[Cites 24, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
University Of Mumbai (Through ... vs Amit S. Bagul on 13 March, 2026
2026:BHC-OS:6573
Neeta Sawant WP. NO 3962 OF 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 3962 OF 2025
University of Mumbai and Others. .....PETITIONERS
: VERSUS :
Amit S. Bagul & Others. ....RESPONDENTS
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 2556 OF 2019
The Registrar University of Mumbai
and Others. .....PETITIONERS
: VERSUS :
Amit S. Bagul & Others. ....RESPONDENTS
Mr. J.P. Cama, Senior Advocate i/b Mr. Yuvraj Narwankar & Mr. Suraj
Kaushik, for Petitioner
Mr. S.C. Naidu with Mr. Abhishek Ingale, Ms. Divya Yajurvedi & Mr.
Pradeep Kumar i/b C.R. Naidu & Co., for Respondent Nos. 2-4, 8, 11, 12,
14-17, 19-21, 25, 26, 28-33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41-43, 45, 48-53, 56, 57 & 62.
Mr. Manoj Gujar, for Respondent Nos. 5, 7, 9, 13, 40, 44, 46, 47, 54 &
55.
Mr. T.R. Yadav, for Respondent Nos. 1, 6, 10, 22, 27, 58 & 60.
Ms. Vaishali Kamble, Deputy Registrar, Legal Cell, University of Mumbai,
present
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CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
Reserved On: 20 February 2026.
Pronounced On: 13 March 2026.
Judgment:
1) Petitioner-University has filed the present Petition
challenging judgment and order dated 28 November 2023 passed by the
Industrial Court, Mumbai allowing Complaint (ULP) No. 208 OF 2017
filed by Respondents alleging unfair labour practices under Item Nos. 5,
6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions
and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP
Act). The Industrial Court has directed Petitioner to pay salary to
Respondents equal to the lowest grade of salary and allowance being
paid to its regular employees from the dates of their respective joining.
Respondents are held entitled to resume their duties on their respective
posts and places with all consequential benefits and equal pay at par
with permanent employees from 5 July 2017. Petitioner has been further
directed to provide all consequential benefits and equal pay to the
Respondents on par with permanent employees from 5 July 2017 until
they are provided with their normal work.
2) Brief facts leading to filing of the Petition are stated thus:
Petitioner No.1 is University of Mumbai and Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are
its Vice Chancellor and Registrar respectively. Respondents were
engaged by the Petitioner-University to discharge duties on various
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posts such as Peon, Junior Typist-Clerk, Sweepers, Scientific Assistant,
Data Entry Operator, Driver, Hamal, Mali, etc. The services of
Respondents were temporary in nature and were extended from time to
time. It appears that the Respondents were in the process of filing a
complaint of unfair labour practices against the University for raising a
claim for regularisation. However a Circular was issued by the Registrar
of the University on 30 June 2017 for discontinuation of all temporary
employees named in the attached list w.e.f. 30 June 2017. Respondents
were accordingly discontinued vide circular dated 30 June 2017.
3) Respondents filed Complaint (ULP) No. 208 of 2017 in
Industrial Court, Mumbai alleging unfair labour practices on the part of
Petitioner-University under Items Nos.5, 6 and 9 of Schedule-IV of the
MRTU and PULP Act. They claimed status of permanent workmen from
the date of completion of 240 days of work. They also claimed allowances
and other monetary and consequential benefits at par with other
permanent employees of the University from the date of completion of
continuous services of 240 days by each of them. Along with the
complaint, a chart providing dates of initial engagement and dates of
completion of 240 days was appended at Annexure A. The complaint was
signed on 30 June 2017 and the same was apparently lodged on 1 July
2017.
4) This is how the acts of filing of complaint for regularization
by Respondents and discontinuation of their services vide Circular dated
30 June 2017 happened almost simultaneously. The Complaint (ULP) No.
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208 of 2017 was accordingly amended by the Respondents, and the relief
of reinstatement was added complaining that from 5 July 2017, the
Petitioner-University refused to provide work to the Respondents. The
Respondents alleged that discontinuation was aimed at frustrating the
Complaint. Respondents pressed for interim stay on discontinuation.
However, by order dated 3 August 2017, the Industrial Court rejected the
application for interim relief on the ground that their services were
already terminated on 30 June 2017. Respondents filed application on 5
October 2018 seeking review of order dated 3 August 2017. Two years
later and by order dated 7 June 2019, the Industrial Court allowed the
review application and allowed the application for interim relief at Exh
U-26 by setting aside previous order dated 3 August 2017. Petitioners
were directed to allot work to the Respondents and allowed them to
perform their duties till final disposal of the Complaint. Petitioners filed
Writ Petition No. 2556 of 2019 challenging order dated 7 June 2019. By
order dated 5 March 2020, this Court admitted the Petition and stayed
the order dated 7 June 2019. The Industrial Court was directed to dispose
of the complaint expeditiously and preferably within a period of 6
months. The time for decision of the Complaint was extended by this
Court from time to time.
5) The Complaint (ULP) No. 208 of 2017 was resisted by the
Petitioners by filing Written Statement. Parties led evidence in support
of their respective claims. By the impugned judgment and order dated 28
November 2023, the Industrial Court has partly allowed the Complaint
holding that Petitioners have engaged in unfair labour practices under
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Item-6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. The prayer of the
Respondent for permanency is not granted. However, Petitioners are
directed to pay to the Respondents salary in the lowest grade which is
being paid to regular employees from the dates of joining by the
Respondents. The Industrial Court has further directed reinstatement to
the Respondents from 5 July 2017 with further direction of equal pay on
par with permanent employees from 5 July 2017.
6) Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 28 November
2023, Petitioners have filed Writ Petition 3962 of 2025. Since Writ
Petition 2556 of 2019 also arises out of same proceedings, the same is
taken up for analogous hearing at the request of the learned counsel
appearing for parties.
7) Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for
Petitioners would submit that the Industrial Court has erred in allowing
the Complaint and granting relief of reinstatement and backwages on
par with permanent employees in favour of the Respondents. He submits
that the University does have any power of creation of posts without
previous sanction of the State Government. He relies on provisions of
Section 5, 8 and 28 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 in support
of the contention that Respondents do not have any right to remain on
the posts which are not sanctioned by the State Government. He submits
that Respondents were engaged temporarily without following due
process of law and in absence of any sanctioned vacant posts. That their
appointments were tenure specific and gave no right to remain on the
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post forever. That direction for reinstatement would entail continuance
of Respondents in absence of availability of posts.
[
8) Mr. Cama would further submit that Industrial Court did not
have jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint filed by the Respondents.
He relies on provisions of Section 57 and 58 of the Maharashtra
Universities Act, 1994 (Act of 1994) in support of his contention that
only Grievance Committee had jurisdiction to decide the issue of
termination and reinstatement. That Industrial Court therefore could
not have entertained the issue relating to termination and
reinstatement, which fell in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Grievance
Committee. He submits that there is actually no inconsistency between
the provisions of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 and MRTU and
PULP Act since Grievance Committee is invested with exclusive
jurisdiction on account of non-obstante clause in Section 59 of the Act of
1994. However, even if it is assumed that there is inconsistency between
the two statutes, it is settled law that the latter stood enacted after
taking note of the former statute and that therefore the later statute
would prevail.
9) Mr. Cama further submits that another facet of absence of
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court relates to entertainment and decision
of Complaint under Item 1 of Schedule IV over which only Labour Court
has jurisdiction in matter of discharge, dismissal or termination. That
the Industrial Court has thus transgressed its jurisdiction in passing the
impugned judgment and order which is liable to be set aside.
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10) Mr. Cama further submits that the Industrial Court has erred
in granting the relief of resumption of duties by the Respondents. That
the findings of violation of provisions of Section 25F and 25G of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) are recorded in ignorance of the
position that the Respondents were tenure appointees and had full
knowledge about the last day of their service. He submits that there has
been no termination in the present case since the tenure of engagement
is brought to an end by efflux of time. In support of their contention of
fixed term employment, he relies upon judgment of Apex Court in
Gangaddhar Pillai Versus. Siemens Limited 1. That the Industrial Court
itself has recorded a finding in para-52 of the impugned judgment that
there is no termination of the concerned employees. That the Industrial
Court has erroneously directed reinstatement in absence of termination.
He submits that cessation of services of the Respondents has no co-
relation with filing of complaint, as circular for cessation of their services
was issued on 30 June 2017 and the complaint was filed much later. That
therefore the allegation of victimization against the Petitioners is clearly
misplaced. He submits that Respondents failed to make out pleadings in
support of claim of completion of 240 days in immediate preceding year
before termination. He relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Regional
Manager, SBI Versus. Rajesh Kumar2. That if Respondents do not have
right of permanency, the Industrial Court could not have directed their
reinstatement. He relies upon judgment of Apex Court in Rajneesh
Khajuria Versus. Wockhardt limited and another 3.
