[Cites 32, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Central Bank Of India vs Naresh Mhaskar And Anr on 4 February, 2026
Author: N. J. Jamadar
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2026:BHC-AS:6101
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 580 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Vikas Kashinath Gaikwad,
Adult, Occ. Business, residing
at Bhanvaj, Budhwada, Near Janata
Vidyalaya, Taluka Khalapur, Dist. Raigad.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony,
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad ...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 133 OF 2025
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
ARS 1/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
1. Ravindra B Patil,
Adult, Occ. Business, residing at Tembhode,
Taluka Panvel, Dist. Raigad.
(As per Reg (J-II) Court's conditional order dated
14th January 2025 this CRA stands abated against
Respondent No.1)
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants, ...Respondents
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony,
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 252 OF 2025
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Dattatray Shrirang Lohar,
Adult, Occ. Business,
residing at Flat No. A-5/2,
Nirmal Coop Hsg Soc Ltd,
Yugantak Hsg Complex,
Sukhapur, New Panvel.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4, ...Respondents
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony,
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
ARS 2/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 590 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Murli K Nair,
Adult, Occ: Business,
residing at B-8, 101,
Yugantak CHS Ltd, Sukhapur,
New Panvel.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony, ...Respondents
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 591 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Vinod Y Ovhal,
Adult, Occ: Business,
residing at Bhanvaj Budhwada,
Near Khopoli Municipal Council,
Tal. Khalapur, Dist: Raigad.
ARS 3/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
...Respondents
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony,
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 592 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Abhijit C Pulekar,
Adult, Occ. Business,
residing at Plot No.6/2/1/8,
Sector-15, New Panvel,
Dist. Raigad.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony, ...Respondents
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 593 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
ARS 4/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Naresh Mhaskar, Adult,
Occ: Business, residing at Plot No.4,
Survey No. 117, House No. 182,
Taloja Majkur, Tal: Panvel,
Dist: Raigad.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony, ...Respondents
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 594 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Kiran Shetye,
Adult, Occ: Business,
residing at Post: Tembhode,
Taluka: Panvel, Dist: Raigad.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
ARS 5/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony,
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad ...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 595 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Rajesh Kale,
Adult, Occ. Business, residing at
Plot No. 14, Road No. 18, Sector 12,
New Panvel, Dist: Raigad.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony,
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad ...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 596 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Vilas Kashinath Patil,
ARS 6/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Adult, Indian Inhabitant
residing at Devicha Pada,
Taluka: Panvel, Dist. Raigad - 410 206.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony,
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad ...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 597 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Shankar Shravan Kamble,
Adult, Occ: Business,
residing at Harima Apartment,
Room No. 303, Plot No. 32,
Sector-3, New Panvel.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony, ...Respondents
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 598 OF 2024
ARS 7/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Amit Chakraborty,
Adult, Occ. Business, residing at
Om Shiva Complex, F-204, Sukhapuri,
New Panvel - 410 206,
Dist. Raigad.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony, ...Respondents
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 599 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Gangadhar Kunjiram Nair,
Adult, Occ. Business, residing at
Khairane, Post Panvel,
Dist.Raigad.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
ARS 8/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony, ...Respondents
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 600 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
1. Sunil Anand Gaikwad,
Adult, Occ. Business,
residing at Harima Apartment,
Room No. 303, Plot No. 32,
Sector-3, New Panvel.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony, ...Respondents
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 601 OF 2024
Central Bank of India, through Branch Office
called 'Chembur Branch', situated at Saikiran
Apartment, Plot No. 2017, Central Avenue 11th
Road, Chembur,
Mumbai - 400 071. ..Applicant
Versus
ARS 9/40
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
1. Kishore Karkera,
Adult, Occ: Business,
residing at Plot No. 5/2/10,
Sector-17, New Panvel,
Dist: Raigad - 410 206.
2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar
2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,
Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,
Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,
Sector 12, CIDCO Colony, ...Respondents
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad
Mr. Rohan Sawant, with Vikas Mulik, i/b Sunil Kadam, for the
Applicant in all Civil Revision Applications.
Mr. A.S. Khandeparkar, Senior Advocate, with Amogh K. Karandikar,
for Respondent Nos. 2a and 2b in all Civil Revision
Applications.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 19th JANUARY 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 4th FEBRUARY 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. All these Revision Applications are directed against identical
orders dated 15th June 2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior
Division, Panvel, whereby the Applications preferred by the Applicant-
Defendant No.2, purportedly seeking the framing and trial of issue of
jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and dismissal of the suit for want of
jurisdiction, came to be rejected.
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
2. Since identical questions of facts and law arise, these Revision
Applications were heard together and are being decided by this
common judgment.
