[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Gurunanak Seva Samiti Ballarpur Thr. ... vs Rashtra Sant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur ... on 7 March, 2026
Author: Anil L. Pansare
Bench: Anil L. Pansare
2026:BHC-NAG:3848-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO. 987 OF 2016
1. Gurunanak Seva Samiti Ballarpur, through
its President Sardar Nagender Singh Soni
S/o Ajitsingh, aged 62 years, Office at
Gurunanak College of Science, Ballarpur,
Dist. Chandrapur
2. Gurunanak College of Science, Ballarpur
through its Principal, Dr. R.G.Weginwar, age
55 years, District Chandrapur ...Petitioners
// VERSUS //
1. Rashtra Sant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur
University, through its Registrar, Civil Lines,
Nagpur
2. Director, Board of College and University
Development, Rashtra Sant Tukdoji Maharaj
Nagpur University, Civil Lines, Nagpur ... Respondents
Dr. R.S.Sundaram, Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Atul Pande, Advocate for the respondents.
CORAM : ANIL L. PANSARE
NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, JJ.
Reserved on : 23.02.2026.
Pronounced on : 07.03.2026.
JUDGMENT :
(PER : NIVEDITA P. MEHTA J.)
By the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioners seek issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the order dated 14.05.2015
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passed by Respondent No. 2 - Director, Board of College and University
Development, Rashtra Sant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University, Nagpur, as well as
the earlier order dated 18.12.2012 passed by Respondent No. 1 - Rashtra Sant
Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University, Nagpur. The petitioners further seek interim
protection against recovery pursuant to the said orders and such other reliefs as
may be deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
2. On 06.03.2017, while issuing Rule, this Court granted interim stay to
the recovery, subject to the petitioners depositing 25% of the amount sought to be
recovered, with the Registry of this Court within a period of eight weeks.
3. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that Petitioner
No. 1 - Gurunanak Seva Samiti Ballarpur, is a Society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and is also a Public Trust registered under the Maharashtra
Public Trusts Act, 1950. Petitioner No. 1 runs Petitioner No. 2 - Gurunanak College
of Science, Ballarpur, which is affiliated to Respondent No. 1 - Rashtra Sant Tukdoji
Maharaj Nagpur University. In its meeting dated 30.11.2015, the Managing
committee of the Society resolved to challenge the impugned orders passed by the
authorities and accordingly authorised and empowered the Principal to sign and
affirm the present petition for and on behalf of the petitioners, and accordingly, the
present petition has been filed.
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4. Petitioner No. 2 is a grant-in-aid college; however, several courses
conducted by it have been permitted on a permanent no-grant basis. The fee
structure for such non-grant courses has been determined by the Management,
taking into consideration the expenditure incurred for running the courses. It is the
case of the petitioners that students admitted to such courses paid the prescribed
fees at the time of admission without raising any grievance.
5. The University Grants Commission (herein after referred to as UGC)
introduced a scheme for vocational degree courses at the undergraduate and
postgraduate levels. Petitioner No. 2, being a science college already affiliated to
Respondent No. 1 and conducting postgraduate M.Sc. courses, applied to the UGC
for permission to commence a vocational degree course in B.Sc. (Biotechnology).
The UGC granted approval vide communication dated 12.07.2002, which was also
approved by the State Government, permitting commencement of the B.Sc.
(Biotechnology) course on a non-grant basis. The course was accordingly
commenced from the academic session 2002-2003.
6. The course, as permitted by the UGC, was recognized and affiliated by
Respondent No. 1 University vide communication dated 24.04.2003 under Section
14(7) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act
of 1994"). Since the course was conducted on a non-grant basis, Petitioner No. 1
prescribed the fee structure considering expenditure on infrastructure, laboratory
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equipment, chemicals, software, development of facilities and creation of a corpus
to ensure sustainability of the programme after cessation of UGC assistance.
Students were admitted accordingly and the course continued for subsequent
academic sessions.
7. Respondent No. 1 University issued a notification dated 06.10.2005
prescribing fee structures for various unaided undergraduate courses for the
academic session 2005-2006. According to the petitioners, the said notification did
not specifically prescribe fees for B.Sc. (Biotechnology) (Vocational), and that a
specific notification in respect of B.Sc. (Biotechnology) was issued for the first time
only on 28.05.2010.
