[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Preeti Manohar Sakpal D/O.Manohar ... vs Municipal Corporation Of Greater ... on 10 February, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:6906
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CONTEMPT PETITION NO.330 OF 2025
IN
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.874 OF 2024
Preeti Manohar Sakpal ]
D/o Manohar Baburao Sakpal (deceased) ]
M/s. Video Game Parlour, ]
Aged-41 years, Occupation - Services, ]
Residing at M. G. Road, Near Tilak Road, ]
Santacruz (w), Mumbai - 400 054 ] ...Petitioner
(Original Appellant)
V/s.
1. The Municipal Corporation of Greater ]
Mumbai, (a body, Corporate, Incorporated ]
under the Provision of B.M.C. Act, 1888), ]
having its Head office at Annex Building, ]
Mahapalika Marg, Fort, Mumbai - 400 001. ]
2. Sachin Hanamdhar, ]
Assistant Engineer, "H/W" Ward ]
Office of the Assistant Commissioner ]
"H/W" Ward, 2nd Hasnabad Lane, ]
BMC building, ]
Khar (w), Mumbai - 400 052. ] ... Respondent/
Contemnors
WITH
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.874 OF 2024
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.15379 OF 2024
Preeti Manohar Sakpal ]
D/o Manohar Baburao Sakpal (deceased) ]
M/s. Video Game Parlour, ]
Aged-35 years, Occupation - Services, ]
Residing at M. G. Road, Near Tilak Road, ]
Santacruz (w), Mumbai - 400 054 ] ...Petitioner
(Original Appellant)
V/s.
Digitally
signed by
SUMEDH
NAMDEO
SUMEDH
NAMDEO SONAWANE
SONAWANE Date:
1
2026.02.10
18:59:17
+0530
::: Uploaded on - 10/02/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 10/02/2026 20:43:01 :::
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
The Municipal Corporation of Greater ]
Mumbai, (a body, Corporate, Incorporated ]
under the Provision of B.M.C. Act, 1888), ]
having its Head office at Annex Building, ]
Mahapalika Marg, Fort, Mumbai - 400 001. ] ... Respondent
(Orig. Defendants)
______________________________________
Mr. Abhishek L. Tripathi a/w. Adv. Bharat Tiwari for the
Petitioner.
Mr. Girish Godbole, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. S.B. Vajale i/by Adv.
Komal Punjabi for the Respondent-BMC.
Dr. Dhruti Kapadia a/w. Adv. Kavita Dhanuka for Respondent
No.2.
_____________________________________________
CORAM : KAMAL KHATA, J.
RESERVED ON : 28TH JANUARY 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : 10TH FEBRUARY 2026.
JUDGMENT:
1) By the present Appeal, the Appellant seeks to set aside the
impugned Order dated 7th May 2024 passed by City Civil Court,
Dindoshi, in Notice of Motion No.2767 of 2019 in L.C. Suit No.1879
of 2019, whereby the Trial Court dismissed the said Notice of
Motion.
2) The Notice of Motion taken out by the Appellant-Plaintiff
sought an interim order to restrain the Defendant - Brihanmumbai
Municipal Corporation ('BMC') from demolishing the Suit
structure or any part thereof situated on M.G. road, Near Tilak
Nagar Road, Santacruz (W), Mumbai - 400 054.
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
FACTS & RIVAL SUBMISSIONS
3) Mr. Abhishek Tripathi, Advocate for the Appellant, submitted
that the Appellant's father had acquired the premises from one
Shri Pandurang Gawade under an agreement dated 12th September
1986 for a sum of Rs.95,000/-. He submitted that in 1987, an
application was made for transfer of electricity meter in
Appellant's name. He further submitted that the Additional
Tahsildar had issued a Notice dated 3 rd February 2012 under
Section 45 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 ('MRTP Act'), which according to him establishes that the
Suit premises was in existence prior to the datum line. He
contended that the Notice under Section 314 of the Brihanmumbai
Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 ('BMC Act') could not have been
issued to the Appellant, as the Appellant has been in uninterrupted
use and occupation of the Suit premises several decades.
