Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 1037 Bom
Judgement Date : 30 January, 2026
2026:BHC-OS:2675
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jsn
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 478 OF 2020
JITENDRA
SHANKAR Jay Anand Co.operative Housing Society ...Petitioner
NIJASURE
Digitally signed by
JITENDRA SHANKAR
NIJASURE
Ltd.
Date: 2026.01.30
18:38:16 +0530
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 2936 OF 2022
WITH
CONTEMPT PETITION (L) NO. 35195 OF 2022
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1953 OF 2021
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 2936 OF 2022
----------
Mr. Pravin Samdhani, Senior Counsel a/w Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar
i/by Mehul Shah, Mr. Yatin Khochare and Mr. Abhishek Nikharge for
the Petitioner.
Ms. Uma PalsuleDesai, AGP for the Respondent No. 1 in WP/478/20.
Ms. Gaurangi Patil, AGP for the Respondent No. 1 in WP/2936/22.
Dr. Virendra Tulzapurkar, Senior Counsel a/w Mr. Akshay
Deshmukh, Mr. Sanket Kadam, Mr. Sumit Chaudhary for the
Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in WP/2936/22 and for the Respondent Nos.
4 to 6 in WP/478/20.
----------
1/49
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CORAM : R.I. CHAGLA J.
Reserved on : 19TH SEPTEMBER, 2025.
Pronounced on : 30TH JANUARY, 2026.
J U D G M E N T:
-
1. The above Writ Petitions along with the Contempt
Petition were heard together as they are between the same parties as
well as concerning common issues.
2. The Writ Petition No.478 of 2020 impugns the Order
dated 3rd November, 2018 passed by Respondent No.3 by which the
Petitioner - Society has been bifurcated under Section 18(1) read
with Section 17 of the Maharashtra Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960
("MCS Act"). The Writ Petition No.2936 of 2022 impugns Order
dated 5th November, 2020 passed by Respondent No.3 by which the
Respondent No.3 has granted Deemed Conveyance in favour of Jay
Anand Bungalow Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. ('Jay Anand
Bungalow CHS'), by issuing certificate of Deemed Conveyance. The
Contempt Petition (L) No.35195 of 2022 has been taken out in Writ
Petition No.2936 of 2022 alleging that the Respondent therein who is
the Petitioner - Society in the said Writ Petitions has violated the
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Order dated 28th September, 2001 passed in Interim Application
No.1953 of 2021 in Writ Petition No.2936 of 2022 whereby this
Court ordered maintaining status quo with respect to the subject land
covered by Deemed Conveyance executed pursuant to the said Order
dated 5th November, 2020.
FACTS
3. The relevant facts as taken from Writ Petition No.478 of
2020 are as under:-
(i) The Petitioner - Jay Anand Co-Operative Housing Society
Ltd. is the owner of land admeasuring 1309.80 Sq. mtrs. bearing
Plot No.105, final plot no.88, TPS (III), village Borivali, Mumbai
400 092 ("subject land"). The building of the Petitioner was
constructed on the subject land consisting of wings 'A' and 'B'
having 22 tenements. The 'A' wing comprises of ground plus two
(part), open terrace and, in all 4 tenements (construction in
1954) and B Wing comprises of stilt plus 6 storeys having 18
tenements (constructed in 1985).
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(ii) The Petitioner was registered as a housing society on 14th
September, 1988. The Petitioner has 22 members. A Wing has
three members viz. Dwarkadhish Joshi, Shantaben Sidhapara
(Patel) and Nanjibhai P. Sidhpara (Patel).
(iii) An Application for Deemed Conveyance was made by the
Petitioner on 11th February, 2015 against the Developer. It is
pertinent to note that the Application was also signed by
Respondent No.4.
(iv) A letter was addressed by the Respondent Nos.4 - 6 for sub
division of the land on 1st April, 2015. It is pertinent to note that
the Respondent Nos.4 - 6 admit to being members of the
Petitioner - Society and state that all FSI on the subject land was
consumed in construction of the building of the Petitioner -
Society.
(v) A letter was addressed by the Petitioner on 17th April, 2015
in response to the said letter of the Respondent Nos.4 - 6 dated
1st April, 2015 informing that the Petitioner would take a legal
opinion on the issue. It is pertinent to note that the Respondent
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No.4 was one of the signatories to the said letter.
(vi) A legal notice was addressed on behalf of Respondent
Nos.4 - 6 to the Secretary of the Petitioner - Society on 28th
August, 2025 calling upon it to convene a General Body Meeting
and give consent for bifurcation of the society. It is pertinent to
note that at that time the Secretary of the Petitioner - Society was
Respondent No.4.
(vii) An order of Deemed Conveyance dated 27th May, 2016
was passed by the Respondent No.3 in favour of the Petitioner.
(viii) The Respondent No.4 made a proposal for bifurcation of
the Petitioner - Society (Bifurcation Proposal) on 27th December,
2016.
(ix) The Respondent No.3 issued a letter dated 9th February,
2017 scheduling hearing on 16th February, 2017 to all members
of Jay Anand Bungalow CHS (then proposed) by Respondent
Nos.4 - 6. It is pertinent to note that the notice was not received
by the Petitioner Society.
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(x) A hearing was held by Respondent No.3 on 16th February,
2017 when only Respondent No.4 was present.
(xi) A bifurcation proposal was forwarded by Respondent No.3
to the Maharashtra District Housing Federation Limited for
remarks on 9th March, 2017. It is pertinent to note that there was
no draft scheme prepared prior to submission of bifurcation
proposal.
(xii) The Respondent No.3 submitted a letter to Respondent
No.1 on 9th March, 2017 to obtain special permission under
Section 157 of the MCS Act.
(xiii) Respondent No.1 sent the case of the Jay Anand
Bungalow CHS (then proposed) for bifurcation of the Petitioner -
Society to the Commissioner of Co-operative Societies and
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Pune for his opinion on 30th
March, 2017.
