Bombay High Court
Sarwan Kumar Jhabarmal Choudhary vs Sachin Shyamsundar Begrajka on 16 October, 2025
Author: M. S. Karnik
Bench: M. S. Karnik, N. R. Borkar
2025:BHC-OS:19505
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION
Digitally signed
URMILA by URMILA
PRAMOD
PRAMOD INGALE
Date:
INGALE 2025.10.16
19:51:54 +0530
MISC. PETITION (L) NO. 6300 OF 2024
IN
TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO. 109 OF 2021
Sarwan Kumar Jhabarmal Choudhary
S/o Jhabarmal Chowdhary,
Domicile of Ecuador,
Hindu, Non Resident Indian,
Divorcee, Occupation - Business ...Petitioner
Versus
Sachin Shyamsundar Begrajka
Aged 45 years, Hindu, Indian Inhabitant
of Mumbai, Occu. Service,
R/at. B-301, Sierra Towers, Lokhandwala
Township, Kandivali (East)
Mumbai - 400 101 being the Sole
Executor and Trustee named in the
above mentioned Last will and Testament
of the Deceased ...Respondent
....
Ms. Yashvi Panchal for the petitioner.
Ms. Sonal, Rohit Gupta a/w Kinnar Shah, Ms. Aditi Bhargava, Mr.
Vaibhav Singh, Mr. Shikha Jain, Mr. Saurabh Jain i/b Divya Shah
Associates for the respondent.
....
CORAM : M. S. KARNIK &
N. R. BORKAR, JJ.
1
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RESERVED ON : 12th AUGUST, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 16th OCTOBER, 2025
UPLOADED ON : 16th OCTOBER, 2025
JUDGMENT :
- (PER M. S. KARNIK, J.)
1. Learned Single Judge of this Court (Manish Pitale, J.)
invoked Rule 28(C) of the Bombay High Court (Original Side)
Rules, 1980, to formulate following questions for decision by a
larger bench.
"(I)Whether explanation (a) to (e) to Section 263 of
the Indian Succession Act, 1925, are exhaustive or
illustrative, in the context of "just cause" for
revoking or annulling grant of Probate or Letters of
Administration?
(II) Whether circumstances not covered under
explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 of the
Succession Act, 1925, can become the basis for "just
cause" for the Court to revoke or annul grant of
Probate or Letters of Administration?
(III) Whether the judgments of learned Single
Judges of this Court in the cases of George Anthony
Harris vs. Millicent Spencer [AIR 1933 Bom. 370]
and Sharad Shankarrao Mane and etc. vs. Ashabai
Shripati Mane [AIR 1997 Bom 275], lay down the
correct position of law?"
2. The papers were accordingly placed before the Hon'ble the
Chief Justice for consideration. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice
referred the questions formulated by learned Single Judge for
consideration before this Division Bench.
3. The learned Single Judge was unable to agree with the
position of law laid down by the learned Single Judges of this
Court in George Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer1 and Sharad
Shankarrao Mane and etc. v. Ashabai Shripati Mane 2. It was
observed that an important question regarding the very
jurisdiction of this Court in the context of Section 263 of the
Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the
"Succession Act") arises, which needs to be settled authoritatively
by a larger bench of this Court.
4. We have carefully perused the detailed order passed by the
learned Single Judge. Before we proceed to deal with the
questions referred for our consideration, it would be appropriate
to appreciate the background facts leading to the reference.
1 AIR 1933 Bom 370
2 AIR 1997 Bom 275
5. Testamentary Petition No. 109 of 2021 was filed by the
respondent for the grant of Probate of a Will allegedly executed
on 3rd March 2022 by deceased Rajesh Chowdhary. Rajesh
Chowdhary died in Ecuador on 25th July 2020, having committed
suicide. The cause of death as recorded in the death certificate is
stated to be suffocation by means of hanging. On 9 th December
2020, the respondent filed the testamentary petition for the grant
of probate. On 20th May 2021, the petitioner filed a caveat and
his affidavit in support of the caveat. The caveat was allotted
lodging number 11828 of 2021. By an order dated 19 th December
2022, the delay in filing the caveat and affidavit in support was
condoned. On 3rd August 2023, the Prothonotary and Senior
Master of this Court granted the petitioner/caveator a last chance
to remove office objections within 4 weeks in respect of the
caveat, so that it could be numbered, failing which the caveat was
to stand rejected under Rule 986 of the Bombay High Court
(Original Side) Rules, 1980.
6. The Advocate for the petitioner/caveator failed to remove
the office objections, as a consequence of which, by operation of
the said order, the caveat stood dismissed. On 10 th November
2023, the Additional Prothonotary and Senior Master of this
Court noted that caveats of some of the caveators, including that
of the petitioner, stood dismissed due to non-removal of office
objections, and the only remaining caveat was withdrawn. On
this basis, the petition was granted, and the office was directed to
issue probate.
7. On 1st January 2023, the petitioner filed Interim Application
(L) No.34288 of 2023 for restoration of his caveat, but in the
meanwhile, the office issued the grant. In this backdrop, the
petitioner filed the present miscellaneous petition for revocation
of the grant and thereupon, on 14 th February 2024, the petitioner
withdrew the aforesaid application for restoration of his caveat.
8. Before the learned Single Judge, counsel for the petitioner
submitted as under:-
That the petitioner (original caveator) was invoking Section
263(a) of the Succession Act for revocation of the probate granted
in favour of the respondent. That the deceased had died under
suspicious circumstances, having committed suicide in Ecuador.