4) He submitted that the Notice dated 30 th July 2019 is
ordinarily issued in respect of hawkers' stalls and is therefore
unsustainable in law. He further submitted that the Appellant has
been paying applicable taxes. He contended that the Trial Court
erred in holding that the Appellant failed to establish that the land
on which the structure stands is non-agricultural land. He
submitted that the Trial Court ignored the order dated 5 th March
2002, which according to him substantiates that the Suit structure
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
is permanent structure. He further submitted that the electricity
bills on record demonstrate the existence of the Suit premises for
over 40 years. He contended that the the Trial Court has
erroneously treated the suit premises as unauthorized and has
mixed up the reference to open space in the agreement with the
structure of the shop admeasuring 40 x 10 feet. He further
submitted that the BMC has also issued a shop and establishment
certificate for running the business of video games. According to
him, in view of the documentary evidence including electricity
bills, payment of the non-agricultural tax, and the agreement of
dated 1986, the Appellant was entitled to an order of injunction.
5) He further submitted that the impugned notice has been
issued under the guise of road widening, whereas in fact the Suit
premises is neither situated on the road nor abutting any nala. He
submitted that there are two other structures abutting the road,
behind which the Appellant premises is situated. He contended
that the land in dispute does not form part of a public street and
that the disputed structure is not situated on, nor touching, any
street-- a fact which is evident from the impugned notice itself. He,
therefore, submitted that considering the long-standing existence
of the Suit premises, a notice under Section 314 of the BMC Act
could not have been issued. He submits that the Notice under
Section 314 is vague, sham, and does not disclose any reasons.
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
6) He further submitted that a notice under Section 314 of the
BMC Act is ordinarily issued in cases relating to hawkers and,
therefore, could not have been invoked in the present case,
particularly having regard to the long-standing existence of the
suit premises. It was contended that the impugned notice is vague
and non-speaking, as it does not disclose any reasons or furnish
particulars such as the description of the land, the area of the
structure, or other material details. He submitted that, if at all any
action was warranted, the BMC ought to have proceeded under
Section 351 by affording him an opportunity of hearing and by
following due process of law.
7) He further submitted that the Contempt Petition ought to be
taken up first, alleging breach of the Court's order dated 27th
November 2024. It was contended that notwithstanding a
subsisting stay granted in favour of the Appellant, the BMC had
demolished a portion of the premises. He submitted that although
the said portion was subsequently reconstructed, it was of a
smaller extent than the original, and that in the meantime the
BMC had permitted two additional structures adjacent to the
Appellant's premises. He therefore sought restoration of the
premises to its original size and, on that basis, urged initiation of
appropriate action against the concerned BMC officers for alleged
disobedience of the Court's orders.
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
8) On the aforesaid submissions, the learned Advocate
submitted that the impugned Order dated 7 th May 2024 deserves
to be set aside.
9) Per Contra Mr. Godbole for the Respondent submitted that
the Suit is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. The
structure is constructed in gross breach and violations of the
provisions of the BMC Act. The unauthorised construction is
admeasuring 10.40 mtrs x 1.6 mtrs is on the Municipal footpath as
per the BMC plan. The sanctioned plan also establishes that the
structure was not constructed prior to the datum line. The
Appellant has obtained no approval or obtained any permission
from the BMC. The Appellant has failed to produce any document
establishing it to be an authorised structure and consequently the
Appellant is not entitled to any relief. There are neither pleadings
nor documents to support the contention of the Appellant and does
not deserve any protection from demolition.
10) The notice was issued to all illegal structures on the street as
these structures were causing obstruction in the implementation
of a Public Project and for improvement of traffic flow in the area.
11) The learned Senior Counsel relied on the definition of "street"
under section 3 (w) of the BMC Act to submit that the Appellant's
structure is on the street and consequently the BMC is entitled to
demolish it. He submitted that an encroachment on a public place
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
could be dealt with under section 314 of the BMC Act.
12) Relying upon the affidavits of the Assistant Engineer, he
submitted that the subject structure was situated on a public road
abutting the Santacruz (West) Railway Station. He submitted that
during a demolition drive undertaken by the BMC on 15th May
2025 to remove unauthorised structures, vendors and roof
projections from the station road--almost six months after the
order dated 27th November 2024--the Appellant's stall, which was
one amongst thirty-eight such stalls, came to be partially
demolished inadvertently. He explained that no one from the
Appellant's side was present when the demolition staff arrived at
site, and consequently a portion of the structure was damaged and
demolished. However, immediately upon the Court's order being
brought to the notice of the staff, the demolition of the suit
structure was stopped. It was therefore submitted that the partial
demolition was neither intentional nor mala fide, as alleged. He
further submitted that the structures were reconstructed on 16th
August 2025, and that the Appellants had acknowledged due
reconstruction. He submitted that the present Contempt Petition
has been filed only to delay the adjudication of the Appeal and
thereby continue the protection of an illegal structure. He further
submitted that the Appellant's contention that the reconstruction
was accepted "without prejudice" is itself mala fide and aimed at
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
deriving benefits to which the Appellant is not entitled.