8. In the year 2007, a complaint was raised by one Shri Samir Kene, a
Senate Member, alleging that excess fees were being charged. Acting upon the
complaint, Respondent No. 1 issued a letter dated 04.10.2007 calling upon the
Principal of the College to furnish an explanation. The Principal submitted a reply
dated 31.10.2007 stating that no excess fees had been charged and that the fee
structure was fixed in accordance with UGC guidelines and with approval granted
under Section 14(7) of the Act of 1994. On 29.11.2007 another letter was issued
by respondent no.1 asking petitioner no.2 to file detailed explanation. Petitioner
no.2 by filing his reply dated 24.12.2007 stated that 'no excess charge is taken'.
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9. Subsequently, another complaint regarding certain illegalities and
irregularities in appointments made by petitioner no. 2 in March 2003 led to
further correspondence. Respondent no.1 asked for explanation from petitioner
no.2 Principal and on 26.03.2008 he submitted his explanation. Respondent No. 1
constituted a fact-finding committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. A.V. Gomase.
The Committee visited the College and submitted its report dated 26.03.2008,
observing that the College had charged fees in excess of those prescribed under the
notification dated 06.10.2005 by comparing them with fees applicable to B.Sc.
degree courses. Thereafter, vide communication dated 23.09.2008, the Principal
was called for a hearing before the Vice-Chancellor and was directed to submit an
explanation to the Committee.
10. According to the petitioners, until that stage, communications were
addressed only to the petitioner no.2 - Principal and not to the respondent no.1-
Management. For the first time, a show cause notice dated 20.03.2009 under
Section 81 of the Act of 1994 was issued to Petitioner No. 1 Society along with a
copy of the Dr. Gomase Committee Report, calling for an explanation. Petitioner
No. 1 submitted a detailed reply on 04.04.2009. Thereafter, by communication
dated 15.10.2009, the University informed the Principal that the explanation was
found unsatisfactory by the Management Council.
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11. A further show cause notice dated 27.08.2010 under Section 14(14)
of the Act of 1994 was issued, to which Petitioner No. 1 submitted its reply dated
17.09.2010 reiterating that no fee structure had been prescribed by the University
for B.Sc. (Biotechnology) at the relevant time. The Vice-Chancellor thereafter
constituted a three-member committee under Section 14(14), known as the Dr.
Choudhary Committee, which treated Dr. Gomase Committee report as a fact-
finding report and examined the replies submitted by the Management. The
Committee submitted its report on 27.02.2012.
12. Based on the said report, Respondent No. 1 issued communication
dated 18.12.2012 directing the College to refund the excess fees collected from
students within one month, deposit a penalty of ₹50,000/-, transfer unclaimed50,000/-, transfer unclaimed
excess amounts to the University Student Welfare Fund, and strictly adhere to the
fee structure prescribed by the University in future, failing which strict action
would follow.
13. The petitioners challenged the impugned communication/order dated
18.12.2012 by filing Writ Petition No. 1119 of 2013. By order dated 27.10.2014,
this Court directed the petitioners to appear before Respondent No. 1 and granted
an opportunity of hearing to ascertain whether there was any procedural error in
passing the order dated 18.12.2012. Subsequently, by order dated 10.04.2015, this
Court observed that the officer who had conducted the inquiry, cannot be asked to
grant a hearing, and the University submitted that the Director, Board of College
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and University Development, being a statutory authority, would extend the hearing.
The petitioners accepted the said contention. Hence, in compliance of the Court's
order dated 10.04.2015, Director, Board of College and University Development
after hearing the petitioners passed order dated 14.05.2015. On 15.06.2015, the
aforesaid writ petition came to be withdrawn by the petitioners with liberty to
institute appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. Pursuant to the said
liberty, the present petition has been filed, wherein the petitioners have specifically
assailed the order dated 14.05.2015 passed by the Director, Board of College and
University Development. The validity, legality and propriety of the said order, along
with the consequential order dated 18.12.2012, thus fall for consideration in the
present proceedings.'
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners -
14. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the B.Sc.
(Biotechnology) course was commenced pursuant to the vocational education
scheme introduced by the University Grants Commission in the year 2001, and the
said course was started by the petitioner-college in the academic year 2002-2003
after obtaining due approval from the UGC and the State Government. It is
contended that the course was conducted strictly in accordance with the UGC
guidelines and, being a non-grant course, the fee structure was determined by the
Management having regard to infrastructure development, laboratory equipment,
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chemicals, staff remuneration and the need to generate a corpus for sustainability
of the programme after the UGC support period.
