[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Kachru Rakmaji Bhosale vs The Sub-Divisional Officer Cum Land ... on 27 February, 2026
2026:BHC-AUG:10075
1 fa 1328.24 corrected
"Corrected copy"
Corrections have been carried out in view of speaking
to minutes order dated 07.03.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1328 OF 2024
Geetabai Eknath Salunke
Since deceased through her L.Rs.
Gayabai @ Leelabai Popatro Gaikwad
and another .. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another ..Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri N. D. Raje, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1329 OF 2024
Tukaram Sakharam
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Walmik Tukaram Bornare .. Appellant
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. N. Morampalle, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
2 fa 1328.24 corrected
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1330 OF 2024
Pandurang Devrao Shete .. Appellant
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. V. Hange, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1331 OF 2024
Kamlabai Rakhibdas Sancheti .. Appellant
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri N. D. Raje, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Mrs. Sarita Gaiikwad, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1332 OF 2024
Nivrutti Govind Salunke
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Balu Nivrutti Salunke and others .. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
3 fa 1328.24 corrected
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. N. Morampalle, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1333 OF 2024
Popat Dhupaji Bhosale .. Appellant
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. V. Hange, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1359 OF 2024
Kachru Rakmaji Bhosale .. Appellant
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri N. D. Raje, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1361 OF 2024
4 fa 1328.24 corrected
Sakhahri Bhavani
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Radhabai S. Salunke died through
L.Rs. Valmik Sakhahari Salunke
and another .. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. N. Morampalle, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri B. V. Virdhe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1362 OF 2024
Raghunath Gopinath
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Dattu Raghunath Shete and others .. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. V. Hange, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri B. V. Virdhe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1367 OF 2024
Udhamsingh Jaywantsingh
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Gokulsingh Udhamsing died through
5 fa 1328.24 corrected
L.Rs. Jaya G. Rajput and others .. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri N. D. Raje, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1368 OF 2024
Shivaji Pandurang Bhosale and another .. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. N. Morampalle, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1369 OF 2024
Jagannath Shamrao
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Zumbarabai Jagannath Salunke
and others .. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
6 fa 1328.24 corrected
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. V. Hange, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri B. V. Virdhe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1370 OF 2024
Gopal Bhika Salunke
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Karbhari Gopal Salunke .. Appellant
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri N. D. Raje, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 2590 OF 2024
Dwarkadas Maniklal
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Tulsidas Dwarkadas Ashar and others .. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Yogesh D. Kale, Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. N. Morampalle, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Shri Rahul A. Tambe, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
AND
FIRST APPEAL NO. 2873 OF 2024
7 fa 1328.24 corrected
Govind Narayan Bhosale
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Bhagirathibai Govind Bhosale and others.. Appellants
Versus
The Sub Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, Vaijapur
and another .. Respondents
Shri Anand P. Bhandari, Advocate a/w Shri Akash Nahar,
Rushikesh Lone, Rushikesh Totla, i/by Shri S. S. Karanne,
Advocate for the Appellants.
Shri S. V. Hange, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.
Mrs. Sarita Gaikwad, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.
CORAM : SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.
CLOSED FOR ORDER ON : 03.02.2026
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON : 27.02.2026
FINAL ORDER :
. Taken up for final disposal with the consent of the
parties.
2. This Court is called upon to answer following issues.
(i) Whether the claimants are entitled to receive the
compensation exceeding the compensation awarded by
the Court relying upon which the recourse is taken to
Sec. 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act ?
(ii) Whether the claimant taking recourse to
redetermination U/Sec. 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act
is entitled to receive compensation for factors other
8 fa 1328.24 corrected
than land viz trees, structure, pipeline which were not
subject matter of the compensation awarded by the
Reference Court upon which reliance is sought for ?
3. These appeals are preferred for enhancement of the
compensation by challenging judgment and award passed by
the Reference Court in the respective references. They are
emanating from proceedings U/Sec. 28-A of the Land
Acquisition Act (for the sake of brevity and convenience
hereinafter referred to as Act). The location of the lands, area
under acquisition, the dates for notifications and the purpose
for acquisition are not in dispute.
4. In all the matters appellants are claiming that the lands
be treated as irrigated lands, whereas, the Special Land
Acquisition Officer and the Reference Court treated them as
dry lands. Appeals are classified into following four groups
considering the nature of the challenge and enhancement.
Group I : Enhancement due to change in classification
from dry land to irrigated land.
Group II : Enhancement due to additional
compensation for trees, wells and structures.
5. In all the appeals the notification U/Sec. 4 Act was
issued on 03.12.1986 and award was passed on 22.11.1990,
which are common. The rate of Rs. 370/- per R was offered.
No compensation was awarded for well, structure or the fruit
bearing trees existing in the acquired lands. Appellants did
9 fa 1328.24 corrected
not prefer to challenge the rates offered by the S. L. A. O. by
resorting to Sec. 18 Act.
6. Arising out of self same notification and award referred
above, L. A. R. No. 10 of 2013 (Old L. A. R. No. 396 of 1993)
was preferred by Hiralal Kishansingh Rajput. The Reference
Court in that matter fixed the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per R for dry
land and Rs. 2,250/- per R for seasonal irrigated land vide
judgment dated 25.06.2015. The land was treated to be dry
land. It was not having trees, wells and the structures. The
rates awarded by above referred judgments are treated to be
foundation for the appellants to approach the Collector U/Sec.