13) In view of the foregoing submissions, it is submitted that the
Appeal is liable to be dismissed and that the Contempt Petition also
deserves to be disposed of, the alleged contempt having already
been purged by the Respondents.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
14) Upon anxious consideration of the rival submissions and
upon a careful perusal of the record, the following conclusions
emerge.
15) Having considered the entire matter, it is evident that the
Appellant has succeeded in retaining possession of an admittedly
unauthorised structure for more than six years since issuance of
the notice dated 30th July 2019. Such prolonged retention,
facilitated by procedural delays, sends an adverse signal and has
the effect of encouraging similar illegal constructions, as
wrongdoers are able to continue deriving benefit from
unauthorised structures for years while proceedings remain
pending. In the present case, the material on record indicates that
the structure has been in use for a considerable period, spanning
well beyond two decades.
NO TITLE, NO RIGHT, NO EQUITY
16) The Agreement dated 12th September 1986 relied upon by
the Appellant is an unregistered document and is therefore
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of establishing any right,
title or interest. The document does not relate to private property
but purports to deal with public land. It does not transfer, nor does
it even purport to transfer, any structure standing thereon. On the
contrary, the agreement expressly contemplates transfer of "open
space".
17) It is well settled that payment of user charges to the
Municipal Corporation, electricity bills, shop and establishment
registration, or licences for commercial activity do not create or
evidence title. None of the documents relied upon by the Appellant
establishes that the structure existed prior to the datum line of 1st
January 1961 or that it was erected with lawful authority.
18) The Trial Court has correctly appreciated the documentary
material and the legal position. The findings recorded therein are
neither perverse nor contrary to law and warrant no interference.
ABUSE OF PROCESS AND LACK OF CLEAN HANDS
19) The conduct of the Appellant disentitles him to any equitable
relief. A litigant who seeks protection of an unauthorised structure
erected on public land cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court
by presenting himself as a lawful occupier.
20) In Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.1, the Supreme
Court has categorically held that courts must deny relief to
litigants who approach with falsehood, suppression or
1 (2010) 2 SCC 114
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
misrepresentation. The present case is a textbook illustration of
the mischief sought to be curbed by the said principle. The extracts
reproduced hereinbelow are relevant even in the present day:
"1. ..... However, post-Independence period has
seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism
has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal
gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation
do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the Court
proceedings.
2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants
has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have
any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood
and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to
meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the
courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is
now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute
the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of
justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief,
interim or final."
(Emphasis supplied)
21) The Appellant has attempted to confer legitimacy upon an
otherwise unlawful occupation by relying upon a purported
unregistered sale agreement relating to public land. The document
itself, on its face, belies any such claim. The attempt is not merely
misconceived, but borders on a deliberate effort to mislead the
Court.
PROCEEDINGS UNDER S.314
22) Section 314 that is under consideration is reproduced herein
below for ready reference:
"314. [Power to remove without notice anything erected,
deposited or hawked in contravention of section 312 or
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
313A].-- The Commissioner may, without notice, cause to
be removed--
(a) any wall, fence, rail, post, step, booth or other
structure or fixture which shall be erected or set up in or
upon any street, or upon or over any open channel drain,
well or tank contrary to the provisions of sub-section (1) of
section 312, after the same comes into force 5[in the city or
in the suburbs, after the date of the coming into force of the
Bombay Municipal (Extension of Limits) Act, 1950 (Bom.