1
2007 (1) SCC 533
2
2006 1 SCC 530
3
2020 (3) SCC 26
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11) Mr. Cama has also canvassed submissions about absence of
right of Respondents to claim permanency. The said submissions are
made essentially in view of apprehension that the impugned judgment
might be misinterpreted to mean that permanency is granted to the
Respondents. He relies on judgment of the Apex Court in State of
Gujarat Versus. Thakor Hathaji Mohanji 4 in support of his contention
that mere reinstatement cannot tantamount to regularization of
services.
12) Mr. Cama further submits that the University does not have
work to provide to the Respondents, who cannot be foisted on the
University. That the termination is effected as per the G.R. issued by the
State Government. That if work itself is not available, direction by the
Industrial Court to allot work to the Respondents is incapable of being
implemented. That the University cannot be made to pay wages to the
Respondents in absence of availability of work.
13) Lastly, Mr. Cama would submit that the Industrial Court has
erred in directing payment of wages in the lowest grade of salary and
allowances from the date of respective joining by the Respondents. He
submits that the period of limitation applies to the relief of backwages
and in complaint filed in the year 2017, the relief of wages could not
have been granted from the dates of their initial engagements. That even
the direction for payment of equal pay for equal work on par with
4
2006 1 CLR 479
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permanent employees is erroneous. He would pray for setting aside the
impugned judgment and order.
14) Mr. Naidu, the learned counsel appearing for Respondents
opposes the Petition. He submits that no interference is warranted in
well-reasoned judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court. He
submits that the issue involved in the present Petition is squarely
covered by the judgments of this Court in Mumbai Vidyapeeth Kamgar
Sanghatana Versus. University of Mumbai 5 and University of Mumbai
Versus. Parag Bhaskar Ghag 6 . He submits that both the judgments
passed by this Court are subject matter of pending proceedings before
the Apex Court in which services of the concerned employees are
continued on payment of pay in the pay scales corresponding to the
regularly appointed employees in addition to allowances. That therefore
the Petition deserves to be dismissed.
15) Mr. Naidu further submits that the Petitioners have
erroneously relied on the provisions of Act of 1994 when infact what is
relevant for the present case is Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016
(Act of 2016) which came into effect from 1 March 2017 and was in
vogue when the complaint was filed and services were discontinued. He
submits that the remedy before the Grievance Committee was not an
effective remedy available to the Respondents as the Grievance
Committee was not even set up at the relevant time as held by this Court
in Mumbai Vidyapeeth Kamgar Sanghatana (supra). So far as the issue
5
2019 SCC Online Bom 801
6
Writ Petition NO.6932 of 2022 decided on 9 May 2025
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of jurisdiction of Industrial Court to decide the issue of termination and
reinstatement is concerned, he submits that the same is squarely covered
by the judgment in University of Mumbai Versus. Parag Bhaskar Ghag
(supra) in which it has held been that termination during pendency of
complaint relating to permanency and equal pay for equal work amounts
to victimization. That in the present case, Petitioners did not approach
the Industrial Court with the grievance of termination. That the
Complaint was filed seeking equal pay for equal work and for
permanency. That the services were terminated after filing of the
Complaint for frustrating the same. That the finding of fact has been
recorded by the Industrial Court that the alleged circular dated 30 June
2017 was actually issued after getting wind of the fact that the
Complaint was filed by the Respondents. That the finding of absence of
termination is recorded by the Industrial Court in the context of the
stand taken by the Petitioner-University.
16) Mr. Naidu further submits that there is absolutely no
evidence of fixed term of employment of the Respondents. That
Petitioners did not produce any appointment order showing fixed tenure.
That the services were continued without any break and without
issuance of fixed term appointments. That juniors were continued by
terminating the services of the Respondents. That Respondents failed to
produce the G.R. and therefore the plea of termination being premised
on G.R. is patently false.
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17) Mr. Naidu further submit that Respondents are
unceremoniously thrown out of service by not following the principles of
nature justice and provisions of Section 25-G and 25-I of the ID Act. That
most of them worked for over 14 long years. They were not paid any
compensation in respect of the services rendered by them. That
therefore no error can be traced in the direction for reinstatement with
full backwages. That services of Respondents were utilized on payment
of meager salaries by extracting same work as performed by regular
employees. That therefore Industrial Court has rightly directed payment
in lowest grade from the dates of filing of the complaint/date of
discontinuation. The direction is also given for equal pay for equal work
to the Respondents on par with permanent employees.
18) Mr. Naidu further submits that the University can no longer
raise the issue of absence of authority to make appointments. He
submits that the power of the University to make appointments is
expressly upheld by this Court in Mumbai Vidyapeeth Kamgar
Sanghatana in which it is held that the University can make
appointments through its own funds. That there is distinction between
appointments made on posts for which assistance is required from the
State Government and appointments made against posts created by the
University from its own funds under the Act of 2016. That there is an
express admission by the witness of the Petitioners that appointments of
the Respondents were made out of University funds.
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19) Mr.Naidu further justifies the relief of backwages
submitting that once termination is found to be illegal, grant of full
backwages is a natural consequence. He relies on judgment of the Apex
Court in Deepali Gundu Survase Versus. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya and others7 . He submits that the two witnesses led by
the Respondents led evidence of victimisation, exploitation and payment
of meager salaries. That grant of relief of wages in the lowest grades
from the dates of engagement is after appreciation of evidence on
record. Mr. Naidu further submits that Respondents were replaced by
others and relies on orders of engagement of other employees in place of
the Respondent. He submits that Petitioners cannot be permitted to
raise the issue of limitation in respect of the backwages as no specific
ground is raised in the petition in relation to backwages. He submits that
even if any period of limitation is made applicable in respect of relief of
wages in the juniormost grade, atleast the said relief be protected from
the date prior to the date of 3 years prior to filing of the complaint. He
prays for dismissal of the Petition.
20) Rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties now fall for
my consideration.
21) The Complaint (ULP) No. 208 of 2017 was filed by the
Respondents, who are 64 in number, and who were working with the
Petitioner-University on various posts such as Junior Typist Clerk,
Scientific Assistant, Computer Lab Incharge, Data Entry Operator, Lab
7
2013 10 SCC 324
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Attendant, Hamal, Peon, Driver, Mali, etc. The Complaint was filed
essentially to redress the grievance of non-grant of permanency and for
payment of salary, allowances and other benefits on par with other
permanent employees. The prayers in the Complaint as originally filed
reads thus :-
a) to hold that the Respondents have engaged in unfair labour practices
under item 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of The MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.
b) to direct the Respondents to cease and desist from engaging in unfair
labour practices under item 5, 6 and 9 of Schdule IV of The MRTU &
PULP Act, 1971.
c) to direct the Respondents to give to the complainants whose details
given in Annexure-A appended to the complaint..
1) status of permanent workmen from the date each one of them has
completed continuous service of 240 days with the Respondents.
ii) Arrears of sales of pay, allowances and other monetary and
consequential benefits of service conditions at par with the other
permanent employees of the Respondents with due retrospective effect
from the date each one of them has completed continuous services of
240 days with the Respondents.
d) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the complaint, this Hon'ble
court be pleased to...
i) direct the Respondents to maintain the status quo in terms of
services and service conditions of the complainants (whose names are
given in Annexure-A appended to the complaint) with them.
ii) restrain the Respondents from terminating or dispensing with the
services of the complainants (whose details are given in Annexure-A
appended to the complaint) in any manner.
iii) restrain the Respondents from recruiting or appointing the
employees either directly or contractual, on the post of complainants
(whose details are given in Annexure-A appended to the complaint).
iv) ad-interim relief in terms of prayer (i), (ii) and (iii) herein above.
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e) cost of Rs.50,000/- be granted.
f) any other or further relief in favour of complainants in the interest of
justice, equity and fair play be granted.
22) Along with the Complaint, Respondent produced a chart
indicating the dates of initial appointment and dates of completion of
240 days of service by each of them. The said chart shows that
Respondent No.1 is engaged on 3 October 2003. Respondent Nos.2 and 3
are engaged in 2004. Respondent Nos.4 and 5 are engaged in 2008.
Respondents Nos.6 and 7 are engaged in 2009 and rest of the
Respondents were engaged thereafter. The engagement of Respondent
Nos.48 to 64 is in the year 2016. Respondent thus formed together a
group of 64 employees, few of whom had rendered substantial services
whereas most of them had rendered services of barely a year by the time
the Complaint was filed.
23) The Complaint was filed for seeking permanency and for
payment of wages on par with permanent employees on completion of
240 days of service. There is no dispute to the position that services of
the Respondents have been disengaged and none of them are in service
as of today. There is some factual dispute about the exact date on which
the services were discontinued. The Petitioners have relied upon Circular
issued by the University on 30 June 2017 in support of their contention
that disengagement occurred at the end of closing hours of 30 June 2017.
On the other hand, it is the case of the Respondents that disengagement
occurred after filing of the Compliant. In fact, it is the case of
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Respondents, which is accepted by the Industrial Court, that the Circular
is issued with a backdate to frustrate the Complaint for permanency. The
Industrial Court has treated the date of 5 July 2017 as the date of
discontinuation.