3. The facts in Revision Application No. 580 of 2024, assailing the
order in SCS No. 57 of 2007, are noted as a representative case. The
background facts can be summarised as under:
3.1 Late Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar, the predecessor-in-tile of Plaintiff
Nos. 1A and 1B, initially instituted a suit against Respondent No.1-
Defendant No.1 only, seeking declarative reliefs, in the context of a
transaction of sale of a developed plot. The Plaintiff claimed that she
had developed a project, "Dwarka Bungalow Scheme" at Survey No.
117, Hissa Nos. 1 and 2, Village Taloja Majkur, Taluka: Panvel, District:
Raigad.
3.2 Defendant No.1 had evinced interest in purchasing a Bungalow
Plot. Post negotiations, Defendant No.1 agreed to purchase Plot No. 86
admeasuring 160 sq mtr ("the suit plot"). An Agreement for Sale came
to be executed on 7th January 2005 by and between the Plaintiff and
Defendant No.1, under the terms whereof the consideration was settled
at Rs.17,60,000/-. In addition, Defendant No.1 had agreed to pay 20%
of the total consideration to the Plaintiff at the time of delivery of
possession of the suit plot, towards charges for development for the
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
amenities. In the event of default in payment of the amounts as agreed,
Defendant No.1 has agreed to pay interest @ 24% per annum.
3.3 The Plaintiff claims, at the time of the execution of the Agreement
for Sale, Defendant No.1 had drawn a cheque of Rs.3,52,000/- towards
earnest money/booking amount. Though Defendant No.1 paid the
amount of Rs.14,08,000/- towards the balance consideration yet the
said cheque drawn towards the first installment was dishonoured upon
presentment. Defendant No.1 also committed default in payment of
20% of the amount, i.e., Rs.3,52,000/- towards the development
charges. The Plaintiff repeatedly called upon Defendant No.1 to pay the
outstanding amount.
3.4 In view of the persistent default, a legal notice was addressed on
16th October 2006 calling upon Defendant No.1 to pay due amount of
Rs.10,20,800/-. As Defendant No.1 did not comply with the said notice,
vide notice dated 28th November 2006, the Plaintiff terminated the
Agreement for Sale dated 7th January 2005, and, thereby, forfeited the
earnest money and offered to refund the balance amount after
deducting the expenses incurred towards the stamp duty and
registration charges, after the sale of the said plot to another purchaser.
3.5 Thus, initially, the Plaintiff prayed for declarations that the
Agreement for Sale dated 7th January 2005 between the Plaintiff and
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Defendant stood rescinded and the Defendant No.1 was entitled to
receive a refund of Rs.9,32,340/-, only from the Plaintiff.
3.5 In the meanwhile, Defendant No.1 had mortgaged the suit plot
with Applicant-Defendant No.2, under a Mortgaged Deed dated 11 th
January 2005. The Plaintiff claimed the said mortgage was in express
breach of the terms of the Agreement for Sale which prohibited
Defendant No.1 from creating any mortgage in respect of the suit plot
until the payment of entire consideration. Thus, the Plaintiff amended
the Plaint to implead the Applicant as Defendant No.2 and seek a
further declaration that mortgage created by Defendant No.1 in favour
of Defendant No.2 vide Mortgage Deed dated 11th January 2005 was
not binding on the Plaintiff.
3.6 Defendant No.1 did not contest the suit. Defendant No.2 resisted
the suit by filing Written Statement.
3.7 Defendant No.2 took out an Application seeking framing and
determination of issue of jurisdiction as preliminary issue in view of the
bar contained in Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy
Act, 1993 ("the RDB Act"), purportedly under Section 9A of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the Code") as it applied to the State of
Maharashtra. It was also contended that in view of the orders passed by
Debts Recovery Tribunal ("DRT") in Original Application No. 39 of
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
2008, the suit was bared by principle of res judicata. Defendant No.2
also sought dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.
3.8 The Application was resisted by the Plaintiff.
3.9 By the impugned order, the learned Civil Judge rejected the
Application negativing the contention of Defendant No.2 that the Plaint
was liable to be rejected in view of the bar of res judicata and the
jurisdictional interdict contained in Section 18 of RDB Act. The learned
Civil Judge was of the view that, since the Plaintiff had instituted the
Suit for rescission of contract, only the Civil Court would have
jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the said issue.
3.10 Being aggrieved, Defendant No.2 has invoked the revisional
jurisdiction.
4. I have heard Mr. Rohan Sawant, the learned Counsel for the
Applicants and Mr. A.S. Khandeparkar, the learned Senior Advocate, for
Respondent No.2-Plaintiff at some length. With the assistance of the
learned Counsel for the parties, I have also perused the material on
record including the judgment and order dated 28th April 2010 passed
by the DRT and judgment and order dated 25 th November 2014 passed
by the DRAT.
5. Mr. Sawant, the learned Counsel for the Applicant, submitted
that, the learned Civil Judge committed a factual error in construing the
import of the order passed by the DRAT in Appeal No. 296 of 2010.
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Indeed, the DRT in its judgment and order dated 28 th April 2010 had
held that no liability can be fastened on the Plaintiff, her husband, and
R.R. Kalyankar Construction Pvt Ltd; Defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5 therein.