VII of 1950) [or in the extended suburbs after the date of
the coming into force of the Bombay Municipal (Further
Extension of Limits and Schedule BBA (Amendment)] Act,
1956];]
(b) any stall, chair, bench, box, ladder, bale, board or
shelf, or any other thing whatever placed, deposited,
projected, attached, or suspended in, upon, from or to any
place in contravention of sub-section (1) of section 313;
[(c) any article whatsoever hawked or exposed for
sale in any public place or in any public street in
contravention of the provisions of section 313A and any
vehicle, package, box, board, shelf or any other thing in or
on which such article is placed or kept for the purpose of
sale.]
[(d) any person, unauthorisedly occupying or
wrongfully in possession of any public land, from such land
together with all the things and material unauthorisedly
placed, projected or deposited on such land by such person:
Provided that, the Commissioner shall, while
executing such removal, allow such person to take away his
personal belongings and household articles, such as
cooking vessels, bed and beddings of the family, etc.]"
23) The contention that the proceedings are wrongfully initiated
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
under Section 314 of the BMC Act is erroneous in law. In Municipal
Corporation of Gr. Bombay v. Premnagar Zopadpatti Committee
Society2, 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 712 similar contentions were raised
before the High Court and the High Court had granted interim
injunction restraining the corporation from evicting the
respondents from the land in dispute in the proceedings under
sections 313 and 314 of the Act. While dealing with the appeal
against the order of the High Court, the Supreme Court in
paragraph 5 made the following observations:
"5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of
the opinion that the view taken by the High Court that the
land was not a public place although it had been acquired
for purpose, therefore no proceedings under sections 313
and 314 of the Act could be taken against the respondents
is erroneous in law. The land which had been acquired for
the public purpose by the Corporation is a public place and
any encroachment made on that land by any person could
be dealt with under sections 313 and 314 of the Act. In this
view, we allow the appeals and set aside the order of the
High Court."
24) It is thus evident that a "street", by virtue of its definition
under Section 3(w), constitutes a public place. The definition of
"Street" as well as "Public Street" is extracted for ready reference:
"3(w). "street" includes any highway and any causeway,
bridge, via duct, arch road, lane, footway, square, court,
alley or passage, whether a thoroughfare or not, over
which the public have a right of passage or access or have
passed and has access uninterruptedly for a period of
2 1991 Suppl. (2) SCC 712
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
twenty years: and, when there is a footway as well as
carriageway in any street, the said term includes, both:
Section 3(x) :- "public street" means any street heretofore
levelled, paved, metalled, channelled, sewered or repaired
by the corporation and any street which becomes a public
street under any of the provisions of this Act: [ or which
vests, in the corporation as a public street]:
25) Consequently, any encroachment made thereon by the
appellants could validly be proceeded against under Section 314 of
the Act.
ASSESSMENT, TAX AND THE MYTH OF REGULARISATION
26) The reliance placed on assessment to property tax is wholly
misplaced. The legal position is no longer res integra. In Sidharam
M. Yanagandul & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 3, affirmed by
the Division Bench in Laxmi Gopinath Shetye v. MHADA & Anr.4, it
has been authoritatively held that assessment of an unauthorised
structure to property tax neither alters its unauthorised character
nor amounts to regularisation. The extracts reproduced
hereinbelow squarely apply to the present case.
"7. The letter of the municipal corporation dated 2nd June,
es the description of the structures assessed for property tax
for the year 1978-1979. Structure No. 4 is the shop No. 3
wherein appellant is running the Santosh Bar. Rateable
value of the shop is shown of Rs. 40/-. Rateable value of the
suit shed (structure No. 4-A) is shown as Rs. 33.30/-.
3 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 971
4 2024:BHC-OS: 4270
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
Relying upon this letter counsel for the appellant submitted
that the fact that the suit shed was assessed to property tax
would show that the suit shed was an authorised structure
constructed after obtaining appropriate permission and in
event the assessment of it for property tax would amount to
regularisation of an unauthorised construction. I am unable
to agree. In my view, any structure, whether authorised or
unauthorised, constructed on a property within the limits of
a municipal corporation can be assessed to municipal taxes.
Mere fact that a structure which is erected without the
permission of the Planning Authority and unauthorisedly is
subsequently assessed to the property tax by the municipal
corporation would not change the unauthorised character of
the structure nor would make the structure authorised from
the date of assessment. Of course, the fact that the structure
is assessed to property tax for a long time may be a relevant
circumstance while considering the evidence on whether the
structure is authorised or unauthorised especially when
sanctioned plans are not available because of long passage of
time. The weight to be attached, to such evidence would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
However once it is proved that the structure is
unauthorised, the mere fact that the structure is assessed to
property tax would not have the effect of deemed
regularisation or structure being treated as authorised.
