Bombay High Court
Shyam Bihari vs Nuclear Power Corporation Of India Ltd ... on 14 October, 2025
Author: Ravindra V. Ghuge
Bench: Ravindra V. Ghuge
2025:BHC-AS:44627-DB
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 11696 OF 2025
Dr. Shyam Bihari,
Major of years, Occupation : Medical Officer/
F, Employee Code No. 1119516,
NPCIL Tarapur Maharashtra Site
Residing at Type-D-6/5, TAPS-3 & 4
Colony (Anuvikas Township),
PO - TAPP, Boisar, Taluka & District - Palghar,
Maharashtra - 401501.
Mobile No. 9421543235.
Email ID : [email protected] ...Petitioner
Versus
1. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd.
Through its Chairman & Managing Director,
Nabhikiya Urja Bhavan, Anushaktinagar,
Mumbai - 400094.
2. Internal Complaints Committee,
NPCIL Tarapur Maharashtra Site
Through Site Director,
Tarapur Maharashtra Site,
PO - TAPP, Boisar, Taluka & District - Palghar,
Maharashtra - 401504. ...Respondents
__________
Dr. Uday P. Warunjikar a/w Ms. Gargi U. Warunjikar, Advocates for the
Petitioner.
Mr. Vishal Talsania a/w Ms. Nukshinaro i/b M. V. Kini & Co., Advocates for
Respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
__________
CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE &
ASHWIN D. BHOBE, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 23rd SEPTEMBER, 2025.
PRONOUNCED ON : 14th OCTOBER, 2025.
JUDGMENT (Per Ashwin D. Bhobe, J.) :
-
1. Heard Dr. Uday Warunjikar, learned Advocate for the Petitioner
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
and Mr. Vishal Talsania, learned Advocate for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard Petition finally
with the consent of learned Advocates appearing for the parties.
3. Challenge in the present Petition filed under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, is to the Memorandum of Charges No.
NPCIL/HR-DC/2(46)/2024/424 dated 14th December, 2024 issued by
Respondent No. 1 ("said Memorandum dated 14th December, 2024"); to
the Notice dated 31st July, 2025 issued by Respondent No. 1 through GM,
HR-DC ("said Notice dated 31st July, 2025"); and to the Inquiry Report
dated 14th July 2025 of the Internal Complaints Committee ("ICC" for
short) constituted by Respondent No. 1, under the Sexual Harassment of
Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013
("said Act" for short).
4. The material facts in this Petition are that the Petitioner is a
Medical Officer in the employment of Respondent No. 1, since 2005.
On 27th July, 2024, Mr. D. Ghosh, a Scientific Officer working with
Respondent No. 1, filed a complaint on behalf of his daughter "aggrieved
woman", alleging sexual harassment at the hands of the Petitioner, during
her medical examination. Complainant is referred to as the "aggrieved
woman", in terms of the direction of this Court in the case of P v/s. A &
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
Ors.1. Allegations against the Petitioner being salacious, reference to the
same is avoided.
4a. Vide Notification bearing No. TMS/HR/ER-3&4/28/vol.II/2024,
dated 29th July, 2024, Respondent No. 1 constituted Respondent No. 2
(ICC) to investigate the complaint filed by Mr. D. Ghosh. Respondent
No. 2 comprised of the following members :-
a] Dr. (Smt.) Sugnya Sachin Patil,
MO/F, Presiding Officer, ICC;
b] Smt. K. S. Kalpanadevi,
SO/D, Member ICC;
c] Smt. Shobha Rajeev,
PPS, Member ICC;
d] Smt. Kriti Lakra,
SM (F&A), Member ICC;
e] Dr. (Smt.) Jeeva Philip,
ENT Specialist, Member ICC; and
f] Shri. K. C. Verma,
DGM (Legal), Member Secretary, ICC.
4b. Respondent No. 2 conducted the inquiry in terms of the NPCIL
(Disciple & Appeal) Rules, 1996. Preliminary report was made on 4 th
October, 2024 (Page No. 167 of the paper-book). Respondent No. 2
submitted its final recommendations dated 3rd December, 2024 (Page No.
172 of the paper-book) to Respondent No. 1.
1. Order dated 24th September, 2021 passed in Suit No. 142 of 2021.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
4c. Vide the said Memorandum dated 14th December, 2024,
Respondent No. 1 notified the Petitioner of the proposed inquiry under
Rule 12 of NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1996. Statement of
Article of Charges; Statement of the Imputation of Misconduct and
Misbehavior along with documents and list of witnesses were appended
to the said Memorandum dated 14th December, 2024.