15. It is further submitted that the action against the petitioners was
triggered solely on account of complaints made by a Senate Member and that the
respondent-University, without conducting a proper comparative or objective
inquiry vis-a-vis other similarly placed institutions conducting B.Sc.
(Biotechnology) courses, singled out the petitioners for adverse action. According
to the petitioners, such selective action is discriminatory and arbitrary.
16. Learned counsel submits that both the Dr. Gomase Committee and the
subsequent Dr. Choudhary Committee failed to undertake an independent and
objective inquiry and merely proceeded on the basis of the complaint. It is urged
that the Committees did not properly consider the explanations submitted by the
petitioners and ignored the fact that no student had lodged any grievance
regarding excess fees. It is also contended that the Principal of the College cannot
be equated with the Management and that the finding that the Principal
represented the Management is legally unsustainable. According to the petitioners,
there was non-compliance with Section 14(14) of the Act of 1994, and the Dr.
Choudhary Committee mechanically endorsed the earlier findings without fresh
evaluation. It is lastly submitted that the notification dated 06.10.2005 prescribing
fees for B.Sc. courses did not apply to B.Sc. (Biotechnology) (Vocational), and in
the absence of any specific fee prescription at the relevant time, the petitioners
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cannot be accused of charging excess fees. The petitioners, therefore, contend that
the impugned orders are unsustainable and liable to be quashed.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents -
17. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
vocational scheme introduced by the UGC was adopted by the State Government
and implemented through affiliated colleges, including the petitioner-college. It is
contended that once the course was affiliated to the University, the petitioner-
college was bound by the statutory regulations and notifications issued by the
University in exercise of its powers under Section 28 of the Act of 1994.
The Management had absolutely no authority to prescribe fees for
unaided courses running in institute in its control and when there is no propriety
on the part of respondent no.1 to call explanation from Management-petitioner
no.1 for violation of notification
18. It is submitted that the notification dated 06.10.2005 prescribing fee
structures for undergraduate science courses applied to all B.Sc. degree courses
conducted on an unaided basis, including B.Sc. (Biotechnology). The nomenclature
of the course does not alter its essential character as a B.Sc. degree course. The
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respondents further submit that the petitioners have failed to produce any
documentary material to establish that other colleges were charging similar fees or
that the UGC had granted liberty to fix fees beyond the University-prescribed
structure.
19. Learned counsel further submits that the Dr. Gomase Committee
report is based on documentary material and admissions made by the Principal of
the College. In communications dated 24.12.2007 and subsequent correspondence,
the petitioner-college admitted that additional amounts were collected from
students towards infrastructure and laboratory expenses and that such amounts
were deposited in the account of the Management. It is contended that the
petitioners took contradictory stands in successive replies, at one stage admitting
collection of additional fees and at another asserting absence of fee norms.
20. The respondents submit that due opportunity was granted at every
stage. Show cause notices under Sections 81 and 14(14) of the Act of 1994 were
issued, reports were supplied, and replies were considered. Even pursuant to the
earlier directions of this Court, a fresh opportunity of hearing was granted before
the Director, Board of College and University Development. The explanations were
found unsatisfactory, and the Management Council, upon accepting the committee
report, passed the order dated 18.12.2012 directing refund of excess fees and
imposing a penalty of ₹50,000/-, transfer unclaimed50,000/-. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned
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orders are legal, reasoned and within jurisdiction, and no interference is warranted
in writ jurisdiction.
Analysis and Findings -
21. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the record, the
primary questions that arise for consideration are (i) whether the impugned orders
suffer from violation of principles of natural justice; (ii) whether the University
notification dated 06.10.2005 was applicable to the B.Sc. (Biotechnology) course;
and (iii) whether the findings of excess fee collection are so arbitrary or perverse as
to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
22. At the outset, the scope of judicial review in such matters is limited.
In Gohil Hanubhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2017 (13) SCC 621, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that judicial review is concerned with the decision-making
process and not with the merits of the decision itself. Unless the action is vitiated by
illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety, the Court does not sit in appeal
over administrative determinations. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment
are reproduced below:
15. The basic principles governing the judicial review of
administrative action are too well settled. Two judgments
which are frequently quoted in this regard are - Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation
2 and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil
Service 3 .