8. Reference may be made to the decision of this Court in
(Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Municipal
Commissioner of Greater Bombay, reported in A.I.R. 1979
BOMBAY 10. In that case the question involved was
whether the municipal corporation was entitled to assess
for property tax the structures which were unauthorisedly
erected on the land. Relying upon the earlier decision of the
Supreme Court in (National Grindlays Bank Ltd. v.
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay)3, reported in
(1969) 1 SCC 541 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1048 and of this Court
in (Ramji Keshavji v. The Municipal Commissioner of
Greater Bombay)4, reported in (1954) 56 Bom. L.R. 1132
and after considering the definition of the word "premises"
contained in section 3(gg) of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act this Court held that the municipal
corporation was entitled to levy property tax not only in
respect of the land but also on structures, whether
authorised or unauthorised. It was specifically held that
even when a trespasser on the land errects a structure, the
municipal corporation would be entitled to take that into
consideration in fixing rateable value of the property. In
other words, municipal corporation is entitled to fix rateable
value and impose the property tax even in respect of an
unauthorised structure. If so, mere fact that rateable value
in respect of a structure has been fixed would not, by itself,
prove that the structure was authorised nor would it
amount to regularisation of the structure. This is because
municipal corporation is authorised to fix rateable value of
not only for the authorised structures but also in respect of
unauthorised structures erected on the land. In my view,
therefore the letter dated 2nd June, 1979 showing that the
suit shed was assessed to property tax, would not, by itself
prove that the suit shed was an authorised structure.
24. In our view, the Petitioner has attempted to mislead the
Court and gain unlawful advantage by stating that the shop
was attached to the building, whilst not particularising
which of the buildings 18A or 18B, and that based on the
shop and establishment certificate, assessment paid and
electricity bills attempted to make us believe that the shop
was authorised. Thus, entitled to an authorised premises.
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
This in our view would be encouraging wrongdoers and
illegal occupants to benefit from their wrongdoings. Neither
do these documents prove any title or entitlement of the
Petitioner in law. On this ground alone the Petition
deserves to be dismissed. The Supreme Court in SP
Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath & Ors has held that a
litigant who approaches the Court is bound to produce all
the documents executed by him which are relevant to the
litigation. If he withholds a vital document or suppresses
material information in order to gain advantage over the
other side then he would be guilty of playing a fraud on the
Court as well as the opposite party. Such a party is not
entitled to any relief. Above all, a Court must have a
complete and candid disclosure of all material particulars.
A failure to disclose material particulars is
indistinguishable from an attempt to mislead the Court.
This is now well settled in our jurisprudence."
[Emphasis supplied]
27) The reliance placed on the circular dated 20th March 2017
prescribing policy guidelines for removal of bottlenecks or missing
links in Development Plan Roads, Town Planning Roads and Road
Lines ("bottleneck policy circular") is wholly misconceived. It is
undisputed that the Appellant's structure is situated on a public
street, which includes the footpath. The impugned notice has been
issued in furtherance of easing traffic congestion and ensuring free
and unobstructed use of the public street. In any event, the
bottleneck policy circular does not confer any right of protection,
regularisation or compensation in respect of such an unauthorised
structure, and the Appellant cannot claim any benefit thereunder.
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
28) The challenge to the validity of the notice issued under
Section 314 of the BMC Act proceeds on the same erroneous
premise. The contention that the notice was issued for the purpose
of road widening is equally untenable and belied by the record. The
record clearly establishes that the Appellant's structure is situated
on a public street and not abutting the carriageway, and that the
notice was issued to remove obstruction and ease traffic congestion
on the public street, and not for road widening. The attempt to
invoke State policies governing road widening, in the teeth of these
undisputed facts, is a clear effort to derive unwarranted benefit
from an unauthorised structure and cannot be countenanced.
STATUTORY NON-COMPLIANCE AND FORUM SHOPPING
29) The notice dated 30th July 2019 was issued under Section
314 of the BMC Act. Instead of availing of the statutory remedy
before the competent authority, the Appellant rushed to file a civil
Suit on 2nd August 2019 without complying with the mandatory
requirement under Section 527 of the said Act. The suit itself was
thus vulnerable at inception.
