at Exhibit F is letter dated 21
August 2020 shown to have been addressed to Respondent No.4-Union,
which again does not bear any acknowledgment. This document is again
shown to have been signed by Mr. Sachin Mhatre who latter appeared
before the Specified Authority alongwith the office bearer of Respondent
No.4-Union. The document at exhibit G is alleged letter dated 28 August
2020 of Respondent No.5-Union and shown to have been submitted to
Respondent No. 1-Company and to labour officers. The letter again does
not bear any acknowledgments. Though endorsement of RPAD is made,
no RPAD receipt is produced to demonstrate that the said letter was
actually posted for dispatch on 28 August 2020.
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33) Respondent No.4 has specifically taken a stand on oath that
the so-called resignation letter was received by it after 4 months and 20
days. The statements in para-11 of Affidavit of Respondent No.4 are as
under :-
11. I deny that 48 workers resigned from the membership of the
Respondent No.4 Union vide the letter August 21, 2020 as alleged or at
all. No such letter was ever received by Respondent No. 4 Union. I
submit that Exhibit "D, E, F and G" to the Petition are documents
subsequently prepared by the Petitioners to make out a false case. The
Union received a letter dated 09/09/2020 by post on 29/01/2021 which
was purported to be resignation letter from the Union by 31 workmen. It
is pertinent to note here, the resignation letter dated 09/09/2020 was
received after 4 months and 20 days. I deny that any of the Petitioners
had become member of Respondent No. 5 before the date on which
Respondent No.2 passed order permitting retrenchment. I say that this
Respondent No.4 have not received any of these letters from the
Petitioners before the retrenchment permission being granted as is
falsely being alleged.
34) Thus, Petitioners have apparently raised the story of
resignation from Respondent No.4-Union with a view to wriggle out of
the consent given by Respondent No.4-Union to retrenchment after
securing a better deal for the retrenched workers. It appears that repeated
meetings were held on behalf of the workers by the Respondent No.4-
Union which ultimately led to settlement by acceptance of better terms
for retrenched workers. I have already dealt with details as to how the
proceedings were adjourned from time to time by the Specified Authority
with a view to ensure settlement between the parties. The case therefore
does not involve sudden grant of consent to retrenchment by Respondent
No.4-Union. Petitioners appear to have conveniently joined another
Union i.e. Respondent No.5 after their retrenchment.
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35) Reverting to the issue of need to decide Review Application
filed under Section 25-N(6) of the ID Act in the light of pendency of the
Complaint of Unfair Labour Practice, it is seen that there is substantial
similarity between the averments of the Complaint (ULP) No.167 of 2020
and the averments in the Review Application. Both Complaint and the
Review Application contain allegation of collusion with the recognized
union. There is also common allegation of failure to give any notice to the
workers before moving application for retrenchment permission. There is
also common allegation of non-following of seniority while effecting
retrenchment. There is also common allegation of non-service of notice
of retrenchment before termination of services. Thus, 80 to 90% of the
grounds in both the proceedings are common.
36) Thus, in the peculiar facts of the present case, Petitioners
have apparently raised almost same grounds in both the proceedings.
Ordinarily, once workers decide to seek review of retrenchment
permission under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N, they can expect the
relief of reinstatement and wages in those proceedings. This is because if
the review is allowed and the permission is recalled, retrenchment
automatically becomes illegal under sub-section (7) of Section 25-N.