That in the affidavits of the two attesting witnesses, they
themselves stated that while the subject Will was signed and
executed by the deceased-testator in Ecuador, the attesting
witnesses had signed on the same in India. That, therefore, the
grant could be said to be defective in substance. That the
mandatory requirement of Section 63 of the Succession Act was
not satisfied inasmuch as the attesting witnesses had not signed
the Will in the presence of the testator. Therefore, the grant
ought to be revoked. Although the delay in filing the caveat and
affidavit in support thereof was condoned, due to default and
mistake on the part of the advocate representing the petitioner
(original caveator), the caveat stood dismissed due to non-
removal of office objections. The petitioner ought not to suffer
due to negligence, oversight and mistake of the advocate and that
therefore, this Court may consider revoking the grant.
9. On the other hand, before the learned Single Judge, it was
submitted by counsel appearing for the respondent that:
The grounds raised in the revocation petition are not
covered in any of the explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 of the
Succession Act and, therefore, this Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction to revoke the grant already issued. That explanations
(a) to (e) given in Section 263 of the Succession Act are
exhaustive and not illustrative in nature, thereby asserting that
"just cause" for revoking or annulling the grant is necessarily
required to be covered under explanations (a) to (e) to Section
263 of the Succession Act. That the ground of negligence,
oversight or mistake of the advocate representing the petitioner is
not covered under explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 of the
Succession Act. That the grant was issued on the basis of the
affidavits of the two attesting witnesses already placed on record
with the testamentary petition for grant of probate, and therefore,
explanation (a) to Section 263 of the said Act cannot be invoked
by the petitioner. That the caveator and/or the advocate
representing the caveator were responsible for the dismissal of the
caveat on the ground of non-removal of office objections, and
since the grant was already issued, there was no question of now
entertaining any contentions or arguments on behalf of the
petitioner in respect of the subject Will.
10. The aforesaid submissions were advanced before the
learned Single Judge. Reference to the arguments before the
learned Single Judge has some bearing on the questions
formulated.
11. So far as this reference is concerned, Ms Yashvi Panchal,
learned Advocate for the petitioner, advanced the following
submissions:
(i) That, Section 263 of the Succession Act is not
exhaustive, and the explanations mentioned therein
are illustrations to be used as guidelines for
interpreting the words "just cause" used in the
section.
(ii) That the petitioner had lodged his caveat, and the
delay in filing the caveat came to be condoned;
however, due to negligence and oversight on the part
of the advocate, the caveat was dismissed for non-
removal of office objection, and probate came to be
issued.
(iii) That the grant of probate deserves to be revoked, as
legitimate and serious objections could not be
considered due to the dismissal of the caveat, which
was based on the non-removal of office objection.
Additionally, certain aspects of the matter necessitate
a trial, and it is argued that the grant is substantively
defective.
12. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance on
the following judgments in support :-
(i) Annoda Prosad Chatterjee v. Kali Krishna, (1897) ILR
24 Cal 95.
(ii) Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Sankarbai, ILR 26 Bom 792.
(iii) Subroya Chetty v. Ragammall, ILR 28 Mad 161.
(iv) Gaur Chandra Das v. Sarat Sundari Das , 1913 ILR 40
Cal 50.
(v) Surendra Nath Pramanik v. Amrita Lal Pal, (1919)
I.L.R. 47 Cal. 115.
(vi) Mohammad Renu Mia v. Sabida Khaton, 1918 SCC
OnLine Cal 120.
(vii) Srish Chandra Chaudhary v. Bhaba Tarini Devi, AIR
1928 Cal 695.
(viii) George Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer, AIR
1933 Bom 370.
(ix) Gulam Ali v. Rahmutullah Khan, AIR 1941 Rang 259.
(x) T Arumuga Mudaliar, AIR 1955 Mad 622.
(xi) Promode Kumar Roy v. Sephalika Dutta , AIR 1957
Cal. 631.
(xii) Southern Bank Ltd. v. Kesarbeg Ganeriwalla & Ors. ,
AIR 1957 Cal 377.
(xiii) In re Sureman Singh & another, AIR 1969 Pat 183.
(xiv) Rajkishore Panda & Anr. v. Haribabu Mahala & Ors. ,
AIR 1973 Ori 81
(xv) Rajeshwari Devi v. Harilal, AIR 1978 MP 201.
(xvi) R. Sivagnanam v. Sadananda Mudliyar , AIR 1978
Mad 265.
(xvii) G. Shanmugham Chetti v. Chinnammal, AIR 1978
Mad 304.
(xviii) S. Govindaraj v. K. R. Ramamani, 1991-2 LW 380.
(xix) Gita alias Gita Ravi v. Mary Janet James , 1995-2 LW
(xx) N. Saroja v. Sri Vidya Chits & Finance, (P) Ltd.
(1996-2 MLJ 74.
(xxi) Sharad Shankarrao Mane v. Ashabai Shripati Mane ,
AIR 1997 Bom 275.
(xxii) Cheryl Margurite Sogee v. Lt. Co. Richard Charles
Measse, ILR 1997 Kar 742.
(xxiii) In re: In the Goods of Sisir Kumar Mitra , AIR 2010
Cal 27.
(xxiv) Moonga Devi v. Radha Ballabh, AIR 1972 SC 471.
(xxv) Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiram, 1985 1 SCC 591.
(xxvi) George Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer , 1932
SCC OnLine Bom 156.
13. Per Contra, Ms Sonal, learned Advocate for the respondent,
made the following submissions:-
(i) That the statement of object and reasons of said
Bill No.4 of 1923, which was passed as the Act,
states that the object of the bill is to consolidate the
Indian law relating to succession as the separate
existence on the statute book of a number of large
and important enactments rendered the law
difficult to ascertain, the bill had been preferred by
the Statute Law Revision Committee as a purely
consolidating measure and no intentional change
of law had been made.
(ii) That it is a trite law that the intention of the
legislature is evident from the language of the
section, and hence, literal interpretation is the
golden rule of interpretation.