However, in the Appeal the DRAT modified the order passed by DRT
and allowed the O.A. against all the Defendants. Yet, in the impugned
order, the learned Civil Judge has recorded that Defendant No.2 did not
succeed in DRAT also. This factual error has vitiated the approach of the
learned Civil Judge and renders the impugned order perverse,
submitted Mr. Sawant.
6. Mr. Sawant would urge that, all the grounds which have been
raised by Plaintiff in the instant suit qua the Defendant No.2, had been
raised and negatived by the forums created under RDB Act. It has been
in terms held that the security interest created in the suit plot, by way of
mortgage, binds the Plaintiff-developer as well. The dispute sought to
be raised falls within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the DRT
under Section 17 of the RDB Act. Thus, as the suit is clearly barred by
provisions of Section 18 of the RDB Act, the learned Civil Judge
committed a grave error in law in rejecting the Application.
7. Mr. Sawant submitted that the jurisdiction of Civil Court in
respect of claims relating to mortgages stands explicitly barred by the
provisions of Section 18 of the RDB Act, as the aspect of security
interest in the secured assets created by way of mortgage is within the
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
exclusive province of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 17
under the RDB Act. Mr. Sawant made a concerted effort to persuade the
Court to hold that the legal position as regards the exclusion of
jurisdiction of civil Court over the matters falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal under RDB Act in the context of the bar
contained in Section 18 of the RDB Act and Section 34 of the
Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
of Security Interest Act, 2002 ("the SARFAESI Act") is no longer res
integra. Reliance was sought to be placed on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Mardia Chemicals Ltd Vs Union of India, 1
Jagdish Singh Vs Heeralal2 and Sree Anandhakumar Mills Ltd Vs Indian
Overseas Bank.3
8. Mr. Sawant would urge that the three Judge Bench judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of Rajasthan Ltd Vs VCK Shares
and Stock Broking Services Ltd4 which, on a reference, has enunciated
that the interdict contained in Section 18 of the RDB Act, does not bar
the jurisdiction of the civil court to try a suit by a borrower against the
bank or a financial institution, does not govern the facts of the case at
hand as the Plaintiff had participated in the proceedings before the
1 (2004) 4 SCC 311.
2 (2014) 1 SCC 479.
3 (2019) 4 SCC 788.
4 (2023) 1 SCC 1.
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Tribunals under RDB Act and the defence of the Plaintiff has been
finally rejected.
9. Lastly, Mr. Sawant would urge that the proposition that a Plaint
cannot be rejected in part does not apply to a situation where there is
either no cause of action against one of the Defendants or the suit
against such Defendants is barred by any law. The binding efficacy of
the decision in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust and
Educational Charitable Society Vs Ponniamman Educational Trust 5 is
not diluted by the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court of co-
equal Benches.
10. In any event, Mr. Sawant would urge, in view of the Division
Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sheela Ram Vidhani Vs S.K.
Trading Co6 which holds that the judgment in the case of Church of
Christ (Supra) commands precedential value and needs to be followed
as the subsequent judgments in the case of Sejal Glass Ltd Vs Navilan
Merchants Pvt Ltd7 and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal Vs Axis Bank 8 have
not considered the previous binding decision in Church of Christ
(Supra), this Court cannot take a different view of the matter. To this
end, Mr. Sawant placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment in the
case of R Parthasarathy, Asst Collector, Central Excise, Kalyan Dn and
5 (2012) 8 SCC 706.
6 (2021) 5 BCR 409.
7 (2018) 11 SCC 780.
8 (2019) 7 SCC 158.
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Anr Vs Dipsi Chemicals Private Ltd9 wherein it was enunciated that an
interpretation (and equally a misinterpretation) of a binding decision of
the Supreme Court is itself binding subsequently on coordinate Courts
and can be corrected only by a higher Court.
11. Thus, looked at from any perspective, Mr. Sawant would urge, the
Plaint in the instant case is required to be rejected qua the Applicant-
Defendant No.2, in view of the incontrovertible facts and well settled
position in law.
12. In opposition to this, Mr. A.S. Khandeparkar, the learned Senior
Advocate for the Respondent Nos. 2a and 2b-Plaintiff, stoutly supported
the impugned order.
13. Mr. Khandeparkar laid emphasis on the fact that the Agreement
for Sale contained a clear prohibition against the mortgage of the suit
plot (Clause 12). In the face of such clear prohibition, creation of
security interest in the suit plot by way of mortgage was completely
unlawful. Such security interest, under no circumstances, could have
been enforced against the developer. Mr. Khandeparkar would urge the
fact that DRAT in Appeal No. 296 of 2010 has decreed the Application
against the Plaintiff as well, does not preclude the Plaintiff from
instituting a suit seeking a declaration that the Agreement for Sale itself
stands terminated and, consequently, the Deed of Mortgage is not
binding on the Plaintiff.
