Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 1829 Bom
Judgement Date : 18 February, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:8700
ppn 1 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Digitally signed
PRACHI
by PRACHI
PRANESH
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
PRANESH NANDIWADEKAR
NANDIWADEKAR
Date: 2026.02.20
14:03:41 +0530
FIRST APPEAL NO.1628 OF 2012
1.Shakuntala Tilakdhari Gupta )
aged about 38 years, Occu: Housewife, )
widow of the Deceased. )
2.Kum. Avina Tilakdhari Gupta )
aged 13 years, Occupation: Student, )
Daughter of the Deceased.
3. Kumar Arun Tilakdhari Gupta )
aged 15 years, Occupation: Student, )
Son of the Deceased.
4.Kumar Vishal Tilakdhari Gupta )
aged 10 years, Occupation: Student, )
Son of the Deceased.
(The Applicant No. 2, 3 and 4 are minors, )
therefore represented by Applicant No. 1, )
being the mother & natural guardian.) )
All appellants are residing at )
Turbhe Stores, Shivshakti Nagar, )
Belapur Road, Navi Mumbai. ) .....Appellants
(Original Applicants)
Versus
1. Shri Jawaharlal R. Gupta )
Plot No. A-15, Sanpada, Navi Mumbai, )
Thane 400705. )
(Owner of Jeep No. MH-04-BH-65220 )
(Toyota Qualis) )
::: Uploaded on - 20/02/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 20/02/2026 22:22:16 :::
ppn 2 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
2. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. )
(Previous address "B"Cabin Naka,Shivkrupa)
Commercial Complex, Thane) )
Present address :
Pinak Galaxy, 201, B Wing, 2nd floor, )
Above Mahadev Hotel, Kapurbawdi Junction)
Kapurbawdi, Thane (West) PIN : 400607 )
(Insurer of Jeep No. MH-04BH-6522) )
At 6th floor, Sun Magnetica, Service Road, )
Near New R.T.O., Teen Haath Naka, )
Lois Wadi, Thane (West) ) ....Respondents
(Original Opposite Parties)
----
Mrs. Varsha Nichani a/w Mr. Roshil Nichani for the appellants.
Mr. Sanjay Krishnan i/by Leges Consultus for respondent no.2.
----
CORAM : JITENDRA JAIN, J.
DATED : 18 February 2026
JUDGMENT :
-
1. This first appeal under Section 30 of the Employees' Compensation
Act, 1923 was admitted on 28 February 2017, challenging the order dated 9
May 2012 passed by the Labour Commissioner, but no substantial question
of law was framed at the time of admission. Therefore, the said question is
now framed at the time of final hearing and which reads as under :-
"Whether the Labour Commissioner was justified in rejecting the application for compensation on the ground that the relationship between the deceased and the opponent no.1 of employer-employee was not established ?"
2. The appellants had served opponent no.1 through paper publication
ppn 3 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
since other modes failed.
Brief Facts :-
3. As per the applicants, the deceased was working as driver for two
months (short duration). It is not in dispute that on the date of accident
i.e., 29 March 2009, the deceased was driving vehicle no.MH 04 BH 6522
belonging to the original opponent no.1. The deceased lost his life in the
accident while driving the said vehicle and other passengers including
opponent no.1 suffered injuries. It was the case of opponent no.1 before the
police authorities that for attending funeral of his brother, he had to leave
for Rajasthan alongwith his other family members and the deceased was
driving the vehicle which met with the accident.
4. The dependents of the deceased issued legal notice to opponent no.1
for compensation which was not replied and, therefore, an application
under the Employees' Compensation Act came to be filed which was
rejected by the impugned order dated 9 May 2012 on the ground that the
applicants have failed to prove employer-employee relationship. It is on this
background that present appeal came to be instituted which got admitted
and is now heard finally.
Submissions of the Appellants:-
5. The learned counsel for the appellants submits, referring to the
ppn 4 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
statement of opponent no.1 while lodging the FIR that the deceased was
hired by opponent no.1 for short period to drive the vehicle to Rajasthan. It
is her submission that opponent no.1 and the deceased are not relatives and
also there is no dispute that the owner of the vehicle was opponent no.1.
She submits that temporary hiring of a driver by opponent no.1 would
constitute an employer-employee relationship between the deceased and
opponent no.1. The learned counsel relied upon the contents of the FIR
lodged by opponent no.1 to buttress her submissions.