(iii) That a perusal of Section 263 shows that the grant
of probate or letter of administration may be
revoked or annulled for 'just cause'. The
explanations to the section state that 'just cause'
shall be 'deemed to exist' where the situation and
contingencies mentioned in clauses (a) to (e)
thereof are shown to exist, followed by eight
illustrations.
(iv) That an explanation is an integral part of the
section. Though 'just cause' has not been defined in
the first part of the section, it has been defined in
the explanation.
(v) That the orthodox function of an explanation is to
explain the meaning and effect of the main
provision to which it is an explanation and to clear
up any doubt and ambiguity in it, yet even though
the provision in question has been called an
explanation, it must be construed according to its
plain language and not on any a priori
considerations.
(vi) That the meaning to be attached to the word
'deemed' must depend upon the context in which it
is used, and it is well settled that the interpretation
of a statute depends on text and context. In the
context of section 263 of the Act, the word
'deemed' means 'regarded as being' or 'shall be
taken to be'. The expression 'shall be deemed to
exist where' means 'shall be regarded to exist
where' or 'shall be taken to exist where' or simply
'is'. Thus, there is no change from the position of
law as contained in the Succession Act, 1865 and
the Probate and Administration Act,1881.
(vii) That the ground mentioned in section 263 cannot
be held to be illustrative, as such a view would
open the floodgates for people to take a second
chance at causing hindrance to the grant of Probate
and Letter of Administration and distribution of the
estate of the deceased and would also enable
mischievous litigants to file an application under
section 263 on frivolous grounds, which would
lead to the delay in the administration of the estate
of the deceased, which is against public policy.
(viii) That a consolidating statute is not intended to alter
existing law. The statement of objects and reasons
for Bill No. 4 of 1923, which was eventually
enacted as the Act, specifically states this intention.
Schedule V of Bill No. 4 of 1923 includes a table
that outlines the sections proposed for repeal. This
table indicates that section 263 corresponds to
section 234 of the Indian Succession Act of 1865
and section 50 of the Probate and Administration
Act of 1889.
(ix) That the change in the language of the explanation
from 'just cause is' to 'just cause shall be deemed to
exist where' is only a change in language and not a
change in meaning. Thus, the interpretation of
section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act,
1881, as amended in 1889 and section 234 of the
Indian Succession Act, 1865, applies to the
interpretation of section 263.
14. Learned Advocate for the respondent has placed reliance on
the following judgments in support.
i. Lynette Fernandes v. Gertie Mathias, 2018 1 SCC 271.
ii. Anil Behari Ghosh v. Latika Bala Dassi, AIR 1955 SC
566.
iii. Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Sakwarbai alias Taj Maharaj &
Ors., ILR 1902 26 Bom 792.
iv. Sharad Shankarrao Mane v. Ashabai Shripati Mane ,
AIR 1996 Bom 422.
v. George Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer, AIR 1932
Bom 156.
vi. Kali Krishna Chatterjee v. Annoda Prosad Chatterjee,
1896 ILR 24 Cal 95.
vii. Promode Kumar Roy v. Sephalika Dutta, AIR 1957 Cal.
631.
viii. Hara Coomar Sircar v. Doorgamoni Dasi, 1893 ILR 25
Cal 195.
ix. Southern Bank Ltd v. Kesardeg Ganeriwalla , 1957 SCC
OnLine Cal 146.
x. Mohan Dass v. Lutchman Dass, 1881 ILR 11 Cal 11.
xi. In re Sureman Singh & another, AIR 1968 Pat 47.
xii. Bablu Mandal v. Vandana Bhowmik, 2008 1 MPLJ
522.
xiii. P. H. Alphonso v. C.F. Coasta, AIR 1964 Ksant 187.
xiv. K.N. Srinivas v. C. Krishna Iyenger, AIR 1957 Kant 74.
xv. Pradeep Kumar Chatterjee v. Shibarata Chatterjee ,
2003 SCC Online Jhar 643.
xvi. Subroya Chetty v. Ragammall, 1904 ILR 28 Mad 161.
xvii. The estate Good and effects of T. Velu Mudaliar c.
Arumugla Mudaliar, AIR 1955 Mad 622.
xviii. Gita alias Gita Ravi v. Mary Janet James , 1995-2 LW
xix. Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra,
1977 2 SCC 548.
xx. Aphaki Pharmaceuticals v. State of Maharashtra, 1989
4 SCC 378.
xxi. Govt. of Andra Pradesh v. Corporation Bank , 2007 9
SCC 55.
xxii. Consolidated Coffee Ltd. v. Coffee Board, 1980 3 SCC
xxiii. The State of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy ,
1977 4 SCC 471.
xxiv. Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioner ,
1996 2 ALL ER 817.
xxv. Beswick v. Beswick, 1968 AC 58.
xxvi. Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd v.
Electricity Inspector & Etio, 2007 5 SCC 447.
xxvii. PIBCO v. CCE, 1988 35 ELT 130.
xxviii. Moonga Devi & Ors v. Radha Ballabh , 1973 2 SCC
15. Heard learned counsel at length. Before we proceed to
consider the rival submissions, let us examine the relevant
statutory provisions. Chapter III of the Indian Succession Act,
1925 contains provisions regarding alteration and revocation of
grants. Revocation or annulment of grant of probate or letters of
administration for "just cause" is provided in Section 263 of the
Succession Act. One of the questions before us is whether
explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 of the Succession Act, are
exhaustive or illustrative, in the context of "just cause" for
revoking or annulling a grant of Probate or Letters of
Administration. To decide this question, it is imperative for us to
appreciate the phraseology of the explanation appended to
Section 263 of the Succession Act and to further draw a
comparison of the same with the provisions for revoking or
annulling grant of Probate or Letters of Administration under the
law governing this aspect prior to the coming into force of the
Succession Act, more specifically, Section 234 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1865 and Section 50 of the Probate and
Administration Act, 1881. For ready reference, these Sections are
reproduced as under :-
A. Section 263, Indian Succession Act, 1925:
"263. Revocation or annulment for just cause - The grant of
probate or letters of administration may be revoked or
annulled for just cause.