(xiv) The Conveyance Deed dated 31st March, 2017 was
registered in favour of the Petitioner under Sr. No.BRL3/2941/
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2014 on 6th May 2017.
(xv) A letter was addressed by the Commissioner of
Cooperative Societies and Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Pune
to Respondent No.3 on 30th May, 2017 to inspect the property
and report.
(xvi) A site inspection report dated 6th July, 2017 stated that
there are three families that hold five flats in Jay Anand Bungalow
CHS (then proposed) and they are not from same family. It is the
Petitioner's case that this was an incorrect statement as there were
only four units held by the members of two families.
(xvii) A letter of Respondent No.3 was addressed to the
Commissioner of Cooperative Societies and Registrar of
Cooperative Societies, Pune on 7th July, 2017 sending inspection
report.
(xviii) The Commissioner of Cooperative Societies submitted
his opinion pursuant to letter dated 30th March, 2017, on 2nd
August, 2017.
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(xix) The Ministry of Cooperation and Industry, Government of
Maharashtra under Section 7 of MCS Act granted exemption on
8th December, 2017 for formation of new society to Respondent
No.4. It is pertinent to note that exemption was granted without
hearing / notice to the Petitioner society.
(xx) The first notice received from Respondent No.3 on 1st
February, 2018 mentioning about complaint filed for bifurcation.
(xxi) A reply was filed by the Petitioner on 9th February, 2018
in response to the said notice.
(xxii) A draft order was prepared by Respondent No.3 on 22nd
March, 2018 proposing bifurcation.
(xxiii) The Petitioner filed Appeal No.114 of 2018 challenging
the draft order before the Divisional Joint Registrar, Cooperative
Societies. The Appeal was disposed of on the ground that it was
merely a draft Order.
(xxiv) The Respondent No.3 passed an Order dated 3rd
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November, 2018 ("impugned order") for bifurcation of the
Petitioner - Society. The said Order was passed under Section
18(1) read with Section 17 of the MCS Act for bifurcation of
Petitioner - Society. It is the contention of the Petitioner that the
said Order was passed contrary to these provisions. It is pertinent
to note that the Petitioner has filed an Appeal under Section 152
of the MCS Act which is pending adjudication. The Petitioner's
contention is that the exemption Order dated 8th December, 2017
is the basis of the said impugned Order dated 3rd November,
2018.
(xxv) Writ Petition No.478 of 2020 filed by the Petitioner -
Society impugning the Order dated 3rd November, 2018 granting
bifurcation of the Petitioner - Society.
(xxvi) Jay Anand Bungalow CHS made an application No.261
of 2019 before the Respondent No.3 under the provisions of
Section 11(3) of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963
("MOFA") for issuance of certificate of Unilateral Deemed
Conveyance in respect of part of the property belonging to the
Petitioner Society.
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(xvii) Order granting certificate of Unilateral Deemed
Conveyance was passed by Respondent No.3 on 5th November,
2020.
(xxviii) Writ Petition No.2936 of 2022 filed by the Petitioner -
Society challenging the Order of Deemed Conveyance dated 5th
November, 2020.
(xxix) This Court in Interim Application No.1953 of 2021 in
Writ Petition No.2936 of 2022 vide Order dated 28th September,
2021 directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of area
covered under the Deemed Conveyance executed pursuant to
order dated 5th November, 2020 for land admeasuring 330.30 sq.
mtrs.
(xxx) The Development Agreement was executed between the
Petitioner Society and Respondent No.9 (in Contempt Petition (L)
No.35195 of 2022) on 29th September, 2022. Under the
Development Agreement there were two scenarios provided for in
Clause 6(a) viz. Scenario (i) & (ii). As on date, Scenario II is
applicable and the entitlement of the Developer is only restricted
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to the extent of 979.50 Sq. mtrs. pursuant to Order dated 28th
September, 2021 passed by this Court.
(xxxi) Contempt Notice was issued by Jay Anand Bunglow CHS
Ltd. alleging violation of the said Order dated 28th September,
2021 to Respondent Nos.1 to 18 (in Contempt Petition (L)
No.35195 of 2022). Thereafter, Contempt Petition (L) No.35195
of 2022 was filed by the Jay Anand Bungalow CHS.
SUBMISSIONS IN WRIT PETITION NO.478 OF 2020
4. Mr. Pravin Samdhani, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner has submitted that Ministry of
Cooperation and Industry, Government of Maharashtra has
erroneously granted exemption for formation of new society to Jay
Anand Bungalow CHS (then Proposed) under Section 7 of the MCS
Act. He has submitted that Sections 6 and 7 of the MCS Act fall under
Chapter II which covers registration of a society. It would have no
application in cases where the society is already registered. He has
submitted that legislature has made an independent provision under
Section 157 for exemptions in respect of an existing society.
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5. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that Section 157 of the
MCS Act is in contrast applied to an existing society in the interest of
members of 'such society'. A different mechanism with respect to
existing society is contemplated for hearing of the existing society.
6. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that Section 18 of the MCS
Act read in the context of and in conjunction with Section 17 of the
MCS Act leaves no manner of doubt that a bifurcation can only be a
general body resolution of 3/4th of the members, unless, in
exceptional cases it is in 'public interest' or 'in the interest of
members' (plural / majority) and not miniscule minority. He has in
this context placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors.1 at paragraphs 51 to 53.
7. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the present case does
not fall within the defined criteria of 'public interest' or in the
'interest of members' as it is not in larger interest of members apart
from majority of the society having opposed bifurcation. He has in
this context placed reliance upon judgment of this Court in Bombay
Catholic CHS Ltd. v. V.B. Mathankar & Ors2.
1 (1992) 4 SCC 305.
2 2000 (3) Mh.L.J. 273.
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8. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the Petitioner was not
heard prior to passing of the impugned order of bifurcation. This has
been admitted by Respondent Nos.4 to 6. There was no personal
hearing which was granted to the Petitioner as according to
Respondent Nos.4 - 6, the impugned Order passed is "Ministerial
Function".
9. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that Section 157 of the
MCS Act provides "...provided that, no order to the prejudice of any
society shall be passed, without an opportunity being given to such
society to represent its case ." He has in this context placed reliance
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court State Bank of India & Ors.
v. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors3. at paragraphs 87, 93 and 95.
10. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that in the alternative to the
above submission, in any event, the Notification of 10th March, 1995
for exemption from minimum 10 members for registration of a
cooperative housing society has not been complied with by Jay
Anand Bungalow CHS (then proposed) and therefore, the Order of
bifurcation which is based on exemption is bad in law. He has
3 (2023) 6 SCC 1.
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submitted that the said Notification provides for grant of exemption
on 2 conditions (i) Plinth area of each flat should not be more than
700 Sq. ft.; (ii) no balance FSI should be available for utilization at
the time of formation of society. He has submitted that the impugned
Order / the purported NoC as such is liable to be set aside as the
sanctioned plan of 5th November, 1988 shows the bungalow
structure in existence comprising of single tenement on ground floor,
one tenement on first floor, both more than 900 sq. ft. in carpet area.
Further, the sanctioned plan dated 5th November, 1988 records FSI
available is 14,016.3 sq. ft. which after construction of wing B, 12.10
sq. ft. of FSI was still available. He has submitted that by change in
FSI rule on the date of the application for exemption, concept of TDR
was introduced where 1 TDR could be loaded on the said land and
Government of Maharashtra issued a notification dated 6th January,
2012 introducing the concept of fungible FSI by which additional FSI
of 25% to 35% can be allowed.
11. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the NoC for bifurcation
of unit at first floor of the bungalow was granted by Respondent No.4
as the Secretary of the Petitioner.
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12. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the explanation to
Section 6 of the MCS Act has not been taken into consideration in
passing of the impugned Order. The explanation reads as,
"Explanation - For the purposes of this section and Section 8, the
expression "member of a family" means a wife, husband, father,
mother, son or unmarried daughter". He has submitted that the
bungalow has only two families i.e. Patel family and Joshi family. 2
names are added viz. i) Snehal Joshi (son of Dwarkadish Joshi) & ii)
Jignesh Patel (son of Nanjibhai Patel) to mislead the Authority. Patel
also uses "Siddhpara" as their surname. The report of the
Commissioner of Cooperative Societies incorrectly records that there
are 3 members.
13. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that even otherwise, the
report of Commissioner of Cooperative Societies opines that in light
of only 3 members, incorporation of a proposed society is not proper.
This report has been ignored and no reasons in that regard are
recorded in the impugned Order.
14. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the reliance by
Respondent Nos.4 - 6 on an Appeal preferred under Section 152 of
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MCS Act and that the Petitioner cannot avail of concurrent remedies
is misplaced. He has submitted that Writ Petition has been correctly
filed as there is no appeal against the Order passed under Section 7
provided for in Section 152 of the MCS Act. He has submitted that
since the Order under Section 7 is the basis of the bifurcation Order
under Section 18 in the present Writ Petition, both orders are
challenged. He has accordingly submitted that the Writ Petition is
maintainable. He has submitted that it is settled law that right of
appeal is statutory and in the absence of statute permitting appeal
the only remedy is Writ Petition.
15. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that in the alternative,
existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not operate as an
absolute bar where the impugned order is ex-facie without
jurisdiction, arbitrary or passed in breach of principles of natural
justice. He has in this context placed reliance upon judgment of the
Supreme Court in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd 4,
Paragraph 7.
16. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that in the present case, the
4 (2003) 2 SCC 107.
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procedure as prescribed under Section 18 when read with Section 17
and Rule 17 of the MCS Act and Rules, is not followed. There was no
draft scheme which was prepared, when only thereafter the
Federation has to be consulted. The draft order is prepared on 22nd
March, 2018 even prior to the Consultation of Federation, when the
response of the federation is on 6th September, 2018. He has
submitted that basic necessity to prescribe the division of assets and
liabilities is not even considered by Respondent No.3 in this
impugned Order. Thus, it cannot be said that the Court lacks
authority to entertain the Writ Petition against impugned Orders
dated 8th December, 2017 and 3rd November, 2018.
17. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the impugned Order of
bifurcation dated 3rd November, 2018 is in violation of the procedure
prescribed above and in any event, is also vitiated as it is not in
consonance with the substantive purpose and object of the Section 18
of the MCS Act. The impugned Order is unreasoned and also fails to
even fulfil the basic ingredients for an order under Section 18 of the
MCS Act.
18. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the Order of exemption
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is in any event also vitiated by gathering the alleged reports /
affidavits ex-parte without any opportunity to the Petitioner Society.
He has submitted that the order of exemption is also unreasoned and
is against the opinion of the Commissioner, without even indicating
as to why the Commissioner's report is not acceptable. He has in this
context placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in
Cosmopolitan III CHS Ltd. v. Hon'ble Minister, Cooperation. 5,
paragraphs 16, 18 to 28.
19. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the opinion of the
Federation is based on the exemption Order under Section 7. He has
submitted that process required to be followed under Rule 17 is
completely violated in the present case. He has placed reliance upon
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hemant Vimalnath Narichania
v. Anand Darshan CHS Ltd.6, at paragraphs 16 and 17.
20. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that Section 7 of the MCS
Act is for registration of a new society and any exemption required
for the existing society, for example bifurcation, is Section 157, which
rightly makes a provision for hearing. Thus, Sections 7 and 157 5 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 1829.
6 (2016) 6 SCC 142:2016 SCC OnLine SC 182.
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operates in different fields.
21. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that the contention of the
Respondent Nos.4, 5 and 6 is that the judicial review of
administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness,
irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and malafides. Further, that its
purpose is to check whether the choice or decision is made 'lawfully'
and not to check whether the choice or decision is sound.