28-A Act, which is referred to "Foundational Award" hereafter.
7. The appellants approached the S. L. A. O. U/Sec. 28-A
and claimed compensation more than the rate fixed in the
Foundational Award. The compensation for well, structure
and the trees are also claimed. The Collector considering the
Foundational Award fixed the rate within the range of Rs.
1,414/- to 1,715/- per R, treating all lands as dry lands. The
claim for wells, structure and trees have been denied. Such
award was passed on 11.09.2018.
8. Appellants preferred to go before the Reference Court
being unsatisfied by the rates fixed by the Collector by
resorting to Sec. 28-A(3). The Reference Court dismissed their
claim by the impugned judgment holding that the appellants
10 fa 1328.24 corrected
are not entitled to claim anything exceeding the rate fixed by
the Foundational Award.
9. Learned counsel Mr. Anand Bhandari appearing for the
appellants submits that the appellants are not only entitled to
enhancement exceeding the rates fixed in the Foundational
Award, but also entitled to separate compensation for wells,
structure and trees. It is submitted that award passed U/Sec.
28-A is at par with the award U/Sec. 18 and redetermination
would encompass enhancement on all counts. It is further
submitted that literal and purposive interpretation need to be
adopted for granting enhancement to the appellants on
account of classification of land as well as compensation for the
objects other than the land. It is submitted that the
legislature has not imposed any restriction for conducting
redetermination U/Sec. 28-A. The Reference Court has
adopted a conservative approach in denying the enhancement
by restricting the inquiry to the extent of market value fixed
by Foundational Award. It is further submitted that Sec. 28-
A(3) permits the Court to apply Sections 18 to 28 for
determining appropriate compensation and the inquiry cannot
be restricted to the extent of market value only.
10. Mr. Bhandari would submit that the Reference Court
committed error of jurisdiction in misinterpreting the law laid
down by the Supreme Court in the matter of V. Ramkrushna Rao
Vs. The Singareni Colleries Co. Ltd. and others reported in (2010) 10 SCC
11 fa 1328.24 corrected
650. It is submitted that in all the appeals tangible material is
placed on record to show that lands are irrigated, which is
overlooked by the Reference Court. The valuation reports
produced on record are admissible in evidence, which would
support claim of enhancement of the compensation. It is
submitted that Reference Court arbitrarily denied the
legitimate benefits to the appellants.
11. Mr. Rahul Tambe, learned counsel for the acquiring body
vehemently submits that the redetermination of the
compensation under Section 28-A does not mean re-opening of
everything. It is not an appeal against award of the S.L.A.O.
passed under Section 11 or judgment and award of the Court
under Section 18 of the Act. He would submit that the purport
of Section 28-A is very limited to remove the discrepancy for
those persons who could not prefer reference or appeal against
the price offered by S.L.A.O. and to bring them at part with
the similarly situated persons getting benefit of enhancement.
It is submitted that Supreme Court in the matter of V.
Ramkrishnarao Vs. The Singareni Colliries Co. Ltd. and others reported in
(2010) 10 SCC 650 in its paragraph No. 15 has imposed
restrictions which are rightly followed in the impugned
judgment. It is further submitted that if Section 28-A is
interpreted in permitting the land owners to have
enhancement for everything and for claiming more amount
than the Foundational Award then that would be against the
very intention of the legislation.
12 fa 1328.24 corrected
12. Mr. Virdhe, learned counsel for the acquiring body in few
of the appeals would submit that Section 28-A restricts inquiry
to the extent of determination of the compensation on the basis
of Foundational Award and any determination regarding
change of classification of the land is impermissible. It is
vehemently submitted that it would be abuse of power to claim
compensation for trees, well and structure under Section 28-A
which was not subject matter of Foundational Award.
13. Ms. Gaikwad appearing for the respondent/acquiring
body adopts the submissions of Mr. Tambe and Mr. Virdhe.
14. Before I proceed to analyze the submissions of the
parties in the wake of the provisions of law and various
judgments cited at the bar, it would be proper to note the
provision of redetermination of the compensation under the
Act which is as follows :
THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894
1. ....
2. ....
[28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the
basis of the award of the Court. - (1) where in an award under
this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector
under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land
covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section
(1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector
13 fa 1328.24 corrected
may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to
the Collector under section 18, by written application to the
Collector within three months from the date of the award of the
Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them
may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of
compensation awarded by the court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months
within which an application to the Collector shall be made
under this sub-section, the day on which the award was
pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under
sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the
persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of
being heard, and make an award determining the amount of
compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-
section (2) may, by written application to the Collector,
required that the matter be referred by the Collector for the
determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to
28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply
to a reference under section 18.]
15. The legislature has employed words "redetermination"
and "compensation" in Sec. 28-A of Act. These words carry
specific meaning and purport. The rates in the Foundational
Award is treated to be additional evidence to have the
compensation redetermined U/Sec. 28-A(1). The Collector has
to apply mind to the facts of the case and adjudicate afresh.