Explanation-Just cause shall be deemed to exist
where-
(a) the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective
in substance; or
(b) the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a
false suggestion, or by concealing from the Court
something material to the case; or
(c) the grant was obtained by means of an untrue
allegation of a fact essential in point of law to
justify the grant, though such allegation was made in
ignorance or inadvertently; or
(d) the grant has become useless and inoperative
through circumstances, or
(e) the person to whom the grant was made has
wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to
exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter VII of this Part, or has
exhibited under that Chapter an inventory or account
which is untrue in a material respect.
Illustrations
(i) The Court by which the grant was made had
no jurisdiction.
(ii) The grant was made without citing parties who
ought to have been cited.
(iii) The Will of which probate was obtained was
forged or revoked.
(iv) A obtained letters of administration to the
estate of B, as his widow, but it has since
transpired that she was never married to him.
(v) A has taken administration to the estate of Bas
if he had died intestate, but a Will has since
been discovered.
(vi) Since probate was granted, a latter Will has
been discovered.
(vii) Since probate was granted, a codicil has been
discovered which revokes or adds to the
appointment of executors under the Will.
(viii) The person to whom probate was, or letters of
administration were, granted has subsequently
become of unsound mind."
B. Section 234, Indian Succession Act, 1865:
"234. Revocation or annulment for just cause, of
grant of probate or administration- The grant of
probate or letters of administration may be
revoked or annulled for just cause.
Explanation. Just cause is- 1st, that the
proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in
substance; 2nd, that the grant or by concealing
from the Court something material to the case;
3rd, that was obtained fraudulently by making a
false suggestion, the grant was obtained by means
of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point
of law to justify the grant, though such allegation
was made in ignorance or inadvertently: 4th, that
the grant has become useless and inoperative
through circumstances.
Illustrations.
(a) The Court by which the grant was made had no
jurisdiction.
(b) The grant was made without citing parties who
ought to have been cited.
(c) The Will of which probate was obtained was forged
or revoked.
(d) A obtained letters of administration to the estate of
B, as his widow, but it has since transpired that she
was never married to him.
(e) A has taken administration to the estate of B as if
he had died intestate, but a Will has since been
discovered.
(f) Since probate was granted, a Codicil has been
discovered, which revokes or adds to the
appointment of executors under the Will.
(g) The person to whom probate was or letters of
administration were granted has subsequently
become of unsound mind."
C. Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881:
"50. Revocation or annulment for just cause- The grant of
probate or letters of administration may be revoked or
annulled for just cause.
Explanation. "Just cause" is-
1st, that the proceedings to obtain the grant were
defective in substance;
2nd, that the grant was obtained fraudulently by making
a false suggestion, or by concealing from the Court
something material to the case;
3rd, that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue
allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the
grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or
inadvertently;
4th, that the grant has become useless and inoperative
through circumstances.
Illustrations.
(a) The Court by which the grant was made had no
jurisdiction.
(b) The grant was made without citing parties who ought
to have been cited.
(c) The will of which probate was obtained was forged
or revoked.
(d) A obtained letters of administration to the estate of B,
as his widow, but it has since transpired that she was
never married to him.
(e) A has taken administration to the estate of B as if he
had died intestate, but a will has since been
discovered.
(f) Since probate was granted, a later will has been
discovered.
(g) Since probate was granted, a codicil has been
discovered, which revokes or adds to the
appointment of executors under the will.
(h) The person to whom probate was, or letters of
administration were, granted has subsequently
become of unsound mind."
16. A plain reading of Section 263 indicates that revocation or
annulment of a grant is permissible for a "just cause".
Explanation to Section 263 ordains when a "just cause" shall be
deemed to exist. Clauses (a) to (e) thereunder provide
circumstances when a "just cause" shall be deemed to exist. The
illustrations under Section 263 further indicates as to the
situations under which the probate or letters of administration
will be revoked or annulled. The answer to this reference turns
on the interpretation of the term "just cause" appearing in Section
263 of the Succession Act in the context of the explanation.
17. We have perused Section 50 of the Probate and
Administrations Act. It is evident that there has been a departure
in the phraseology used in Section 263 of the Succession Act.
Section 263 uses the expression "just cause shall be deemed to
exist" whilst the erstwhile provision (section 50) used the
expression '"just cause" is'.
18. To determine the legislative intent behind such a change in
the terminology employed in the 'Explanation' in Section 263, a
reference will have to be made to precedents that determined the
position of law in this regard prior to the enactment of the
Succession Act.
19. In Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Sakwarbai & Ors. 3, a Division
Bench of this Court, whilst deciding the nature of the
'Explanation' clause appended to Section 50 of the Probate and
Administration Act, 1861, held the said clause to be exhaustive in
nature. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court in Kali Krishna Chatterjee v. Annoda Prosad
Chatterjee4 pertaining to Section 50 of the Probate and
Administration Act, 1861. What had led to the conflict as to the
3 ILR (1902) 26 Bom 792.
4 (1896) ILR 24 Cal. 95.
interpretation of Section 263 of the Succession Act are the
judgments rendered by learned Single Judges of this Court in
George Antony Harris (supra) and Sharad Shankarrao Mane
(supra), propounding that the 'Explanation' clause to the said
Section is exhaustive in nature. In our humble opinion, the same
was without discussing the notable deviation in the phraseology
of Section 263 from the wording of the former provisions of law
dealing with the subject.
20. The moot point that needs to be addressed is the scope and
ambit of the words "just cause" that have been used in the
Explanation clause appended to the said Sections in case of the
Acts of 1881, 1886 and the Succession Act, 1925. At this stage, it
would be pertinent to allude to certain relevant principles of
statutory interpretation from which we seek guidance.