22. Mr. Samdhani has submitted that this contention on
behalf of these Respondents and their reliance placed on Tata
Cellular v. Union of India 7., paragraphs 77 to 93 in the present case is
misplaced. He has submitted that judicial review of an administrative
decision can be reviewed and interfered with in Writ Jurisdiction
where the process is fundamentally defective or violation of
mandatory procedure as well as there is non application of mind to
expert / technical advice and reasons are absent or perverse. He has
submitted that in the instant case every step smacks of impropriety.
The impugned decision is completely arbitrary and patently illegal.
He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
7 (1994) 6 SCC 651 @ 677.
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Epuru Sudhakar and Anr. v. Govt of A.P. & Ors8, at paragraph 34.
23. Dr. Virag Tulzapurkar, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Respondent Nos.4 to 6 has raised the preliminary
issue of maintainability of Petition on the ground that the Petitioner
has filed an Appeal against both the impugned Orders under Section
152 of the MCS Act. He has submitted that the Petitioner cannot avail
concurrent remedies in different forum. This is a case of forum
shopping and they have approached this Court having failed to get
any stay on the impugned Orders challenged before the appellate
authority. He has submitted that the Petition is liable to be rejected
on this ground in limine.
24. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the challenge to the
Order dated 8th December, 2017 passed by the Respondent No.1
(referred to as the exemption order) is not sustainable on facts or in
law. The exemption Order was passed in the proceedings for
registration of a society on an application made by these Respondents
who are occupying flats in a separate structure viz. the bungalow
which is different from the building in which other members are
8 (2006) 8 SCC 161.
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occupying. He has submitted that the Petitioner was not party to the
application. In processing the said application, the Registrar noticed
that the proposed society could not be registered as the society
consisted of less than 10 members. Therefore, the Registrar wrote a
letter dated 9th March, 2017 to Respondent No.1 setting out facts on
the basis of which application is made for registration of a society of
Respondent No.4 and others and pointing out that exemption was
required to be granted for registration of a society of less than 10
members. He has submitted that the Deputy Registrar had carried out
inquiry as to whether the Applicants of the proposed society are
members of one family and thereafter submitted a report. It was
upon receipt of the report and information supplied that the
Commissioner had concluded that there are 3 members and
therefore, it will not be proper to form a society of 3 members. The
Respondent Nos.4 to 6 have also submitted a report dated 14th
October, 2017 of the concerned authorities.
25. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that after considering the
entire matter, the facts verified by visits and the documents on
record, Respondent No.1 passed the order dated 8th December, 2017
granting exemption. He has submitted that proper procedure was
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followed, relevant material was taken into consideration and for
valid reasons, the exemption order was passed. He has submitted
that in view thereof, the said exemption order is not liable to be
reviewed by this Court. He has submitted that judicial review is
limited only for finding out whether the process adopted or the
decision made is malafide or arbitrary or irrational or no responsible
authority acting reasonably and in accordance with the relevant law
could have reached. He has submitted that the exemption order is
valid and ought to be sustained in the facts of the case.
26. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that it is contended by the
Petitioner that before passing the exemption order no hearing was
given to the Petitioner. He has submitted that the provisions of
Section 7 of the MCS Act do not provide for any hearing being given.
This is a matter between the Applicant, the Registrar and the
Government. The Petitioner is not concerned with the said
application. As against this, the provisions of Sections 17 and 18
require a hearing to be given before a bifurcation order is passed. He
has submitted that bifurcation Order affects the society which is
bifurcated and therefore there is an express provision for giving
notice of hearing. Thus, the legislature whenever it wanted to
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provide specific notice of hearing to be given, a specific provision to
that effect is made.
27. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the provisions of
Sections 157 are not applicable and it is a general provision. He has
submitted that this case is specifically covered by Section 7 which
provides for exemption from the requirements of Section 6 whenever
a society is to be registered. He has submitted that the special
provision overrides the general provision. He has placed reliance
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board
of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh
Bhupeshkumar Sheth9, paragraph 20. It has been held that it is a well
established doctrine of interpretation that the provisions contained in
a statutory enactment or in the rules / regulations framed thereunder
have to be so construed as to be in harmony with each other and that
where under a specific section or rule a particular subject has
received special treatment, such special provision will exclude the
applicability of any general provision which might otherwise cover
the topic. He has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Managing Director, Chhatisgarh State Co Op. Bank
9 (1984) 4 SCC 27 @ 47.
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Maryadit v. Zila Sahakari Kendrya Bank Maryadit10, at paragraphs 33
to 35 in this context.
28. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that there is no illegality
in the Order. Respondent No.1 has understood correctly the law that
regulates its decision making power and has given effect to it. There
is no irrationality and there is no procedural impropriety.
29. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that judicial review of
administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness,
irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fide. He has in this
context placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa11, paragraph 22.
30. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the exemption order
cannot be faulted. He has submitted that the contention of the
Petitioner that no hearing was given to the Petitioner is also not
sustainable. He has submitted that neither the act or the rules
provide for giving hearing. He has submitted that Section 7 is the
provision specifically dealing with exemption against the provisions 10 (2020) 6 SCC 411 @ Pgs. 42.
11 (2007) 14 SCC 517 @ 531.
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contained in Section 6 which provides for conditions requiring 10
members to be there for registration of a society. He has submitted
that the contention that hearing was not given before passing the
exemption order is totally baseless.
31. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the Petitioner is not
an aggrieved person at all in the present case regarding exemption
under Section 7. He has submitted that the Petitioner has no locus to
challenge the exemption order as it does not pertain to the Petitioner
nor does it affect the Petitioner. It was a matter between the person
who applied for registration of a society and the Government and
therefore, the Petition is liable to be rejected in limine.
32. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the contention of the
Petitioner that the provisions of Section 157 are applicable is also not
correct. The exemption Order is not passed under Section 157 of the
MCS Act but under Section 7 of the MCS Act. The provision
contained in Section 157 are for general application to societies.
