[Cites 14, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Shri Ramesh Devrawji Ghode vs Sadhana Yogesh Rais on 7 March, 2026
2026:BHC-NAG:4055
1 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 33 OF 2026
1. Shri Ramesh Devrawji Ghode, Age 42 years,
Occ. Business, Residing at plot No.2, Mitra
Vihar, Kharbi Ring road, Nagpur - 440009.
... PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. Sadhana Yogesh Rais, Age 62 years, Occ.
Retired, r/o Flat No.A22/5B, "Nirmal Nagari",
Umred Road, Abhinandan School, Nagpur.
2. State of Maharashtra, through Police Station
Officer, P.S. Nandanvan, Nagpur.
... RESPONDENTS
_____________________________________________________________
Shri Pradyuman Sharma, Advocate a/w Ms Vishakha Wadhwani
and Shri Prateek Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mrs. M.H. Deshmukh, APP for the State.
Shri P.P. Kotwal, Advocate for respondent no.1.
______________________________________________________________
CORAM: M.M. NERLIKAR, J.
DATE : 07.03.2026.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith.
2 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
2. Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties.
3. A short question involved in this matter is whether without
recording the plea of guilt, the Court can pass the order under Section
143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short hereinafter
referred to as 'the NI Act'). The petitioner challenges the order dated
04.03.2025 passed by the 10th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division and
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur, whereby the application
filed by the complainant under Section 143A of the NI Act came to be
allowed and petitioner was directed to pay interim compensation
equivalent to 10% of the amount of the disputed cheque, within a
period of sixty days.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Trial
Court has failed to apply its mind to the facts of the present case. The
order was passed in violation of Section 143A(1)(a) of the NI Act, so
also without recording the plea of guilt. Further the Trial Court has not
considered the necessary factors which are required before passing of
the order and the order is without reason and therefore, according to
him, the order is bad in law. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. State
of Jharkhand and anr. 2024(4) SCC 419, specifically on paragraphs 10,
3 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
16 and 19 so as to submit that consideration as laid down by the Apex
Court while passing the impugned order has not been considered.
5. On the other hand, learned APP and learned Counsel
appearing for respondent no. 1 vehemently opposed the petition by
submitting that the conduct of the petitioner is necessary to be seen as
he was continuously absent in the proceedings. The very aim and object
of Section 143A of the NI Act is to avoid undue delay in the finality of
proceedings was frustrated as the petitioner was not appearing in the
proceedings, therefore, no option was left with the Trial Court but to
pass the impugned order to pay compensation under Section 143A of
the NI Act. Learned Counsel invited my attention to the Roznama to
demonstrate that the petitioner has remained absent on several
occasions and he is not co-operating in the trial. It was also submitted
that now the plea of guilt has been recorded wherein the accused has
pleaded not guilty and therefore, even otherwise if again the
respondent is compelled to make an application, then it would frustrate
the very purpose of Section 143A of the NI Act as ultimately, the result
would be the same and therefore, prayed to reject the petition.
6. I have considered the rival submission. It would be useful to
refer to Section 143(A) of the NI Act which reads as under :
4 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
"143A. Power to direct interim compensation.--(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence
under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to
pay interim compensation to the complainant --
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he
pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the
complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge.
..."
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Ranjan
Shrivastava vs. State of Jharkhand and anr. (supra) particularly in
paragraphs 10, 16 and 19 has observed as under :
"10. The power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is
to direct the payment of interim compensation in a
summary trial or a summons case upon the recording of
the plea of the accused that he was not guilty and, in
other cases, upon framing of charge. As the maximum
punishment under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is of
imprisonment up to 2 years, in view of clause (w) read
with clause (x) of Section 2 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Cr.PC'), the cases under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act are triable as summons cases.
However, sub-section (1) of Section 143 provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.PC, the
learned Magistrate shall try the complaint by adopting a
summary procedure under Sections 262 to 265 of the
Cr.PC. However, when at the commencement of the trial
or during the course of a summary trial, it appears to the
Court that a sentence of imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year may have to be passed or for any
other reason it is undesirable to try the case summarily,
the case shall be tried in the manner provided by the
CrPC. Therefore, the complaint under Section 138
5 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
becomes a summons case in such a contingency. We may
note here that under Section 259 of the Cr.PC, subject to
what is provided in the said Section, the learned
Magistrate has the discretion to convert a summons case
into a warrant case. Only in a warrant case, there is a
question of framing charge. Therefore, clause (b) of sub-
section (1) of Section 143A will apply only when the
case is being tried as a warrant case. In the case of a
summary or summons trial, the power under sub-section
(1) of Section 143A can be exercised after the plea of the
accused is recorded.
...
