[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Sagar Gautam Sable vs The State Of Maharashtra And Another on 12 January, 2026
2026:BHC-AUG:1105
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 112 OF 2024
WITH
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2509 OF 2025
Sagar Gautam Sable,
Age. 25 years, Occ. Labour work,
R/o. Takshshil Nagar, Near Batco Transport,
Juna Monda, Dist. Aurangabad. ...Appellant
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra,
Through Police Inspector,
Police Station Pundliknagar,
Tq. and Dist. Aurangabad.
2. XYZ ...Respondents
...
Advocate for Applicant : Mr. Ghanekar Nilesh S.
APP for Respondent No. 1 : Ms. Ashlesha S. Deshmukh
Advocate for Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Vishal A. Chavan (appointed)
...
CORAM : RAJNISH R. VYAS, J.
DATE : 12TH JANUARY, 2026
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. Heard respective learned counsels.
2. By that instant appeal, the original accused/appellant has
challenged his conviction awarded by, Special Judge (POCSO),
Aurangabad, in Special Case (POCSO) No. 383/2021, dated 12.12.2023,
by which, the appellant was convicted for commission of offence
punishable under Section 363 of Indian Penal Code (herein after would
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be referred to as 'the IPC' for sake of brevity), and was directed to suffer
rigorous imprisonment of three years and pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- in
default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month.
3. The appellant was also convicted for commission of offence
punishable under Section 376-AB of the IPC and directed to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and pay fine of Rs. 20,000/- in
default to suffer simple imprisonment for four months.
4. The appellant was also convicted under Section 354-A (2)
of the IPC and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and
pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two
years.
5. He was also convicted for commission of offence
punishable under Section 4 (2) of Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (herein after would be referred to as 'the Act of
2012' for sake of brevity) and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment
for twenty years and pay fine of Rs. 25,000/- in default to suffer simple
imprisonment for five months.
6. He was also convicted for commission of offence punishable
under Section 8 of the Act of 2012, and directed to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for three years and pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to
suffer simple imprisonment for one month. All these sentences were
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ordered to run concurrently.
7. Furthermore, a fine of Rs. 56,000/- was imposed upon the
appellant, out of which Rs. 25,000/- was directed to be paid to the
victim under Section 4 (3) of the Act of 2012.
8. A criminal law was set in a motion on the basis of
information supplied by PW-2 / mother of victim who was examined by
the prosecution at exhibit 24. PW-2 has, in her evidence, deposed that at
the relevant time, she was residing along with her father, mother and
three daughters. The victim of the crime / PW-1 is her daughter. The
incident took place prior to two-three days of lodging first information
report. On that day, when PW-1 had been to attend her work at about
10:00 am and returned at about 01:00 pm to 01:30 pm, at that time,
mother of PW-2 met her on the way and disclosed that victim was
missing from the house. PW-2, thereafter, visited various places in order
to search her daughter but was unsuccessful. She then made a
telephonic call to her relatives and since victim was not traced, she filed
a report with the police station.
9. The said information culminated in registration of First
Information Report below exhibit 26 dated 11.10.2021, for commission
of offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC, against the
unknown persons. Consequently, criminal law was set in a motion.
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10. According to PW-2 / mother, after two days to lodging of
report i.e. 13.10.2021, victim was found. According to her, two to three
women along with mother of accused and accused brought her
daughter, at which time, daughter was crying and was not in a condition
to talk. PW-2 further deposed that then a phone call was made to police
and police took daughter to the police station.
11. This narration of the incidence has resulted in charging the
accused under various Sections. During investigation, the birth
certificate of the victim was seized along with the clothes worn by the
accused and the victim. The accused was arrested on 14.10.2021. After
completion of investigation, final report was filed against appellant. Co-
accused was also chargesheeted but was shown absconding. Learned
Trial Court on 12.12.2023, charged the accused for commission of
offence punishable under Sections 363, 376-AB, 354-A (2) of the IPC
and Section 4 (2) of the Act of 2012, so also Section 8 of the same act.
In order to bring home the charge, prosecution in all has examined five
witnesses.
12. As already discussed, PW-2 was the mother who has lodged
the report. The narration of the testimony is already mentioned in the
above part of the judgment. So far as cross-examination of PW-2 is
concerned, suffice it to say that the suggestion was given by the defence
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was that victim was not in the company of anyone, she left house of her
own. It was also suggested to her that she has produced certified copy of
birth extract and that her bother had given papers for the victim's birth
registration to the Municipal Corporation. She was unable to answer
which papers were given by her brother. A suggestion regarding giving
false evidence was also given to her.