Whereas the provisions contained in Section 7 are specific and / or
special provision relating to exemption from conditions of
registration mentioned in Section 6 of the MCS Act. When there is a
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specific provision dealing with a specific situation the general
provisions do not apply.
33. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that there is no merit in
the challenge to the Order of bifurcation under Section 18 of the
MCS Act. He has submitted that there was factually a need for
bifurcation of the societies and he has placed reliance upon the
application for bifurcation which has been preferred by Respondent
Nos.4 to 6. He has submitted that it is a factual position that the
bungalow existed prior to the construction of the building. When the
newly constructed building came into being it was decided to form
one society and only for the sake of convenience, the occupants of
the bungalow decided to joint in the society to basically avail of the
benefit of togetherness. Unfortunately, the members of the bungalow
never got any benefits of the society as received by the members
staying in the building. He has submitted that accordingly request
was addressed by Respondent Nos.4 to 6 calling for general body
meeting of the Petitioner - Society for their consent for bifurcation of
the two societies. It is thereafter that the application was made for
bifurcation under Section 18 on 27th December, 2016. The Petitioner
had by its letter dated 6th February, 2018 raised false contentions.
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34. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the impugned Order
of bifurcation notes that the bungalow and the building have
separate and independent water supply and also separate electric
supply and independent entrances. For the purpose of members, it
recorded that to avoid irregular activities in the management and to
prevent and protect the property and considering the interest of the
members, bifurcation was required. This will also avoid frictions
among the members and the supply of amenities, repairs will be
carried out without complaints.
35. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the impugned Order
of bifurcation is a well reasoned order recording all material facts.
There is no irregularity in procedure as proper hearing has been
given. He has submitted that there is neither illegality nor there is
any irrationality or procedural impropriety. He has submitted that the
impugned order is well reasoned and there is no reason to interfere
with the same. He has accordingly submitted that the Petition is
liable to be dismissed with costs.
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SUBMISSIONS IN WRIT PETITION NO.2936 OF 2022
36. Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar, the learned Counsel appearing
for the Petitioner has submitted that under the provisions of Section
11 of MOFA read with Rules 8 and 9 of MOFA Rules, the Society
could seek directions against the promoter to convey the title of the
property for which the flat purchasers had constituted the society as
per Section 10 of MOFA. He has submitted that in the present case
the Petitioner - Society was incorporated by the flat purchasers in
1988-89. The property was conveyed to the Petitioner society having
22 members under the provision of MOFA after notice to the
promoter and District Deputy Registrar. He has submitted that upon
granting an Order of Deemed Conveyance to the Petitioner society,
the competent authority seized to have any further powers and could
not entertain a second application for the same cause of action at the
instance of a party who was not a society incorporated within the
provisions of Section 10 of MOFA but was infact a representation
made by the two family members who had called for exemption
letter from the State.
37. Mr. Khandeparkar has relied upon the judgment of this
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Court in Vaidehi Akash Housing Pvt. Ltd. v. New D.N. Nagar Co-Op.
Housing Society Union Ltd. and Ors 12, Paragraphs 86-90 in support of
his submission that where a building is constructed by developers, it
cannot be said that such a building was caused to be constructed by
the Society within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the MOFA. Further,
there is no case to treat the society who is merely in the position of
an owner vis-a-vis the third party purchasers, as a 'promoter' within
the meaning of MOFA and foist the obligations of a promoter on the
society in relation to the purchasers.
38. Mr. Khandeparkar has also relied upon the judgment of
this Court in Goregaon Pearl CHS Ltd. v. Dr. Seema Mahadev
Paryekar & Ors13, paragraphs 7 to 9 which has followed the judgment
of this Court in Vaidehi Akash (Supra) and held that the Society is
not to be treated as 'promoter' under RERA as the definition of
'promoter' under RERA is on similar lines as MOFA. In that case it
was held that it is nobody's case that the Appellant society is such
specified promoter in the online registrations. Besides, grievance, if
any, in this behalf must be addressed to the regulatory authority
thereunder and not to a civil court.
12 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 5068.
13 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 3274.
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39. Mr. Khandeparkar has also relied upon the order of the
Division Bench of this Court in Deepak Prabhakar Thakoor v. MHADA
& Ors14. It has been held that third party purchasers would have no
privity of contract with the Society and the Society would in no way
be responsible for any claim made by such purchasers against the
society under their respective agreements for sale.
40. Mr. Khandeparkar has submitted that the bifurcation of
Jay Anand CHS into Jay Anand Bungalow CHS was not done in
accordance with Section 17 and Section 18 of MCS Act, 1960. He has
submitted that assets were not divided as mandated, rendering
subsequent transactions and orders defective.
41. Mr. Khandeparkar has submitted that Deemed
Conveyance once granted by Respondent No.2 against the promoter
could not be reopened on the alleged ground of bifurcation of society
in respect of the very same property which was incorporated under
the PR Card. The proceedings before Respondent No.2 are not
maintainable. Respondent No.2 lacks the authority to exercise any
jurisdiction on any application by any applicant once the Order dated
14 Writ Petition (L) No.1776 of 2023 dated 12th October, 2023.
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27th May, 2016 was passed granting the Deemed Conveyance for the
very same plot (part of the entire plot) to the Petitioner Society.
42. Mr. Khandeparkar has submitted that Section 11 of the
MOFA cannot be used to cure defects in the Order dated 3rd
November, 2018, which failed to comply by the statutory requirement
of division of assets when read with Sections 17 and 18 of the MCS
Act.
43. Mr. Khandeparkar has submitted that subject property on
which Jay Anand Bungalow and building CHSL was constructed and
sold by the promoter, already stood transferred in favour of the
Petitioner society by virtue of the conveyance duly registered. The
Application by Respondent No.3 in the above Writ Petition for
Deemed Conveyance in 2019 is void ab initio. He has submitted that
the provision of Deemed Conveyance is unknown under the Transfer
of Property Act and it is only provided for under MOFA as amended.