24) Respondents therefore prayed for interim stay on
discontinuation during pendency of the Complaint. The Industrial Court
rejected the application for interim injunction by order dated 3 August
2017, but reviewed the same on 7 June 2019 and directed allotment of
work to the Respondents. Order dated 7 June 2019 is subject matter of
challenge in Writ Petition No. 2556 of 2019 which has been admitted. By
order of this Court dated 5 March 2020, the order of Industrial Court
dated 7 June 2019 has been stayed. With this, the Respondents have
continued to remain without employment since June 2017.
25) For deciding the Compliant, the Industrial Court framed 9
issues and has answered the same as under :-
Sr. No. ISSUES FINDINGS
1 Whether the University of Mumbai is an "Industry" In the Affirmative
within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947?
2 Whether the University of Mumbai is an "Industrial In the Negative
Establishment" within the meaning of Section 2(e) of
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,
1946?
3 Does the Maharashtra University Act, 1994 oust the In the Negative
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court constituted under
Section 4 of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 to decide a
Complaint of unfair labour practices under Section 28
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read with Items 5, 6 & 9 of Schedule IV of the Act?
4 Do the Complainants prove that the Respondent Partly in Affirmative,
University has engaged in unfair labour practice under under Item 6 of Schedule
Section 28 read with Items 5, 6 & 9 of Schedule IV of IV of the MRTU & PULP
MRTU & PULP Act, 1971? Act
5 Whether the appointments of Complainants are In the Negative
consistent with the procedure in view of the judgment
passed in Writ Petition Nos. 1492/2013 and 2615/2013 ?
6 Do the Complainants make out a case of declaration In the Affirmative
and injunction as prayed?
7 Do the Complainants entitled to the status of Entitled for equal pay
permanency or regularization of their services with
Respondent Mumbai University?
8 Do the Complainant prove that they are entitled to In the Affirmative
resume their duty on their respective post and place
and pay full wages and consequential benefits for the
period from 5th July 2017, until the Complainants are
provided with their normal work and Mr. Nitin M.
Sawant is entitled to full wages and consequential
benefits?"
9 What Order? As per final order
(emphasis added)
26) Before going further, it would be first necessary to achieve
clarity about the exact nature of relief granted by the Industrial Court to
the Respondents. Perusal of the operative part of the Industrial Court's
impugned order would indicate that it has only granted the relief of
reinstatement and payment of equal wages to the Respondents. The
operative part of the impugned order reads thus:
1. The Complaint is partly allowed.
2. It is hereby declared that Respondents have engaged in unfair labour
practices under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.
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3. The Respondents are hereby directed to cease and desist from
engaging in unfair labour practices under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the
MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.
4. The Respondents are hereby directed to pay salary to Complainants
equal to the lowest grade of salary and allowances being paid to its
regular employees from the date of their respective joining.
5. The Complainants including Mr. Nitin M. Sawant are entitled to
resume their duties on their respective posts and places with all
consequential benefits and equal pay at par with the permanent
employee from 05.07.2017, until the Complainants are provided with
their normal work.
6. The Respondents shall provide all consequential benefits and equal
pay to the complainant at par with permanent employees from
05.07.2017, until the Complainants are provided with their normal
work.
27) The operative part of the judgment of the Industrial Court, I
must say, is a bit confusing. Courts and Tribunals need to issue
unambiguous directions in the operative part of the judgment and order,
avoiding the need for an interpretative process for understanding the
exact purport of the directions. The directions issued by the Industrial
Court in the operative part and their exact meaning is as under:
Directions in operative part of Order Effect of direction and exact relief
granted
2. It is hereby declared that Respondents
Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act enlists
have engaged in unfair labour practices the unfair labour practice of employing
under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the budlis, casuals and temporaries and to
MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. continue them for years with the
objective of denying them status and
3. The Respondents are hereby directed privileges of permanent employees.
to cease and desist from engaging in Confusion is created by direction Nos. 2
unfair labour practices under Item 6 of and 3 about grant of benefit of
Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, permanency, but the confusing is
1971. resolved by (i) absence of specific
direction for permanency and (ii) the
way Issue No. 7 is answered.
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4. The Respondents are hereby directed All complainants would receive salary
to pay salary to Complainants equal to equal to the lowest grade (Peon is the
the lowest grade of salary and lowest grade in the hierarchy) from the
allowances being paid to its regular date of joining. The direction is in the
employees from the date of their nature of difference in wages from the
respective joining. dates of initial engagements.
5. The Complainants including Mr. Nitin Direction for reinstatement as
M. Sawant are entitled to resume their temporary employees.
duties on their respective posts and
places with all consequential benefits
and equal pay at par with the permanent
employee from 05.07.2017, until the
Complainants are provided with their
normal work.
6. The Respondents shall provide all Equal pay and benefits on par with
consequential benefits and equal pay to permanent employees from dates of
the complainant at par with permanent termination till reinstatement
employees from 05.07.2017, until the
Complainants are provided with their
normal work.
In addition to confusion relating to permanency, there is also confusion
in direction Nos. 4 and 6 relating to grant of equal wages which is
discussed in greater details in the latter part of the judgment. Mere
direction for reinstatement cannot be confused with the concept of
regularization as held by the Apex Court in State of Gujarat vs. Thakor
Hathaji Mohanji in which it is held in Para 3 of the judgment as under:
3. It is not possible for us to re-open the issue as to whether there was
an abandonment of the work by the respondent or a termination of the
respondent's services. The Labour Court has found that there was a
termination and that finding, cannot be said to be perverse. We may
clarify that when a daily wager is reinstated, he/she is re-employed as a
daily wager. The award cannot, by directing reinstatement, tantamount
to regularisation of the workman's services. Continuity of service in the
context of a daily wager, means the maintenance of the seniority of the
workman amongst other daily wagers.
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28) As observed above, Respondents specifically prayed for
permanency from the date of completion of 240 days of service.
However, perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 28
November 2023 indicates that the Industrial Court has not granted the
relief of permanency. This is clear from answer to Issue No.7 by the
Industrial Court as reproduced above. Thus, specific issue of entitlement
of Respondents to permanency or regularization has been answered
holding that they are 'Entitled for equal pay'. Even the operative part of
the order does not indicate that the prayer for permanency is granted to
the Respondents. No doubt, the Industrial Court has made some
discussion on the issue of permanency and regularization in paragraph
Nos. 48 to 50 of the Judgment. However, while discussing the ratio of
various judgments, the Industrial Court has not recorded a definitive
finding in respect of Respondent's entitlement for permanency. Be that
as it may. There is no specific direction for grant of permanency to the
Respondents. On the contrary, the Industrial Court has specifically
answered Issue No. 7 relating to 'Do the Complainants entitled to the
status of permanency or regularization of their services with Respondent
Mumbai University' as only entitled for equal pay. Thus, there is no
direction in the impugned judgment and order for permanency.
29) After going through the nature of operative directions of the
Industrial Court and particularly answering of Issue No. 7, even Mr.
Naidu has fairly admitted that the relief of permanency, though sought,
has not been granted by the Industrial Court. Grant of relief of equal pay
on par with permanent employees cannot be confused with the concept
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of 'permanency' or 'regularization'. In fact, grant of relief of equal pay on
par with regular employees signify that the concerned workers remain
temporary employees but are to be paid wages on par with regular
employees. However, payment of wages on par with regular employees
does not mean that the status of temporary employees gets elevated to
that of regular employees. Courts grant the relief of wages in the
minimum of pay-scales applicable to regular posts to ad hoc, casual,
temporary employees to ensure that their temporary services are not
exploited by paying meagre wages. The aspect of payment in minimum
of payscale is being discussed in greater details in the latter part of the
judgment. However the concept of 'equation of pay' cannot be confused
with the concept of 'permanency or regularisation'.
30) Respondents have not challenged the impugned judgment
and order dated 28 November 2023, which does not grant them the relief
of permanency. Since the relief of permanency is not granted, it is not
really necessary to go into the aspect of University's power to create
posts or to employ employees. Discussion on the issue of University's
power to create posts would have had some relevance, if the issue of
entitlement to permanency was the subject matter of dispute before this
Court. Since permanency is not granted by the Industrial Court and since
Respondents have not challenged non-grant of permanency, in my view,
it is not really necessary to enter into the controversy about University's
power to create posts. I therefore find it unnecessary to go into various
provisions of Sections 57, 58 and 59 the of Act of 1994 or provisions of
Act of 2016.
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31) Since the relief of permanency is not granted by the Industrial
Court, it is also not necessary to consider the ratio of judgments in
Regional Manager, SBI Versus. Rajesh Kumar Rajneesh Khajuria
Versus. Wockhardt limited and Gangadhar Pillai (supra) relied upon by
Mr. Cama relating to issue of permanency. Similarly reliance by Mr.