9 1987 MhLJ 900.
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
14. Mr. Khandeparkar further submitted that the entire premise of the
jurisdictional objection is flawed. The Defendant No.2-Bank has not
resorted to any action under the SARFAESI Act. Only an Original
Application was filed before the DRT under the RDB Act. Since the
Plaintiff was not a party to the transaction between Defendant Nos. 1
and 2; neither a borrower nor a guarantor, the Plaintiff cannot be
precluded from asserting his civil rights before the civil court.
15. Mr. Khandeparkar joined the issue on the bar of jurisdiction by
placing a strong reliance on the three Judge Bench judgment of the
Supreme Court in case of Bank of Rajasthan Ltd (Supra). Mr.
Khandeparkar forcefully submitted that the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain and
Ors10 which has analysed all the previous precedents, including the
judgment in the case of Jagdish Singh (Supra) and enunciated that the
civil courts jurisdiction is not ousted in respect of matters which do not
fall within the ambit of jurisdiction, as conferred under Section 17 of
RDB Act, is a complete answer to the submissions sought to be
canvassed on behalf of the Applicant.
16. Mr. Khandeparkar would urge, even if one of the reliefs survives,
the Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. This
position in law is consistently followed in a line of judgments.
10 (2025) 4 SCC 38.
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Therefore, the endeavour of Defendant No.2 to seek the rejection of the
Plaint qua Defendant No.2 cannot be countenanced.
17. Mr. Sawant, the learned Counsel for the Applicant, made an
endeavour to distinguish the case of Prabha Jain (Supra), it was urged
that the said decision eventually proceeds on the premise that a Plaint
cannot be rejected in part, even against one of the Defendants which in
view of the judgment in the case of Church of Christ (Supra), is not
correct position in law.
18. The aforesaid rival submissions now fall for consideration.
19. First and foremost, it is necessary to note that the prayers in the
Applications filed on behalf of Defendant No.2 were to frame and try
the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, and dismiss the suit. In
addition to the ground of bar contained in Section 18 of the RDB Act, it
was contended that the suit was liable to be dismissed on the principle
of res judicata in view of the judgment in Appeal No. 296 of 2010
delivered by the DRAT..
20. The learned Civil Judge, however, construed the Application to be
one for rejection of the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code,
in view of bar of jurisdiction propounded by Defendant No.2 and, in the
view of this Court, rightly so. The prayer for dismissal of suit was in a
sense misconceived. Before this Court as well, parties have proceeded
on the premise that the Application filed by Defendant No.2 and
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
consideration thereof by the trial Court was for rejection of the Plaint
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code.
21. Before adverting to the contentious issues, it is necessary to keep
in view the object of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of
the Code. The Court is conferred jurisdiction to reject the Plaint so as to
nip in the bud a fruitless and vexatious litigation. It is well-settled that
while considering the Application for rejection of the Plaint, the Court
should confine the inquiry to the averments in the Plaint and the
documents annexed with it. The defence of the Defendant is not at all
germane, for a plea for rejection of the Plaint is by way of demurrer.
Secondly, the Court is required to read the averments in the Plaint as a
whole in a meaningful and not formalistic manner. When upon such a
meaningful reading of the Plaint as a whole, the Court finds that the
suit is manifestly vexatious and fruitless, in the sense that, either it does
not disclose a clear right to sue or that it is barred by the provisions of
law, the Court need not hesitate in exercising the power under Order VII
Rule 11 of the Code as the rejection of such Plaint at the very threshold
sub-serves the interest of public justice.
22. In the instant case, one of the grounds on which the bar to the
tenability of the suit was sought to be urged was that, it was barred by
the principle of res judicata in view of the decision of DRAT in Appeal
No. 296 of 2010. The contention need not detain the Court. It is well-
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recognized that a Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of
the Code on the ground that the suit would be barred by the principle of
res judicata as the said issue warrants investigation into facts and
ascertainment as to whether the matter before the Court was directly or
substantially in issue in the former suit. In the case of Shrihari
Hanumandas Totala Vs Hemant Vithal Kamat and Ors, 11 the Supreme
Court has enunciated in clear and explicit terms that a plea for rejection
of the Plaint on the ground of res judicata would be beyond the scope of
Order VII Rule 11(d), where only the averments in the Plaint will have
to be perused.
23. Since the thrust of the submission on behalf of the Defendant
No.2 is that the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 18 of the RDB
Act, certain fundamental principles with regard to the jurisdiction of the
civil court vis-a-vis a Tribunal, which is created under a statute, also
deserve to be kept in mind. Jurisdiction of the civil court is of wide
amplitude. In a sense, it is plenary and omnipotent. The civil court has
jurisdiction to entertain all suits of civil nature, unless its jurisdiction is
expressly or impliedly barred. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the
civil court is not readily to be inferred.
24. In contrast, in the context of case at hand, the DRT is a creature
of RDB Act. It is empowered to exercise the powers under RDB Act and
SARFAESI Act. A Tribunal is thus bound by the powers conferred on it
11 (2021) 9 SCC 99.