He has submitted that the Authority did not have the requisite right
to entertain a second application once a certificate was issued for
unilateral deemed conveyance in favour of Petitioner Society which
was executed, registered and title was transferred in favour of the
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Petitioner Society incorporated by the purchasers who have become
owners and not promoters. He has submitted that the provisions
under Section 11(3) of MOFA would thus not apply.
44. Mr. Khandeparkar has submitted that A and B wings of
the building and bungalow, were interconnected with one another.
He has submitted that it appears that the certificate of architect
issued to Jay Anand Bungalow CHS was fabricated and manipulated.
He has submitted that it is not possible or practical to divide the
property. This despite the fact that Jay Anand Bungalow CHS did not
have minimum requirement of Society members to become a society.
45. Mr. Khandeparkar has submitted that the Deputy
Registrar passed the impugned Order overlooking the order of this
Court in Writ Petition No.478 of 2020.
46. Dr. Tulzapurkar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Respondent No.3 has submitted that the challenge of the
Petitioner to the impugned Deemed Conveyance order dated 5th
November, 2020 under MOFA on the ground that there was already a
Deemed Conveyance in favour of the Petitioner society vide an Order
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passed on 30th March, 2017 and therefore there cannot be a further
order requires to be rejected. He has submitted that the earlier Order
of Deemed Conveyance was passed in respect of the entire property
consisting of plots 88 and 89. The Deemed Conveyance Order dated
5th November, 2020 pertains to plot 88 on which there is a
bungalow. He has submitted that the occupants of the bungalow and
members of the Jay Anand Bungalow CHS are entitled to get
conveyance after bifurcation of the society. The bifurcation having
been done, the members of the new society are entitled to apply for
conveyance.
47. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the contention of the
Petitioner that the said Application for Deemed Conveyance was not
maintainable as the Petitioner society who had already got the larger
property consisting of plot Nos.88 and 89 conveyed by way of
Deemed Conveyance, are not promoters is unsustainable. He has
submitted that the Petitioner is an assignee from the promoter who
was also a party to the said application. Under the definition of
'Promoter' under MOFA, an assignee of the promoter is liable under
Section 11 to convey the property. He has submitted that any other
interpretation results in enabling a dishonest promoter to alienate the
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property to a third party. He has submitted that the definition of
promoter includes an assignee.
48. Dr. Tulzapurkar has placed reliance upon the judgment
in Arunkumar H. Shah, HUF v. Avon Arcade Premises Co Operative
Society Ltd15, in support of his submission that the competent
authority exercises summary power and the parties are at liberty if
aggrieved by the order to file a civil Suit on the basis of title. He has
submitted that the Order of Deemed Conveyance is perfectly valid
and the Petition is liable to be dismissed with compensatory costs.
SUBMISSION IN CONTEMPT PETITION (L) NO.35195 OF 2022
49. Dr. Tulzapurkar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Petitioner in the above Contempt Petition has submitted that
the Respondents have violated Order dated 28th September, 2001
passed in Interim Application No.1953 of 2021 in Writ Petition
No.2936 of 2022. He has submitted that by the said Order both the
parties i.e. Petitioner and Respondents were ordered to maintain
status quo with regard to the land covered by the Deemed
15 (2025) 7 SCC 249.
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Conveyance executed pursuant to Order dated 5th November, 2020.
50. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the Respondents have
committed breach of the said order by creating rights in respect of
property covered by the Deemed Conveyance pursuant to the order
dated 5th November, 2020. The rights are created by entering into a
Development Agreement by Respondent Nos. 1 to 8 in favour of
Respondent No. 9 dated 29th September, 2022.
51. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the Development
Agreement includes the bungalow property covered by the Deemed
Conveyance order which admeasures 330.30 sq. mtrs. (referred to as
the Petitioner's property). He has submitted that the entire property
has been described in the said Development Agreement to consist of
the area of 1309.80 sq. mtrs. The combined property viz. the
adjoining plots of the two cooperative societies are referred to in the
said agreement as the said property. He has submitted that by the
reason of the provisions of the Development Agreement, it is clear
that the Respondents have altered the Petitioner's property which
forms part of the said property and have thus violated the order. He
has placed reliance upon the provisions of the Development
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Agreement.
52. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the Respondent Nos.1
to 8 have created rights in favour of Respondent No.9 in respect of
the Petitioner's property. He has referred to the two Scenarios
described in the Development Agreement. Scenario (1) refers to the
area 1309.80 sq. mtrs i.e. the said property and Scenario (2)
describes the area admeasuring 979.50 sq. mtrs. i.e. the property of
the building and excludes the Petitioner's property. He has submitted
that except for describing the property covered in Scenario 1 and 2,
there is no other provision in the agreement that the agreement does
not cover the Petitioner's property. He has submitted that the
description in Scenario 1 and 2 is only to create a cloud or a ruse to
get out of the order of status quo.
53. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the entire agreement
read as a whole clearly shows that Respondent No.9 by virtue of the
said agreement has become entitled to develop the said property
which includes the Petitioner's property, demolish the structure on
the Petitioner's property, use FSI and all benefits arising from the
Petitioner's property and also mortgage the Petitioner's property.
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Respondent No.1 has further agreed to execute conveyance and
documents for transfer of "the said property" which includes the
Petitioner's property. He has submitted that the said Development
Agreement contains an obligation on the part of the members and
society to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the said
property within 30 days of obtaining IOD by Respondent No.9 to
enable Respondent No.9 to demolish the structures on the said
property for redevelopment. Respondent No.9 becomes entitled to
load TDR FSI on the said property. Respondent No.9 are entitled to
submit plans for development of the said property.
54. Dr. Tulzapurkar has accordingly submitted that there is a
clear violation of the said Order dated 28th September, 2021.
55. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the redevelopment
plan claims incentives as per Table 12 of Regulation 33(7) (B) of the
DCPR, which provides a 50% FSI on rehabilitation component
amounting to 10 sq. mtrs. equal to 107.64 sq. ft. per consenting
member. The Respondent No.9 has based the calculation on 110
members, yielding 1100 Sq. mtrs. of incentive FSI. This includes four
members of the Petitioner. As per the Conveyance Deed of
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Respondent No.1, the total membership comprises 22 members, 18
from Respondent No.1 society and 4 from the Petitioner society.