Naidu on latest judgment of the Apex Court in Pawan Kumar & Ors. Vs.
Union of India & Ors.8 is not relevant to the case at hand which does not
contemplate regularization as result of impugned judgment and order of
the Industrial Court. As observed above, Mr. Naidu has conceded the
position, and in my view, quite fairly, that the impugned order does not
contemplate grant of regularization and has relied on judgment in
Pawan Kumar to the limited extent of argument of discrimination and
implantation of outsourcing policy. It would be relevant to extract order
dated 20 February 2026 passed while reserving the judgment, which
reads thus:
1) The arguments in the Petition were fully heard and the judgment has
been reserved on 11 February 2026. The Petitions are listed at the
instance of Mr. Naidu, the learned counsel appearing for the
Respondents, who has produced before the court judgment of the
Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar and Ors. V/s Union of India and Ors.
which is rendered after the date on which the judgment in the present
Petitions got reserved. Mr. Naidu has been heard on the judgment in
Pawan Kumar (supra). Mr. Naidu however, concedes that the judgment
impugned in the present Petitions does not grant the
permanency/regularization to the Respondents. He however, submits
that the judgment in Pawan Kumar (supra) is relied upon by the
Respondents only to the aspect of discrimination and implementation
of outsourcing policy.
2) The judgment is reserved.
8
SLP (c) No. 29214 of 2019 decided on 13 February 2026
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32) Since permanency is not granted to the Respondents, it is
also not necessary to go into the issue of manner of effecting initial
engagements, number of years of service put by them and availability of
posts against which engagements were initially made, etc.
33) Before proceeding further, it is necessary to quickly deal
with the objection raised by the Petitioner-University about the issue of
jurisdiction of Industrial Court to grant the relief of reinstatement. It is
contended that since termination and reinstatement falls in Item 1 of
Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, only Labour Court has jurisdiction
to decide the said issue. However, in the present case, the Compliant was
never instituted with the grievance of termination as the Respondents
were apparently not terminated when the Complaint was lodged. The
termination/discontinuation occurred during pendency of the
Complaint, which was filed for permanency and equal pay. This issue is
no more res integra and is already dealt with by this Court in and
University of Mumbai Versus. Parag Bhaskar Ghag. Jurisdiction of
Industrial Court to grant relief of reinstalment is upheld in that
judgment when termination occurred during pendency of Complaint.
REINSTATEMENT
34) I first proceed to decide Petitioner's challenge to the relief
of reinstatement granted by the Industrial Court. As observed above, the
services of the Respondents are apparently discontinued in view of
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Circular dated 30 June 2017. The Industrial Court recorded following
reasons for directing reinstatement:
52. Ongoing through the evidence adduced by the Complainant it
transpired that the employees were appointed by giving them an
appointment letter and thereafter their services were extended from
time to time. However, witnesses have not admitted the fact that they
are terminated from the services of Respondent. UW-1 specifically
stated in his evidence that he is working in the Information and
Technology Department of the University. Admittedly, the office order
of Respondent University dated 30.01.2016 is produced on record,
however, none of the witnesses has stated that they have received
individual termination letters from the Respondent University.
Witnesses have admitted in cross-examination that they have not
undergone any written examination, but they faced an interview for
their job in Respondent University. However, it is pertinent to note that
it is not a case of the Complainant that Complainants are appointed, on
following the due process of law i.e. by way of a recruitment. Therefore,
the said admission of the witnesses is not fruitful to the defence
adopted by the Respondent University. On the contrary, CW-1 is
admitted in the cross-examination that the Complainants have been
the employees of the University, and the date of joining of the
concerned employees is correct as mentioned in the list annexed to the
Complaint. It also comes on record that Respondent University has no
record to show the termination of concerned employees. In light of the
said admission, as there is no reliable and cogent documentary
evidence to show the termination of concerned employees, it can not
be said that concerned employees are terminated. However, the
Complainants have not brought on record about the entitlement of Mr.
Nitin M. Sawant, about his entitlement, but his name is shown in the
list of employees annexed to the Complaint.
53. It is significant to note that no notice is issued by the Respondent
University about the termination, no charge sheet is filed, no enquiry is
conducted. Moreover, it transpired that the employees of Respondent
No.1 i.e. Complainants had approached this Court for filing the present
Complaint on 30.06.2017, on the same day Respondent University
issued a circular with the signature of its Registrar, whereby
discontinued the services of the concerned employees. As such, it is
seen that this office order was brought into existence to deprive the
rights of the Complainants. There was no compliance of Sections 25F
and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As such, sudden
termination of the services of the Complainant by issuing a disputed
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circular dated 30.06.2017, can not be come within the provisions of law.
In view of this, I find that Complainants are entitled to resuming their
duties and they are also entitled to pay full wages and consequential
benefits, as prayed for. Hence, my answer to issues No. 6 & 8 in
Affirmative and as to issue No.7 entitled "for equal pay".
35) Mr. Cama has particularly highlighted the finding in para 52
of the order that 'as there is no reliable or cogent documentary evidence to
show termination of the concerned employees, It cannot be said that the
concerned employees are terminated'. It is contended by him that since the
Industrial Court itself has not found merit in the claim for termination, it
could not have directed reinstatement. However, the background in
which the above finding has been recorded by the Industrial Court needs
to be appreciated. The Industrial Court has taken into consideration
evidence of Mr. Ashok Ferde, Deputy Registrar, Human Resource
Development Cell of Petitioner-University. He deposed during the course
of his cross examination that 'It is true to say that University has no record
to show the termination of concerned employees'. Thus, the finding of
absence of records to indicate termination is essentially traceable to the
above admission given by the witness. Also, though the above admission
of the witness is taken into consideration by the Industrial Court, it has
not granted reinstatement only on the basis of absence of 'real
termination'. Industrial Court has ultimately considered the act of 'non-
continuation of services' to be 'termination' and has held that since the
provisions of Section 25F and 25G of the ID Act are not followed, the
termination is bad in law. Therefore, not much capital can be made by
the Petitioners in respect of the findings of absence of termination
recorded by the Industrial Court.
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36) Coming to the legality of termination/non-continuation, it
is contended by Mr. Cama that there is in fact no termination since the
appointments were tenure appointments and that they came to an end
with efflux of time. If that was the case, this Court called upon Mr. Cama
to show the last order of appointment/extension which contemplated
continuation of services only till 30 June 2017. In response, Mr. Cama
invites my attention to order dated 29 May 2017 by way of an example in
support of his contention that similar orders used to be issued for every
six months. The order dated 29 May 2017 does not pertain to the
Respondents. The said order makes appointment of about 80 employees
for a period of 6 months. The order dated 29 May 2017 provided by way
of an example is not helpful since Respondents were also appointed only
till 30 June 2017. However, along with the Compilation, the Petitioners
have produced Office Order dated 15 February 2017 to which Mr. Cama
did not invite my attention. The said Order appoints 418 employees on
temporary basis for six months from 3 January 2017 to 30 June 2017. As
observed above, Mr. Cama did not cite the Order dated 15 February 2017
as the last tenure appointment of the Respondents. Also, it is not clear
whether the University terminated services of all 418 employees listed in
the order dated 15 February 2017. Therefore, this Court is unable to
believe that Circular dated 30 June 2017 effected termination of all 418
temporary employees. There is nothing on record to indicate that all 418
employees reflected in the order dated 15 February 2017 were
discontinued on 30 June 2017. On the other hand, Mr. Farde admitted in
his cross examination that 'at present there are 925 employees on the basis
of temporary basis'. Petitioner's witness Mr. Farde further gave admission
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in his cross examination that 'I cannot tell the exact last date of allotment
of work of the concerned 64 workers without verifying the record'. He further
admitted that 'It is true to say that I have not mentioned in my written
statement the last date of allotment of the work to the concerned workers'. It
is also not a pleaded case of the Petitioners either in the Statement of
Defence or in the present Petition that Order dated 15 February 2017 was
the tenure appointment of all 64 Respondents and that all 418 temporary
employees covered by order dated 15 February 2017 were terminated by
Circular dated 30 June 2017. It is therefore difficult to infer that the
University terminated services of all 417 employees vide Circular dated
30 June 2017.
37) Coming to the Circular dated 30 June 2017 the same reads
thus :-
The Directors/Heads of the University Departments/Centres, the
Principal, Sit J.J. College of Architecture, the Librarian, University
Library, the Controller of Examinations and the Officers in-charge of
the different Sections/Units of the Registrar's Office are hereby
informed that the temporary employees who were working in the
respective departments as per the attached list and whose temporary
appointment was for six months, has ceased with closing hours of 30
June, 2017 by virtue of appointment/extension-office order. Please note
that their services should not be continued, it is crystal clear that no
office order has been issued in regards to extension of any appointment
in respect of those employees mentioned herewith.
In view of above clear and categorical instructions, anyone who
attempts to continue, shall be responsible at his/her own risk to
consequences.