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16. Lord Diplock in his celebrated opinion in Council of
Civil Service Unions summarised the principles as follows:
(AC p.410-D-H & 411 A-B)
"... Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today
when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by
which the development has come about, one can
conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon
which administrative action is subject to control by judicial
review. The first ground I would call "illegality," the second
"irrationality" and the third "procedural impropriety." That
is not to say that further development on a case by case
basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have
in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of
the principle of "proportionality" which is recognised in
the administrative law of several of our fellow members of
the European Economic Community; but to dispose of the
instant case the three already well-established heads that I
have mentioned will suffice.
By "illegality" as a ground for judicial review I mean
that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law
that regulates his decision-making power and must give
effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a
justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute,
by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power
of the state is exercisable.
By "irrationality" I mean what can by now be
succinctly referred to as "Wednesbury unreasonableness"
(Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corporation). It applies to a decision which is so
outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who had applied his
mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.
Whether a decision falls within this category is a question
that judges by their training and experience should be well
equipped to answer, or else there would be something
badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the court's
exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer
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needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in
Edwards v. Bairstow of irrationality as a ground for a
court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred
though unidentifiable mistake of law by the decision-
maker. "Irrationality" by now can stand upon its own feet
as an accepted ground on which a decision may be
attacked by judicial review.
I have described the third head as "procedural
impropriety" rather than failure to observe basic rules of
natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness
towards the person who will be affected by the decision.
This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this
head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to
observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in
the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is
conferred, even where such failure does not involve any
denial of natural justice. But the instant case is not
concerned with the proceedings of an administrative
tribunal at all."
It can be seen from the above extract, Lord Diplock
identified three heads under which judicial review is
undertaken, i.e., illegality, irrationality and procedural
impropriety. He also recognised the possibility of new
heads such as 'proportionality' being identified in future.
He explained the concepts of the three already identified
heads. He declared that the head 'irrationality' is
synonymous with Wednesbury unreasonableness'
17. The principle laid down in Council of Civil Service
Unions has been quoted with approval by this Court in
Tata Cellular v. Union of India and Siemens Public
Communication v. Union of India.
18. Normally while exercising the power of judicial
review, Courts would only examine the decision making
process of the administrative authorities but not the
decision itself. The said principle has been repeatedly
stated by this Court on number of occasions .
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23. In the present case, the record demonstrates that the notices were
issued under Sections 81 and 14(14) of the Act of 1994; copies of the Dr. Gomase
Committee report were furnished; replies were submitted by the petitioners on
multiple occasions; and an additional opportunity of hearing was granted pursuant
to directions of this Court. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC
364, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even where there is some procedural
lapse, interference is warranted only if prejudice is established. The petitioners
have failed to demonstrate any real prejudice. The relevant paragraph is
reproduced hereinbelow:
".....
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any
rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to
observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that matter,
wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature
and impact of the order/action the Court or the Tribunal should
make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice [rule
of audi alteram] and violation of a facet of the said rule, as
explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction
must be made between no opportunity" and no adequate
opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing" "no fair hearing".
(a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be
invalid [one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to]. In such
cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take
proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said
rule [audi alteram partem ]. ......"
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24. Significantly, the correspondence placed on record indicates that the
petitioner-college admitted collection of additional fees from students on the
ground of infrastructure and laboratory expenses. An admission is substantive
evidence against the maker. In Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another
reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that admissions,
unless satisfactorily explained, constitute the best evidence. The subsequent
contradictory stands adopted by the petitioners weaken their challenge. The
relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced below:
29. Admission is the best piece of substantive evidence that an
opposite party can rely upon, though not conclusive, is decisive of
the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous.
Admission may in certain circumstances, operate as an estoppel.