There are two other societies. He has submitted that inclusion of
additional 10 sq. mtrs. pertaining the Petitioner's property results in
entitlement to a portion of incentive FSI which pertains to the
Petitioner's property. Thus, this clearly shows that the Respondents
have violated the status quo order. Once this FSI pertaining to the
Petitioner's property is dealt with by Respondent No.9, it will cause a
perpetual loss to the Petitioner's Society.
56. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that it is crystal clear that
rights are created after the said order and particularly the premium
has been paid by Respondent No.9 to MCGM on the basis of the
entire property, resulting in the forfeiture of the right to load TDR on
the Petitioner's property in future.
57. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that unless the
Respondents purge themselves of the contempt, they are not entitled
to proceed with the main Petition. He has submitted that as a general
rule, the Respondents are required to clear their contempt before
they can be heard. This is not a case falling in any exceptions to the
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said rule because the order of which violation has taken place is not
sought to be challenged by the Respondents or the Respondents are
not merely defending any proceedings but are seeking assistance
from the court on their own. He has in this context placed reliance on
the judgments of this Court in Extrusion Processes Pvt. Ltd. v.
Goregaon Electrical Industries Pvt. Ltd16, at paragraphs 455, 456, 457
& 458 and Nenshi Monji (Bombay) v. State of Maharashtra 17, at
paragraphs 402, 403 and 404.
58. Dr. Tulzapurkar has submitted that the Respondents are
guilty of violating the Order dated 28th September, 2021 by
breaching the order of status quo and creating rights in favour of
Respondent No.9 who was aware of the said Order. Respondent No.1
is not entitled to proceed with Writ Petition No.478 of 2020 without
purging the contempt and all the Respondents are liable to be dealt
with in accordance with law for the violation of the said Order.
59. Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar has relied upon 'Proforma I" of
the sanctioned plan which is annexed to the Affidavit in Reply of
Respondent No.18. He has submitted that from Proforma I it is clear 16 (LXVII) Bom. L.R. Page 453.
17 2015 (5) Mh.L.J. 397.
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that there is a deduction of 330.30 Sq. mtrs. from the total plot area
prior to calculation of FSI. He has submitted that there is no
utilization of any FSI, TDR, incentive FSI or fungible FSI or any form
of FSI on the area admeasuring 330.30 Sq. mtrs. Thus, there is
compliance with the said Order dated 28th September, 2021 in
maintaining status quo. He has submitted that there is non utilization
of FSI of the status quo area as per Order dated 23rd September,
2021 covered under Conveyance Order dated 5th November, 2020.
60. Mr. Khandeparkar has submitted that scenario 1 and
Scenario 2 are not a cloud. In fact the Index II (Compilation page 1)
categorically records the ambit as of date to the extent of 979.50 sq.
mtrs. is contemplated.
61. Mr. Khandeparkar has submitted that amalgamation of
the plot can never be termed as violation or breaches as what is
granted under Deemed Conveyance Order dated 5th November, 2020
is the undivided portion and in no manner can the amalgamation of
larger plot be termed as breach.
62. Mr. Khandeparkar has accordingly submitted that the
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Contempt Petition be dismissed with costs.
FINDINGS
63. Having considered the submissions in the above two Writ
Petitions and Contempt Petition, since a preliminary objection has
been raised by Dr. Tulzapurkar to the hearing of the Writ Petition
No.478 of 2020 on the ground that the Petitioner is alleged to be
guilty of violating the order dated 28th September, 2021 i.e. by
breaching the order of status quo and creating rights in favour of
Respondent No.9 by entering into Development Agreement which
covers the property of the Jay Anand Bungalow CHS, it would be
pertinent to first deal with this preliminary objection.
64. I have perused the Recitals as well as the relevant
Clauses of the Development Agreement. Recital (O) specifically
discloses the status quo order dated 28th September, 2021 and
Clause (6) (a) though referring to the entire property admeasuring
1309.80 Sq. ft. mentions Scenarios (1) and (2) i.e. in Clause 6(b)
and 6(c) respectively. It is provided in Clause 6(c) that Scenario 2 is
applicable in view of the status quo order and the entitlement of the
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developer is only restricted to the extent of 979.50 Sq. mtrs. This can
be read with the clause 6(d) which defines the said property ("entire
property") and provides that currently Scenario 2 shall be applicable
where the development rights of the Developer are restricted to the
extent of 979.50 sq. mtrs. (excluding the portion of 330.30 sq. mtrs.
pursuant to Order dated 28th September, 2021). Further clause 6(h)
defines the total Constructible Area, where Scenario 2 of the said
property is applicable and FSI available on 979.50 Sq. mtrs. is
claimed. Clause 6(m) defines total saleable area which shall be
constructed on utilization of FSI that is available on 979.50 Sq. mtrs.
only. Further, Clause 32 grants development rights in respect of the
said property which allows the developer to only utilize FSI available
on 979.50 Sq. mtrs. Schedule II of Development Agreement
specifically talks about Scenario 2 where the Development rights are
also restricted to the extent of 979.50 Sq. mtrs. Further, Proforma I of
the sanctioned plan shows deduction of 330.30 sq. mtrs. from the
total plot area prior to calculation of FSI. Thus, by entering into the
Development Agreement the Petitioner cannot be said to have
violated the status quo Order dated 28th September, 2021.
65. Having arrived at a finding that there is no violation of
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the status quo Order dated 28th September, 2021. I then proceed to
consider the challenge to the exemption order and bifurcation order
in Writ Petition No.478 of 2020 as well as the challenge to the Order
of Deemed Conveyance in favour of Jay Anand Bungalow CHS in
Writ Petition No.2936 of 2022.