13. It is necessary to mention here that, so far as age of the
victim is concerned, it has not been seriously contested by way of cross-
examination. Exhibit 27 i.e. birth certificate is proved by PW-2 which
clearly shows that date of birth of victim was 19.09.2010. Even PW-1 in
her examination-in-chief has specifically stated that her date of birth is
19.09.2010. From record, it would be crystal clear that no suggestion
was given denying the date of birth. In that view of the matter, I come to
conclusion that the date of birth of victim was 19.09.2010, thus was
minor at the time of commission of offence.
14. Since the accused was charged and convicted for
commission of offence punishable under Section 363 of the Indian Penal
Code, it is necessary to reproduce Section 361 of the IPC, which reads as
under :
"361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship. - Whoever
takes or entices any minor under sixteen years if a male,
or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any
person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the
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lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound
mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to
kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship."
15. If the testimony of PW-1 is perused, she had categorically
deposed that in the year 2021, she was in 6th standard in a school and
she knew the accused. According to her, she had been with her maternal
aunt to vegetables market, at that time, the appellant met her and since
then she knew the appellant. She deposed that the appellant had given
his phone number to victim for making calls and on the next date, she
made phone call to him from the mobile of her maternal aunt. According
to PW-1/victim on phone he said "We would go for outing." Thereafter,
accused came along with vehicle on Jalna road in front of High Court
gate, where she was standing. The accused at the relevant time, was
accompanied by one of his friends. The accused, at that juncture, said to
victim "We would go together to Karnpura for darshan." Thereafter, she
along with the appellant and his friend went together to Karnpura on
motorbike which was driven by the appellant.
16. If the cross-examination of the aforesaid witness is perused,
it would be clear that so far as this particular incidence is concerned,
nothing has been brought on record to disbelieve the story of
prosecution. In paragraph no. 4, of cross-examination what has been
stated is that on particular day, it was victim who has made a phone call
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to the appellant in the morning at about 11:00 am. The cross-
examination further shows that she did not inform her family members
that she was going for outing and when she came to Jalna road in front
of High Court gate, she had a phone of her mother and for two-three
days that phone was with her, but it was not working as it fell in water.
Thus, regarding taking away of the victim, no effective cross-
examination has been conducted by the defence.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial
Court ought not have convicted the appellant for offence punishable
under Section 363 of the IPC. According to him, offence of kidnapping
stands on two legs. One is taking away and other one is enticing. So far
as enticing is concerned, it is not even a case for the prosecution that it
was the appellant who had at any point of time enticed the victim.
Therefore, the offence of kidnapping cannot be made applicable to him.
As far as "takes" is concerned, he submitted that he had not even taken
the victim from lawful guardianship. He submitted that earlier there was
a phone call and he had only said that they would go for outing.
According to him, the victim could have very well denied his request. He
further submitted that there was no forceful act on his part to take the
victim with him.
18. In order to buttress his contention, he has relied upon the
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judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in Criminal Appeal No. 46/1963
decided on 09.09.1964, in the case of S. Varadarajan Versus State of
Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, more particularly on paragraph nos. 7 and 8,
which read as under :
"7. The question whether a minor can abandon the
guardianship of his or her own guardian and if so the
further question whether Savitri could, in acting as she did,
be said to have abandoned her father's guardianship may
perhaps not be very easy to answer. Fortunately, however, it
is not necessary for us to answer either of them upon the
view which we take on the other question raised before us
and that is that "taking" of Savitri out of the keeping of her
father has not been established. The offence of "kidnapping
from lawful guardianship" is defined thus in the first
paragraph of s. 361 of the Indian Penal Code :
"Whoever takes or entices any minor under
sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen
years of age if a female, or any person of
unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful
guardian of such minor or person of unsound
mind, without the consent of such guardian, is
said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful
guardianship."
8. It will thus be seen that taking or enticing away a
minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an
essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here,
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we are not concerned with enticement but what, we
have to find out is whether the part played by the
appellant amounts to "taking", out of the keeping of
the lawful L2Sup./64--3 guardian, of Savitri. We have
no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S.
Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Natarajan ,She
still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the
former but then the question remains as to what is it
which the appellant did that constitutes in law
"taking". There is not a word in the deposition of
Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that
she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or
even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly
admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself
telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a
certain place, went up to that place and finding him
waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord.
No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant
where to go and that it was the appellant himself who
drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and
other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had
decided to marry the appellant. ......."