21. This Court in Narayan s/o Gujabrao Bhoyar Vs. Yeotmal
Zilla Parishad Karmachari Sahakari Path Sanstha Maryadit,
Yeotmal & Anr. (in Writ Petition No. 1744 of 2009) decided on
25th September 2009 in paragraph 11 made the following
observations, which read thus :-
"11. While keeping in mind the object of the Act, the
legislative intent and legislative history, it would have to be
seen that the rule of fair and rational interpretation is
applied. According to Blackstone, the most fair and rational
method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the
intention of the Legislature through the most natural and
probable signs which are "either the words, the context, the
subject-matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit
and reason of the law". This principle was also referred by
the Supreme Court in the case of Atmaram Mittal v. Ishwar
Singh Punia, AIR 1988 SC 203. Lord Watson dealing with
the expression "intention of the Legislature" said that it was
a "slippery phrase" and said:
"In a court of law or equity, what the Legislature
intended to be done or not to be done can only be
legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen
to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and
necessary implication".
22. Basically, interpretation is the process of discovering, from
permissible data, the meaning or intention of the testator as
expressed in his will. If interpretation discloses a clear and full
intention on the part of the testator, further inquiry is not
necessary. On the other hand, courts resort to the process of
construction if the discovered intention is partial or ambiguous
and therefore inconclusive. In pursuing this process, a court is
aided by certain rules of construction or presumptions. In
applying these rules, the court is seeking to assign intention to the
words used by the testator, and is not seeking the testator's actual
intention, for it has already failed to find this. In essence, the
court is attempting to formulate a permissible intent for the
testator with the aid of rules of construction.5
23. An illustration to a statutory provision "merely illustrates a
principle, and what the court should try and do is to deduce the
principle which underlines the illustrations" 6. They are parts of a
section that help to elucidate the principle of the section. 7 They
provide a "better clue to the meaning sought to be conveyed by
the language of the section than the setting in which the section
appears in the Act or the headings that the sections, parts or
chapters carry"8. Illustrations are only aids to understanding the
real scope of an enactment, beyond which they cannot extend or
limit the scope of the text9.
5 Washington and Lee Law Review (Vol.XX)
6 N.S. Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes (13 th Edn. LexisNexis).
7 Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma, (1996) 8 SCC 128, 145, para 19.
8 Amar Singh v. Chhaju Singh, 1972 SCC OnLine P&H 46 at para 31.
9 N.S. Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes (13 th Edn., LexisNexis).
24. What is the purpose of the Explanation clause. Explanation
clause is an internal aid of interpretation of statutes. The purpose
of an Explanation clause, as the term itself suggests, is merely to
explain the applicability of the Section to which it is appended. It
is trite law that an Explanation clause neither expands nor
restricts the meaning of a Section.
25. In Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India
& Ors.10, Their Lordships have elucidated the scope of the
Explanation clauses to a Section. It has been held that the
Explanation must be read harmoniously with the main Section to
clear any ambiguity caused, further stating that an explanation
neither expands nor narrows down the scope of the main
provision; explanation is meant to explain the main provision, not
vice versa. Paragraph 66 of the said judgment is significant which
reads thus :-
"66. What can be discerned from the above is that an
explanation must be read so as to harmonise with and
clear up any ambiguity in the main section. It should
not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section.
10 (2025) 1 SCC 695.
An explanation does not enlarge the scope of the
original section that it is supposed to explain. It is
axiomatic that an explanation only explains and does
not expand or add to the scope of the original section.
The purpose of an explanation is, however, not to limit
the scope of the main provision. The construction of the
explanation must depend upon its terms, and no theory
of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be
inferred from the language used. An "explanation" must
be interpreted according to its own tenor. Sometimes an
explanation is appended to stress upon a particular
thing which ordinarily would not appear clearly from
the provisions of the section. The proper function of an
explanation is to make plain or elucidate what is
enacted in the substantive provision and not to add or
subtract from it. Thus, an explanation does not either
restrict or extend the enacting part; it does not enlarge
or narrow down the scope of the original section that it
is supposed to explain. The Explanation must be
interpreted according to its own tenor; that it is meant
to explain and not vice versa. Explanation added to a
statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any
sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word
itself shows it is merely meant to explain or clarify
certain ambiguities which may have crept in the
statutory provision."
(emphasis supplied by us)
26. In Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. State of Manipur & Ors.11,
Their Lordships, while deciding the import of the Explanation
clause to Section 14(1)(b) of the Wakf Act, 1995, observed the
11 2025 SCC OnLine SC 875.
function of an Explanation clause to be clarificatory in nature and
further enunciated the principles to be considered while
interpreting any provision of a statute that has explanations and
provisos appended to it. We find it profitable to extensively quote
the relevant paragraphs, which will help us answer the questions
formulated. The significant portion reads thus :-
"10. To interpret a legislative provision, what must be
primarily considered is its substantive part. An explanation
simply performs a clarifying function. In other words, the
substantive part of a provision cannot be understood solely
from the point of view of an explanation.
14. The object of any provision must be seen in light of
the provisions surrounding it, which includes the proviso(s)
and the explanation(s) appended to it. When a right
accrues to a person pursuant to a position that they hold, it
ultimately becomes a qualification. Once such qualification
ceases to exist, that person would not be eligible to hold
any other post based on his earlier position, unless the
statute categorically facilitates the same. An explanation,
which is simply in the nature of a clarification as regards
certain categories, cannot be read in a manner which is
violative of the substantive part of the provision. Although
normally, a proviso cannot be used to understand the
substantive part of the provision, there is no absolute bar in
doing so, particularly in cases where the statute is peculiar
and the proviso does not create any exception. For the
aforementioned purpose, an explanation can also be
understood through the proviso. In other words, if a proviso
or an explanation, as the case may be, is phrased in a
manner which throws more light on the objective behind
the substantive part of the provision, there would be no
difficulty in appreciating the same. Ultimately, a proviso or
an explanation may be used for several purposes. Therefore,
what is required is that Courts appreciate the context of
such usage before rendering an interpretation to a provision
vis-a-vis the proviso or explanation contained therein."