The question which is needed to be considered is what weight is
to be attached to an admission and for that purpose it is
necessary to find out as to whether it is clear, unambiguous and a
relevant piece of evidence, and further it is proved in accordance
with the provisions of the Evidence Act. It would be appropriate
that an opportunity is given to the person under cross-
examination to tender his explanation and clear the point on the
question of admission. (Vide: Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi
Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi & Ors., Basant Singh v. Janki
Singh & Ors., Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil,
Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, United Indian Insurance Co Ltd.
v. Samir Chandra Choudhary., Charanjit lal Mehra & Ors v. Kamal
Saroj Mahajan & Anr., and Udham Singh v. Ram Singh & Anr.,)
25. As regards applicability of the notification dated 06.10.2005, the
University is empowered under Section 28 of the Act of 1994 to regulate fee
structures for affiliated colleges.
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Perusal of the same reveals that 'B.Sc.' includes even B.Sc. (Biotechnology).
The B.Sc. (Biotechnology) course culminates in a B.Sc. degree and falls within the
broader category of undergraduate science courses. The argument that it
constitutes an entirely distinct class beyond regulatory control cannot be accepted.
In Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P. reported in (2016) 7
SCC 353, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the power of the State and regulatory
authorities to prescribe fee structures to prevent commercialization of education.
Similarly, in Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka reported in (2003)
6 SCC 697 and P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2005) 6 SCC 537,
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it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that while private educational
institutions enjoy autonomy, profiteering and commercialization are impermissible
and reasonable regulation is constitutionally valid.
26. Notably, despite the categorical admission made by the Principal in
the contemporaneous correspondence that additional fees had in fact been
collected from the students of B.Sc. (Biotechnology), the petitioners have sought to
assail the impugned action on the ground of alleged violation of the principles of
natural justice. In the considered view of this Court, such a plea is wholly
misconceived and unsustainable. The record unequivocally establishes that show
cause notices were issued under the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra
Universities Act, 1994; copies of the inquiry reports were furnished to the
petitioners; written explanations were called for and submitted on multiple
occasions; and, pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in the earlier round
of litigation, a further opportunity of personal hearing was extended before the
competent statutory authority. The petitioners actively participated in the
proceedings at every stage.
27. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has authoritatively held that interference on the ground of violation of
natural justice is warranted only where prejudice is demonstrated. In the present
case, the petitioners have failed to establish any prejudice whatsoever. Having
admitted the factual substratum, namely, collection of additional fees from
students, the petitioners cannot now be permitted to challenge the process on
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hyper-technical grounds. The doctrine of natural justice cannot be invoked as a
ritualistic incantation to invalidate a lawful and reasoned decision, particularly
when adequate opportunity was, in fact, granted.
28. The direction to refund excess fees and to deposit a penalty of
₹50,000/-, transfer unclaimed50,000/- is regulatory and corrective in character. It is neither punitive in excess
nor disproportionate. On the contrary, it is a measured response to a statutory
breach. The findings recorded by the competent authorities are founded on
documentary material, correspondence on record, and admissions of the
petitioners. No perversity, arbitrariness, or jurisdictional error has been
demonstrated so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
Conclusion -
29. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that (i) the
petitioners were afforded full and adequate opportunity of hearing in consonance
with the principles of natural justice, (ii) the respondent-University acted within
the bounds of its statutory authority under the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994,
(iii) the conclusion regarding collection of excess fees is supported by cogent
material and admissions on record; and (iv) no case of arbitrariness,
discrimination, mala fides, or procedural impropriety has been made out.
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30. The impugned orders dated 18.12.2012 and 14.05.2015 are legal,
valid and sustainable in law, and do not warrant interference in exercise of writ
jurisdiction.
31. The writ petition, being devoid of merit and having unnecessarily
consumed judicial time despite clear admissions on record, is dismissed with costs
quantified at ₹50,000/-, transfer unclaimed25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand only), to be deposited by
the petitioners with the University Students Welfare Fund within a period of six
weeks from the date of this judgment.
32. Rule stands discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.
[NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J.] [ANIL L. PANSARE, J.]
33. After pronouncement of the judgment dismissing the writ petition as
being devoid of merits and imposing costs of Rs.25,000/- to be deposited by the
petitioners with the University Students' Welfare Fund within a period of six weeks,
learned counsel for the petitioners prayed for continuation of the interim order
granted at the time of issuing 'Rule' for some time.
34. In view of the findings recorded in the judgment and the dismissal of
the writ petition, the said prayer is rejected.
[NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J.] [ANIL L. PANSARE, J.]
Signed by: Mr. S.K. NAIR
Designation: PS To Honourable
Sknair Judge
Date: 09/03/2026 10:33:10