16. When the court deals with an application under
Section 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima
facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the
complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by
the accused in the reply to the application under sub-
section (1) of Section 143A. The presumption under
Section 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to
direct the payment of interim compensation. The reason
is that the presumption is rebuttable. The question of
applying the presumption will arise at the trial. Only if
the complainant makes out a prima facie case, a
direction can be issued to pay interim compensation. At
this stage, the fact that the accused is in financial distress
can also be a consideration. Even if the Court concludes
that a case is made out for grant of interim
compensation, the Court will have to apply its mind to
the quantum of interim compensation to be granted.
Even at this stage, the Court will have to consider various
factors such as the nature of the transaction, the
relationship, if any, between the accused and the
complainant and the paying capacity of the accused. If
the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a
plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in
refusing to grant interim compensation. We may note
that the factors required to be considered, which we
have set out above, are not exhaustive. There could be
several other factors in the facts of a given case, such as,
the pendency of a civil suit, etc. While deciding the
6 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record
brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant
factors.
...
19. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions
can be summarised as follows:
a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of
Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is
directory and not mandatory. The word "may" used
in the provision cannot be construed as "shall."
b. While deciding the prayer made under Section
143A, the Court must record brief reasons
indicating consideration of all relevant factors.
c. The broad parameters for exercising the
discretion under Section 143A are as follows:
i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate
the merits of the case made out by the
complainant and the merits of the defence
pleaded by the accused in the reply to the
application. The financial distress of the
accused can also be a consideration.
ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can
be issued, only if the complainant makes out a
prima facie case.
iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be
prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise
discretion in refusing to grant interim
compensation.
iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made
out to grant interim compensation, it will also
have to apply its mind to the quantum of
interim compensation to be granted. While
doing so, the Court will have to consider
several factors such as the nature of the
transaction, the relationship, if any, between
the accused and the complainant, etc.
v. There could be several other relevant factors
in the peculiar facts of a given case, which
7 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters
stated above are not exhaustive. "
8. Considering the above exposition of law and after perusal
of the Section 143A of the NI Act, it is crystal clear that the power to
direct payment of interim compensation is the discretionary power of
the Court. However, in paragraph 10 of the judgment in the case of
Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. State of Jharkhand and anr. (supra) it
has also been observed that the powers under Section 143A of the NI
Act can be exercised after the plea of accused is recorded. Admittedly,
in the present case, the impugned order was passed on 04.03.2025
whereas the plea of guilt was recorded on 09.10.2025, wherein the
petitioner pleaded not guilty. As contemplated under Section 143A of
the NI Act and as the Supreme Court has interpreted the very Section in
the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. State of Jharkhand and anr.
(supra), it is crystal clear that the Court cannot pass order under
Section 143A of the NI Act before recording the plea of the accused,
therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case that
without recording the plea of accused, the impugned order was passed
and therefore, the order is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
9. Further, after going through the impugned order,
admittedly, it reveals that there are no reasons given to substantiate the
8 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Ranjan
Shrivastava vs. State of Jharkhand and anr. (supra) has specifically in
paragraph 16 observed that while exercising the discretion, the factors
which are necessary to be kept in mind are (1) prima facie evaluation
of the merits of the case made out by the complainant; (2) merits of the
defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under
Section 143A(1). The Court will have to apply its mind if it comes to
the conclusion to grant interim compensation as to what quantum of
interim compensation ought to be granted; further the court will have
to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the
relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, and the
paying capacity of the accused.
10. After going through the impugned order it reveals that the
impugned order lacks the reasons as well as there is non-application of
mind. Further the factors which are necessary to be considered while
exercising the discretion have not at all been considered.
11. It is to be borne in mind that when the discretion is
conferred on the Court by the statute, reasons are necessarily to be
spelt out, which is indicative of application of mind to the facts and
circumstances of the case. This Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.48 of
9 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
2022 (Ashwin Ashokrao Karokar vs. Laxmiant Govind Joshi) dated
07.07.2022, in paragraph 11 has stated as under :
"11.... This is more so for the reason that reasons are the
heart of an order/judgment and unless reasons are spelt
out in the order/judgment, neither the litigant nor the
Court before whome a challenge is laid to be exercise of
such discretion, would be able to fathom what weighed
with the Court passing the order/judgment to hold one
way or another, and thus make the exercise of discretion,
to be struck down for non-application of mind and thus
any order exercising or refusing to exercise discretion to
award interim compensation will have to spell out the
reasons for exercise of such exercise."
12. Therefore, even this Court has in unequivocal terms has
held that reasons are the heart of an order/judgment. Considering the
above exposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as
well as this Court, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned
order is without reasons, without application of mind so also non
consideration of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. State of Jharkhand and anr.
(supra) and therefore, does not sustain in law. Hence, the following
order :
(a) The Criminal Writ Petition is allowed.
(b) Order dated 04.03.2025 passed by the 10th Civil Judge,
10 19.J.cri.wp.33.2026..odt
Senior Division and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Nagpur is hereby quash and set aside.
13. The Petition stands disposed of accordingly. Rule is made
absolute in above terms.
(M.M. NERLIKAR, J.)
Trupti
Signed by: Trupti D. Agrawal
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 11/03/2026 12:53:09