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38) The Circular refers to the 'attached list'. However, though
copy of Circular dated 30 June 2017 is filed along with the Compilation
by Petitioners, the 'attached list' referred to in the Circular is not
produced for my perusal. Thus, only the employees in the attached list
were to be terminated as per the Circular dated 30 June 2017. The
Circular states that the temporary appointments of the employees in the
attached list were for six months and had ceased with closing hours of 30
June 2017. In that view of the matter, Circular cannot be blindly relied
upon to infer that the appointments were tenure specific or that they had
automatically come to an end by 30 June 2017, not requiring following of
any process for termination.
39) In my view therefore there is no sufficient material to hold
that services of the Respondents were discontinued only on account of
efflux of tenures of their appointments.
40) Petitioner's witness has given a clear admission that as on 4
March 2023, when his evidence was recorded, there were 925 employees
working on temporary basis. This shows that Respondents were
subjected to discriminatory treatment and several other temporary
workers continued to work in the University.
41) Apart from the fact that the Respondents were not issued any
notices before terminating their services nor were paid the notice wages,
they are also not paid the retrenchment compensation. Also, there is
nothing on record to indicate that the principle of seniority was followed
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for effecting discontinuance. Considering this position no serious flaw
can be traced in the direction of the Industrial Court for resumption of
services by the Respondents.
DIRECTION FOR PAYMENT OF LOWEST GRADE SALARY
42) While directing that the Respondents are entitled to resume
duties on their respective posts and places, the Industrial Court has
directed payment of all consequential benefits and equal pay on par with
permanent employees from 5 July 2017 in direction No. 6. The same is
repeated in direction No. 4 of operative part of the order. However, in
Direction No. 4 of the operative part, the Industrial Court has directed
payment of salary equal to the lowest grade of salary and allowances as
paid to the regular employees from the date of their respective joining.
Direction No. 4 of operative part of the order reads thus :-
4. The Respondents are hereby directed to pay salary to Complainants
equal to the lowest grade of salary and allowances being paid to its
regular employees from the date of their respective joining.
43) It must be observed that the above quoted direction is
slightly difficult to comprehend. What exactly is meant by 'equal to the
lowest grade of salary and allowances' is difficult to comprehend and even
Mr. Naidu struggled explaining this to the Court. He has submitted that
the Industrial Court has directed payment of salary and allowances of the
lowest grade in the University and that the lowest grade in the University
is that of a Peon. Upon query by the Court as to whether a Scientific
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Assistant is directed to be paid salary of a Peon, Mr. Naidu has answered
in the affirmative.
44) Perusal of the chart appended to the complaint would
indicate that 64 Respondents were deployed to work on various positions
like Scientific Assistant, Data Entry Operator, Computer incharge, Lab
Assistant, Clean Room Maintenance engineer, Junior typist clerk,
Technical assistant, Driver, Peon, Hamal, Mali, etc. However, if the
contention of Mr. Naidu is believed to be correct, the exact purport of
Direction No. 4 in the operative part of the order is that all of them will
receive salary payable to that of a Peon from the dates of their respective
joining. In my view, this direction of the Industrial Court is grossly
erroneous and defies logic.
45) Furthermore, in the entire body of the judgment, there is
not even a whisper as to why this relief of payment of salary in the
lowest grade is granted in favour of the Respondents. The grant of this is
also contrary to the prayers in the Statement of Claim in which
Respondents had demanded arrears of allowances and other benefits on
par with permanent employees from the date of completion of
continuous service of 240 days. Thus, while Respondent demanded
arrears of wages on par with permanent employees from the dates of
completion of 240 days of service, the Industrial Court has awarded the
relief from the dates of initial joining. Also, the Industrial Court has not
directed payment of difference of wages but has directed payment of
whole of wages payable to lowest grade in the University. In my view
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Direction No. 4 in the operative part of the order suffers from multiple
errors.
LIMITATION APPLICABLE FOR ARREARS OF BACKWAGES
46) There is yet another glaring error committed by the
Industrial Court in directing payment of wages in the lowest grade from
the date of respective joining. Respondents have allegedly joined the
services of the Petitioner-University on various dates starting from 3
October 2003. This would mean that Respondent No.1 will have to be
paid salary in the lowest grade from 3 October 2003 though he filed a
complaint on 5 July 2017. It is a settled position that even if payment of
lesser wages may constitute continuous cause of action, the period of
limitation would apply to payment of arrears. In M.R.Gupta Versus.
Union of India and others 9, the Apex Court has held that limitation
would apply to the relief of recovery of arrears. The principle is
reiterated by the Apex Court in Union of India and others Versus.
Tarsem Singh10 wherein the Apex Court has held that though there is an
exception to normal rule of limitation in cases involving continuous
cause of action, there is an exception to that exception wherein cases
involving continuous wrong need to be restricted to a period of three
years. This Court in Jaihind Shakari Pani Purvatha Mandali Versus.
Rajendra Bandu Khot and others considered the ratio of the judgment
11
9
1995 5 SCC 628
10
2008 8 SCC 648
11
WP No. 563 of 2017 decided on 20 November 2019
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of the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh and M.R.Gupta (supra) and held in
paras-8, 9 and 11 to 14 as under:
8. The Supreme Court has explained the difference between a
continuous wrong and recurring or successive wrongs in the case of
Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh1 . A continuing wrong is a single
wrong causing a continuing injury. In case of a continuing wrong, the
grievance essentially is about an act which creates a continuous source
of injury and renders the doer of that act responsible and liable for
continuance of that injury. The injury is not complete when the act is
committed; it continues even thereafter; and so long as it does, the
cause of action itself continues. A recurring or successive wrong, on the
other hand, occurs when successive acts, each giving rise to a distinct
and separate cause of action, are committed. Each act, in itself
wrongful, constitutes a separate cause of action for sustaining a claim
or a complaint. It is important to bear in mind in this context the
distinction between an injury caused by a wrongful act and the effect of
such injury. What is to be seen is whether the injury itself is complete
or is continuous. If the injury is complete, the cause of action accrues
and is complete; the clock starts ticking for the purposes of limitation,
notwithstanding the fact that the effect of such injury continues even
thereafter. For example, let us take the case of an occupant of a house
who is driven out of it. The injury is complete with the act of throwing
him out, though the effect of that injury, namely, his being unable to
use or occupy the house, continues even thereafter. Take, however, the
case of a person who is detained in a house and not allowed to roam
about. The act of detention is the one which causes an injury. This
injury, however, is a continuing injury, since the injury here consists in
being unable to move about. This injury continues and since the injury
itself continues, the wrong is a continuous wrong and the cause of
action, a continuing cause of action. Take, on the other hand, the case
of a person who is barred from entering a house he is entitled to enter.
When he is barred for the first time, an injury follows, and a cause of
action thereby accrues. Each successive day on which he is so barred
gives rise to a fresh and distinct cause of action, making it a case of
recurring/successive wrongs.
9. In service jurisprudence, this distinction (i.e. the distinction
between a continuing wrong and a recurring one) becomes important
particularly from the point of view of relief. In M.R. Gupta vs. Union of
India2 , the Supreme Court has explained it succinctly. The appellant
before the court in that case was a workman, whose grievance was that
his wage fixation was not in accordance with the applicable rules. He
asserted that the wrong was a continuous one. The court held that his
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cause of action was a recurring cause of action rather than a continuous
one. Each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in
accordance with the rules, a cause of action accrued unto him. The
Court held as follows (SCC pp.629- 30):
"So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action
arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the
basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no
doubt true that if the appellant's claim is found correct on
merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly
fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation
would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In
other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears
calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has
become time-barred would not be recoverable, but he would be
entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules
and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is
justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by
him, such as, promotion etc., would also be subject to the
defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs."
11. The three years' period considered by the Supreme Court in Tarsem
Singh's case was on the basis of a general limitation for recovery of a
money claim. What was considered was that since the recovery period
being considered by the High Court was in a writ petition, where the
case was not covered by any particular article of limitation, the normal
rule of limitation for recovery of money dues, i.e. limitation of three
years, should apply unless there are extra-ordinary circumstances. Had
the case been before an administrative tribunal, it would have been the
particular article of limitation which would have applied. In the present
case, since we are dealing with an unfair labour practice of not
honouring a settlement between the employer establishment and its
workmen, the period is of three months. Ordinarily, therefore, salaries
and other emoluments payable for three months prior to the complaint
can alone be considered for relief as a normal rule. The Industrial Court
appears to have disregarded this law. It appears to have proceeded on
the footing of a continuous cause of action. It ought to have instead
considered each successive act of nonpayment as a separate injury and
cause of action and proceeded to consider the successive acts as
recurring causes of action. Going by that, as per the law stated in
Tarsem Singh's case, enforcement of settlement could have always
been ordered for future and as for arrears, they could have been ordered
only for three months as per the limitation period ordinarily applicable.
The court should then have considered whether and to what extent to
exercise its discretion to go beyond this ordinarily applicable period,
depending on good and sufficient reasons being shown for the delay.