The word compensation is referable to Sec. 23. The
constituent factors of the compensation are enumerated in Sec.
23. One of vital components is market value of the land
14 fa 1328.24 corrected
prevalent at the date of publication of the notification U/Sec.
4(1) of the Act. The word market value has not been used in
the section concerned. It is not the intention of the legislature
to provide market value to the inarticulate and poor land
owner who is unable to approach the Reference Court, when he
takes recourse for redetermination of the compensation U/Sec.
28-A.
16. The difference between the market value and the
compensation is dealt with by three Judges Bench in the
matter of Union of India Vs. Shri Ram Mehar and another reported in
AIR 1973 SC 305.
17. I do not find that any restrictions can be read in the
powers exercisable by the Collector U/Sec. 28-A(1) or by the
Court U/Sec. 28-A(3) of the Act so as to restrict the
compensation to the rate of Foundational Award. For that
purpose it is necessary to look into the object and intention of
the legislature. It would be profitable to refer to the judgment
of Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of
Union of India Vs. Pradeep Kumari and others reported in (1995) 2 SCC
736. In that case the issue before the Apex Court was in
respect of computation of period of three months for making
application U/Sec. 28-A and as to whether the first award after
coming into force of Sec. 28-A or any subsequent award can be
read into Sec. 28-A. It is relevant to reproduce the following
paragraphs.
15 fa 1328.24 corrected
8. We may, at the outset, state that having regard to the
Statement of Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier, the object
underlying the enactment of Section 28-A is to remove inequality
in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality of
land arising on account of inarticulate and poor people not being
able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court
under Section 18 of the Act. This is sought to be achieved by
providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is
covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once
any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher
compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the
Act. Section 28-A is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent
provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the
inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of
right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. In
relation to beneficent legislation, the law is well-settled that while
construing the provisions of such a legislation the court should
adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation
to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the
effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of
Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view the
object underlying the said provision.
9. A perusal of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of
Section 28-A of the Act would show that after an award is made
under Part III whereby the court allows to the applicant any
amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the
Collector under Section 11, a right accrues to a person interested in
the other land covered by the same notification under sub-section
(1) of Section 4 who is also aggrieved by the award of the
Collector but who had not made an application to the Collector
under Section 18, to move an application before the Collector for
redetermination of the amount of compensation payable to him on
the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court.
This application for redetermination of the compensation is
required to be made within three months from the date of the
award of the court. The right to make the application under Section
28-A arises from the award of the court on the basis of which the
person making the application is seeking redetermination of the
16 fa 1328.24 corrected
compensation. There is nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A
to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award
that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-
A. By construing the expression "where in an award under this
Part" in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A to mean "where in the first
award made by the court under this Part", the word 'first', which is
not found in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A, is being read therein
and thereby the amplitude of the said provision is being curtailed
so as to restrict the benefit conferred by it. In the matter of
construction of a beneficent provision it is not permissible by
judicial interpretation to read words which are not there and
thereby restrict the scope of the said provision. (See : Jnan Ranjan
Sen Gupta v. Arun Kumar Bose.)
10. It is possible to visualise a situation where in the first award
that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-
A the enhancement in the amount of compensation by the said
award is not very significant for the reason that the person who
sought the reference was not able to produce adequate evidence in
support of his claim and in another reference where the award was
made by the court subsequently such evidence is produced before
the court and a much higher amount is awarded as compensation in
the said award. By restricting the benefit of Section 28-A to the
first award that is made by the court after the coming into force of
Section 28-A the benefit of higher amount of compensation on the
basis of the subsequent award made by the court would be denied
to the persons invoking Section 28-A and the benefit of the said
provision would be confined to redetermination of compensation
on the basis of lesser amount of compensation awarded under the
first award that is made after the coming into force of Section 28-
A. There is nothing in the wordings of Section 28-A to indicate
that the legislature intended to confer such a limited benefit under
Section 28-A. Similarly, there may be a situation, as in the present
case, where the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act covers
lands falling in different villages and a number of references at the
instance of persons having lands in different villages were pending
in the court on the date of coming into force of Section 28-A and
awards in those references are made by the court on different
dates. A person who is entitled to apply under Section 28-A
belonging to a particular village may come to know of the first
17 fa 1328.24 corrected
award that is made by the court after the coming into force of
Section 28-A in a reference at the instance of a person belonging to
another village, after the expiry of the period of three months from
the date of the said award but he may come to know of the
subsequent award that is made by the court in the reference at the
instance of a person belonging to the same village before the
expiry of the period of three months from the date of the said
award. This is more likely to happen in the cases of inarticulate
and poor people who cannot be expected to keep track of all the
references that were pending in court on the date of coming into
force of Section 28-A and may not be in a position to know, in
time, about the first award that is made by the court after the
coming into force of Section 28-A. By holding that the award
referred to in Section 28-A(1) is the first award made after the
coming into force of Section 28-A, such persons would be
deprived of the benefit extended by Section 28-A. Such a
construction would thus result in perpetuating the inequality in the
payment of compensation which the legislature wanted to remove
by enacting Section 28-A. The object underlying Section 28-A
would be better achieved by giving the expression "an award" in
Section 28-A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is
made by the court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force
of Section 28-A. If the said expression in Section 28-A(1) is thus
construed, a person would be able to seek redetermination of the
amount of compensation payable to him provided the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i ) An award has been made by the court under Part III after the
coming into force of Section 28-A;
(ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of
the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been
allowed to the applicant in that reference;
(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is
interested in other land covered by the same notification
under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;
(iv) The person moving the application did not make an
application to the Collector under Section 18;
(v) The application is moved within three months from the date
of the award on the basis of which the redetermination of
18 fa 1328.24 corrected
amount of compensation is sought; and
(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A for
redetermination of compensation by an applicant.