4d. Respondent No. 2 conducted the Inquiry into the charges leveled
against the Petitioner. In the said Inquiry, Petitioner was afforded
opportunity to file his written statement of defence; he was afforded
opportunity to admit/deny the charges; he was afforded opportunity to
nominate defence assistance of his choice; he was afforded opportunity to
inspect the documents/to submit documents; present his evidence;
examine/cross-examine witnesses as also an opportunity to submit
written brief.
4e. The aggrieved woman, her father Mr. D. Ghosh and mother Mrs.
Emily Ghosh in addition to three other officials of the hospital were
examined in support of the prosecution case, whereas the Petitioner
deposed in the said inquiry before Respondent No. 2.
4f. Respondent No. 2 submitted its Inquiry Report dated 14 th July,
2025, holding the charges leveled against the Petitioner as proved.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
4g. Vide Notice dated 31st July, 2025, the Inquiry Report dated 14th
July, 2025 was forwarded to the Petitioner, calling upon the Petitioner to
submit his representation/submission in writing, failing which the
Petitioner was notified that the Disciplinary Authority would pass further
orders as deemed appropriate.
5. Petitioner is before this Court, seeking the following
substantive reliefs :-
A. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned
Memorandum of Charges No. NPCIL/HR-DC/2(46)/2024/424
dated 14.12.2024 issued by Respondent No.1, as well as the
impugned Notice dated 31.07.2025 issued by Respondent No.1
(through GM, HR-DC) enclosing the Inquiry Report dated
14.07.2025 and quash all proceedings and actions taken pursuant
thereto, including the Inquiry Report of the ICC/Inquiry Authority.
B. Issue a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents to
constitute a fresh Internal Committee/Inquiry Committee to inquire
into the complaint against the Petitioner afresh by law, ensuring
compliance with the POSH Act, 2013, DoPT guidelines and
principles of natural justice - with the Petitioner being given full
opportunity to defend himself (including cross-examination of
witnesses and production of relevant evidence like medical records)
so that a fresh, unbiased consideration of the matter can be done.
6. Respondent No. 1 has filed reply dated 20 th February, 2025
opposing the Petition. In response to the reply, Petitioner has filed
Affidavit-in-Rejoinder.
7. Dr. Uday Warunjikar, learned Advocate for the Petitioner has
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
advanced the following arguments :-
a. Constitution of Respondent No. 2 (ICC) is not in accordance
with the requirement of Section 4 and section 11 of the said Act and
not in compliance with the Office Memorandum dated 21 st
December, 2022, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of
Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions Department of Personnel
and Training ESTT. (Estt. A-III). He submits that the Presiding
Officer of Respondent No. 2 though was headed by a woman,
however the said Presiding Officer is an employee of the
organization, but is not senior to the Petitioner. To clarify, he
submits that the law requires a higher level woman officer to preside
over Respondent No. 2, in terms of Section 4(2)(a) of the said Act.
He submits that the non-compliance of the said requirement vitiates
the inquiry since its inception.
b. He submits that Respondent No. 2 did not include a member
from a non-governmental organization or association committed to
the cause of women or any person familiar with the issues of sexual
harassment, as required by Section 4(2)(c) of the said Act. He
submits that Dr. Smt. Jeeva Philip a member of the said committee,
who was appointed as an Expert Member of Respondent No. 2, had
an agreement dated 25th July, 2024 with Respondent No. 1 for
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
providing consultancy services, i.e. ENT consultation to the
beneficiaries, as such, does not qualify to be a member in terms of
Section 4(2)(c) of the said Act.
c. He submits that the other member of Respondent No. 2 Smt.
K. S. Kalpana Devi lives in the same building where Mr. D. Ghosh,
father of aggrieved woman resides, as such, possibility of the said
member influencing Respondent No. 2 cannot be ruled out. Thus,
according to Dr. Uday Warunjikar, the constitution of Respondent
no. 2 (ICC) fails to meet the required criteria.
d. He by referring to the report dated 4th October, 2024 of
Respondent No. 2, submits that all the members of Respondent No.
2 having observed that "there is no sufficient evidence to support
the complainant's allegations", the proceedings against the
Petitioner were required to be dropped. He submits that Respondent
No. 2 has no jurisdiction to submit a modified final report dated 3 rd
December, 2024 after a period of about 2 months, of its report dated
4th October, 2024. He submits that the inconsistency in the said two
reports should accrue to the benefit of Petitioner.
e. Dr. Warunjikar has relied on the following decisions :-
(i) Punjab and Sind Bank and Others v/s. Mrs. Durgesh
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
Kuwar2 and
(ii) Dr. A. Manimekalan v/s. The Registrar, Bharatiya
University, Coimbatore and other connected
Petitions3.
