[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Complete Solution Facility And Anr vs Maharashtra Suraksha Rakshak Aghadi ... on 10 April, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:17141
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AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.10442 OF 2019
1. Complete Solution Facility Management
Private Limited, having its office at 8,
Angela Baptista, Behind Maha Auto,
C.S.T. Road, Kalina, Santacruz (East),
Mumbai - 400 098
ATUL 2. Ashok Vishnu Sawant,
GANESH
KULKARNI Managing Director, Complete Solution
Digitally signed
by ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI Facility Management Private Limited,
Date: 2026.04.10
12:29:58 +0530
having its office at 8 Angela Baptista,
Behind Maha Auto, C.S.T. Road,
Kalina, Santacruz (East),
Mumbai 400 098 ... Petitioners
Vs.
1. Maharashtra Suraksha Rakshak Aghadi,
104 "Shramik" (Royal Crest),
Plot No.31, Lokmanya Tilak Colony,
Road No.3, Dadar (East),
Mumbai - 400 014
2. Vijay Nikalje,
Flat No.04, Shri Yog CHS.,
Kharegaon, Kalwa, Thane 400 605
3. Dinesh Nakashe,
Area Manager, 8 Angela Baptista,
Behind Maha Auto, C.S.T. Road,
Kalina, Santacruz (East),
Mumbai - 400 098
4. Avinash Oza,
Assistant General Manager,
8, Angela Baptista, Behind Maha Auto,
1
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C.S.T. Road, Kalina, Santacruz (East),
Mumbai - 400 098
5. Dattatray Sahadev Madye,
Age Adult, Occupation Nil,
R/at: 104, Shivranjan Housing Society,
Kurar Village, Malad East,
Mumbai 400 094
6. Vijay Balkrishna Raul,
Age Adult, Occupation Nil,
R/at Ramdas Chowk, Rajbali Dube
Chawl, Chawl No.343, Room No.6,
Mill Road, Kurla (W), Mumbai 400 070
7. Uday Hjru Palaye,
Age Adult, Occupation Nil,
Mayekar Chawl, Waghari Wada,
Datta Mandir Road, Near Vakola Bridge,
Kalina, Santacruz (E), Mumbai 400 055
8. Vivek Sadashiv Palav,
Age Adult, Occupation Nil,
R/at: Amar Jyoth Building,
1st Floor, Room No.4, Hatav Pull
Pipe Line, Kurla (W), Mumbai 400 070
9. Pandurang Bala Parab,
Age Adult, Occupation Nil,
R/at:- 3/5, National Chawl,
Kranti Nagar, Aakurli Road,
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101 ... Respondents
Mr. Avinash Jalisatgi with Mr. T.R. Yadav, Ms. Divya
Wadekar and Mr. Mulanshu Vora i/by Mr. Vaibhav
Jagdale for the petitioner.
Mr. Nigam C. Kumar with Mrs. Shilpa D. More i/by
N.K. Juris for respondent Nos.7 and 9.
2
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CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : APRIL 9, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 10, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. By the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have called in
question the legality and correctness of the judgment and order
dated 3 May 2019 passed by the Industrial Court at Mumbai in
Complaint (ULP) No. 466 of 2009. By the said judgment, the
Industrial Court, while rejecting the remaining allegations, reliefs
and claims advanced in the complaint, nevertheless proceeded to
record a finding that the petitioners had engaged in unfair labour
practices falling under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour
Practices Act, 1971. Consequential directions were issued thereby
requiring the petitioners to pay retrenchment compensation and
gratuity to 35 employees named in the complaint.
2. The facts giving rise to the present petition, as set out by the
petitioners, may be briefly stated. The petitioners are engaged in
the business of providing utility services, housekeeping, office
assistance and other allied services to various clients, which
includes supply of security personnel. Having regard to the nature
of such business, the deployment of employees is dependent upon
the availability of contracts and work sites. It is, therefore, an
inherent feature of the petitioners' operations that employees are
required to be deployed and re-deployed at different locations
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from time to time, depending upon the contractual requirements.