18. Another issue dealt in the same matter was applicability
of interest payable U/Sec. 28 to the compensation
redetermined U/Sec. 28-A. In that context following
observations are recorded.
14. Shri Goswamy has next contended that while redetermining
the amount of compensation under Section 28-A it is not
permissible for the Collector to award interest on the additional
amount of compensation awarded by him for the reason that
under Section 28 of the Act only the court can direct payment of
interest on the excess amount awarded as compensation and no
such power is conferred on the Collector and, therefore, interest
cannot be awarded by the Collector on the additional amount of
compensation determined under Section 28-A. It is no doubt true
that under Section 28 only the court can direct payment of interest
on the excess amount awarded as compensation and the Collector
is not competent to award interest on the additional amount of
compensation under the said provision. But sub-section (2) of
Section 28-A provides that after an application has been
submitted under sub-section (1) of Section 28-A the Collector
after conducting an inquiry makes an award determining the
amount of compensation payable to the applicants and under sub-
section (3) of Section 28-A any person who has not accepted the
award under sub-section (2) may move the Collector requiring
that the matter be referred for determination to the court and the
provisions of Sections 18 to 28 have been made applicable to
such reference. This would show that after an application has
been submitted under Section 28-A(1) for redetermination of the
amount of compensation the process of such redetermination
results in making of an award by the Collector and a person not
accepting the said award can move the Collector to refer the
matter to the court for determination and such reference is
governed by Sections 18 to 28. If that is so, Section 34 of the Act
19 fa 1328.24 corrected
would be applicable to the award that is made by the Collector
under sub-section (2) of Section 28-A and it would be permissible
for him to award interest under Section 34 on the additional
amount of compensation awarded by him. The second contention
urged by Shri Goswamy is, therefore, rejected.
It is clear from the above decision that Sec. 28-A is
beneficial legislation and its purport would be to remove the
discrepancy and to bring inarticulate and poor litigant at par
with the land owner getting reasonable compensation who is
covered by the same notification. The Apex Court in clear
words held that the words first award cannot be read into Sec.
28-A of the Act. In the present matter also learned counsel
Mr. Anand Bhandari is urging that no fetters can be read to
the powers of redetermination given to the Collector or the
Court U/Sec. 28-A.
19. As the interpretation of Sec. 28-A has fallen for
consideration, it is useful to refer to the Five Judges Bench of
the Supreme Court in matter of Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devi and
others reported in (2002) 7 SCC 273. The Bench was considering
two questions and out of them following are the most relevant :
"1. (a) Whether dismissal of an application seeking reference
under Section 18 on the ground of delay amounts to " not filing
an application" within the meaning of Section 28-A of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
(b) Whether a person whose application under Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is dismissed on the ground of
delay or any other technical ground is entitled to maintain an
application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act?"
20 fa 1328.24 corrected
20. The Apex Court dealt with the principles of
interpretation in the following manner :
4. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the
correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to
bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of statute. The
rule stated by Tindal, CJ in Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 Cl &
F.85, still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect:
"If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and
unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to
expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.
The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare
the intent of the lawgiver."
It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court
must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be
open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the
ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged
object and policy of the Act.
In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd, [1955] 2 All ER 345, Lord
Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning of "ambiguous' and held
that "provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word
which in different context is capable of different meanings and it
would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which
does not contain such a word. A provision is, in my judgment,
ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in that
particular context is capable of having more than one meaning." It is
no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of the
language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and
absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for which the
statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which
would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, CJ in the
case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] SCR 1, had
held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside
words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have
appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the
21 fa 1328.24 corrected
contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway, Light Heat and
Power Co. v. Vandray, AIR (1920) PC 181, it had been observed
that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say
anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to
the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons.
Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are
not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the
statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to
repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with
certainty that these words would have been inserted by the
draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been
drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At
times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the
unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the
statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in
such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the
surplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind
the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of the
Section 28-A of the Act, to answer the questions referred to us by
the Bench of the two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the
object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a
reference, who might have not made a reference earlier under
Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a
reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of
delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land
Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the
reference is answered. But the Parliament having enacted Section
28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a
literal interpretation is given to the expression "had not made an
application to the Collector under Section 18" in Section 28-A of
the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the land-owner
has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that
reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be
permissible for a land owner to make a reference and get it
answered and then subsequently make another application when
some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher
amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumari's case the three learned Judges,
while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an
application under Section 28-A can be moved, had categorically
stated -"the person moving the application did not make an
22 fa 1328.24 corrected
application to the Collector under Section 18". The expression "did
not make an application", as observed by this Court, would mean,
did not make an effective application which had been entertained by
making the reference and the reference was answered. When an
application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of
limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that
would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently
the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference
being answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot
be denied. We, accordingly answer question No. l(a) by holding that
the dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18
on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application
within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894.