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977)
2 SCC 548
"9. ...It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation
is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision
to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or
ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention of the
legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label
cannot control or deflect such intention. It must be
remembered that the legislature has different ways of
expressing itself and in the last analysis the words used by
the legislature alone are the true repository of the intent of
the legislature and they must be construed having regard to
the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even
though the provision in question has been called an
Explanation, we must construe it according to its plain
language and not on any a priori considerations...."
(emphasis supplied)
S. Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591
"46. ...It is now well settled that an Explanation added to a
statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any
sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself
shows it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain
ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory
provision. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes while
dwelling on the various aspects of an Explanation observes
as follows:
(a) The object of an Explanation is to understand the
Act in the light of the explanation.
(b) It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the
original section which it explains, but only makes the
meaning clear beyond dispute. (p. 329)
47. Swarup in Legislation and Interpretation very aptly
sums up the scope and effect of an Explanation thus:
"Sometimes an Explanation is appended to stress
upon a particular thing which ordinarily would not
appear clearly from the provisions of the section. The
proper function of an Explanation is to make plain or
elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision
and not to add or subtract from it. Thus an
Explanation does not either restrict or extend the
enacting part; it does not enlarge or narrow down the
scope of the original section that it is supposed to
explain.... The Explanation must be interpreted
according to its own tenor; that it is meant to explain
and not vice versa." (pp. 297-98)
48. Bindra in Interpretation of Statutes (5th Edn.) at p. 67
states thus:
"An Explanation does not enlarge the scope of the
original section that it is supposed to explain. It is
axiomatic that an Explanation only explains and does
not expand or add to the scope of the original
section... The purpose of an Explanation is, however,
not to limit the scope of the main provision.... The
construction of the Explanation must depend upon its
terms, and no theory of its purpose can be entertained
unless it is to be inferred from the language used. An
'Explanation' must be interpreted according to its own
tenor."
49. The principles laid down by the aforesaid authors are
fully supported by various authorities of this Court. To
quote only a few, in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and
Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. CTO [(1961) 1 SCR 902 :
AIR 1961 SC 315 : (1960) 11 STC 764] a Constitution
Bench decision, Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court,
observed thus:
"Now, the Explanation must be interpreted according
to its own tenor, and it is meant to explain clause (1)
(fl) of the Article and not vice versa. It is an error to
explain the Explanation with the aid of the Article,
because this reverses their roles."
50. In Bihta Cooperative Development Cane Marketing
Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar [(1967) 1 SCR 848 : AIR 1967
SC 389 : 37 Comp Cas 98] this Court observed thus:
"The Explanation must be read so as to harmonise
with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section.
It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of
the section."
51. In Hiralal Rattanlal case [(1973) 1 SCC 216 : 1973 SCC
(Tax) 307] this Court observed thus: [SCC para 25, p. 225:
SCC (Tax) p. 316]
"On the basis of the language of the Explanation this
Court held that it did not widen the scope of clause
(c). But from what has been said in the case, it is clear
that if on a true reading of an Explanation it appears
that it has widened the scope of the main section,
effect be given to legislative intent notwithstanding
the fact that the Legislature named that provision as
an Explanation."
53. Thus, from a conspectus of the authorities referred to
above, it is manifest that the object of an Explanation to a
statutory provision is--
"(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the
Act itself,
(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the
main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it
consistent with the dominant object which it seems to
subserve,
(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant
object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and
purposeful,
(d) an Explanation Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v.
State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548
"9. ...It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation
is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision
to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or
ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention of the
legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label
cannot control or deflect such intention. It must be
remembered that the legislature has different ways of
expressing itself and in the last analysis the words used by
the legislature alone are the true repository of the intent of
the legislature and they must be construed having regard to
the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even
though the provision in question has been called an
Explanation, we must construe it according to its plain
language and not on any a priori considerations...."
(emphasis supplied)
S. Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591
"46. ...It is now well settled that an Explanation added to a
statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any
sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself
shows it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain
ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory
provision. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes while
dwelling on the various aspects of an Explanation observes
as follows:
(a) The object of an Explanation is to understand the
Act in the light of the explanation.
(b) It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the
original section which it explains, but only makes the
meaning clear beyond dispute. (p. 329)
47. Swarup in Legislation and Interpretation very aptly
sums up the scope and effect of an Explanation thus:
"Sometimes an Explanation is appended to stress
upon a particular thing which ordinarily would not
appear clearly from the provisions of the section. The
proper function of an Explanation is to make plain or
elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision
and not to add or subtract from it. Thus an
Explanation does not either restrict or extend the
enacting part; it does not enlarge or narrow down the
scope of the original section that it is supposed to
explain.... The Explanation must be interpreted
according to its own tenor; that it is meant to explain
and not vice versa." (pp. 297-98)
48. Bindra in Interpretation of Statutes (5th Edn.) at p. 67
states thus:
"An Explanation does not enlarge the scope of the
original section that it is supposed to explain. It is
axiomatic that an Explanation only explains and does
not expand or add to the scope of the original
section... The purpose of an Explanation is, however,
not to limit the scope of the main provision.... The
construction of the Explanation must depend upon its
terms, and no theory of its purpose can be entertained
unless it is to be inferred from the language used. An
'Explanation' must be interpreted according to its own
tenor."
