[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Meghraj S/O Gulabrao Somkuwar vs Ministry Of Rdd, Rural And Water ... on 7 March, 2026
Author: M.S. Jawalkar
Bench: M.S. Jawalkar
2026:BHC-NAG:4220-DB
WP1384.23.odt 1/20
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO. 1384/2023
1. Mr. Meghraj s/o Gulabrao Somkuwar,
Aged about 46 years, Occ. Service,
R/o Wagoda, Tah. Saoner,
District - Nagpur.
... PETITIONER
...VERSUS...
1. Ministry of RDD, Rural and
Water Conservation Department,
through its Secretary, Mantralaya,
Mumbai - 32.
2. Collector, office of the
Collectorate, Civil Lines,
Nagpur - 440001.
3. Chief Executive Officer,
Zilla Parishad, Opposite Ravi
Bhavan, Nagpur - 440001.
4. Block Development Officer,
Panchayat Samiti, Tah.
Narkhed, District - Nagpur -
441304.
...RESPONDENTS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. R. S. Sudaram, Advocate for petitioner
Mr. A. S. Fulzele, Addl. G. P. for respondent nos. 1 and 2 /State
Mr. Shaik Majid, Advocate for respondent nos. 3 and 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP1384.23.odt 2/20
CORAM : SMT. M.S. JAWALKAR AND
NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 11th FEBRUARY, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : 07th MARCH, 2026.
JUDGMENT (PER : NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.)
1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with
the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner challenges the order of termination dated
06.02.2023 issued by Respondent No.3, Chief Executive Officer,
Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, terminating him from the post of
contractual Gram Sevak on the ground of suppression of facts in the
attestation form vide column Nos. 15A and 15D.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was
appointed as Panchayat Servant in Gram Panchayat Singarkheda,
Tahsil Narkhed in 1990 and served continuously till 2019. He was
selected as contractual Gram Sevak under 10% quota as per
Sections 10A and 10B of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads District
Service Recruitment Rules, 1967 on the basis of seniority, good
behaviour and efficient working. He was appointed vide order
dated 13.09.2019, joined duty on 20.09.2019. That as per condition
No. 21 of the appointment order, the petitioner was to get a police
verification report about his character and conduct from the office
of the Police Commissioner or the District Superintendent of Police.
As per condition No. 22 of the appointment order, if the
information provided in the attestation form by the petitioner was
found to be incorrect, his services were liable to be terminated.
4. That an unfortunate incident took place at the Village, where
the petitioner was residing on 23.01.2019 for which a complaint
was lodged by one complainant Sahadeo Patil in the Police Station
on 23.03.2019. Consequently FIR No. 227/2019 was registered at
Police Station Saoner against the petitioner for offences under
Sections 323, 504, 506 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code
(herein after referred to as "IPC").
5. That on receiving police verification report by respondent no.
3, a communication dated 12.06.2020 was issued to the petitioner
stating about the fact of pendency of criminal prosecution and as
such he was called upon to put forward his explanation to the same.
The petitioner replied the said letter vide his written
communication dated 22.06.2020 and has categorically stated that
the complaint is a fraudulent and false complaint and the petitioner
in no way concerned with the offence alleged in the said First
Information Report.
6. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Saoner vide judgment
dated 30.03.2021 convicted the petitioner for offence under Section
323 IPC but released him on admonition and acquitted him of
offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC. An appeal preferred by
the petitioner against the order of conviction passed by the Judicial
Magistrate First Class on 30.03.2021 vide Criminal Appeal No.
137/2021 has resulted into an acquittal by order dated 22.04.2025.
The Appellate Court had acquitted the petitioner for an offence
punishable under Section 323 of the IPC. The petitioner was
however terminated vide order dated 06.02.2023 which is
impugned in the petition.
7. We have heard Shri Dr. R.S.Sudaram, Counsel for the
petitioner, Shri A. S. Fulzele Assistant Government Pleader for
Respondent nos. 1 and 2 and Shri Shaikh Majid Counsel for
Respondent 3 and 4.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
termination order was passed solely on the ground of conviction
dated 30.03.2021, which has been reversed by the appellate order
dated 22.04.2025. The petitioner now stands acquitted of all
charges in the appeal. The subsequent acquittal ipso facto renders
the termination order unsustainable. He further submits that no
departmental enquiry was held despite the petitioner being in
service since 1990. Except the show cause notice dated 12.06.2020,
no chargesheet was issued and the reply dated 22.06.2020 was not
considered before passing the termination order, constituting
breach of natural justice.