21. Thus in the above judgment it is made clear by the Apex
Court that if the language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous then the Court must give effect to the words
used in the statute and it would not be open to the Courts to
adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such a
construction is more consistent with the alleged object and
policy of the Act. The purposive interpretation needs to be
adopted. It is profitable to refer to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. and others, etc.
Vs. State of Orissa and others reported AIR 1987 SC 1454 to highlight
the cardinal principle that the legislature does not use the
words unnecessarily. Following are the relevant observations.
"09. In considering the rival submissions of the learned counsel
and in defining and construing the area and the content of the Act
and its provisions, it is necessary to make certain general
observations regarding the interpretation of statutes. A statute is
best understood if we know the reason for it. The reason for a
statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a
23 fa 1328.24 corrected
statute take their colour from the reason for it. How do we
discover the reason for a statute? There are external and internal
aids. The external aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons
when the Bill is presented to Parliament, the reports of Commit-
tees which preceded the Bill and the reports of Parliamentary
Committees. Occasional excursions into the debates of Parliament
are permitted. Internal aids are the preamble, the scheme and the
provisions of the Act. Having discovered the reason for the statute
and so having set the sail to the wind, the interpreter may proceed
ahead. No provision in the statute and no word of the statute may
be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be
looked at generally before any provision or word is attempted to
be construed. The setting and the pattern are important. It is again
important to remember that Parliament does not waste its breath
unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not expected to use
unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also not expected to
express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any
word without meaning something, Parliament does not legislate
where no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to
legislate for the sake of legislation, nor can it be assumed to make
pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge in legislation
merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is
already validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to legislate
unnecessarily. Again, while the words of an enactment are
important, the context is no less important. For instance, "the fact
that general words are used in a statute is not in itself a conclusive
reason why every case falling literally within them should be
governed by that statute, and the context of any Act may well
indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive
meaning" (See Halsbury, 4th Edn. Vol. 44 para 874)."
22. Mr. Anand Bhandari learned advocate has relied on the
judgment of Banwari and others Vs. Haryana State Industrial and
Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. and others reported in
AIROnline 2024 SC 841, in which inter alia reliance is placed
upon the ratio of Union of India Vs. Pradeep Kumari and others
(supra). Following is the relevant paragraph of Banwari.
24 fa 1328.24 corrected
24. As already discussed hereinabove, the provisions of Section 28-
A(1) of the 1894 Act have been elaborately considered by a three
Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari and
Others (supra). In the said case, it has been held that the Statement
of Objects and Reasons of Section 28-A would reveal that the object
underlying the enactment of the said provision is to remove
inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar
quality of land. It has been held that the said provision is for giving
benefit to inarticulate and poor people not being able to take
advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section
18 of the Act. It has been held that this is sought to be achieved by
providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is
covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any of
them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from
the reference court under Section 18 of the Act. The same benefit
would be available to the other landholders under Section 28-A. It
has been held that Section 28-A being a beneficent legislation
enacted in order to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people, the
principle of interpretation which would be required to be adopted is
the one which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the
benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing
the benefit conferred by it.
23. While upholding the legislative intent and interpreting
Sec. 28-A, the Supreme Court reiterated that Sec. 28-A is a
beneficial legislation and the principles of interpretation which
would be required to be adopted is the one which advances the
policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather the
construction which has the effect of curtailing benefit.
24. Further reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Bombay High Court in the matter of Maharashtra Krishna Valley
Development Corporation Solapur Vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in
AIR 2014 Bombay 74 following are the relevant extracts :
25 fa 1328.24 corrected
11. The object of 28-A seems to be to help a person interested,
who for the various reasons was unable to file an application for
Reference under Section 18 of the said Act. The object seems to be
to pay the compensation to the person interested to which in law he
was entitled by way of an award under Section 11 of the said Act.
The object is to pay compensation to him to which he was
legitimately entitled to on the date of passing an award under
Section 11 of the said Act. If Sub Sections (2) and (3) of Section
28-A are read together, it appears that an Award under Sub section
(2) is on par with an Award under Section 11 of the said Act in so
far as the provisions of reference under Section 18 of the said Act
are concerned. Once an Award under Sub-section (2) of Section
28A is made, it replaces an Award under Section 11 for all purposes
as it becomes an offer of the Appropriate Government.