6. In support of her above submissions, learned counsel for the
appellants has relied upon following decisions :-
(i) Shahajahan & Anr. Vs. Shri Ram General Insurance Company Limited & Anr.1
(iii) Bharti Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd., Nagpur Vs. Manohar Atmram Pardhi & Ors.2;
(iii) New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Mohan Kumar Sahoo & Anr.3;
(iv) K. Saraswathi Vs. S. Narayanaswamy & Ors.4;
Submissions of the Insurance Company:-
7. Per contra, learned counsel for opponent no.2-Insurance Company
has vehemently opposed the appeal. It is his submission that the accident
1 (2022) 19 SCC 494 2 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 11790 3 2003 (4) L.L.N. 634 4 97 L. W. 418.
ppn 5 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
happened because of the negligence of the deceased and, therefore, they
could not have got any compensation before the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal (MACT) and therefore, they have lodged this claim under the
Employees' Compensation Act. The learned counsel further relied upon the
evidence and the cross-examination of the witness of the applicant to draw
the point that the applicants have failed to prove the relationship and the
onus is on them before making any claim. He further submits that even in
the application, nothing is mentioned as to the period for which the
deceased was hired by opponent no.1. He, therefore, submits that in the
absence of any evidence to show employer-employee relationship, the
Labour Commissioner was justified in rejecting the claim.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the respondents.
Analysis & Conclusions:-
9. Relevant provisions of the Employees' Compensation Act are
reproduced :-
Section 2(dd) "employee" means a person, who is -
(i) .........
(ii)(a) ... ... ...
(b) ... ... ...
(c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle,
(d) ... ... ...
ppn 6 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
(iii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to any employee who has been injured shall, where the employee is dead, include a reference to his dependents or any of them;
Section 2(e) defines employer and same reads as under :-
(e)"employer" includes any body of persons whether incorporated or not and any managing agent of an employer and the legal representative of a deceased employer, and, when the services of an employee are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the employee has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, means such other person while the employee is working for him;
Relevant Schedule II to the Empolyees' Compensation Act reads as under :-
(i) ... ... ...
(ii) ... ... ...
(iii) ... ... ...
(xxv) employed as a driver;
(emphasis supplied)
10. Opponent no.2-Insurance Company has not led any evidence nor any
question was asked to the witness of the applicants on the relationship
between the deceased and opponent no.1 being that of relative. Therefore,
it is undisputed that the deceased and opponent no.1 were not relatives.
ppn 7 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
11. It is also undisputed that at the time of the accident, the deceased
was driving the vehicle. Opponent no.1 in his statement recorded on 30
March 2009 under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
before the police authorities at the time of accident has stated the
circumstances under which the deceased was requested by opponent no.1
to drive the vehicle for attending the funeral of brother of opponent no.1.
In the said statement, it is also recorded that opponent no.1 has addressed
the deceased as a "driver". In this statement, opponent no.1 has given
names of other co-passengers alongwith his relationship with each one of
them who were travelling in the vehicle and who were injured and how the
accident happened and in which the driver died. This statement is signed by
opponent no.1. The statement given at the first instance by a person at the
time of lodging FIR is the best piece of evidence in such cases, the way
dying declaration is at the time of death of a person. If the deceased was a
friend or relative of opponent no.1, opponent no.1 would not have
addressed before the police authorities the deceased as a "driver" when he
expressly stated about his relationship with other passenger. The contents
of the FIR when read as a whole cannot be doubted.
12. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that, a driver who is not
regularly employed or even if he is regularly employed, there will rarely be
any written contract unless the driver is hired by a corporate entity. This is
ppn 8 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
a case where an individual opponent no.1 had hired and had availed the
services of the deceased to drive the vehicle to Rajasthan on urgent basis
for short duration. In such circumstances, there can never be a written
contract or agreement between the parties to prove the relationship of
employer and employee.
13. It is the circumstantial factors and evidence which have to be
considered. In this case, as narrated above, the relationship between the
two is not that of relatives, the vehicle is owned by opponent no.1, before
the police authorities opponent no.1 has addressed the deceased as a
"driver", the deceased was hired for a short period to drive the vehicle,
relationship with other passenger was mentioned etc., which leads no
doubt in my mind that there was an employer-employee relationship
between opponent no.1 and the deceased. If the deceased was not a
relative or a friend then only conclusion that can be drawn based on FIR is
that the deceased was hired by opponent no.1 to drive the vehicle.