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This aspect of the matter, however, has not been addressed to at all by
the Industrial Court, since it, as we have seen above, wrongly, treated
the cause of action as a continuing one and gave relief on that basis.
The impugned order of the court, thus, deserves to be quashed and the
complaint remitted to the court for consideration of the period of
recovery, that is to say, how far to go back for ordering recovery of
arrears.
12. Ms.Singh, learned Counsel for the Respondents, refers to the case of
Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. D.J. Bahadur . What this case
lays down is that a settlement made between an establishment and its
workmen subsists till a new award or settlement takes its place. This
proposition does not, in any way, advance the Respondent's case in the
present case. It is not that in our case the award is not binding or that it
does not continue to be in force, but that each individual act of refusal
to implement the award gives rise to a fresh cause of action. The cause
of action of non-implementation of the settlement is not a continuous
cause of action, but a recurring cause of action, each individual act of
nonimplementation giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of
action. The case of Jagatjit Industries Ltd. vs. Labour Officer4 referred
by Ms.Singh does not state the law of continuing cause of action any
differently. The case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. vs. Sharad Laxman
Dalvi decided by our court was about an unfair labour practice of not
recognising a claim of permanency. What was submitted to the court
was that the claim of permanency related to the year 1990 and no
complaint in that behalf could have been entertained in the year 1998.
The court did not countenance this argument for the reason that the
claim being about permanency, its denial gave rise to a cause of action
for complaining about adoption of unfair labour practice by the
employer and this was a continuing cause of action. Non-recognition of
permanency is indeed a continuing cause of action; the injury caused
by such non-recognition cannot be said to be complete when
permanency, though due, was not recognised or given effect to for the
first time by the employer; the injury continues on each succeeding day
when permanency benefits are denied to the employee. None of these
judgments, thus, supports the case of the Respondent-employees.
13. Ms.Singh, however, relies on four other cases decided by our Court,
where our Court appears to have taken a different view. These cases did
involve claims of non-payment of salaries and other monetary dues as a
cause of action and our Court does appear to have proceeded on the
basis that the claims were within time, though filed beyond the
ordinary rule of limitation, without taking into account any distinction
between a continuing cause of action and a recurring cause of action.
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14. The Division Bench of our court in Warden & Co. (India) Ltd. vs.
Akhil Maharashtra Kamgar Union6 was concerned with a workmen's
complaint of unfair labour practice of non-payment of wages from
February 1992, and bonus, leave travel allowance, encashment of
privilege and causal leave for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92. The
complaint was filed on 29-3-1993 under MRTU & PULP Act. Though
the main controversy before the court was whether an unrecognised
union was entitled to appear and act on behalf of workmen of an
industry governed by the Industrial Disputes Act in a complaint
relating to unfair labour practice other than those specified by Items 2
and 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, the Division Bench did
consider the other issue involved in the matter, namely, whether the
complaint was barred by limitation. From the employer's side, the
same provision of limitation was pressed into service, namely, Section
28 of the Act, providing for three months' period. The Division Bench
observed that the complaint was of an unfair labour practice under
Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act, namely, "failure to implement award,
settlement or agreement"; Section 28 enabled a complainant to file a
complaint where "any person has engaged in or is engaging in any
unfair labour practice" and every time wages were not paid when due, it
could be averred that the employer was engaging in an unfair labour
practice under Item No.9 of Schedule IV. That was the basis on which
the Division Bench did not find merit in the submission of the employer
based on limitation of three months. The Division Bench, with respect,
correctly held the complaint as not barred under Section 28, but that
was on the basis of a recurring cause of action - every time wages were
not paid, the employer could certainly be said to have engaged in an
unfair labour practice. The Division Bench, however, does not appear to
have considered the further question, namely, what should be the
period for which arrears of wages should be ordered or in other words,
which arrears, calculated on the basis of difference in pay, were
recoverable as within time and which were time-barred. The decision of
the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta's case (supra) was not brought to the
notice of the Division Bench. The Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta, as we
have noted above, made it clear that so long as an employee was in
service, a fresh cause of action arose every month when he was paid his
monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation; if the employee's
claim of computation was found to be correct on merits, he would be
entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale "in the
future" and "the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the
arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any,
for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay
which has become time barred would not be recoverable". This has now
been fully explained and reiterated by the Supreme Court, by making
out a clear distinction between a continuing cause of action and
recurring causes of action particularly from the standpoint of service
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jurisprudence in Tarsem Singh's case (supra). After this latter decision,
it is impermissible to argue that since each time wages are not paid
when due there is a resultant unfair labour practice, arrears could be
ordered to be paid for any length of time, that is to say, without
reference to any time-bar. The judgments of two learned Single Judges
of our court in Indian Smelting & Refining Co.Ltd. vs. Sarva Shramik
Sangh7 , Maharashtra State Electricity Board vs. Suresh Ramchandra
Parchure8 and Cipla Ltd. vs. Anant Ganpat Patil9 , also, with utmost
respect, do not state the law correctly to the extent they allow the
claims of arrears of wages without reference to the bar of limitation for
claiming past dues. The decisions could be said to be per incuriam for
not considering the law laid down in M.R. Gupta's case (supra) and, in
any event, now impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court decision in
Tarsem Singh's case (supra).
47) In Kumar Dashrath Kamble Versus. Bombay Hospital12,
this Court has agreed with the statement of law expounded in Jaihind
Sahakari Pani Purvatha Mandali and has restricted the payment of
arrears only in respect of 90 days since the period of limitation stipulated
in MRTU & PULP Act is 90 days. This Court held in paras-33 and 34 as
under:
33) In my view therefore, though this Court is inclined to grant the
benefit of permanency to the Petitioner from the year 2006, the
principle of delay and laches would come into play in respect of arrears
arising out of grant of such permanency. Petitioner slept over his rights
for over 12 years. No doubt, he was wrongfully denied the benefit of
permanency in the year 2006. Therefore, he ought to have raised the
said grievance immediately after denial of benefit of permanency. His
medical examination in pursuance of Memorandum of Settlement was
held on 6 December 2006. He ought to have filed the complaint of
unfair labour practice within 90 days of denial of benefit of
permanency. In that view of the matter, the Respondent-Hospital
cannot be saddled with the financial burden of paying difference in
wages for unduly long period of 12 long years. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, it would be appropriate to deny the actual
benefits arising out of permanency during the period from 2006 till 90
days before the date of filing of the complaint. The principle of
restricting the arrears for three years in Tarsem Singh and Shiv Dass is
12
Writ Petition No. 3766 of 2024 decided on 23.12.2025
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on account of period of limitation for filing of suit of three years.
However, in respect of complaints of unfair labour practice under the
MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 the prescribed period of limitation is only 90
days. Therefore, Petitioner would be entitled to actual arrears from 90
days prior to filing of his Compliant.
34) The Petition deserves to be allowed partly by directing Respondent-
Hospital to confer the benefit of permanency on the Petitioner from the
date of execution of Memorandum of Settlement ie. 1 December 2006.
However, he would be entitled to the actual financial benefits in respect
of period 90 days before the date of filing of Complaint before the
Industrial Court i.e. 5 July 2018.
48) The Industrial Court has failed to take into consideration
the above stated settled law of applicability of period of limitation to
payment of arrears even in respect of the grievances involving
continuous cause of action. Since the complaint is filed under MRTU &
PULP Act, the arrears could not have been granted for a period exceeding
90 days.
PAY IN MINIMUM OF PAYSCALE
49) As observed above the directions for payment of salary in
the lowest grade is erroneous. The Apex Court in State of Punjab
Versus. Jagjit Singh and others13 has directed that all temporary
employees need to be paid wages in the minimum of the pay scale (at the
lowest grade in the regular pay scale) extended to regular employees
holding the same post. It has held in paras-54 to 61 of the judgment as
under:
13
2017 1 SCC 148
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54. The full bench of the High Court, while adjudicating upon the above
controversy had concluded, that temporary employees were not
entitled to the minimum of the regular pay-scale, merely for the
reason, that the activities carried on by daily-wagers and regular
employees were similar. The full bench however, made two exceptions.
Temporary employees, who fell in either of the two exceptions, were
held entitled to wages at the minimum of the pay-scale drawn by
regular employees. The exceptions recorded by the full bench of the
High Court in the impugned judgment are extracted hereunder:-
"(1) A daily wager, ad hoc or contractual appointee against the regular
sanctioned posts, if appointed after undergoing a selection process
based upon fairness and equality of opportunity to all other eligible
candidates, shall be entitled to minimum of the regular pay scale from
the date of engagement.
(2) But if daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees are not
appointed against regular sanctioned posts and their services are
availed continuously, with notional breaks, by the State Government or
its instrumentalities for a sufficient long period i.e. for 10 years, such
daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees shall be entitled to
minimum of the regular pay scale without any allowances on the
assumption that work of perennial nature is available and having
worked for such long period of time, an equitable right is created in
such category of persons. Their claim for regularization, if any, may
have to be considered separately in terms of legally permissible
scheme.