12. Thus, Award made by the Collector under subsection 2 of
section 28-A of the said Act is on par with the Award made under
section 11 of the said Act in as much as the offer made by the
original Award under section 11 of the said Act in relation to a
person interested who makes an application under sub-section 1 of
section 28-A is substituted by an Award made under sub-section 2
of section 28-A. The effect of making an award under sub-section 2
of section 28-A offering additional compensation is that the
Appropriate Government accepts that the compensation offered by
the Award under section 11 was not adequate. Under sub-section 3
of section 28-A, a remedy is provided to a person who has not
accepted the Award under sub-section 2 of section 28-A to apply
for a reference to the Court. Once such application is made, for all
purposes, it becomes an application under sub-section (1) of section
18 of the said Act and it will be governed by the provisions of
sections 18 to 28 of the said Act. For all purposes including for the
purpose of a reference under section 18, an under subsection 2 of
section 28-A granting enhancement becomes an Award under
section 11. The submission of the learned AGP as well as the
learned counsel for the petitioner was that sub-section 1 of section
28- A does not make a specific reference to the Award made on a
reference under sub-section 3 of section 28-A. In fact, sub-section
1 of section 28-A provides that "Where in an award under this
Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation
26 fa 1328.24 corrected
in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section
11", a person aggrieved may apply for redetermination of
compensation. Sub-section 1 applies when the Award of the Court
allows the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the
amount awarded by the Collector by an Award under section 11 of
the said Act. The Award made on a reference under sub-section 3
of section 28-A of the said Act will be an Award of the Court under
part III which is specifically referred to in subsection 1 of section
28-A of the said Act. Thus, when such Award of the Court allows
an amount in excess of the amount provided in the Award under
section 11, an application under sub-section 1 of section 28 will
lie. Thus, an application will lie under said sub-section even on the
basis of the Award made by the Court on a reference made in
accordance with sub-section 3 of section 28-A of the said Act.
Therefore, the first submission made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner has no merit.
25. My attention is also adverted to Sub Sec. 3 of Sec. 28-A,
which stipulates that for the determination of the
compensation the provisions of Sec. 18 to 28 of Act are made
applicable. Section 23 provides for various factors on the
basis of which compensation would be determined. There is no
difference between the award U/Sec. 11 and award U/Sec. 28-
A(1) as well as award of the Court U/Sec. 18 and that of U/Sec.
28-A(3).
26. The learned counsel Mr. Bhandari as well as learned
advocate Mr. Tambe appearing for the respondent have
adverted my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court
in the matter of V. Ramkrishnarao Vs. The Singareni Colliries Co. Ltd.
and others (supra). The precise issue as to whether the Collector
or the Court U/Sec. 28-A of the Act is empowered to grant
27 fa 1328.24 corrected
compensation exceeding the compensation awarded in
Foundational Award was not fallen for determination directly.
The following observations are made by the Apex Court :
11. If sub-section (3) of Section 28A is interpreted keeping in
view the object sought to be achieved by enacting the provision for
removing inequality in the matter of payment of compensation, it
must be held that a person who is not satisfied with an award made
under Section 28A(2) can make an application to the Collector
under Section 28A(3) for making a reference to the Court as defined
in Section 3(d) of the Act and this right cannot be frustrated merely
because as a result of re-determination made under Section 28A(2)
read with Section 28A(1) the applicant becomes entitled to receive
compensation at par with other land owners. There is nothing in the
plain language of Section 28A(3) from which it can be inferred that
a person who has not accepted the award made under Section
28A(2) is precluded from making an application to the Collector
with the request to refer the matter to the Court. Of course, the
Court to which reference is made under Section 28A(3) will have to
bear in mind that a person who has not sought reference under
Section 18 cannot get compensation higher than the one payable to
those who had sought reference under that section.
27. Learned advocate Mr. Rahul Tambe has placed reliance
on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of
India Vs. Munsiram (Dead) by L.Rs. and others reported in (2006) 4 SCC
538 for the following proposition.
9. We hold that under Section 28A of the Act, the
compensation payable to the applicants is the same which is finally
payable to those claimants who sought reference under Section 18
of the Act. In case of reduction of compensation by superior courts,
the applicants under Section 28A may be directed to refund the
excess amount received by them in the light of reduced
compensation finally awarded.
28 fa 1328.24 corrected
28. Further reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the matter of Kendriya Karmachari Sehkari Grah
Nirman Samiti Ltd. Noida Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported
in (2009) 1 SCC 754 and following are the relevant observations.
40. It is true that once Reference Court decides the matter and
enhances the compensation, a person who is otherwise eligible to
similar relief and who has not sought Reference, may apply under
Section 28A of the Act. If the conditions for application of the said
provision have been complied with, such person would be entitled
to the same relief which has been granted to other persons seeking
Reference and getting enhanced compensation. But, it is equally
true that if Reference Court decides the matter and the State or
acquiring body challenges such enhanced amount of compensation
and the matter is pending either before the High Court or before
this Court (Supreme Court), the Collector would be within his
power or authority to keep the application under Section 28A of
the Act pending till the matter is finally decided by the High Court
or the Supreme Court as the case may be. The reason being that the
decision rendered by the Reference Court enhancing compensation
has not attained 'finality' and is sub judice before a superior Court.
It is, in the light of the said circumstance that the State of U.P.
issued two Government orders on January 14, 1994 and June 13,
2001.
29. Both of the judgments would not answer the point raised
in the present petition as to whether there is any inhibition on
the power of the Collector or the Court to award more
compensation than awarded in the Foundational Award. But
it can be safely inferred that the redetermination seeker is
entitled to receive compensation by the same rate as fixed in
the Foundational Award. In the present matters appellants
are claiming that there is clinching material on record to
suggest that the lands are semi irrigated lands and the fruit
29 fa 1328.24 corrected
bearing trees, structures, pipeline and well are assessable to
the compensation which is denied to them.