14. Under the Employees' Compensation Act, the liability can be imposed
on the owner and the insurance company jointly and severally. The
advocate of appellants issued legal notice to opponent no.1 on 11 August
2009 seeking compensation. The said notice was never replied by opponent
no.1 and the only conclusion for not replying obvious was to avoid any
ppn 9 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
financial liability. In the reply filed to the application, opponent no.1 has
denied everything including the incident of accident of his vehicle. The
reply is nothing short of stating lie on oath and, therefore, opponent no.2-
Insurance Company cannot drive mileage from such reply. Therefore,
opponent no.1 to absolve himself from any liability, filed a reply to the
application on 14 February 2011, after almost 2 years of incident/notice,
denying employer-employee relationship. This conduct has to be read along
with his statement made at the time of accident before the police
authorities.
15. The Labour Commissioner ought to have exercised powers under
Section 23 of the Employees' Compensation Act and issued summons and
for enforcing the attendance of opponent no.1, so that the truth could have
been found out but that was not done. Therefore, when based on above
documents i.e. FIR and the reply of opponent no.1, the statement was
found contradictory, the Labour Commissioner could not have come to a
conclusion that relationship was not established. The Commissioner while
administering welfare legislation should have by virtue of his powers ought
to have taken the averments made in reply and FIR to its logical conclusion
rather than holding against the applicants who are powerless. The
Commissioner while administering welfare legislation should exercise
power in furtherance of the objective for which the Act is enacted. The
ppn 10 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
Labour Commissioner has not at all considered the FIR lodged by Opponent
No.1 and the site inspection report though same were filed with the
application. The Labour Commissioner accepts that the death has occurred
on the basis of the documents which gives reasons and facts which have not
been considered.
16. Section 2 (dd) of the Employees' Compensation Act defines
"employee" to mean a person who is recruited as driver, helper, mechanic,
cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle. Section
2 (dd) does not provide that there has to be a written contract or
agreement between the employer and employee, what is material is
"recruited as driver." The phrase "recruited" would cover even a driver
hired for shorter duration. Section 2(dd)(iii) read with entry (xxv) of
Schedule II to the Act expands the definition of "employee" to a person who
is employed as a driver and it is expressly provided in clause (iii) of Section
2(dd) that contract can be implied or oral. The phrase "employed as a
driver" and "recruited as driver" lays emphasis on the nature of work for
which a person is hired and as observed above and supported by the
definition, the need for anything in writing is dispel with by the legislature
for proving deceased was an employee moreso in the present case based on
contents of FIR lodged by opponent no.1.
ppn 11 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
17. The phrase "employed as driver" in Schedule-II is wider and would
mean to give work to someone or to make use of. In the instant case,
opponent no.1 in the FIR has stated that the deceased was the driver hired
by him, which in my view, would amount to employing deceased for work
of driving by opponent no.1. The definition emphasis the act of
employment/recruitment and not the duration for which a person is
employed or recruited. The expression "employed" has at least two known
connotations but as used in the definition, the context would indicate that
it is used in the sense of a relationship brought about by express or implied
contract of service in which the employee renders service for which he is
engaged by the employer and the latter agrees to pay him in cash or kind as
agreed between them or statutorily prescribed. It discloses a relationship of
command and obedience. There is no dispute that opponent no.1 in FIR has
admitted that the deceased was hired as driver for driving vehicle.
18. It is also important to note the wide coverage of the Employees'
Compensation Act which is borne out by Schedule II to the said Act which
list down the persons who are included in the definition of employee. On a
thorough reading of all the persons specified therein and looking at the
object for which the Act has been enacted and applying to the facts of the
present case, in my view, the employer-employee relationship gets
established in the present case.
ppn 12 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
19. Section 2(e) defines "employer" inclusively to include persons
specified therein. Looking at the objective of the Employees' Compensation
Act and when read with definition of employee, in my view, employer
would include a person who hires a driver, even for a shorter duration, to
drive his vehicle. In the facts of the present case, when opponent no.1
addressed deceased as "driver" in FIR, no reply to legal notice and after
perusing the contents of FIR, in my view, opponent no.1 is an employer for
the purposes of the present Act. Section 2(e) does give clue that even
temporary letting on hire by one person to another would treat the other
person as employer. Therefore, if a person hires a driver for short period
certainly person hiring would be an employer.
20. Equally, it is well established that the fact an individual is entirely
free to work or not, and owes no contractual obligation to the person for
whom the work is performed when not working, does not preclude a
finding that the individual is a worker, or indeed an employee, at the time
when he or she is working. Many casual workers will periodically work for
the same employer but often neither party has any obligations to the other
in the gaps or intervals between engagements. There is no reason in logic
or justice why the lack of employee status in the gaps should have any
bearing on the status when working. There may be no overarching or
umbrella contract, and therefore no employment status in the gaps, but that
ppn 13 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
does not preclude such a status during the period of work.