It is the case of the petitioners that in or about the year 2009,
certain employees declined to comply with orders of transfer or
relocation issued by the petitioners and further failed to report for
duty at the locations to which they were assigned. According to the
petitioners, such employees thereafter remained absent and did
not resume their duties.
3. Respondent No. 1, claiming to espouse the cause of all
employees in the employment of the petitioners, instituted
Complaint (ULP) No. 466 of 2009 before the Industrial Court at
Mumbai under Section 28 read with Items 1, 4 and 6 of Schedule
II and Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP
Act, 1971. In the said complaint, several allegations were levelled
against the petitioners and respondent Nos. 2 to 4. It was alleged
that the petitioners had failed to extend statutory benefits
available under various labour legislations. Specific allegations
were made regarding non-payment of benefits such as house rent
allowance, privilege leave, sick leave, casual leave and national
holidays with wages. It was further alleged that the petitioners had
not issued Employees' State Insurance cards and had not provided
documents under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme. The
complaint also contained allegations that wages were not being
paid in accordance with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act,
1948 and that overtime wages were not being paid as required
under law. Additionally, it was alleged that upon employees joining
respondent No. 1 union, the petitioners adopted hostile conduct by
threatening such employees and discontinuing the allotment of
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work. The complaint was stated to have been filed on behalf of
approximately 39 employees. However, no list of such employees
was annexed and reliance was placed solely upon certain
membership forms purportedly executed by them.
4. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, respondent No. 1
preferred an application dated 18 January 2010 before the
Industrial Court, asserting that an additional 25 employees had,
after institution of the complaint, become members of the union. It
was prayed that the interim as well as final reliefs sought in the
complaint be extended to such additional members. Notably, the
said application did not contain the names of these alleged
employees nor was any list annexed. Only certain membership
forms were produced. The said application came to be marked as
Exhibit U-8. The petitioners opposed the said application. It is
material to note that the Industrial Court did not pass any order on
the said application. Further, no steps were taken by respondent
No. 1 to amend the complaint so as to incorporate these alleged
additional members. In such circumstances, according to the
petitioners, the said persons never formed part of the proceedings
before the Industrial Court.
5. During the pendency of the proceedings, the Industrial
Court, by an interim order dated 20 April 2010, directed the
petitioners to provide work to the persons named in Annexure-A to
Exhibit U-14, subject to such workmen reporting for duty within
seven days from the date of the order. The petitioners contend that
none of the concerned workmen complied with the said condition
by reporting for duty, nor did they seek any further directions from
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the Industrial Court thereafter.
6. The petitioners filed their written statement before the
Industrial Court controverting the allegations made in the
complaint and placing on record their version of facts. It was
specifically contended that the workmen named in Annexure-A
had abstained from duty at the instance of respondent No. 1
union. The petitioners asserted that several communications were
addressed to such workmen calling upon them to resume duty,
however, the same were returned undelivered as the addressees
refused to accept them.
7. Upon hearing the parties, the Industrial Court, by its
judgment and order dated 3 May 2019, partly allowed the
complaint. While the allegations pertaining to Items 1, 4 and 6 of
Schedule II and Items 5 and 10 of Schedule IV were rejected, the
Industrial Court held that the petitioners had engaged in unfair
labour practices under Item 9 of Schedule IV. On that basis,
directions were issued to the petitioners to pay retrenchment
compensation and gratuity to approximately 35 persons named in
the order. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have preferred
the present writ petition.
8. Mr. Jalisatgi, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners,
submitted that the concerned employees had voluntarily abstained
from reporting for duty and that there was no act on the part of
the petitioners preventing them from resuming work. He invited
attention to the findings recorded by the Industrial Court itself,
wherein it has been held that the petitioners had not restrained
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any employee from reporting on duty and further that the
employees were not entitled to wages for the intervening period. It
was contended that once such findings were recorded, it
necessarily followed that no cause of action survived against the
petitioners and the complaint ought to have been dismissed in its
entirety. It was further urged that mere omission on the part of the
employer either to terminate the services of employees or to
initiate disciplinary proceedings cannot, by any stretch, constitute
an unfair labour practice, much less one falling under Item 9 of
Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. It was submitted
that the statutory provision under Item 9 contemplates failure to
implement an award, settlement or agreement, and does not
encompass a situation where no such obligation is shown to have
been breached. On this basis, it was contended that the findings
recorded by the Industrial Court are contrary to law and
unsustainable.
