Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 2557 Bom
Judgement Date : 12 March, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:12663
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.104 OF 2026
Tanaji Chandrakant Tapkir ... Petitioner
versus
The State of Maharashtra and Ors. ... Respondents
Mr. Narayan G. Rokade with Mr. Swapnil S. Kalokhe, Mr. Tribhuvan Sharma,
for Petitioner.
Mr. P.P.Malshe, APP for State.
PSI B.S.Ware, Dighi Police Station, Pune, present.
CORAM: N.J.JAMADAR, J.
DATE : 12 MARCH 2026
JUDGMENT :
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and with the consent of the
learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
2. This Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section
528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS 2023) calls in
question the legality and correctness of the order dated 28 November 2025
passed by the Appellate Authority in Appeal No.73 of 2025, whereby the said
appeal preferred by the Petitioner against the order of externment passed by
the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone III, Pimpri Chinchwad purportedly
under Section 56(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, came to be
dismissed by affirming the said order of externment.
3. A notice under Section 59 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, was
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served on the Petitioner calling upon him to show cause why action under
Section 56 of the Act, 1951, be not taken against the Petitioner in view of the
registration of the three crimes against the Petitioner at Dighi Police Station,
during the period 2022 to 2024 and the prohibitory action taken against the
Petitioner. It was, inter alia, alleged that there were reasonable grounds for
believing that the Petitioner was engaged or was about to be engaged in the
commission of an offence punishable under Chapters XVI or XVII of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and the witnesses were not willing to come forward to give
evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their
part as regards the safety of their person or property.
4. Post inquiry, by an order dated 29 March 2025, the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Zone III, Pimpri Chinchwad, externed the Petitioner
by invoking the power under Section 56(1)(b) of the Act, from the limits of
Pune District for a term of two years.
5. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the
Divisional Commissioner, Pune Division. By the impugned order, the Appellate
Authority dismissed the appeal concurring with the view of the Competent
Authority. Being further aggrieved, the Petitioner has invoked the writ
jurisdiction.
6. Mr. Rokade, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that, the
impugned order of externment is legally unsustainable, as there was no
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material on the basis of which the Competent Authority could form an opinion
that the witnesses were not coming forward to give evidence against the
Petitioner in public.
7. Secondly, the externment order suffers from the vice of excessiveness
on both the counts; the area of externment and duration of externment. As
the externment order puts unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental
freedom of the Petitioner, it deserve to be quashed and set aside.
8. Mr. Malshe, learned APP, made an endeavour to support the impugned
order.
9. The Petitioner was ordered to be externed by invoking the provisions
contained in Section 56(1)(b) of the Act, 1951. The measure of externment,
by its very nature, is extra-ordinary. It has the effect of forced displacement
from the home and surroundings. Often it affects the livelihood of the person
ordered to be externed and the dependants on him. The order of externment,
therefore, must be strictly within the bounds of the statutory provisions. Under
clause (b) of Section 56(1), there must be an objective material on the
strength of which the externing authority must record subjective satisfaction
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the externee is engaged
or about to be engaged in the commission of offences involving force or
violence. Mere registration of a number of offences by itself does not sustain
an externment under Section 56(1)(b) of the Act. The offences must either
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involve elements of force or violence or fall under Chapters XII, XVI and XVII
of the Indian Penal Code. In addition, the externing authority must record
satisfaction that the witnesses are not willing to come forward to give
evidence in public against the externee by reason of apprehension on their
part as regards the safety of their person or property.
10. In effect, to sustain an action of externment under sub-clause (b), the
offences the externee has engaged in must be under one of the Chapters
enumerated therein and that the acts or conduct of the externee are such that
the witnesses are terrified and dissuaded from giving evidence against the
externee in public fearing safety of their person or property.
11. In the case at hand, it appears that, the following three crimes have
been registered against the Petitioner :
Sr. No. Police Station C.R.No. Sections Date of Remarks Institution 1 Dighi 28 of 2022 307, 323, 504, 506, 01 February Subjudice 509, 143, 144, 146, 2022 147 148 with 4(25) of Arms Act, and 37(1)(3) and 135 of Maharashtra Police Act.