19. In the aforesaid background, he submitted that there was
no question of taking away of the victim from lawful guardianship, since
by cogent and reliable evidence, same has not been proved. He further
submitted that in criminal law previous and subsequent conduct of the
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accused plays very important role. He, in order to take this contention to
the logical end, submitted that appellant's previous conduct in taking the
victim to the Karnpura, and thereafter, to his house clearly shows that he
had no intention of taking her away. According to him, when he along
with the victim reached the appellant's house, his mother and family
members were questioning the victim about where she had come from.
They were trying to drop the victim at her house but it was the victim
who told them that her mother had been to Pune. Thus, he submitted
that offence of kidnapping cannot be attributed to him.
20. Per contra, learned APP and learned counsel for respondent
no. 2, submitted that victim was minor and was taken from the custody
of lawful guardianship. In this background, if examination-in-chief of
PW-1 (page 26 is perused), it would be crystal clear that initial proposal
to go outside was from the appellant on telephone to victim and it was
the accused who took the victim to Karnpura along with his friend. The
testimony further shows that friend was dropped at Karnpura and,
thereafter, the victim with the appellant came to appellant's house. It is
difficult to understand the reason for taking the victim to the appellant's
house and dropping the friend at Karanpura. The appellant being 25
years old could have very well dropped 11 years girl to her place.
21. In that view of the matter, I come to conclusion that the
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appellant has taken away the victim from lawful guardianship and,
therefore, offence under Section 363 of the IPC, is rightly made out.
22. The appellant is also convicted for commission of offence
punishable under Section 376-AB of the IPC and directed to suffer
imprisonment for period of 20 years. Section 376-AB of the IPC, read as
under : -
"376AB. Punishment for rape on woman under 12
years of age. - Whoever, commits rape on a woman
under twelve years of age shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than twenty years, but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment
for the remainder of that person's natural life, and
with fine or with death:
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to
meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the
victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this
section shall be paid to the victim."
23. At this juncture, the definition of rape is required to be
taken into consideration. Section 375 of the IPC, speaks about a man
committing rape if he penetrates, inserts, manipulates or applies his
mouth to urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or
any other person. Thus, the Section clearly speaks about these acts
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which are narrated above.
24. The testimony of the witness i.e. PW-1 is important. She, in
her examination-in-chief, has stated as under :
"In the evening, I took dinner and went to sleep with
his mother. On the next morning, his mother said that
she will leave me at my house. I refused it for the
reason I was frightened of my mother. Then I stayed
there on that day also. I was sleeping near his mother.
At that time, he woke up me and took to down room
and tried to have physical relations with me. I refused
for it. Then, he attempted to make forceful physical
relations with me. On the next morning, I took bath,
wore clothes of his sister and then went I was left to
my house."
25. There is one more aspect which is clear from conducting of
cross-examination i.e. paragraph no. 2 in examination-in-chief which
reads as under :
"2. It was happened that he removed my clothes
after bringing me in down room and had forceful
physical relations with me."
26. At this juncture, it is necessary to mention here that the said
answer was given in the examination-in-chief which, prima facie, is
outcome of the question put by the learned prosecutor therein.
(Paragraph no. 25 of judgment).
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27. PW-5 is the Medical Officer who has medically examined
the victim. She in her examination-in-chief, has stated that on
13.10.2021, she was working as a RMO at GMCH, Aurangabad, on that
date, after obtaining consent from victim and her mother, her medical
examination was conducted. The consent form was proved by this
witness at exhibit 39. The relevant portion of her examination-in-chief is
as under :
"After recording sexual assault history narrated by the
survivor, I conducted her physical and genital
examination. On physical examination, I found that
there was no injury on her person. On genital
examination, I found no evidence for fresh injury,
abrasion, etc. There was no injury on hymen."
28. If the deposition of PW-1 is tested in the light of deposition
of PW-5 and even separately, it would reveal that nothing has been
uttered by this witness about the penetration, insertion or manipulation.
In order to answer the leading question, she has stated that " It was
happened that he removed my clothes after bringing me in down room
and had forceful physical relations with me."
29. On the basis of aforesaid evidence and testimony of PW-5,
opining that a possibility of sexual intercourse cannot be ruled out,
learned Trial Court has convicted the appellant for commission of
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offence under section 376-AB of IPC and suffer rigorous imprisonment
for 20 years.