9. It was further submitted that assuming the Industrial Court
had come to the conclusion that the petitioners had engaged in
unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV, it was
incumbent upon the Court to specifically identify the award,
settlement or agreement which had allegedly not been
implemented by the petitioners. It was pointed out that the
impugned judgment is completely silent on this essential aspect.
According to the learned Advocate, such omission strikes at the
root of the impugned order, rendering it legally untenable and
liable to be set aside. The learned Advocate further submitted that
none of the concerned employees, nor respondent No. 1, had
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challenged the orders of transfer or posting issued by the
petitioners. Even during the pendency of the complaint, no
effective or concrete steps were taken by the employees or the
union to resume work or seek appropriate directions for the same.
It was highlighted that, except for two employees, none of the
concerned persons entered the witness box. These circumstances,
whether considered individually or cumulatively, indicate that the
employees were not inclined to continue in employment. It was
thus contended that the complaint was instituted and pursued
with mala fide intent, with a view to exert pressure upon the
petitioners. In such circumstances, it was submitted that the
Industrial Court ought to have dismissed the complaint.
10. It was further contended that it was never the case of the
respondents that the petitioners had terminated the services of the
concerned employees. Neither the employees nor the union
initiated any proceedings before any forum alleging termination.
This circumstance, coupled with the admitted position that no
steps were taken by the employees during the pendency of the
proceedings to obtain work, clearly establishes that the employees
had no intention to resume duties. It was submitted that the
Industrial Court failed to consider this material aspect and thereby
arrived at conclusions which are not sustainable in law. It was
further urged that no relief could have been granted in favour of
the employees unless a clear finding was recorded that the
petitioners had illegally prevented them from reporting for duty.
On the contrary, the Industrial Court has categorically held that
there was no such prevention. The Industrial Court also rejected
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the allegation of illegal lockout and dismissed the complaint under
Item 6 of Schedule II. Additionally, it held that the principle of "no
work no pay" applied, thereby denying wages for the intervening
period. In view of these findings, it was submitted that the
employees themselves were responsible for not working and were,
therefore, not entitled to any relief. The grant of relief, in such
circumstances, is stated to be internally inconsistent and contrary
to the findings recorded. It was further submitted that the
direction issued by the Industrial Court to pay retrenchment
compensation and gratuity is contrary to the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972. It was contended that in the absence of any act of
retrenchment by the petitioners, and considering that the
employees had not rendered any service during the period from
2010 to 2019, the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to award
retrenchment compensation or gratuity for such period.
11. The learned Advocate also contended that the Industrial
Court erred in granting reliefs to persons who were not parties to
the original complaint. It was submitted that the complaint, as
initially filed, pertained to 39 employees whose names were set
out in Annexure 'A'. Subsequently, by an application at Exhibit U-8,
respondent No. 1 sought to include an additional 25 employees.
The said application was opposed by the petitioners and was never
adjudicated upon by the Industrial Court. It was further submitted
that no amendment to the complaint was sought or carried out for
incorporating such additional employees. In the absence of any
such amendment and without any order allowing the said
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application, the Industrial Court could not have extended reliefs to
persons who were not part of the original proceedings.
12. Per contra, Mr. Kumar, learned Advocate appearing for
respondent Nos. 7 and 9, submitted that the petitioners are
financially sound and carry on business with considerable profits,
yet have exhibited an indifferent attitude towards their employees.
It was contended that despite assurances, the petitioners failed to
extend statutory benefits under various labour laws. Repeated
representations made by the employees did not yield any result. It
was alleged that house rent allowance, though legally payable, was
not granted. Similarly, privilege leave, casual leave and sick leave
were not provided. National holidays with wages were also denied.