2 Dighi 342 of 447, 427 read with 18 August Subjudice
2022 34 of IPC 2022
3 Dighi 406 of 118(1), 118(2), 19 April Subjudice
2024 115(2), 352, 351(2), 2024
3(5) of BNS.
12. However, apart from the registration of the aforesaid crimes, the
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Competent Authority has not considered any other material on the basis of
which the objective findings could have been recorded that the witnesses
were terrified and dissuaded from giving evidence against the externee in
public fearing safety of thier person or property. It does not appear that the
Competent Authority had recorded the statements of confidential witnesses,
on the basis of which such an inference could be legitimately drawn. In the
absence of such objective material, mere registration of the offences falling
under Chapters XVI and XVII of the Penal Code, 1860, by itself, was not
sufficient to justify the extreme measure of externment under clause (b) of
Section 56(1) of the Act, 1951.
13. The submission on behalf of the Petitioner in regard to the term of the
externment order also carries substance. Under Section 58 of the Act, 1951,
the period of operation of the order passed under Section 56 of the Act, 1951,
shall in no case exceed the period of two years from the date on which the
externee either removes himself or is removed from the area from which he is
ordered to be externed. Section 58, thus, empowers the Competent
Authority to specify the period for which the externment order may remain in
operation, while providing the maximum term of two years. The Competent
Authority is, therefore, expected to delve into the question of the term for
which the order of externment, in the circumstances of the given case, shall
be operative. The externment for the maximum term of two years cannot be
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construed as a default period of externment. Resultantly, if the Competent
Authority externs a person for a full term of two years, the order of externment
ought to spell out the reasons for which the Competent Authority considered
it necessasry to extern the externee for a full term of two years, and not a
lesser period.
14. In the case of Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre V/s. State of Maharashtra
and Ors.1, the Supreme Court after adverting to the provisions of Section 58
of the Act, 1951, underscored the necessity of arriving at the subjective
satisfaction regarding the term of externment also on the basis of objective
material. It was ruled that, where the externee is externed for a maximum
permissible period of two years, without recording the subjective satisfaction
regarding the necessity of the externment for a full term, it would amount to
imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights guaranteed
under clause (d) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India. The observations
in paragraph No.16 of the said judgment are instructive, and, hence, extracted
below :
"16. On a plain reading of Section 58, it is apparent that while passing an order under Section 56, the competent authority must mention the area or District or Districts in respect of which the order has been made. Moreover, the competent authority is required to specify the period for which the restriction will remain in force. The maximum period
1 (2023) 14 SCC 707
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provided for is of two years. Therefore, an application of mind on the part of the competent authority is required for deciding the duration of the restraint order under Section 56. On the basis of objective assessment of the material on record, the authority has to record its subjective satisfaction that the restriction should be imposed for a specific period. When the competent authority passes an order for the maximum permissible period of two years, the order of extrnment must disclose an application of mind by the competent authority and the order must record its subjective satisfaction about the necessity of passing an order of externment for the maximum period of two years which is based on material on record. Careful perusal of the impugned order of externment dated 15 December 2020 shows that it does not disclose any application of mind on this aspect. It does not record the subjective satisfaction of the respondent No.2 on the basis of material on record that the order of externment should be for the maximum period of two years. If the order of externment for the maximum permissible period of two years is passed without recording subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity of extending the order of externment to the maximum permissible period, it will amount to imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India." (emphasis supplied)
15. Reverting to the facts of the case, it would be suffice to note that the
Competent Authority did not bestow any consideration in regard to the term of
the externment. Why the Petitioner was required to externed for the full term,
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was not at all adverted to by the Competent Authority. It seems that the
Competent was simply not alive to the necessity of bestowing consideration in
regard to the term for which the Petitioner be externed to achieve the object of
externment. The order of externment, thus, singularly lacks reasons to
support the externment for the full term. Thus, on both the counts, the order
of externment suffers from the legal infirmities. Resultantly, the impugned
order as well as the order of externment deserve to be quashed and set
aside.
16. Hence, the following order :
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition stands allowed.
(ii) The impugned order dated 28 November 2025 as well as the
order of externment dated 29 March 2025 stand quashed and set aside.
(iii) Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms.
( N.J.JAMADAR, J. )
Signed by: S.S.Phadke Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 16/03/2026 17:39:39
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