30. Mr. Tambe, learned advocate has further relied on the
judgment of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in the matter
of K. V. Sarda Kunnaru P. O. Karanthadu, Ramanthali Kannur District Vs. The
Special Tahsildar, Thalassery reported in (2016) 4 KLJ 421. In that
case the issues which were referred for consideration were as
follows :
8. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties, perused the records and have gone through
the reference order dated 13.08.2015. From the submissions of the
parties and the pleadings on record, the following are the issues
which arise for consideration in this appeal.
(i) Whether the court deciding a reference under
Section 28A(3) can award compensation exceeding the
amount as awarded by court on the basis of which award
the application for redetermination has been made by an
interested person under Section 28A(1)?
(ii) Whether judgments of this Court in Raghava
Poduval, Purushan and District Collector v. Muhammed
Kunhi's cases (supra) taking the view that reference court
under Section 28A(3) is not inhibited from awarding higher
compensation than one claimed under Section 28A(1) or
the judgment of the Division Bench in State of Kerala v.
Kumaran Nair taking the view that reference court under
Section 28A(3) cannot grant amount in excess of the
amount claimed under Section 28A(1), lays down the
correct law?
(iii) Whether in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Ambya Kalya Mhatre's case (supra), judgment of the
Division Bench in State of Kerala v. Kumaran Nair needs
30 fa 1328.24 corrected
reconsideration?
All the issues being interconnected are taken together.
31. Following is the conclusion of the bench.
13. Provisions of Section 28-A were inserted by the aforesaid
Amendment Act providing for "redetermination of the amount of
compensation on the basis of the award of the court." Section 28-A
as inserted by the Amendment Act is as follows:
"28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on
the basis of the award of the Court: (1) Where in an award under
this part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector
under S.11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by
the same notification under S.4, sub-s.(1) and who are also
aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that
they had not made an application to the Collector under S.18, by
written application to the Collector within three months from the
date of the award of the Court requires that the amount of
compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of
the amount of compensation awarded by the Court.
Provided that in computing the period of three months
within which an application to the Collector shall be made under
this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be
excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under
sub-sec. (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons
interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard
and made an award determining the amount of compensation
payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-s.
(2) may, by written application to the Collector, requires that the
matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the
Court and the provisions of S.18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply
31 fa 1328.24 corrected
to such reference as they apply to a reference under S.18."
32. The observations of the Apex Court in para No. 11 of V.
Ramkrishnarao (supra) are the obiter dictum . The caution
given by the Apex Court cannot be undermined. The judgment
of the full bench of Kerla High Court in K.V. Sarda (supra)
does not lay down absolute inhibition under Section 28-A to
award the compensation exceeding one awarded in
Foundational Award. The market value cannot be exceeded
under Section 28-A than the one fixed in the Foundational
Award. Taking benefit of the principles of the interpretation of
the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India Vs.
Pradip Kumari (supra) and Union of India Vs. Hansoli
Devi (supra), it can be inferred that compensation
determinable under Section 28-A cannot be restricted to the
compensation awarded in a Foundational Award. For the
reasons stated above, I answer issue no. 1 in favour of the
appellants/Claimants.
33. There is no iota of doubt that appellants are entitled to
receive rate of Rs. 1500/- per Are for dry land or Rs. 3000/- per
Are for irrigated land, which are equal to the rates in the
Foundational Award. The Reference Court committed
manifest illegality in depriving the appellants from awarding
these rates, notwithstanding the claim of the appellants for
additional compensation.
34. So far as the issue no. 2 is concerned, I find that in none
32 fa 1328.24 corrected
of the judgments cited by the parties it was directly fallen for
the consideration. It is settled law that Section 28-A of the
L.A. Act is a beneficial legislation. It is being enacted with
intention to provide fair and reasonable compensation to
inarticulate poor litigants. The rate fixed in the Foundational
Award can be treated to be the basic market value. If the
Foundational Award is silent in respect of additional
compensation for trees, structure, well and pipeline, it would
be causing harm to the legitimate expectation of a particular
class of litigant to deprive them from those benefits. It is
possible to award additional compensation to such persons
adhering to the rate fixed in the Foundational Award. That
cannot be said to be largesse. But it is in consonance with
spirit of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Considering
various judgments referred by the parties I find that issue no.
2 has to be answered in favour of appellants/claimants.
35. If the clinching material is placed on record by the
applicants/claimants suggesting that classification of the land
is incorrect or additional compensation for trees, structure,
well, etc. has been denied arbitrarily or by adopting hyper
technical approach, it would be within realm of Section 28-A of
the L.A. Act to award the additional compensation.
36. In the present matters Reference Court refused to treat
lands as irrigated lands in the matters falling in Group I. My
attention is adverted to the material produced on record to
33 fa 1328.24 corrected
show that the lands under acquisition are irrigated lands. The
Reference Court refused to look into the material because it
followed the observations of the Apex Court in the case of V.
Ramkrishnarao Vs. The Singareni Colliries Co. Ltd. and others (supra). I
have already observed that there is no prohibition for
awarding more amount than awarded by the Foundational
Award. The appeals categorized in this group are the
examples that if the classification of land is changed, then the
appellants are likely to get excess compensation than the
Foundational Award. I am of the considered view that
approach of the Reference Court is against the legislative
intent and the spirit of Sec. 28-A.