66. The Ministry of Cooperation and Industry, Government
of Maharashtra had granted exemption for formation of new society
to Respondent No.4 under Section 7 of the MCS Act vide exemption
Order dated 8th December, 2017. However, from the plain language
of this section, it provides for registration of a new society. In the
present case, the Petitioner Society had already been granted a
Deemed Conveyance on 27th May, 2016. Thus, the Petitioner Society
was already an existing society to whom the Deemed Conveyance
had been granted. The exemption order is the pre-requisite for
granting the bifurcation order and unless the exemption to form the
society had been granted, there could have been no bifurcation of the
Petitioner Society. I find much merit in the submission of Mr.
Samdhani on behalf of the Petitioner that Section 157 of the MCS Act
is applied on an existing society in the interest of members of 'such
society'. Whereas Sections 6 and 7 of the MCS Act fall under Chapter
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II which governs registration of a society and hence would have no
application in cases where the society is already registered, as in the
present case.
67. Thus, in my considered view the exemption could, if at
all, have been granted under Section 157 of the MCS Act which is a
specific provision for an existing society. Under the said Section, the
Petitioner was required to be heard prior to the passing of the
impugned Order of exemption. The Respondent Nos.4 to 6 have
admitted that the impugned Order was passed without granting
personal hearing to the Petitioner on the ground as stated by them,
namely that the order passed is "Ministerial Function". This in my
view is stated to be rejected. The exemption Order having formed the
basis of the bifurcation order, the Petitioner was necessarily required
to be heard. Section 157 of the MCS Act provides, "...provided that,
no order to the prejudice of any society shall be passed, without an
opportunity being given to such society to represent its case." The
principles of Audi alteram partem are necessarily required to be
followed as has been held by the Supreme Court in State Bank of
India & Ors. v. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors. (Supra).
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68. Accordingly, the exemption order having been passed
without granting an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner, is in
violation of the principles of natural justice and hence on this ground
alone requires to be set aside.
69. On merits of the exemption order, also, the Notification
dated 10th March, 1995 for exemption from minimum 10 members
for registration of a cooperative housing society has not been
complied with. The two conditions viz. (i) Plinth area of each flat
should not be more than 700 Sq. ft., (ii) no balance FSI should be
available for utilization at the time of formation of society have also
not been met. This in view of bungalow structure in existence
comprising of single tenement on ground floor, one tenement on first
floor, both more than 900 sq. ft. in carpet area. Further, there being
12.10 sq. ft. of FSI still available for utilization at the time of
formation of the society. For this reason too the impugned Order of
exemption is liable to be set aside.
70. Further, explanation to Section 6 of the MCS Act was
required to be taken into consideration and which provided that
"member of a family means a wife, husband, father, mother, son or
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unmarried daughter". The bungalow has only two families i.e. Patel
family and Joshi family. The Report of Commissioner of Cooperative
Society had incorrectly recorded there were three members. Even
otherwise, the said Report opines that in light of only 3 members
incorporation of the proposed society was not proper. This Report has
been ignored and no reasons for departure are recorded in the
impugned Order. The impugned Order of exemption is thus in
violation of Section 6 of the MCS Act.
71. In view of the exemption order being contrary to law the
bifurcation of the Petitioner society could never have been granted. It
is provided in Section 18 of the MCS Act read with Section 17 of the
MCS Act that a bifurcation can only be a general body resolution of
3/4th of the members, unless, in exceptional cases it is in 'public
interest' or 'in the interest of members' (plural / majority) and not
miniscule minority. This has been held by the Supreme Court in
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. (Supra). I find from the facts of
the present case that it does not fall within the defined criteria of
'public interest' or in the 'interest of members' as it is not in larger
interest of members apart from the majority of the members having
opposed bifurcation. Further, the judgment relied upon by the
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Petitioner viz. Bombay Catholic CHS Ltd. (Supra) is apposite.
72. I do not find any merit in the preliminary objection
raised by Dr. Tulzapurkar namely that the Petitioner has preferred an
Appeal under Section 152 of the MCS Act and thus cannot avail the
concurrent remedy. The impugned Order of exemption being under
Section 7 of the MCS Act, is not appellable and hence writ is
appropriate remedy. Further, as held above the impugned Order is ex-
facie without jurisdiction, arbitrary and / or passed in breach of
principles of natural justice and hence in any event writ is the only
appropriate remedy.
73. The impugned bifurcation order is not made in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 18 read
with Section 17 of the MCS Act and Rule 17 of the MCS Rules,
particularly since there is absence of draft scheme prepared prior to
consultation with the Federation. The opinion of the federation is
based on the exemption order under Section 7 and as held, the
exemption order is required to be set aside.
74. Accordingly, the impugned exemption order dated 8th
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December, 2017 and impugned bifurcation Order dated 3rd
November, 2018 are quashed and set aside. Writ Petition No.478 of
2020 is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a).
75. In so far as the order of Deemed Conveyance dated 5th
November, 2020 passed by the Deputy Registrar, CS, Dadar, Mumbai
which has been impugned in Writ Petition No.2936 of 2022 is
concerned, I find much merit in the submissions of Mr. Mayur
Khandeparkar that Section 11 (3) of the MOFA cannot apply where
in the present case, the Petitioner Society has already been granted
Deemed Conveyance and by virtue of which the competent authority
seized to have any further powers and could not have entertained a
second application for Deemed Conveyance by a party who was not a
society incorporated under Section 10 of MOFA.
76. Having held that the exemption order as well as
bifurcation order are set aside, the resultant Deemed Conveyance
order itself is required to be set aside. Section 11 of MOFA cannot be
used to cure defects in the bifurcation order dated 3rd November,
2018 which has failed to comply with the statutory requirement of
division of assets.
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77. In view thereof, Writ Petition No.2936 of 2022 is also
made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a).
78. The Contempt Petition and Writ Petitions are accordingly
disposed of.
79. Interim Application No.1953 of 2021 does not survive
and is also disposed of accordingly.
[ R.I. CHAGLA J. ]
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