30. Learned APP Ms. Deshmukh, submitted that learned Trial
Court had rightly convicted the appellant, since the age of victim was
only 11 years. She further submitted that absolutely no corroboration is
required when prosecution has come with a case that prosecutrix was
subjected to sexual intercourse and the prosecutrix has deposed the said
fact in the Court. She has invited my attention to the law laid down by
Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ganesan Versus State Represented by its
Inspector of Police, AIR 2020 SC 5019, more particularly, paragraph no.
9.3, which is reproduced as under :
"9.3 Who can be said to be a "sterling witness", has
been dealt with and considered by this Court in the
case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21. In paragraph 22, it is
observed and held as under:
"22. In our considered opinion, the "sterling
witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre
whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The
court considering the version of such witness should be
in a position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the
status of the witness would be immaterial and what
would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement
made by such a witness. What would be more relevant
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would be the consistency of the statement right from
the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when
the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately
before the court. It should be natural and consistent
with the case of the prosecution qua the accused.
There should not be any prevarication in the version of
such a witness. The witness should be in a position to
withstand the cross-examination of any length and
howsoever strenuous it may be and under no
circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the
factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well
as the sequence of it. Such a version should have
corelation with each and every one of other supporting
material such as the recoveries made, the weapons
used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific
evidence and the expert opinion. The said version
should consistently match with the version of every
other witness. It can even be stated that it should be
akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial
evidence where there should not be any missing link in
the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of
the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of
such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all 12
other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held
that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness"
whose version can be accepted by the court without
any corroboration and based on which the guilty can
be punished. To be more precise, the version of the
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said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should
remain intact while all other attendant materials,
namely, oral, documentary and material objects should
match the said version in material particulars in order
to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the
core version to sieve the other supporting materials for
holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged."
On evaluating the deposition of PW3 - victim on
the touchstone of the law laid down by this Court in
the aforesaid decisions, we are of the opinion that the
sole testimony of the PW3 - victim is absolutely
trustworthy and unblemished and her evidence is of
sterling quality.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the learned trial Court has not committed any
error in convicting the accused, relying upon the
deposition of PW3 - victim. The learned trial Court has
imposed the minimum sentence provided under
Section 8 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, the learned
trial Court has already shown the leniency. At this
stage, it is required to be noted that allegations against
the accused which are proved from the deposition of
PW3 are very serious, which cannot be permitted in
the civilized society. Therefore, considering the object
and purpose of POCSO Act and considering the
evidence on record, the High Court has rightly
convicted the accused for the offence under Section 7
of the POCSO Act and has rightly sentenced the
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accused to undergo three years R.I. which is the
minimum sentence provided under Section 8 of the
POCSO Act."
31. She submitted that since the version of PW-1, is trustworthy
there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve her testimony. According to
her, the deposition of said witness was of sterling quality, and therefore,
the conviction may not be upset.
32. Learned counsel for respondent no. 2/victim has also
supported the stand taken by the prosecutor and has submitted that the
testimony must be read holistically. He submitted that there was no
reason for the victim to falsely implicate the appellant.
33. Mr. Ghanekar, learned counsel for the appellant challenged
victim's testimony so far as conviction under Section 376-AB is
concerned. He submitted that since the fundamental principle of
criminal law is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, considering
the testimony of PW-1, it cannot be said that the said burden has been
discharged by the prosecution. He submitted that there is nothing in the
testimony of the witness which shows that the act which would
constitute the offence was committed. So far as paragraph no. 2 of the
deposition of the PW-1 which states that the appellant removed her
clothes after bringing her to the down room and had forcible physical
relations with the victim is concerned, same being outcome of leading
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question asked in examination-in-chief, without even obtaining
permission of the Court, is required to be ignored. He submitted that the
method and manner in which the witness is required to be examined has
to be strictly in consonance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. The
said act of putting leading question in examination-in-chief and giving
answer without obtaining permission of Court is unknown in criminal
law. He thus submits that his conviction under Section 376-AB of the
IPC, be disturbed.
34. I have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned
prosecutor and learned counsel for the victim. In her cross-examination,
the prosecutrix has stated that when she was sleeping near the mother
of the appellant, the appellant woke her up and took her to room and
tried to do physical relations with her, which was refused by her, then,
he attempted to make forcible physical relations with her. The aforesaid
fact clearly shows the act of rape was not committed. So far as the
answer given in paragraph no. 2 in examination-in-chief is concerned,
suffice it to say that it cannot be considered since it seems to have been
given with reference to a leading question put. Thus, I come to
conclusion that there is no enough evidence to say that the victim was
subjected to forcible sexual intercourse.