37. I have assessed the material on record separately in
Appeals of Group I, which is as under :
A. First Appeal No. 1328 of 2024.
It is stated in the evidence of first witness of the
claimant Parigabai Raosaheb Gaikwad that land in question is
irrigated land. The copies of 7/12 extract at Exhibit 16 show
irrigated crop pattern. It reveals from E-Statement that gut
No. 432 is belonging to different persons. The land belonging
to Sakhahari Bhavana Salunke from same land has been
acquired and it is treated to be seasonal irrigated land. It is
having various trees. There is substance in the submissions of
the learned counsel Mr. Bhandari that land under acquisition
needs to be treated as irrigated land. Appellant is entitled to
get rate of Rs. 3,000/- per R.
34 fa 1328.24 corrected
B. First Appeal No. 1330 of 2024
The 7/12 extract and the deposition of Pandurang Devrao
Shete shows that land is irrigated one. 7/12 extracts at
Exhibit 16 and 17 corroborate the claim. A well is located in
the adjacent land. There is entry to that effect in other rights
column. The land acquired in this appeal has to be treated to
be irrigated land. The appellant is entitled to receive rate of
Rs. 3,000/- per R.
C. First Appeal No. 1331 of 2024
The deposition of witness Kamalabai Rakhibdas
Sancheti shows that the land is irrigated. The extract of 7/12
at Exhibit Nos. 16, 20 and 21 corroborate the claim. The crop
pattern shows that the land is irrigated one. It reveals from
record that well is located in the adjacent lands. The land in
this appeal is also irrigated one, to enable the appellant to
fetch rate of Rs. 3,000/- per R.
D. First Appeal No. 1368 of 2024.
The deposition of Shivaji Pandurang Bhosale and the
7/12 extract corroborate. The judgment at Exhibit 18 passed
in L. A. R. No. 10 of 2018 supports the claim. In this appeal
also the appellant is entitled to receive rate of Rs. 3,000/- per
R.
38. The appellants are claiming additional compensation in
35 fa 1328.24 corrected
the appeals classified in Group II. The Reference Court
refused to award compensation for well, house/hut or the tress
existing in the land in question. The Reference Court did not
delve upon the factual matrix. The appellants have made
attempt to demonstrate before this Court regarding their
entitlement for additional compensation. The objective
scrutiny for the first time in the High Court is not possible. It
would be appropriate to remand the matter to the Reference
Court with a direction to decide the quantum of compensation
for the above factors.
39. It is made clear that it would not be open for the
Reference Court to deny the compensation merely on the
ground that it would be exceeding the compensation of the
Foundational Award. It is reiterated that claimants would be
entitled to receive the compensation for the factors for which
the Foundational Award is silent.
40. In view of above analysis I find that the appeals
classified in Group I deserve to be allowed. As against that
appeals classified in Group II are remanded to the Reference
Court for conducting scrutiny afresh for adjudicating the
compensation. I, therefore, pass following order.
ORDER
A] First appeals of Group I are allowed partly in the
following matter :
36 fa 1328.24 corrected
(i) Appellants in First Appeal Nos. 1328 of 2024, First
Appeal No. 1330 of 2024, First Appeal No. 1331 of 2024
and First Appeal No. 1368 of 2024 shall be entitled to
receive rate of Rs. 3,000/- per R for the acquired lands.
(ii) Appellants shall be entitled to get 30% of solatium as per
Section 23(2) of the L.A. Act.
(iii) Appellants shall be entitled to receive additional
component at the rate of Rs. 12% per annum on the
market value as per Section 23(1A) of the L.A. Act.
(iv) Appellants shall be entitled to interest U/Sec. 28 and 34
of the Act as per the judgment of the Full Bench of this
Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra Vs. Kailash Shiva
Rangari reported in 2016(3) Mh.L.J. 457.
(v) Appellants shall pay deficit court fees.
(vi) Award be drawn up accordingly.
(vii) Record and proceedings shall be sent back.
B] First appeals in Group II are disposed of in following
manner.
I Impugned judgments and awards passed by the
Reference Court in First Appeal No. 1329 of 2024, First
37 fa 1328.24 corrected
Appeal No. 1332 of 2024, First Appeal No. 1333 of 2024,
First Appeal No. 1359 of 2024, First Appeal No. 1361 of
2024, First Appeal No. 1362 of 2024, First Appeal No.
1367 of 2024, First Appeal No. 1369 of 2024, First
Appeal No. 1370 of 2024, First Appeal No. 2590 of 2024
and First Appeal No. 2873 of 2024 are quashed and set
aside.
II Parties are relegated to the Reference Court, which shall
decide their claims afresh on the basis of material on
record by extending opportunity to the parties.
III The Reference Court shall determine the compensation
for wells, houses/huts, structure and the trees as the
case may be in the wake of observations made in the
judgment.
IV Parties shall appear before the Reference Court on
18.03.2026 and an endeavour shall be made to decide
the references as expeditiously as possible and
preferably within a period of ten (10) months from the
date of appearance of the parties.
V Record and proceedings shall be sent back to the
Reference Court.
[ SHAILESH P. BRAHME J. ]
bsb/Feb. 26