9. He contends that Respondent No.3 failed to exercise
discretion vested in the employer to assess suppression of facts vis-
a-vis the nature of post and character antecedents. He further
submits that at the time of termination, the criminal appeal was
pending. Respondent No.3 failed to consider this material fact and
did not conduct independent enquiry into the incident arising from
village rivalry. The conviction was only under Section 323 IPC for
which no sentence was imposed - the petitioner was merely
admonished. This does not warrant termination without proper
enquiry.
10. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on Sarita
Choudhary v.High School of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (2025)
9 SCC 297, Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P (2024) 5 SCC 264,
Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471, Prakash Dabhade
v. Zilla Parishad, Aurangabad and Others, 2000 (4) L.L.N.127, SK.
Rashid Gani v. Zilla Parishad, Beed and Others, 2000(3) Mh.L.J.
and Wasim Beg v State of U.P (1998) 3 SCC 321,
11. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent no. 2 submits
that, as under as per Government Circular dated 26.08.2014, a
Character Verification Committee (Committee B) comprising the
Collector (President), Appointing Authority, Joint Secretary (Law),
Deputy Police Commissioner/Superintendent of Police, and
Resident Deputy Collector was constituted for taking decisions on
character verification for District level Group C and D
appointments. He further submits that the said Character
Verification Committee meeting held on 14.09.2022 under the
Chairmanship of the Collector, Nagpur noted that the petitioner
suppressed material facts by answering "No" to columns 15(c) and
15(d) of the attestation form regarding offences registered and
criminal cases pending against him and that the petitioner was
convicted under Section 323 IPC. The Co1384mmittee therefore
unanimously decided to terminate his services. Lastly he submits
that, impugned termination order dated 06.02.2023 was issued
pursuant to the Committee's decision and the present petition is
devoid of merit and liable to be rejected.
12. Learned counsel for Respondents No.3 and 4 submits that the
petitioner has not availed the alternate remedy of filing an appeal
before the Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur Division under the
Maharashtra Zilla Parishad Act and Rules, therefore writ petition is
not maintainable. He Further submits that petitioner deliberately
suppressed material facts in the attestation form regarding FIR No.
227/2019 registered on 23.03.2019 for offences under Sections
324, 504, 506 read with Section 34 IPC, which was pending at the
time of filling the application form. The petitioner was aware that
disclosure of the pending FIR would render him ineligible for the
post of Gram Sevak which is a responsible post. He contends that
petitioner executed an undertaking dated 16.09.2019 wherein he
accepted all terms and conditions of the appointment order and
agreed that violation of any condition would result in termination of
his appointment. In his reply dated 22.06.2020 to the show cause
notice, the petitioner admitted that he did not fill the form
correctly.
13. Lastly it is submitted that, subsequent acquittal vide order
dated 22.04.2025 does not exonerate the petitioner. The
termination is based on breach of terms and conditions of the
appointment order due to deliberate suppression of material facts at
the time of appointment. The Five Members Committee headed by
the Collector, Nagpur thoroughly considered the matter on
14.09.2022 before taking the decision to terminate.
14. We have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned
counsel for the respective parties and have also gone through the
record with their assistance, which includes the attestation forms
submitted by the petitioner. The first ground as raised by the
learned counsel for the petitioner is of deemed confirmation. As can
be seen from the record the petitioner was appointed on
13.09.2019 on a probation of three years. The said period of three
years was completed on 13.09.2022. He therefore submits that the
termination order dated 06.02.2023 being beyond the said period
of probation is illegal. We have gone through the order of
termination, as also order of appointment, which states that the
period of probation would be three years and only after successful
completion of the said period, the petitioner would be appointed as
a regular Gram Sevak. What is conspicuous by its absence in the
said appointment order is provision for extension of the said period
of probation. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard has
pointed out a judgment of Wasim Beg Vs. State of U.P. and others,
reported in (1998) 3 SCC 321, by placing reliance on paragraph 15
and 16 of the said judgment, the learned counsel submits that there
is a deemed confirmation in absence of any provision for extension
of probation. Paragraph 15 and 16 of the said judgment is
reproduced for the sake of brevity as under:-
15. Whether an employee at the end of the
probationary period automatically gets confirmation in
the post or whether an order of confirmation or any
specific act on the part of the employer confirming the
employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in
the relevant Service Rules relating to probation and
confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of
this Court dealing with this question. In those cases
where the Rules provide for a maximum period of
probation beyond which probation cannot be extended,
this Court has held that at the end of the maximum
probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation
of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. This
is the line of cases starting with State of Punjab v.