(3) In the event, a claim is made for minimum pay scale after more than
three years and two months of completion of 10 years of continuous
working, a daily wager, ad hoc or contractual employee shall be entitled
to arrears for a period of three years and two months."
54.1. A perusal of the above conclusion drawn in the impugned
judgment (passed by the full bench), reveals that the full bench carved
an exception for employees who were not appointed against regular
sanctioned posts, if their services had remained continuous (with
notional breaks, as well), for a period of 10 years. This category of
temporary employees, was extended the benefit of wages at the
minimum of the regular pay-scale. In the Secretary, State of Karnataka
case28 , similarly, employees who had rendered 10 years service, were
granted an exception (refer to paragraph 53 of the judgment, extracted
in the preceding paragraph). The above position adopted by the High
Court reveals, that the High Court intermingled the legal position
determined by this Court on the subject of regularization of employees,
while adjudicating upon the proposition of pay parity, emerging under
the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. In our view, it is this mix-up,
which has resulted in the High Court recording its afore-extracted
conclusions.
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54.2. The High Court extended different wages to temporary
employees, by categorizing them on the basis of their length of service.
This is clearly in the teeth of judgment in the Daily Rated Casual
Labour Employed under P&T Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar
Mazdoor Manch case22. In the above judgment, this Court held, that
classification of employees based on their length of service (- those who
had not completed 720 days of service, in a period of 3 years; those who
had completed more than 720 days of service - with effect from
1.4.1977; and those who had completed 1200 days of service), for
payment of different levels of wages (even though they were admittedly
discharging the same duties), was not tenable. The classification was
held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
54.3. Based on the consideration recorded hereinabove, the
determination in the impugned judgment rendered by the full bench of
the High Court, whereby it classified temporary employees for
differential treatment on the subject of wages, is clearly unsustainable,
and is liable to be set aside.
55. In view of all our above conclusions, the decision rendered by the
full bench of the High Court in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors.
(CWP no. 14796 of 2003), dated 11.11.2011, is liable to be set aside, and
the same is hereby set aside. The decision rendered by the division
bench of the High Court in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh &
Ors. (LPA no. 337 of 2003, decided on 7.1.2009) is also liable to be set
aside, and the same is also hereby set aside. We affirm the decision
rendered in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar (LPA no. 1024 of
2009, decided on 30.8.2010), with the modification, that the concerned
employees would be entitled to the minimum of the pay-scale, of the
category to which they belong, but would not be entitled to allowances
attached to the posts held by them.
56. We shall now deal with the claim of temporary employees before
this Court.
57. There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of 'equal pay for
equal work' has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions
of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded through a large
number of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law
declared by this Court The same is binding on all the courts in India,
under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of the
principle, have been summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove.
The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has also been extended to
temporary employees (differently described as workcharge, daily-wage,
casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position, relating to
temporary employees, has been summarized by us, in paragraph 44
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hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly
declared, is being reiterated by us, yet again.
58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial
parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same
work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties
and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action
besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human
dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not
do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family,
at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth,
and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents
would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act,
of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate,
constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a
domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive,
suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation.
59. We would also like to extract herein Article 7, of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. The same is
reproduced below:-
"Article 7 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of
work which ensure, in particular: (a) Remuneration which provides all
workers, as a minimum, with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for
work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A decent living for
themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the
present Covenant; (b) Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal
opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those
of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation
of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as
remuneration for public holidays."
India is a signatory to the above covenant, having ratified the same on
10.4.1979. There is no escape from the above obligation, in view of
different provisions of the Constitution referred to above, and in view
of the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution
of India, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' constitutes a clear
and unambiguous right and is vested in every employee - whether
engaged on regular or temporary basis.
60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the
application of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', in relation to
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temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees,
employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the
like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the
concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties
and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees,
holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the
application of the parameters of the principle of 'equal pay for equal
work' summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the
instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to
record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly
acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab,
that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were
appointed against posts which were also available in the regular
cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of
their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being
randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at
some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise,
regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to
discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees,
from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the
duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in
the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by
regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the
respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for
appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the
State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay
parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42
hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of 'equal pay for
equal work' would be applicable to all the concerned temporary
employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with
the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government
employees, holding the same post.
61. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph,
we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary
employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw
wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (- at the lowest grade, in the
regular pay-scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same
post.
50) Thus, the law expounded in Jagjit Singh has been reiterated
by the Apex Court in Sabha Shanker Dube Versus. Divisional Forest
Officer and others in which it has held in paras-10 to 12 as under :-
14
14
2019 12 SCC 297
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10. On a comprehensive consideration of the entire law on the subject
of parity of pay scales on the principle of equal pay for equal work, this
Court in Jagjit Singh held as follows: (SCC p. 223, para 58)
"58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine
artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee
engaged for the same work cannot be paid less than another
who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly
not, in a welfare State. Such an action besides being demeaning,
strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Anyone, who is
compelled to work at a lesser wage does not do so voluntarily.
He does so to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost
of his self-respect and dignity, at the cost of his self-worth, and
at the cost of his integrity. For he knows that his dependants
would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage.
Any act of paying less wages as compared to others similarly
situate constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging
out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is
oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary
subjugation."
11. The issue that was considered by this Court in Jagjit Singh is
whether temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad hoc
appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual
employees and likewise) are entitled to the minimum of the regular pay
scales on account of their performing the same duties which are
discharged by those engaged on regular basis against the sanctioned
posts. After considering several judgments including the judgments of
this Court in Tilak Raj 5 and Surjit Singh, this Court held that
temporary employees are entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the
pay scales which are applicable to the regular employees holding the
same post.
12. In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh, we are unable to uphold the
view of the High Court that the appellants herein are not entitled to be
paid the minimum of the pay scales. We are not called upon to
adjudicate on the rights of the appellants relating to the regularisation
of their services. We are concerned only with the principle laid down by
this Court initially in Putti Lal Z relating to persons who are similarly
situated to the appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh that
temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long
as they continue in service.
51) It appears that the Industrial Court, has confused itself on
account of use of the words 'at the lowest grade, in the regular pay scale'
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used in para-61 of the judgment in Jagjit Singh. What is directed by the
Apex Court is to pay the minimum basic pay in the pay scale which is
applied to regular employees holding the same post. This means a
temporary Data Entry Operator would receive entry pay in the pay scale
payable to regular Data Entry Operator. The temporary employees do not
receive increments. What is ensured by the Apex Court is that temporary
employees are not exploited by payment of honorarium or meager
wages. To ensure some parity in pay, it has been directed that they are
entitled to receive alteast entry pay in the pay scale during the period
they continue to serve as temporary employees. However, there cannot
be absolute parity in pay between regular employees and temporary
employees. Regular employees receive yearly increments, which
temporary employees are not entitled to receive. Throughout their
service they would be entitled to receive entry pay in the applicable pay
scale and all other allowances thereon.
52) Even in Direction No. 6 of the operative part of the order,
the Industrial Court has directed equal pay on par with regular
employees from 5 July 2017. This direction is again erroneous as
temporary employees are not entitled to draw increments and therefore
there is no question of granting them exact equal pay on par with regular
employees. They are only entitled to draw wages in the minimum of the
pay scale and allowances.
53) Reliance by Mr. Naidu on judgments of this Court in
Mumbai Vidyapeeth Kamgar Sanghatana and University of Mumbai
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Versus. Parag Bhaskar Ghag does not enure to the benefit of the
Respondents. In Mumbai Vidyapeeth Kamgar Sanghatana, this Court
directed appointment of employees in the vacant posts firstly from
amongst the serving Petitioners. In the present case, the Industrial Court
has denied the benefit of regularization to the Respondents. The only
relief granted in favour of the Respondents herein is backwages and
payment of equal pay. In University of Mumbai Versus. Parag Bhaskar
Ghag this Court dismissed the Petition filed by the University and
confirmed the order passed by the Industrial Court and apparently
granted permanency to the Respondents as is apparent from para-2 of
the judgment of this Court. In the present case, permanency is not
granted. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the
ratio of the judgment in University of Mumbai Versus. Parag Bhaskar
Ghag. However, qua the issues of jurisdiction of the Industrial Court I
have referred to the relevant part of the judgment in Mumbai
Vidyapeeth Kamgar Sanghatana. Also, both the judgments in Mumbai
Vidyapeeth Kamgar Sanghatana and University of Mumbai Versus.
Parag Bhaskar Ghag are pending challenge before the Apex Court and
only continuance of the employees involved therein is directed on
payment of minimum pay scale. In the present case also, it is ensured
that the Respondents are continued in service on payment of wages in
the minimum of payscales.