49. The principles laid down by the aforesaid authors are
fully supported by various authorities of this Court. To
quote only a few, in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and
Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. CTO [(1961) 1 SCR 902 :
AIR 1961 SC 315 : (1960) 11 STC 764] a Constitution
Bench decision, Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court,
observed thus:
"Now, the Explanation must be interpreted according
to its own tenor, and it is meant to explain clause (1)
(fl) of the Article and not vice versa. It is an error to
explain the Explanation with the aid of the Article,
because this reverses their roles."
50. In Bihta Cooperative Development Cane Marketing
Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar [(1967) 1 SCR 848 : AIR 1967
SC 389 : 37 Comp Cas 98] this Court observed thus:
"The Explanation must be read so as to harmonise
with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section.
It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of
the section."
51. In Hiralal Rattanlal case [(1973) 1 SCC 216 : 1973 SCC
(Tax) 307] this Court observed thus: [SCC para 25, p. 225:
SCC (Tax) p. 316]
"On the basis of the language of the Explanation this
Court held that it did not widen the scope of clause
(c). But from what has been said in the case, it is clear
that if on a true reading of an Explanation it appears
that it has widened the scope of the main section,
effect be given to legislative intent notwithstanding
the fact that the Legislature named that provision as
an Explanation."
53. Thus, from a conspectus of the authorities referred to
above, it is manifest that the object of an Explanation to a
statutory provision is--
"(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the
Act itself,
(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the
main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it
consistent with the dominant object which it seems to
subserve,
(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant
object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and
purposeful,
(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with
or change the enactment or any part thereof but
where some gap is left which is relevant for the
purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the
mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help
or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and
intendment of the enactment, and
(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right
with which any person under a statute has been
clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by
becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the
same.""
(emphasis supplied)
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Corporation Bank, (2007)
9 SCC 55
"12. In construing a statutory provision, the first and
foremost rule of construction is the literal
construction. If the provision is unambiguous and if
from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we
need not call into aid the other rules of construction.
The other rules of construction are invoked when the
legislative intent is not clear. In Bihta Co-op.
Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank
of Bihar [AIR 1967 SC 389] this Court was called
upon to consider Explanation to Section 48(1) of the
Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935. This
Court observed that the Court should not go only by
the label. The Court observed that an explanation
must be read ordinarily to clear up any ambiguity in
the main section and it cannot be construed to widen
the ambit of the section. However, if on a true reading
of an Explanation it appears to the Court in a given
case that the effect of the Explanation is to widen the
scope of the main section then effect must be given to
the legislative intent. It was held that in all such cases
the Court has to find out the true intention of the
legislature. Therefore, there is no Single yardstick to
decide whether an Explanation is enacted to clarify
the ambiguity or whether it is enacted to widen the
scope of the main section...."
(emphasis supplied)
27. In case of ambiguity in interpreting a certain provision, the
Courts have followed the principle of purposive construction,
which is to give such an interpretation of the ambiguous provision
as to uphold its true purpose. The purpose of a certain provision
can be determined by ascertaining the intent of the legislature
behind the use of words in a certain Section, as well as the
legislative history of the provision.
28. In Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid (supra), Their Lordships
referred to the precedents in Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan
Balkrishna Lulla12 and in Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v.
Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys13, which discuss the principle
of purposive construction elaborately. The relevant paragraphs
which are of importance read thus :-
"31. ...The principle of "purposive interpretation" or
"purposive construction" is based on the understanding that
the court is supposed to attach that meaning to the
provisions which serve the "purpose" behind such a
provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it
designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by
interpretative process the court is supposed to realise the
goal that the legal text is designed to realise. As Aharon
Barak puts it:
Purposive interpretation is based on three components:
language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the
range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter
acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he
or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among
the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic
component thus sets the limits of interpretation by
restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text
can bear in its (public or private) language." [ Aharon
Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton
University Press, 2005).]
32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language,
purpose and discretion "of the court", insofar as purposive
component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose
12 (2016) 3 SCC 619.
13 (2011) 11 SCC 334.
at the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals,
interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to
actualise. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil.
33. We may also emphasise that the statutory interpretation
of a provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though
the literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago, was
treated as the "golden rule", it is now the doctrine of
purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly
in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the
purpose or may lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end
which is at variance with the purpose of statute, that cannot
be countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers such as
Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand strategy
for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered
purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the
courts not only in this country but in many other legal
systems as well."
(emphasis supplied)
Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys,
(2011) 11 SCC 334
"25. ...The golden rule of interpretation is that the words of
a statute have to be read and understood in their natural,
ordinary and popular sense. Where however the words used
are capable of bearing two or more constructions, it is
necessary to adopt purposive construction, to identify the
construction to be preferred, by posing the following
questions: (i) What is the purpose for which the provision is
made? (ii) What was the position before making the
provision? (iii) Whether any of the constructions proposed
would lead to an absurd result or would render any part of
the provision redundant? (iv) Which of the interpretations
will advance the object of the provision? The answers to
these questions will enable the court to identify the
purposive interpretation to be preferred while excluding
others. Such an exercise involving ascertainment of the
object of the provision and choosing the interpretation that
will advance the object of the provision can be undertaken,
only where the language of the provision is capable of more
than one construction...."
(emphasis supplied)
29. Considering the legislative history of Section 263 of the
Succession Act, according to us, comparing the wordings of the
earlier provisions that provided for revocation of probate, is an
indication that 'just cause' in the Explanation to Section 263
would be deemed to exist in cases covered by (a) to (e) of the
said Explanation clause, leaving it open for the Courts to
determine the existence of 'just cause' in other cases after
appreciating the facts of each case.