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under the provisions of the Act by which it is created. Being a creature
of the statute, the Tribunal has limited jurisdiction. It has to discharge
the statutory functions within the four-corners of the statute creating it.
The Tribunal, thus, cannot transgress its jurisdictional limits and delve
into the matters which do not strictly fall within its adjudicatory
province.
25. The relevant part of Section 17 of the RDB Act which provides for
jurisdiction, power and authority of the Tribunal reads as under:
"17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals.--(1) A
Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the
jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide
applications from the banks and financial institutions for
recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions.
[(1-A) Without prejudice to sub-section (1),--
(a) the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the
date to be appointed by the Central Government,
the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain
and decide applications under Part III of
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;
(b) the Tribunal shall have circuit sittings in all
district headquarters.]
(2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the
appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to
entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have
been made, by a Tribunal under this Act.
[(2-A) Without prejudice to sub-section (2), the
Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the date to be
appointed by the Central Government, the jurisdiction, powers
and authority to entertain appeals against the order made by
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the Adjudicating Authority under Part III of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
26. Section 18 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of Court or
authority reads as under:
"18. Bar of jurisdiction.--On and from the appointed day, no
court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any
jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and
a High Court exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in section
17:
Provided that any proceedings in relation to the recovery of debts
due to any multi-State co-operative bank pending before the date
of commencement of the Enforcement of Security Interest and
Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012 under the
Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002) shall
be continued and nothing contained in this section shall, after
such commencement, apply to such proceedings.
27. A conjoint reading of the provisions contained in Sections 17 and
18 of the RDB Act, would indicate that the Tribunal under DRT has
been conferred with jurisdiction to entertain and decide applications
from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts. The
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try suits or proceedings at the instance of
the borrowers or others against the banks and financial institutions.
Indeed, under Section 19, defendant may claim set-off, or, in addition,
to his right of pleading of set-off, put up a counter-claim.
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
28. It is in this context, the decision in the case of Bank of Rajasthan
Ltd (supra), assumes significance. In the said case, a three Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court exposited in clear and explicit terms that,
there is no provision in the RDB Act, by which the remedy of a civil suit
by the Defendant in a claim by the Bank is ousted, but, it is a matter of
choice of that defendant. Such a defendant may file a counter-claim or
may be desirous of availing of the more strenuous procedure established
under the Code, and that is the choice he takes with the consequences
thereof. The three Judge Bench answered the reference on the question
of ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the negative, in the
following terms :
"56(c) Is the jurisdiction of a civil court to try a suit filed
by a borrower against a bank or financial institution
ousted by virtue of the scheme of the RDB Act, in
relation to the proceedings for recovery of debt by a
bank or financial institution ?
The aforesaid question ought to be answered first and is
answered in the negative."
29. At this juncture, it may be apposite to appreciate the bar of
jurisdiction of the Civil Court sought to be mounted with reference to
the provisions contained in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. As
noted above, Mr. Sawant sought to draw support from the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the cases of Mardia Chemicals
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
Ltd (supra), Jagdish Singh (supra), and Sree Anandhakumar Mills Ltd
(supra).
30. The legal position in regard to the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is fairly crystallized. It may not be necessary to trace the
development of law. In the context of the controversy at hand, it would
be suffice to make a reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain and Ors
(supra) and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bank
of Baroda V/s. Gopal Shriram Panda and Anr.12
31. Since the judgment of this court in the case of Bank of Baroda
(supra), has the imprimatur of approval by the Supreme Court in the
judgment in the case of Central Bank of India and Anr. V/s. Prabha Jain
and Ors. (supra), in relation to the import of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Singh (supra), which constituted
the sheet anchor of the submission of Mr. Sawant, it may be appropriate
to first note the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Bank of
Baroda (supra). The Division Bench considered, on a reference, the
following question :
"Whether the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to decide all
the matters of civil nature, excluding those to be tried
by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of
the Securitisation Act, in relation to enforcement of
12 2021 SCC Online Bom 466
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
security interest of a secured creditor, is barred by
Section 34 of the Securitisation Act ?"
32. The Division Bench after an elaborate analysis, including the
judgments in the cases of Mardia Chemicals Ltd (supra), Jagdish Singh
(supra), answered the above question, as under :
"The answer, looking to the nature of the question, in our view, is in
parts :-
(A) Jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to decide all
matters relating to Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act, is
exclusive.
(B) In all cases, where the title to the property, in respect of
which a 'security interest', has been created in favour of the
Bank or Financial Institution, stands in the name of the
borrower and/or guarantor, and the borrower has availed the
financial assistance, it would be only the DRT which would have
exclusive jurisdiction to try such matters, to the total exclusion
of the Civil Court. Any pleas as raised by the borrowers or
guarantors, vis-a-vis the security interest, will have to be
determined by the DRT.