21. A mere error, if at all, in drafting of the application cannot be held
against the applicants. The fact of the deceased having been employed as a
driver by opponent no.1 is recorded in the very first paragraph of the
application and merely because the period for which he was recruited or
employed is not mentioned that cannot be a ground to reject the claim. The
submission of opponent no.2 that applicant could not have got relief before
the MACT and, therefore, he made application under present Act cannot be
accepted to reject the appeal. There is no bar in litigant electing one forum
when more than one forum is available. It is not a case of forum shopping
nor any bar is brought to my notice. Merely because opponent no.2 thinks
that the MACT would have not given any relief cannot preclude the
applicants to make application under the Employees' Compensation Act.
Insofar as the civil suit is concerned, there is a bar to make application
under Section 3(5) of the Employees' Compensation Act if the civil suit is
filed.
22. In the evidence of the witness of the applicant admittedly no
document was produced to show that the deceased was a driver of
opponent no.1 but as I have observed above in such cases, there can never
be a written agreement or document but on the contrary there is direct
ppn 14 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
admission by opponent no.1 while lodging FIR and impliedly by not
replying to legal notice and then speaking total lie in reply. Even Section
2(dd)(iii) states there need not be contract in writing but oral or implied
contract is sufficient to treat a person as "employee."
23. The learned counsel for the appellants is justified in relying upon the
decisions which are reproduced above in support of her contention that the
employer-employee relationship, in such cases, can be said to have been
established. I propose to discuss two of them.
(a) In K. Saraswathi (supra), the question raised before the High Court
was whether the deceased is a workman as defined in Section 2(i)(n) of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The relevant observation in paragraph 7 of
the said decision is reproduced herein:
"7. The Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation came to the conclusion that the deceased Gurusami was a workman under the second respondent. This finding is challenged by the second respondent on the ground that late Gurusami was not employed under him and he was only working for a few days as a substitute driver for the lorry. But in a statement before the police the second respondent stated that late Gurusami was his employee for 15 days prior to his death. According to S.2 (1)(n) of the. Workmen's Compensation Act, 'workman' means an person who is employed on monthly wages of not exceeding one thous and rupees in any capacity as is specified in Schedule II of the Act. A workman whose employment is of a casual nature for the purpose of the trade or business of the employer falls within the definition of workman in S.2 (1) (n). In this case the evidence of the second respondent before the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is that the deceased was employed only for 2 or 3 days as a substitute driver. But before the police he had stated that the deceased was under his employment for 15 days prior to his death. Considering the evidence in
ppn 15 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
the case the conclusion arrived at by the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation that the deceased was a workman within the meaning of S.2 (1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be said to be incorrect."
The present Act is much wider in its scope than its erstwhile avtar
because the exclusion of casual worker under the erstwhile Act has been
done away with under the new Act.
(b) In Mohan Kumar Sahoo & Anr. (supra), the Orissa High Court was
faced with very similar situation like the present case. Relevant paragraphs
read as under :-
"17. The case at hand, stands on a better footing because there is direct relationship between the employer and the deceased. The evidence in that regard goes unimpeached. The owner had admitted to have engaged the deceased and directed him to drive his vehicle which means, the deceased was engaged in the service of the employer and died while performing the work and duty for his employer. It was proved that he was retained for the service of the employer, which is the paramount consideration.
18. Even assuming that the deceased's employment on that day was of a casual nature, that by itself is not enough to push him out of the ambit of the definition of "workman" because the casual nature of his engagement must couple with the definition that such employment should not be for the trade or business of the employer. In the present case, the deceased was engaged by the employer for the purpose of performing, duties for the employer and the accident so occurred can safely be construed to be in course of his employment."
24. The Rajasthan High Court in the case of Mahendra Shah Vs. Baldev
Singh5 under the erstwhile Workmen's Compensation Act has taken a view
5 2011 SCC OnLine Raj 2775
ppn 16 43.fa-1628.12(j).doc
that a person employed on daily basis would also be covered by definition
of workman.
25. In view of above and for the reasons stated above, the appeal is
allowed and the impugned order dated 9 May 2012 is quashed and set
aside. It is clarified that this judgment is rendered in the peculiar facts of
the present case.
26. Looking at the facts that the accident happened in 2009 and the first
appeal is decided in 2026 i.e., almost after 16 years which has deprived the
applicant of their legitimate dues, I deem fit to request the Labour
Commissioner to calculate compensation within 8 weeks from the
applicants making an application enclosing the present order so that
applicants can receive the compensation at the earliest without any further
delay.
27. The above order is dictated in the open Court and all the contentions
raised by both the parties have been recorded.
28. The appeal is allowed in above terms.
(JITENDRA JAIN, J.)
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