30. In our considered opinion and keeping in mind the
principles of statutory interpretation discussed above, the words
"deemed to be just cause" in the Explanation clause has carved
out cases where 'just cause' has to be assumed to exist. Thus, in
all other cases which do not fall within (a) to (e) of the
Explanation, the Courts would have to, depending on the facts
and circumstances of each case, determine whether 'just cause' is
made out. The Explanation clause providing a deeming fiction
applies to the circumstances where a case is made out in clauses
(a) to (e). There may be myraid situations where a 'just cause'
exists. The jurisdiction of the Court to determine whether a 'just
cause' exists in a given fact situation cannot be stifled by giving a
restrictive meaning to 'just cause' in Section 263. This
interpretation, in our opinion, upholds the legislative intent
behind the use of words "deemed to be just cause" thereby
harmonising the Explanation clause with the main Section.
31. As noted from the decisions rendered hereinbefore, the
Explanation clause merely clarifies the meaning of the main
Section. It can neither be interpreted to widen nor narrow down
the scope of the main provision. In this case, the Explanation
clause serves the sole purpose of specifying cases when just cause
can be assumed to exist. The expression 'just cause' cannot be
construed in a manner that would restrict the scope of Section
263 to only those specific cases provided by the Explanation
clause.
32. The purpose of Section 263 is to preserve the integrity of
probate proceedings and to ensure that grants are not obtained by
fraud, concealment, or procedural unfairness. If the interpretation
were to be restrictive, it would result in injustice by allowing a
fraudulent or defective probate to stand merely because the facts
of the case do not neatly fall within one of the five enumerated
clauses. Such an interpretation would defeat the very object of the
law, which is to provide the court with the flexibility to revoke
probate whenever circumstances reveal existence of a 'just cause'.
33. There are Judicial opinions favouring this view. The Madras
High Court and other High Courts have held that the term "just
cause" is wide enough to include cases of gross negligence,
suppression of material facts, or violation of natural justice, even
if these are not expressly mentioned in the Explanation clause to
Section 263. George Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer (supra),
which adopted a restrictive approach, was based on the language
of the earlier Acts of 1865 and 1881.
34. Clause (a) of the Explanation stipulates that if the
proceedings to obtain the grant of probate is defective in
substance, it will be deemed to be a 'just cause'. The existence of
a 'just cause' is sine qua non for exercising jurisdiction under
Section 263 of the Succession Act. Let us look at the issue this
way. For example, in a proceeding for grant of probate, for any
reason whatsoever, the respondent fails to appear or does not
defend the proceedings effectively and this results in grant of
probate. The aggrieved person places an record circumstances
which constitute 'just clause' for revocation or annulment of a
probate in a proceeding under Section 263. Merely because the
aggrieved person has not appeared or defended his case in the
proceeding for grant of probate, can it be a reason for refusing to
exercise jurisdiction under Section 263. We think not. The
Legislature, in its wisdom has carved out an independent
safeguard in the form of Section 263 for obvious reasons to
protect those who are able to establish the existence of
circumstances which constitute a 'just cause' for annulment or
revocation of probate. Such is the width and amplitude of Section
263, which has to be construed accordingly.
35. In the present facts, it is not the absence of the advocate or
the failure on the part of the Caveator to defend the grant of
probate which constitutes a reason for invoking Section 263. The
Caveator says that the following circumstances amongst others
viz.:
(i) That the deceased had died under suspicious circumstances,
having committed suicide in Ecuador; and
(ii) That the affidavits of the two attesting witnesses themselves
stated that while the subject Will was signed and executed by the
deceased- testator in Ecuador, the attesting witnesses had signed
on the same in India when the subject Will, bearing only the
signature of the deceased testator, was sent from Ecuador to India
which according to the petitioner defeats the mandatory
requirement of Section 63 of the Succession Act which requires
the attesting witnesses to sign the Will in the presence of the
testator. This according to the petitioner constitutes a 'just cause'
within the meaning of Section 263. There may be legitimate and
serious objections which could not be considered due to dismissal
of the caveat. It may be possible that the aggrieved person is in a
position to satisfy the necessity of a trial if grounds exist that the
grant is defective in substance. Ultimately, it is for the Court to
determine in the facts and circumstances of each case what
circumstances would constitute a 'just cause'.
36. The reasoning of learned Single Judge (Manish Pitale, J.)
appeals to us as the correct view. We are in respectful agreement
with His Lordship's observations that the wording of Section 263
reflects an intention to allow wider judicial discretion. His
Lordships view that the explanations are illustrative and not
exhaustive preserves the dynamic character of the provision,
ensuring that it continues to meet the demands of justice in varied
factual circumstances appears to be in tune with the legislation
intent. To interpret the explanations narrowly would be to
frustrate the legislative intent.
37. The statutory provision is the source of power, while the
explanations merely indicate situations where that power may be
exercised. Therefore, in case of any conflict, the main provision
must prevail over its explanations/illustrations. The term "just
cause" must receive a liberal interpretation so that the court may
revoke a grant of probate whenever fairness, equity, and justice so
require. The Explanation clause to Section 263 is thus held to be
illustrative and not exhaustive.
38. We, therefore, answer the reference in the following term:-
(A) The Explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 of the
Indian Succession Act, 1925 are illustrative, in the context
of 'just cause' for revoking or annulling grant of Probate or
Letters of Administration.
(B) The circumstances not covered under explanations (a)
to (e) to Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925,
can become the basis for "just cause" for the Court to
revoke or annul grant of Probate or Letters of
Administration.
(C) The judgments of learned Single Judges of this Court
in George Anthony Harris Vs. Millicent Spencer, AIR
(1933) Bom. 370 and Sharad Shankarrao Mane and etc. Vs.
Ashabai Shripati Mane, AIR (1997) Bom. 275 do not lay
down the correct position of law in the context of Section
263 of the Succession Act. Resultantly, we uphold the
view of the learned Single Judge (Manish Pitale, J.) from
which order the present reference arises.
39. The matter be now placed before the learned Single Judge.
(N.R. Borkar, J.) (M.S. Karnik, J.)