30) The judgment in Sopan Maruti Thopte & Anr. v. Pune
Municipal Corporation & Anr.5 is clearly distinguishable, having
arisen from notices under Sections 351 and 260. The reliance is
therefore entirely misconceived.
5 AIR 1996 Bom 304
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
TACTICAL USE OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
31) The Appellant thereafter sought to invoke contempt
proceedings and insisted that the same be heard prior to the
Appeal. This sequencing was clearly intended to divert attention
from the core issue of illegality and to prolong enjoyment of the
unauthorised structure. Courts cannot permit contempt
jurisdiction to be employed as a strategic tool to perpetuate
illegality.
CONTEMPT BY THE CORPORATION - ADDRESSED BUT
CONTAINED
32) It is true that the Municipal Corporation failed to adhere to
the interim status quo order and proceeded with partial
demolition. The explanation of inter-departmental
miscommunication is unsatisfactory and cannot be accepted as a
justification for disobedience of court orders.
33) However, it is equally material that the demolition formed
part of a larger drive undertaken along the entire street and that
the demolished portion was subsequently reconstructed. In these
circumstances, the unconditional apology tendered by the
concerned officers, coupled with restorative action, is sufficient to
close the contempt proceedings with a warning.
SYSTEMATIC FAILURE AND MUNICIPAL ACCOUNTABILITY
34) The location of the unauthorised structure--immediately
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
behind a Municipal chowki and abutting a railway line--raises
serious and troubling questions. Such a structure could not have
existed for years without willful blindness or dereliction of duty on
the part of municipal officers.
35) The Municipal Commissioner shall treat this case as a test
case and initiate an inquiry to identify responsibility for prolonged
inaction. Failure to act against illegal constructions emboldens
wrongdoers and corrodes the confidence of law-abiding citizens in
municipal governance and the rule of law.
36) In view of the above, the following order is passed:
ORDER
i. The Appeal is dismissed is with costs ₹5,00,000/- (Rupees
Five Lakhs only), payable by the Petitioner to the Armed
Forces Battle Casualties Welfare Fund, within a period of four
weeks from today. In the event of default, the said amount
shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Details of the
bank account for payment of cost are as under :-
Account Name : Armed Forces Battle Casualties
Welfare Fund
Account Number : 90552010165915.
Bank Name : Canara Bank
Branch : South Block, Defence Headquarters,
New Delhi - 110 011.
IFSC Code : CNRB0019055.
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
ii. The AGP shall intimate this order to the Armed Forces. In the
event the Petitioner fails to deposit the said cost within
stipulated period as noted herein above, the Authorized
Officer of the Armed Forces Battle Causalities Welfare Fund
will be entitled to file an application for execution of the
present Order and for recovery of the said amount before this
Court through the learned A.G.P.
iii. The impugned Order dated 7th May 2024 passed by the City
Civil Court, Dindoshi, in Notice of Motion No. 2767 of 2019 in
L.C. Suit No. 1879 of 2019 is upheld.
iv. The Contempt Petition is dismissed with a stern warning that
any future violation of court orders by the Corporation or its
employees shall invite strict consequences, including
departmental inquiry and suspension, and shall be placed on
the service records of the concerned officers.
v. A copy of this order shall be forthwith communicated to the
Municipal Commissioner, Brihanmumbai Municipal
Corporation, for necessary steps against the concerned
officers who permitted the structure for more than two
decades and shall be placed on the service records of the
concerned officers.
vi. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.
vii. Interim Application, if any, stands disposed of.
Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc
viii. List the matter for compliance on 24th March 2026.
(KAMAL KHATA, J)
37) At this stage, learned Advocate for the Petitioner requested
for stay. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the request for stay is
rejected.
(KAMAL KHATA, J)
Judgements Relied:
1. Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC
114.
2. Municipal Corporation of Gr. Bombay v. Premnagar
Zopadpatti Committee Society 1991 Suppl. (2) SCC 712.
3. Sidharam M. Yanagandul & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra &
Anr. 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 971.
4. Laxmi Gopinath Shetye v. MHADA & Anr. 2024:BHC-OS:
4270.
5. Sopan Maruti Thopte & Anr. v. Pune Municipal Corporation &
Anr. AIR 1996 Bom 304.