(C) The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide all the matters
of civil nature, excluding those to be tried by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal under Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act, in
relation to enforcement of security interest of a secured creditor,
is not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
(D) Where civil rights of persons other than the borrower(s) or
guarantor (s) are involved, the Civil Court would have
jurisdiction, that too, when it is prima facie apparent from the
face of record that the relief claimed, is incapable of being
decided by the DRT, under Section 17 of the DRT Act, 1993 read
with Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act.
(E) Even in cases where the enforcement of a security interest
involves issues as indicated in Mardia Chemicals (supra) of
fraud as established within the parameters laid down in A.
Ayyasamy (supra); a claim of discharge by a guarantor under
Sections 133 and 135 of the Contract Act [Mardia Chemicals
(supra)]; a claim of discharge by a guarantor under Sections
139, 142 and 143 of the Contract Act; Marshaling under Section
56 of the Transfer of property Act [J.P. Builders (supra)]; the
Civil Court shall have jurisdiction.
(F) Examples as indicated in para 22.3, are illustrative of the
Civil Court's jurisdiction.
(G) The principles laid down in para 33 (i) to (ix) of Sagar
Pramod Deshmukh (supra) are in accordance with what we
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have discussed and held above."
(emphasis supplied)
33. The Division Bench has held in clear and explicit terms that the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide all the matters of Civil nature,
excluding those to be tried by the Tribunal under Sections 13 and 17 of
the SARFAESI Act, 2002, in relation to enforcement of security interest
of a secured creditor, is not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act,
2002. Where civil rights of persons other than the borrowers or
guarantors are involved, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction,
especially when it is prima facie apparent from the face of the record
that the relief claimed is incapable of being granted by the Tribunal
under Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993
("the RDB Act") read with Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act,
2002.
34. In the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain and
Ors (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a fact situation which
resembled with the facts of the case at hand in regard to the prayers. In
the said case, Plaintiff therein was asserting a right of inheritance in a
property in which security interest was created and, incidentally,
Defendant No.2 - Central Bank had decided to proceed in accordance
with the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002. The Plaintiff had, inter alia,
sought the following reliefs :
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"(1) declaration that the sale deed executed by the
brother-in-law of the Plaintiff in favour of the borrower
was illegal;
(2) declaration that the mortgage deed executed by the
borrower in favour of the bank was illegal;
(3) delivery of possession of the subject property"
35. It is in that context, the Supreme Court held that, so far as the
first and second reliefs were concerned, they were not in relation to any
measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002. Rather, those reliefs were in relation to action
taken prior to the secured creditor stepped into the picture and well
prior to the creditor invoking the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002.
Therefore, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction under Section 17 of
the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to grant declarations sought in the first and
second reliefs.
36. To retain emphasis, reverting to the facts of the case, it may be
apposite to note that, the Plaintiffs in the instant case, are seeking the
following reliefs :
"(a) declaration that the agreement for sale dated 7
January 2005 between the Plaintiffs and Defendant
No.1 is rescinded;
(aa) declaration that the mortgage deed executed
between Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.2 Bank is
not binding on the plaintiffs;
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(b) direction as to which Defendants, the Plaintiffs
should refund the balance amount as agreement for
sale is rescinded."
37. If the principles adverted to above, are applied to the facts of the
case at hand, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction under Section 17
of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, much less, under Section 17 of the RDB Act,
to grant declarations sought in prayer clauses (a) and (aa), extracted
above.
38. While explaining the ratio in the case of Jagdish Singh (supra),
the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs
Prabha Jain and Ors (supra), observed, inter alia, in relation to the
Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Bank of Baroda
(supra), as under :
"29. In para 24 (of Jagdish Singh) this Court held
that DRT has jurisdiction with respect to "measures"
taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) and
that in respect of such matters, the civil court's
jurisdiction is ousted. However, thereafter, there is no
further discussion on the nature of the suit and without
recording any finding that DRT has the power to decide
partition suits, this Court straightaway affirmed the
rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11. While
doing so, this Court missed to consider that under
Section 17, DRT has no power to partition properties and
hence, civil court's jurisdiction to grant a decree of
partition cannot be said to be ousted. When there is no
finding in the judgment that the DRT has the jurisdiction
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
to grant the relief of partition, the judgment cannot be
said to be a precedent on that point.
30. The aforesaid was looked into by a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bank of Baroda
(supra), and the reasonings assigned in our view are
very commendable..........." (emphasis supplied)
39. In view of the aforesaid clarification of law, in the context of the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002,
reliance placed by Mr. Sawant on the decisions in the cases of Jagdish
Singh (supra) and Sree Anandhakumar Mills Ltd (supra), which
followed Jagdish Singh (supra), does not advance the cause of the
submission on behalf of the Applicant.
40. As the provisions contained in Section 18 of the RDB Act, 1993
and Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, are not prima facie
attracted, in view of the nature of the suit and the reliefs claimed
therein, in the facts of the case at hand, the submissions made as
regards the conundrum over the rejection of the plaint, in part, is not
required to be delved into elaborately.