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35. As far as conviction of the appellant under Section 4 of the
Act of 2012 is concerned, it is necessary to peruse Section 4 (2) of the
Act of 2012. Section 4 speaks about punishment for penetrating sexual
assault. Penetrating sexual assault is defined under Section 3 of the Act
of 2012, which is on a somewhat similar line of Section 375 of the IPC.
Suffice it to say that in view of the discussion made above regarding
applicability of Section 376-AB of the IPC, even offence under Section 4
(2) of the Act of 2012, is not made out, since there is neither
penetration, insertion or manipulation or applying of mouth.
36. This takes me to the conviction of the appellant under
Section 8 of the Act of 2012, which speaks about punishment of sexual
assault. The sexual assault is defined under Section 7 of the Act of 2012,
which reads as under :
"7. Sexual assault.--Whoever, with sexual intent
touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or
makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast
of such person or any other person, or does any other
act with sexual intent which involves physical contact
without penetration is said to commit sexual assault."
37. It is necessary to mention here that this witness i.e.
victim/PW-1 in her testimony has categorically stated that when she was
sleeping near the mother of appellant, at that time, the appellant woke
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her and took her to room and tried to have physical relationship which
was refused, then he attempted to make forcible physical relations with
her.
38. Learned prosecutor Ms. Deshmukh, submitted that offence
under Section 8 of the Act of 2012, so also, offence under section 354-A
(2) of the Indian Penal Code, is clearly made out. She submitted that the
aforesaid part of deposition of PW-1 clearly makes out ingredients of the
aforesaid two Sections. She further invited my attention to provisions of
Section 354-A (2) of IPC, which is reproduced as under :
"Section 354-A. Sexual harassment and punishment for
sexual harassment. -
(1) A man committing any of the following acts -
(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome
and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
(vi) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of
the offence of sexual harassment.
(2) Any man who commits the offence specified in
clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1)
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both.
(3) Any man who commits the offence specified in
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clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
39. Learned counsel for respondent no. 2/victim has also
supported the stand taken by the prosecutor and submitted that the
manner in which the accused has acted clearly shows that there was a
sexual intent.
40. Learned counsel Mr. Ghanekar, for the appellant submitted
that there was absolutely no sexual intent since the testimony advanced
by the prosecution is not trustworthy. According to him, it was the
family members of the appellant who had shown their willingness to
take the victim of the crime to her house. He further submitted that, had
he been really involved in the commission of the crime, he would have
been arrested on 13.10.2021, when he, along with the other members of
the family went to the house of the victim to drop her off. There was
absolutely no reason for the police authorities to arrest the appellant on
the next date i.e. 14.10.2021.
41. Mr. Ghanekar may be right in his submission but the
testimony of PW-1 regarding taking her in a room and the appellant
causing sexual harassement, cannot be ignored in absence of effective
cross-examination. Thus, I come to conclusion that the prosecution has
proved offence punishable under Section 354 -A (2) of the IPC and
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Section 8 of the Act of 2012.
42. It is pertinent to mention here that the testimony of PW-1
and PW-2 is truthful so far as aforesaid two Sections are concerned, and
in answer to the queries made by the Court while examining the accused
under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, no convincing
explanation for false implication was given by the accused. An attempt
could have been made by the appellant to rebut the presumption
required to be revised under Sections 29 and 30 of the Act of 2012,
either through cross-examination or by examining witnesses. Having not
done so, I do have any option but to come to the conclusion that the
offence of sexual assault under Section 8 of the Act of 2012 and Section
354-A of the IPC are proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, I pass the following order :
ORDER
A. Criminal Appeal is partly allowed.
B. So far as conviction of present appellant for commission of
offences punishable under Sections 363, 354-A (2) of IPC and
Section 8 of POCSO Act is concerned, same is maintained.
C. The appellant is acquitted for the commission of offence
punishable under Section 376-AB of the IPC, Section 4 (2) of
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.
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D. At this stage, the word of appreciation is required to be
noted for learned Advocate Mr. Vishal Chavan, who was appointed
by the Legal Aid, in order to put forth the case of victim. Mr.
Chavan, without seeking any adjournment has vehemently
opposed the prayer made by the learned counsel for the appellant.
He has invited my attention to various provisions of law. The High
Court Legal Services Sub-Committee, Aurangabad, is directed to
quantify his fees according to the Rules.
E. Pending Criminal Applications, if any, stand disposed of.
( RAJNISH R. VYAS, J. )
SPC