Dharam Singh, M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank,
Om Parkash Maurya v. U.P. Coop. Sugar Factories
Federation, State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav.
16. However, even when the Rules prescribe a
maximum period of probation, if there is a further
provision in the Rules for continuation of such probation
beyond the maximum period, the courts have made an
exception and said that there will be no deemed
confirmation in such cases and the probation period will
be deemed to be extended. In this category of cases we
can place Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab which was the
decision of a Bench of seven Judges where the principle
of probation not going beyond the maximum period fixed
was reiterated but on the basis of the Rules which were
before the Court, this Court said that the probation was
deemed to have been extended. A similar view was taken
in the case of Municipal Corpn. v. Ashok Kumar Misra. In
Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of M.P. although the
Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not
exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also
necessary, the termination order was issued within the
extended period of probation. Hence the termination was
upheld.
15. If the appointment order of the petitioner is tested on the
touchstone of what has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court,
we find that there is no provision for extension of the probation
period. However the petitioner was issued a show cause notice on
12.06.2020 during the period of probation indicating the intention
of the employer that it was not satisfied with his work /
performance. It also initiated a procedure for the termination of the
employer.
16. There are catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
and this Court which hold that if the termination of a probationer is
stigmatic and if the said termination is done without hearing him,
the same would offend Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India. However, the termination simplicitor for unsatisfactory
performance would not violate the said Constitutional protection.
Thus, even though the termination is said to be stigmatic, in the
present case, opportunity of hearing and explaining the same is
given to the petitioner.
17. Furthermore, the aspect regarding suppression of pendency
of criminal case is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied on a judgment of Ravindra Kumar Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh And Others, reported in (2024) 5 SCC 264, in which the
Hon'ble Apex Court, by relying on the earlier judgment of Avtar
Singh vs. Union of India, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471, in
Paragraph 22, has culled out the following principles.
22. The law on this issue is settled by a three-Judge Bench
of this Court in Avtar Singh. Paras 34, 35, 36 and 38, which
sets out the conclusions, are extracted hereinbelow: (SCC pp.
506-508)
"34. No doubt about it that verification of character and
antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess
suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge
antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should
be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of
all relevant aspects.
35. Suppression of "material" information presupposes
that what is suppressed that "matters" not every technical
or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due
consideration of rules/instructions, if any, in exercise of
powers in order to cancel candidature or for terminating
the services of employee. Though a person who has
suppressed the material information cannot claim
unfettered right for appointment or continuity in service
but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and
exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with
objectivity having due regard to facts of cases.
36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon
the nature of post, higher post would involve more
rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed
service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of
duties, impact of suppression on suitability has to be
considered by authorities concerned considering
post/nature of duties/services and power has to be
exercised on due consideration of various aspects.
38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to
explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of
the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our conclusion
thus:
38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as
to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a
criminal case, whether before or after entering into
service must be true and there should be no suppression
or false mention of required information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of services or
cancellation of candidature for giving false information,
the employer may take notice of special circumstances of
the case, if any, while giving such information.
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the
Government Orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the
employee, at the time of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of
involvement in a criminal case where conviction or
acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the
application/verification form and such fact later comes to
knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses
appropriate to the case may be adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had
been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or
for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have
rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the
employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression
of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which
is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature
or terminate services of the employee.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case
involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious
nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean
acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given,
the employer may consider all relevant facts available as
to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to
the continuance of the employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration
truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still
has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be
compelled to appoint the candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in
character verification form regarding pendency of a
criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and
circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint
the candidate subject to decision of such case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with
respect to multiple pending cases such false information
by itself will assume significance and an employer may
pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or
terminating services as appointment of a person against
whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be
proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the
candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have
adverse impact and the appointing authority would take
decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service,
holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before
passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the
ground of suppression or submitting false information in
verification form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false information
attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague.
Only such information which was required to be
specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information
not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the
employer the same can be considered in an objective
manner while addressing the question of fitness.