It was further submitted that although contributions under the
Employees' State Insurance Scheme were deducted from wages,
the employees were not provided with ESI cards or identification
numbers, thereby depriving them of benefits under the scheme. It
was also alleged that several employees were not paid wages in
accordance with the Minimum Wages Act. Though provident fund
contributions were deducted, no corresponding records or slips
were provided, and in some cases, such contributions were not
deposited. No provident fund account numbers were issued. It was
also alleged that overtime wages were not paid despite employees
being required to work beyond prescribed hours, and that
adequate safety measures were not provided.
13. It was further submitted that respondent No. 1 had collected
information regarding wages paid to security guards deployed by
the petitioners at various locations. It was contended that the
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petitioners were in the practice of abruptly withdrawing security
personnel from one site and directing them to report at another
location. In such situations, the employees were required to
remain present at the office for extended periods, but were
thereafter sent back without any work assignment or posting order.
It was alleged that wages were not paid for such days, despite the
employees being available for work.
14. It was further submitted that during the pendency of the
complaint, an interim application was filed seeking a direction to
the petitioners to allot work to the concerned employees. It was
contended that the petitioners did not file any reply to the said
application, and accordingly, by order dated 20 April 2010, the
Industrial Court directed the petitioners to assign work to the
employees named in the application within a period of seven days
from the date of the order.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
15. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties and
having gone through the pleadings and the material placed on
record, the real issue is whether the petitioners can be said to have
committed unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of
the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971, and whether the reliefs granted by
the Industrial Court can stand when tested on the touchstone of
the record and the findings itself recorded by that Court.
16. The petitioners have taken a clear stand that the concerned
employees had themselves stopped reporting for work and that the
petitioners had not prevented them from joining duty. This
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submission cannot be brushed aside lightly, because the Industrial
Court itself has recorded a finding that the petitioners had not
stopped any employee from reporting on duty. Once such a finding
is there, the foundation of the complaint becomes weak. The Court
below has also held that the employees were not entitled to wages
for the interregnum on the principle of no work, no pay. If that is
so, then the necessary consequence was to examine whether any
further relief could still survive against the petitioners. In my view,
the answer would be no, because when the Court itself accepted
that there was no prevention from work and no entitlement to
wages for the period in question, the complaint could not have
been partly converted into a case of unfair labour practice under
Item 9 without a proper legal basis.
17. Item 9 of Schedule IV is very specific. It speaks of failure to
implement an award, settlement, or agreement. Therefore, if the
Industrial Court wanted to hold the petitioners guilty under Item
9, it was first necessary for the Court to record which award,
which settlement, or which agreement was not implemented. The
impugned order does not show this. There is no clear finding on
any award. There is no clear finding on any settlement. There is no
clear finding on any agreement. In such situation, the finding
under Item 9 becomes without support of law. The petitioners are
right in saying that omission to terminate services or omission to
start disciplinary action cannot by itself be treated as unfair labour
practice under that item.
18. The case of the petitioners also gets support from the
conduct of the employees. The orders of transfer or posting were
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never challenged by the concerned employees or by respondent
No.1. Even during the pendency of the complaint, there is nothing
to show that the employees made any sincere or effective effort to
resume work in the manner required by law. Except two
employees, the other concerned persons did not step into the
witness box. When a party claims denial of employment or denial
of work, it is expected to come before the Court and speak to the
facts. Silence of most of the employees, coupled with absence of
any challenge to the transfer or posting orders, does create serious
doubt about the genuineness of the complaint. The petitioners
have, therefore, a fair point that the complaint appears to have
been pursued more as a pressure tactic than as a genuine
grievance of denial of service.
19. A further important aspect is that it was never the case of the
respondents that the petitioners had formally terminated the
services of the concerned employees. No proceeding was brought
before any Court or authority alleging such termination. If there is
no termination, the normal legal case of retrenchment does not
arise. If there is no retrenchment, direction to pay retrenchment
compensation becomes difficult to sustain. The Industrial Court
seems to have lost sight of this basic distinction. It has itself held
that the petitioners had not prevented the employees from
performing duty and had also denied the plea of illegal lockout.
Once that is the position, then the employees cannot be treated as
retrenched employees for purpose of compensation.