However, in the present case, Petitioners made a conscious choice of
challenging their termination orders before Labour Court by filing
Complaint of Unfair Labour Practice raising virtually all the grounds
which are subsequently raised in the Review Application. It is on account
of these peculiar facts that this Court is not inclined to interfere in the
impugned order as Petitioners have already availed the remedy of
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Neeta Sawant FINAL-1650 OF 2023
challenging terminations before the Labour Court. If at this stage Review
Application is remanded or if the suggestion of Mr. Naidu of making
reference is accepted, there would be parallel enquiry virtually in respect
on the same grounds. In this regard, reliance by Mr. Jalisatgi on judgment
of Division Bench of this Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation Versus. Yadao and others (supra) is apposite in which, the
employer had dismissed the employee and had filed Application under
Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act for approval. The approval was refused and
the employer challenged refusal of approval by filing Writ Petition. The
approval was refused and the employer challenged refusal of approval by
filing Writ Petition. Concurrently, the employee filed Complaint of unfair
labour practice under Section 28 of the MRTU and PULP Act. In such
circumstances, while holding the ULP complaint to be maintainable, the
Division Bench made reference to Section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act
and held in paragraph 9 of the judgment as under:-
9. The question to ask is: Does the action of the employer in obtaining
an express permission in writing under Cl. (b) Sub-sec. (1) of S. 33 or in
obtaining "approval" under the proviso to Cl. (b) of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33
of the Industrial Disputes Act, amount to a proceeding "falling within
the purview of U.L.P. Act? "It has been valiantly argued by Sri Mehadia,
on behalf of the corporation, that Sch. IV to the U.L.P. Act which deals
with matters pertaining to the discharge or dismissal of the employees
can be called a matter falling within the purview of the U.L.P. Act. We
find that the philosophy behind the bar of S. 59 of the U.L.P. Act is
akin to that of S. 10 or S. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code which
enjoins upon a Court not to proceed with trials of suits where
similar issues were also directly and substantially in issue in
another suit. The intention is to prevent the multiplicity of of
proceedings, possibility contradictory verdicts and wastage of
judicial time. As we read S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act together
with marginal note thereto it appears to us that the section was inserted
with a view to preventing an employer powerful as he is to take pre-
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emptive action of dismissing some ring leaders of strike, decimate
workmen's agitation by taking the wind out of their sails. The
Legislature in enacting S. 33 puts fetters on the common law powers of
the employer to hire and fire at will. It tells the employer that if an
industrial dispute it pending he will have to obtain an express
permission in writing or ex post facto approval to effect a change in the
conditions of service to the detriment of the employee or to terminate
his services. This fetter was imposed in the larger interest of industrial
production and peace. The authority under the Industrial Disputes Act,
does not act in a judicial capacity while according express permission or
an approval. In a convoluted administrative process, very many factors
have to be taken into consideration by that authority before granting
permission or approval which factors fade into penumbra of zone of
consideration in a judicial process. It may be permissible for the
competent authority under the Industrial Disputes Act to come to the
conclusion that even though the employer's proposal to dismiss the
employee can be defended on merits, the industrial climate, the nature
of the product which the industry is producing, the urgency of supply for
defence purposes, etc., are such matters that it would not make for a
better labour management relations if at a particular juncture the
employee is dismissed.
37) Thus, the Division Bench in Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation Versus. Yadao and others (supra) has equated
provisions of Section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act with Sections 10 and
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 which enjoins upon Court not to
proceed with trial of the suit where similar issues were also directly and
substantially an issue in another suit. It is further held that the intention
is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, possibility of contradictory
verdicts and wastage of judicial time.
38) There is yet another reason why this Court is not inclined to
grant any relief to the Petitioners in the present Petition. There are
specific allegations levelled against the Petitioners of having indulged
into production of forged documents. The case of the Petitioners that
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they resigned from membership of Respondent No.4-Union on 21 August
2020 does not appear to be believable. There is sufficient room to infer
that in their capacity as members of Respondent No.4-Union, the
Petitioners participated in the negotiation process with the management.
The proceedings before Specified Authority were adjourned from time to
time for the purpose of enabling the workers to settle the disputes. The
negotiations between the parties yielded positive outcome and the
Respondent No.1 agreed to pay additional compensation at the rate of 45
days wages per year. Respondent No.1 has placed on record the details of
compensation paid to each of the Petitioners. They have accepted the
amounts of compensation.
39) It is well settled position that the Petitioner invoking
jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 or 227 must approach the
Court with clen hands. This Court can refuse to look into merits, if it is
satisfied that the Petitioner has attempted to mislead it. In the present
case, the conduct of the Petitioners does not appear to be above board.
They have approached this Court with false story of resignations from the
recognised unions solely for the purpose of wriggling out of consequences
of being governed by the terms of settlement. Such conduct on the part of
the Petitioners would disentitle them from invoking the discretionary and
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
40) It also appears that Respondent No.2 did not grant
permission to retrench 85 workers, on account of which Respondent No.1
floated a Voluntary Retirement Scheme offering same package of wages of
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45 day/per year compensation under the scheme. It appears that 45
workers voluntarily opted for the scheme. Thus, the attractive offer of
additional compensation given by Respondent No.1 has enabled it to
reduce work force of 67+45 = 112 workers, though it had sought
permission to retrench only 85 workers. Petitioners have accepted the
compensation and have thereafter turned around and sought review of
retrenchment permission. Considering the overall conduct of the
Petitioners, this Court is not inclined to exercise extraordinary
jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. As
observed above, Petitioners have already exercised alternate remedy of
challenging their retrenchment before the Labour Court by filing
complaint of unfair labour practice. The said complaint can be
adjudicated on merits. In the present case, this Court is not inclined to
grant any relief in favour of the Petitioners.
41) The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. However,
dismissal of the Writ Petition shall not come in the way of Petitioners
prosecuting Complaint (ULP) No.167 of 2020 which shall be decided by
the Labour Court on its own merits without being influenced by any of the
observations made in the present order. Considering the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Digitally
signed by
NEETA
NEETA
SHAILESH
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
SHAILESH SAWANT
SAWANT Date:
2026.03.13
19:11:36
+0530
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