41. Mr. Sawant would urge that, in view of the Division Bench
judgment of this Court in the case of Sheela Ram Vidhani (supra), so
far as this Court is concerned, the position stands settled that the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ (supra),
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that the plaint as a whole can be rejected against some of the
Defendants needs to be followed.
42. In the case of Kaycee Corporation V/s. Suresh Ramchand Mehta
and Ors.13, this Court had an occasion to deal with the question as to
whether the plaint can be rejected as a whole against some of the
Defendants, in the context of the submissions based on the decision in
the case of Sheela Ram Vidhani (supra). After referring to a three
Judge Bench judgment in the case of D. Ramachandran v/s. R.V.
Janakiraman and Ors.14, this Court opined that the attention of the
Division Bench of this Court did not seem to have been drawn to the
said prior three Judge Bench judgment in the case of D. Ramachandran
(supra). The observations in para No.23 read as under :
"23. Firstly, the proposition that a plaint can be
rejected, as a whole against defendant No.5, or for that
matter, on account of the declarations sought in respect
of the consent decree, cannot be accepted unreservedly.
It is pertinent to note that in the case of Sheela Ram
Vidhani (supra), attention of the Division Bench of this
Court does not seem to have been drawn to a Three-
Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of D. Ramchandran vs. R. V. Jankiraman and others,
which preceded the decision in the case of Church of
Christ (supra). In the case of D. Ramchandran (supra),
the Three-Judge Bench has explicitly enunciated that
under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code, there cannot be
13 2025 SCC Online Bom 1431
14 (1999) 3 SCC 267
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
a partial rejection of the plaint or the petition. In the
said decision, a reference was made by the Supreme
Court to an earlier judgment in the case of Roop Lal
Sathi vs. Nachhattar Singh Gill (supra), wherein the
Supreme Court enunciated that where the plaint
discloses no cause of action, it is obligatory upon the
Court to reject the plaint as a whole under Order VII
Rule 11(a) of the Code, but the rule does not justify the
rejection of any particular portion of a plaint."
43. Mr. Sawant made an endeavour to draw a distinction between
partial rejection of the portion of the plaint, which was the case in D.
Ramchandran (supra), and rejection of the plaint as a whole qua one of
the Defendants.
44. In the case of Church of Christ (supra), a two Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court considered the decision in the case of Roop Lal Sathi
V/s. Nachhattar Singh Gill15 pressed into service in support of the
proposition that the rejection of the plaint in respect of one of the
Defendants was not sustainable. In paragraph No.29, the Supreme
Court observed as under :
"29. Finally, learned senior counsel for the
respondent submitted that in view of a decision of
this Court in Roop Lal Sathi V/s. Nachhattar Singh
Gill (supra), rejection of the plaint in respect of one
of the defendants is not sustainable. We have gone
through the facts in that decision and the materials
15 (1982) 3 SCC 487
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placed for rejection of plaint in the case on hand. We
are satisfied that the principles of the said decision
does not apply to the facts of the present case where
the appellant-1st defendant is not seeking rejection
of the plaint in part. On the other hand, the 1st
defendant has prayed for rejection of the plaint as a
whole for the reason that it does not disclose a cause
of action and not fulfilling the statutory provisions.
In addition to the same, it is brought to our notice
that this contention was not raised before the High
Court and particularly in view of the factual details,
the said decision is not applicable to the case on
hand." (emphasis supplied)
45. The decision in the case of Church of Christ (supra), as is evident,
proceeds on the premise that there was no cause of action in a suit for
specific performance against one of the Defendants against whom the
plaint as a whole was rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court.
46. In the case of Sejal Glass Ltd (supra), a two-judge Bench of the
Supreme Court was confronted with a situation where, in a commercial
suit, the plaint was directed to be bifurcated, in the sense, that it
disclosed no cause of action against the directors of the company, but
was to continue against the defendant No.1 company. Holding that the
judgment was wrong on principle, the Supreme Court traced the
precedents on the rejection of the plaint and enunciated that, if the
plaint survives against certain defendants and/or properties, Order VII
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Rule 11 will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole must
then proceed to trial.
47. In the case of Madhav Prasad Aggarwal Vs Axis Bank (supra), the
Notice of Motion filed by Axis Bank, one of the Defendants in the suit,
came to be allowed and the suit filed by the appellant therein, was
rejected against the Axis Bank by invoking the provisions under Order
VII Rule 11(d) of the Code, by the Division Bench of this Court, as being
barred by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act,
2002.
48. Following the decision in the case of Sejal Glass Ltd. (supra), a
two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court enunciated the law, inter alia,
as under :
"10. We do not deem it necessary to elaborate on
all other arguments as we are inclined to accept the
objection of the appellant(s) that the relief of rejection
of plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d)
of CPC cannot be pursued only in respect of one of the
defendant(s). In other words, the plaint has to be
rejected as a whole or not at all, in exercise of power
Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC. Indeed, the learned Single
Judge rejected this objection raised by the appellant(s)
by relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the
same High Court. However, we find that the decision of
this Court in the case of Sejal Glass Limited (supra) is
directly on the point. In that case, an application was
filed by the defendant(s) under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of
CPC stating that the plaint disclosed no cause of action.