However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of
suppression or submitting false information as to a fact
which was not even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or
suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable
to him." (emphasis supplied)
18. It is thus clear that though a person who has suppressed a
material information cannot claim an unfettered right for
appointment but he or she has a right not to be dealt with
arbitrarily. The exercise of power has to be in a reasonable manner
with objectivity and having due regard to the facts. In short, the
ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria after due
consideration of the relevant aspects.
19. Relevant clauses of verification / attestation form are
reproduced as under:-
15 ¼1½ v rqEgkyk vkrki;Zar d/khgh LFkkucËn Bsoys gksrs dk\ ukgh
a Have you ever been kept under detention? No
d RkqeP;k fo:Ën [kVyk nk[ky dj.;kr vkyk vkgs dk \ ukgh
¼Eg.kts dks.kR;kgh U;k;ky;kr rqpE;k fo:Ën QkStnkjh
[kVY;kckcr nks"kkjksi i= nk[ky dj.;kr vkys gksrs dk\½
c Have you ever been prosecuted? No
M gk lk{kkadu uequk HkjrsoG
s h dks.kR;kgh U;k;ky;kr] ukgh
vkiY;k fo:Ën QkStnkjh [kVyk izdj.k izyafcr vkgs dk
\
Is any criminal case pending against you in
d any court of Law at the time or filing up this No
Attestation form?
Bare perusal of this table would reveal that what is
contemplated/expected by the employer is not clear. Furthermore,
the copies of judgments of the trial Court as also the Appellate
Court does not specify any date of filing of charge sheet. Thus, it is
not clear as to whether the petitioner was aware of the pending
prosecution against him since the date of filing charge sheet as
contemplated under the above table is not clearly mentioned.
20. If the action of the respondents in terminating the petition is
tested under touchstone of the enunciation of law of the Hon'ble
Apex Court, it can be seen that the offence complained of is under
Section 324, 504 and 506, read with Section 34 of the IPC. The said
sections speak about voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapon,
and threatening the complainant with any injury, etc. It is a matter
of record that even though the petitioner stood convicted by the
trial Court, the said judgment has been reversed in appeal by the
Sessions Court. Furthermore, offence under Section 504 is a non-
cognizable and bailable offence, prescribing punishment upto two
years. Even the offence under Section 506, which speaks about
punishment for criminal intimidation (which is defined under
Section 503) states punishment only up to two years, making it a
non-cognizable and bailable offence. Except for offence under
Section 324, which is a cognizable and non-bailable offence, the
other offences can be said to be minor offences. This fact has to be
construed in the light of admitted fact that the petitioner stands
acquitted by the Appellate Court and the said acquittal has attained
finality for want of any further challenge.
21. It is a matter of record that the conviction of the appellant in
Regular Criminal Case No. 242/2019 was that he was released on
admonition and executing a P.R. Bond of Rs. 15,000/- and bond of
good behavior for a period of six months, and with a further
direction that he shall not commit such type of offence in future. As
stated supra, the appellate Court has even set aside that
admonition. It can thus be seen that even though the trial Court
found the petitioner guilty of the offence punishable under Section
323, he was released on admonition. Thus, it can be seen that the
punishment awarded was also not of any serious nature, and
therefore, in our view, the termination effected by the employer i.e.
respondent no. 3 herein, was disproportionate.
22. Thus, in our considered opinion, even though the petitioner
has indeed committed some mistake, it is not clear as to whether it
was intentional one and / or committed with knowledge.
Admittedly, order of termination is passed on 06.02.2023 and the
petitioner has been acquitted on 22.04.2025. We are therefore of
the considered opinion that the order impugned which is dated
06.02.2023, is liable to be quashed and set aside. However, we
cannot turn our blind eye to the fact that the post of Gram Sevak is
a post which covers responsibilities with it. We are therefore of the
opinion that it would be proper to relegate the matter to the
employer i.e. respondent no. 3 to decide upon the termination
afresh. This is more so since it would be the sole prerogative of the
employer to take a decision whether to continue with the services of
the petitioner. We, therefore, pass the following order:-
ORDER
i) Writ Petition is partly allowed.
ii) Impugned order dated 06.02.2023, issued by the Chief
Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, is quashed and set aside.
iii) It is hereby directed that the respondent no. 3 to reconsider
the termination of the petitioner afresh on the basis of the fact that
he stands acquitted on 22.04.2025.
iv) The Writ Petition is disposed of in above terms, with no order
as to costs.
(NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.) (SMT. M.S. JAWALKAR, J.)
Shubham