20. The direction to pay gratuity also stands on weak ground.
Gratuity is not a benefit which can be granted in a vacuum. It is
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tied to the actual service conditions and to the legal event which
makes it payable. If the employees had not worked for more than
five and if there was no termination by the petitioners, then an
award of gratuity for that period cannot be justified in the manner
done by the Industrial Court. The Court below has not shown how
the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 was attracted in the facts of this
case so as to fasten such liability upon the petitioners. The
direction, therefore, appears to be legally unsound.
21. The grievance of the petitioners regarding inclusion of
persons not covered by the original complaint is also well-founded.
The complaint was filed in respect of employees shown in
Annexure A, which was said to contain 39 employees. Thereafter,
Exhibit U-8 was filed seeking to bring in 25 more employees. That
application was opposed by the petitioners. More importantly, no
order was passed by the Industrial Court on that application. When
there is no order, there is no valid enlargement of the scope of the
complaint. Also the complaint was never amended to include those
additional employees. In such circumstances, the Industrial Court
could not have extended reliefs in favour of persons who were not
part of the original complaint and who were never properly
brought on record. That part of the impugned order cannot be
supported.
22. At the same time, the submissions of respondent No.7 and 9
also deserve notice, because the complaint was not entirely
without factual allegations. They alleged non-payment of house
rent allowance, leave benefits, national holidays, ESI benefits,
provident fund slips, minimum wages, overtime wages and safety
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measures. If proved, they would certainly show breach of labour
obligations. However the problem for the respondents is that the
Industrial Court has already rejected the main allegations under
Items 1, 4 and 6 of Schedule II and Items 5 and 10 of Schedule IV.
That means the foundation of those allegations did not survive.
What remained was only Item 9, and on that aspect the Court
below did not record the necessary legal finding with clarity.
Therefore, even if some factual grievance existed, the final relief
granted cannot be sustained merely on sympathy or on general
dissatisfaction with the petitioners' conduct.
23. The statement that the petitioners used to shift security
guards from one site to another and sometimes send them back
without work also does not assist the respondents beyond a point,
because the issue before this Court is not whether the petitioners
were perfect employers, but whether the specific legal findings and
reliefs granted by the Industrial Court are sustainable. Even if
there were management practices which caused inconvenience, the
Court below was still bound to examine the exact legal ingredients
of the alleged unfair labour practice. The result is that the
impugned order travels beyond the pleadings and beyond the
findings recorded in the same judgment.
24. On the whole, the record shows a clear inconsistency in the
approach of the Industrial Court. On one hand it has held that the
petitioners did not stop the employees from reporting for duty and
that wages for the intervening period were not payable. On the
other hand it has still granted retrenchment compensation and
gratuity, and has also proceeded under Item 9 without identifying
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the award, settlement or agreement allegedly breached. Such an
order cannot be allowed to stand. The grant of benefit to persons
not properly included in the complaint is also without authority.
Thus, the impugned judgment suffers from serious legal infirmity
and cannot be sustained.
25. For these reasons, the proper conclusion is that the
complaint, to the extent it has been partly allowed against the
petitioners, cannot be upheld. The petitioners have shown that the
employees had not been illegally prevented from work, that no
termination was proved, that Item 9 was not correctly attracted,
and that relief was wrongly extended to additional persons who
were never validly brought into the proceedings. The order under
challenge is therefore liable to be set aside.
26. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons recorded
hereinabove, the following order is passed:
(i) The writ petition is allowed;
(ii) The judgment and order dated 3 May 2019 passed by
the Industrial Court, Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No. 466 of
2009 is hereby quashed and set aside to the extent it holds
that the petitioners have engaged in unfair labour practice
under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act,
1971 and directs payment of retrenchment compensation
and gratuity to the concerned employees;
(iii) The complaint (ULP) No. 466 of 2009 stands
dismissed;
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(iv) It is clarified that the findings recorded by the
Industrial Court rejecting the allegations under Items 1, 4
and 6 of Schedule II and Items 5 and 10 of Schedule IV shall
remain undisturbed;
(v) No order as to costs.
27. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