WAGES DURING PENDENCY OF COMPLIANT
54) Respondents were discontinued from various grades
beginning from 5 July 2017 and most of them did not actually work
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during pendency of the complaint. The Tribunal has however granted
not just 100% backwages but has directed payment of equal pay on par
with regular employees from 5 July 2017 till the complaint is decided on
28 November 2023. The issue for consideration is whether Respondents
are entitled to backwages and if answer to the question is in the
affirmative, to what extent.
55) Since the Respondents approached Industrial Court and
decided to rely on labour laws to claim reliefs, it became incumbent for
them to lead evidence to demonstrate absence of gainful employment for
claiming backwages. The complaint initially filed was for permanency
and for payment of equal pay from the dates of completion of 240 days of
service. It is claimed that on the date of filing of the complaint, services
of the Respondents were not terminated. This appears to be the reason
why there was no occasion for them to raise a pleading of absence of
gainful employment. However, after their services were discontinued, it
became incumbent for them to incorporate a pleading in the Complaint
of absence of gainful employment. It appears that though the Complaint
was amended to incorporate challenge to terminations, no averment was
added relating to absence of gainful employment. To make the case of
the Respondent worse, they did not even lead evidence of absence of
gainful employment. Respondents examined only 2 witnessed in support
of their case. Ms. Shubhangi Sudhakar Balge did not state in her affidavit
of evidence that she was not gainfully employed after termination of her
services. The second witness examined by the Respondents was Mr.
Swarneem Anil More who was in service on the date of filing of affidavit
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of evidence dated 20 January 2021. Therefore there was no occasion for
him to lead evidence of absence of gainful employment. Thus, the two
witnesses examined by Respondents did not make any statement even
for themselves about absence of gainful employment, Ms. Shubhangi
Balge admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the other
Respondents. Mr. Swarneem Anil More deposed that he had filed
affidavit in his personal capacity and that he did not know about any
particulars of rest of the Respondents.
56) Mr. Naidu has also relied on judgment of the Apex Court in
Dinesh Chandra Sharma Versus. Bhartiya Paryatan Vikas Nigam
Limited and another. in support of his contention that requirement to
15
plead absence of gainful employment is not a rigid rule. However, in the
present case, there is failure not just to plead absence of gainful
employment, but there is also no evidence to demonstrate absence of
gainful employment.
57) Also of relevance is the fact that the Industrial Court had
initially rejected the prayer for interim stay of termination but in
erroneous exercise of review jurisdiction, it reintroduced such stay much
later on 7 June 2019. Thus, till passing of the review order on 7 June
2019, there was no stay on termination. The order dated 7 June 2019 has
been stayed by this Court on 5 March 2020 in Writ Petition No. 2556 of
2019. Thus, initially the Industrial Court and later this Court thought it
appropriate not to direct the Petitioners to permit Respondents to
15
2025 SCC Online SC 3003
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continue in service during pendency of the complaint. This also would
be an important factor to bear in mind while deciding the issue of
backwages.
58) Thus, there is neither pleading nor evidence of absence of
gainful employment after termination of services of the Respondents.
This issue is completely glossed over by the Industrial Court, while
directing payment of backwages and equal pay from 5 July 2017. Mr.
Naidu has relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Survase (supra) in support of his contention that payment of full
backwages is a natural consequence of termination being rendered
illegal. However, the judgment in Deepali Gundu Survase has been
explained in subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Management of
Regional Chief Engineer Public Health and Engineering Department
Ranchi Versus. Their Workmen 16
in which it has held in para-16 as
under :-
16. We, however, find that the High Court in para 9 of the order placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase for
holding that the question of back wages is covered by this decision. In
our view, the High Court erred in so observing. It should have seen that
in Deepali Gundu Surwase itself, this Court referred to decisions, which
we have mentioned in para 12 above and then in para 38 of Deepali
Gundu Surwase, this Court culled out the ratio of all the cited cases.
Thereafter, this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase case granted
relief to the workers concerned on the facts involved in that case.
In our opinion, the High Court did not apply the ratio of the decision in
Deepali Gundu Surwase to the facts of this case properly and only
quoted one paragraph of the judgment in Deepali Gundu Surwase
which contained general observations. Those observations had to be
read in juxtaposition with para 38 which culled out the ratio of all the
case law on the subject.
(emphasis added)
16
2019 8 SCC 814
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59) Thus, the Apex Court, in a subsequent judgment, has
clarified that the relief of backwages is granted in Deepali Gundu
Surwase in the light of facts of that case. In absence of any pleading and
evidence of absence of gainful employment, this Court would be actually
justified in denying backwages to the Respondents.
60) Petitioner is a University engaged essentially in the
activities of imparting education. Directing payment of full backwages
on par with the regular employees during the period when the
Respondents did not actually work would put a huge financial burden on
the University. It is not that each of the Respondent was in service for a
long period of time. The chart appended to the complaint would indicate
that Respondent Nos. 48 to 64 had joined services in 2016 and had
rendered hardly a year's service. Similarly, Respondents 28 to 47 had
joined service in 2015 and had worked hardly for 2 years. Respondents
Nos. 17 to 27 had worked for only 3 years. Thus out of the 64
Respondents, about 10 actually worked for 3 years, 19 worked for 2 years
and 16 worked for only 1 year. Thus, 70% of the Respondents had
rendered services ranging between 1-3 years. They are not regular
employees of the University. The issue is whether they need to be
granted full backwages for 6 long years when their service period in the
University is hardly between 1 to 3 years. The answer to my mind
appears to be in the negative.
61) Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
where services of the Respondents were discontinued immediately after
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filing of the complaint, I deem it appropriate to award 50% backwages to
them after 5 July 2017 till 28 November 2023 when the complaint was
decided. From 29 November 2023 onwards, Respondents were supposed
to be reinstated towards implementation of the order of the Industrial
Court. The direction for reinstatement is upheld by this Court. In that
view of the matter, Respondents would be entitled to full wages in the
minimum pay scale payable to regular employees holding corresponding
post.
62) Writ Petition No. 2556 of 2019 challenges interlocutory
order dated 7 June 2019 by which the Industrial Court had reviewed its
earlier order of refusal of interim stay on termination. Since this Court
has modified the final judgment and order of the Industrial Court,
nothing survives to be adjudicated in Writ Petition No. 2556 of 2019 and
both the learned Counsel agree that the same is rendered infructuous.
CONCLUSIONS
63) The conspectus of the above discussion is that the Industrial
Court has not granted the relief of permanency to the Respondents. It
has only granted them reinstatement and the relief of reinstatement
granted by the Industrial Court is found to be justified. However,
direction for payment of salary equal to lowest grade paid to regular
employees from the date of respective joining is found to be erroneous.
Instead, arrears need to be restricted only to a period of 90 days before
filing of the complaint. Accordingly, Respondents would be entitled to
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difference of wages between the one actually paid to them and the pay in
minimum of pay scale applicable to the relevant posts plus dearness
allowance for a period of 90 days prior to filing of the complaint. The
direction for payment of consequential benefits and equal pay from 5
July 2017 is also found to be erroneous. As observed above, Respondents
would be entitled to only 50% of backwages from 5 July 2017 to 28
November 2023. The backwages shall be calculated on the basis of entry
pay in the pay scale applicable to the respective posts plus dearness
allowance. From 29 November 2023 till Respondents are actually
reinstated, the Petitioner-University shall pay full wages and dearness
allowance arrived at by taking into consideration entry pay in the pay
scale applicable to the posts held by the Respondents. It appears that in
pursuance of order dated 26 February 2025, the Petitioner-University has
deposited salaries of Respondents for a period of 3 months. Respondents
would be entitled to withdraw the deposited amounts alongwith accrued
interest. The balance payments arising out of the present order shall be
paid over to each of the Respondents within a period of 4 months.
ORDER
64) I accordingly proceed to pass the following order :-
i) The judgment and order dated 28 November 2023 passed by
the Industrial Court, Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No. 208 of
2017 is partly set aside and modified.
ii) Petitioners shall pay to the Respondents difference of wages
between the one actually paid and the one payable,
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considering the entry pay in the minimum of the pay scale
applicable to the posts held by them plus dearness
allowance for a period of 90 days prior to the date of filing of
Complaint.
iii) Petitioner shall pay to the Respondents 50% of backwages
from 5 July 2017 to 28 November 2023 calculated by taking
into consideration entry pay and dearness allowance in the
pay scale admissible to the respective posts held by the
Respondents.
iv) From 29 November 2023 onwards, Petitioners shall pay to
the Respondents full salary and dearness allowance
calculated by considering entry pay in the pay scale
admissible to the posts held by the Respondents.
v) The Respondents shall be entitled to withdraw the entire
deposited amount in this Court along with accrued interest.
vi) The amount arising out of the order shall be paid over by the
Petitioner to the Respondents within a period of 4 months.
65) With the above directions, Writ Petition No. 3962 of 2025 is
partly allowed and disposed of. Writ Petition No. 2556 of 2019 is
disposed of as infructuous.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
Digitally
signed by
NEETA
NEETA SHAILESH
SHAILESH SAWANT
SAWANT Date:
2026.03.13
19:15:43
+0530
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