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
The civil court held that the plaint is to be bifurcated as
it did not disclose any cause of action against the
director's defendant(s) 2 to 4 therein. On that basis, the
High Court had opined that the suit can continue
against defendant No.1 company alone. The question
considered by this Court was whether such a course is
open to the civil court in exercise of powers under Order
7 Rule 11(d) of CPC. The Court answered the said
question in the negative by adverting to several
decisions on the point which had consistently held that
the plaint can either be rejected as a whole or not at all.
The Court held that it is not permissible to reject plaint
qua any particular portion of a plaint including against
some of the defendant(s) and continue the same against
the others. In no uncertain terms the Court has held that
if the plaint survives against certain defendant(s) and/or
properties, Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC will have no
application at all, and the suit as a whole must then
proceed to trial.
......
12. Indubitably, the plaint can and must be
rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d)
of CPC on account of non compliance of mandatory
requirements or being replete with any institutional
deficiency at the time of presentation of the plaint,
ascribable to clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of
CPC. In other words, the plaint as presented must
proceed as a whole or can be rejected as a whole but not
in part. In that sense, the relief claimed by respondent
No.1 in the notice of motion(s) which commended to
the High Court, is clearly a jurisdictional error. The fact
that one or some of the reliefs claimed against
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respondent No.1 in the concerned suit is barred by
Section 34 of 2002 Act or otherwise, such objection can
be raised by invoking other remedies including under
Order 6 Rule 16 of CPC at the appropriate stage. That
can be considered by the Court on its own merits and in
accordance with law. Although, the High Court has
examined those matters in the impugned judgment the
same, in our opinion, should stand effaced and we order
accordingly." (emphasis supplied)
49. I am conscious of the position that in the case of Sheela Ram
Vidhani Vs S.K. Trading Co (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has
held that the decision in the case of Church of Christ (supra),
commands precedential value in contradistinction to Sejal Glass Ltd.
(supra) and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal (supra). Yet with all humility at
my command, it must be noted that, in a line of decisions prior to and
post Church of Christ (supra), the Supreme Court has consistently
enunciated the principle that a plaint cannot be rejected in part, and, if
one of the reliefs survives, the suit must go for trial.
50. In the case of V. Narayanaswamy V/s. C.P.Thirunavukkarasu16, a
three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court enunciated that, where the
election petition does not disclose any cause of action it has to be
rejected. The Court, however, cannot dissect the pleadings into several
parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of
16 (2000) 2 SCC 294
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action. The petition has to be considered as a whole. There cannot be
a partial rejection of the petition.
51. In the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain and
Ors (supra), as well, the Supreme Court after following the decision in
the case of Madhav Prasad Aggarwal (supra), enunciated that even if
the third relief (that of possession) was barred by Section 17(3) of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002, still the plaint must survive because there cannot
be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.
Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. It was held, since the first and second
reliefs were not clearly barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002,
and were within the Civil Court's jurisdiction (like the case at hand), the
plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.
52. In the case of Kum. Geetha and Ors. V/s. Nanjundaswamy and
Ors.17, the Supreme Court observed that in an application under Order
VII Rule 11 of the Code, the plaint cannot be rejected in part. This
principle is well established and has been consistently followed since
1936 decision in the case of Maqsud Ahmad V/s. Mathra Datt and Co. 18
A reference was made by the Supreme Court to the decisions in the
cases of Sejal Glass Ltd Vs Navilan Merchants Pvt Ltd (supra) and
Madhav Prasad Aggarwal Vs Axis Bank (supra).
17 (2024) 14 SCC 390
18 1936 SCC Online Lah 337
-CRA-580-2024+.DOC
53. The aforesaid being the position in law, in my considered view,
the principle that a plaint cannot be rejected in part, either in relation to
a property or the reliefs or defendants, is well ingrained and has been
consistently followed. Moreover, the decision in the case of Madhav
Prasad Aggarwal (supra), appears nearer home to the controversy at
hand.
54. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders do not warrant
any interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The Civil
Revision Applications, thus, deserve to be dismissed.
55. Hence, the following order :
:ORDER:
(i) Civil Revision Applications stand dismissed.
(ii) No costs.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
56. Mr. Sawant, the learned Counsel for the Applicants, seeks
continuation of ad-interim relief in the nature of the stay to the
proceedings before the trial Court.
57. The suits are instituted in the year 2007. Thus, at this length of
time, this Court does not consider it expedient to stay the proceedings
before the trial Court.
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58. Oral Application for stay, thus, stands rejected.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
Signed by: S.S.Phadke ARS 40/40
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/02/2026 21:04:44