8. Mr. Vishal Talsaniya, learned Advocate for the Respondents by
relying on the reply dated 20th February, 2025 filed by Respondent No. 1,
has advanced the following arguments :-
a. Petitioner was aware of the composition of Respondent No.
2, as early as on 29/07/2024. At no point of time prior to filing of
the present Petition, the Petitioner raised any objection to the
composition of Respondent No. 2. He submits that the Petitioner
participated in the inquiry without any objection or demurrer. He
submits that the contention of the Petitioner with regards to the
composition of ICC, sought to be raised after a delay of about 9
months is with malafide intentions, only to delay the disciplinary
proceedings. He submits that the present Petition is an abuse of
process of law and is liable to be dismissed on this count.
b. He submits that the provisions of Section 4(2)(a) of the said
Act requires the Presiding Officer to be a woman employed at a
2. 2020(19) SCC 46.
3. WP No. 5764 of 2023 decided by the High Court of Judicature at Madras on 27th July, 2023.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
senior level, however the same does not specify that the Presiding
Officer must be senior to the Delinquent Officer. He, by referring to
para 6 of the reply filed by Respondent No. 1 submits that the
Presiding Officer of Respondent No. 2 was in the same grade as that
of the Petitioner, which position is of a senior level. He therefore
submits that the Presiding Officer was an employee at the senior
level in Respondent No. 1. He relies on the NPCIL (Disciple &
Appeal) Rules, 1996 governing the service conditions of the
Petitioner.
c. He submits that Dr. Smt. Jeeva Philip is a ENT Specialist
and is experienced in sexual harassment issues. He submits that Dr.
Smt. Jeeva Philip is not an employee of Respondent No. 1 and she is
an independent medical professional having her own private
practice. No prejudice is caused to the Petitioner by her inclusion in
the Committee.
d. He submits that the allegation in the memo of Petition that a
member being known to the father of aggrieved woman are vague.
He submits that it is in the rejoinder that the Petitioner claims Smt.
Kalpana Devi residing in the same building where the father of
aggrieved woman resides. He submits that the claims of the said
member having influence on Respondent No. 2 is mischievous and
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
at any rate speculative, malafide and without any evidence on record
to support such contention.
e. He submits that the Office Memorandum dated 21st
December, 2022 issued by Government of India, Ministry of
Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions Department of Personnel
and Training ESTT. Estt. A-III, relied by the Petitioner pertains to
regular disciplinary inquiry and not to the inquiries conducted under
the said Act. He relies on the Office Memorandum dated 9 th
September, 2016 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of
Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions Department of Personnel
and Training ESTT. A-III Desk, which specially states that there is
no bar under either CCS (CCA) Rules or under the said Act to the
Chairperson of ICC being junior to the suspect officer or the
charged officer.
9. Having considered the rival contentions, the issue which fall for
consideration in the present Petition is, 'whether the composition of
Respondent No. 2 (ICC) in the present case is contrary to the provisions
of the said Act ?'
10. Sum and substance of the challenge in the present Petition is to
the constitution of Respondent No. 2 (ICC).
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
11. Dr. Warunjikar in support of his challenge to the appointment of
the Presiding Officer, has relied on Section 4(2)(a) and Section 11 of the
said Act read with the Office Memorandum dated 21 st December, 2022
issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public
Grievances and Pension Department of Personnel & Training
Establishment A-III Desk.
12. Section 4(2)(a) to (c) of the said Act reads as follows :-
"4. Constitution of Internal Complaints Committee.-(1) Every employer
of a workplace shall, by an order in writing, constitute a Committee to
be known as the "Internal Complaints Committee":
Provided that where the offices or administrative units of the workplace
are located at different places or divisional or sub-divisional level, the
Internal Committee shall be constituted at all administrative units or
offices.
(2) The Internal Committee shall consist of the following members to be
nominated by the employer, namely:-
(a) a Presiding Officer who shall be a woman employed at a
senior level at workplace from amongst the employees:
Provided that in case a senior level woman employee is not available,
the Presiding Officer shall be nominated from other offices or
administrative units of the workplace referred to in sub-section (1):
Provided further that in case the other offices or administrative units of
the workplace do not have a senior level woman employee, the Presiding
Officer shall be nominated from any other workplace of the same
employer or other department or organisation;
(b) not less than two Members from amongst employees
preferably committed to the cause of women or who have had experience
in social work or have legal knowledge;
(c) one member from amongst non-governmental organisations
or associations committed to the cause of women or a person familiar
with the issues relating to sexual harassment:
Provided that at least one-half of the total Members so nominated shall
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
be women.
(3) The Presiding Officer and every Member of the Internal Committee
shall hold office for such period, not exceeding three years, from the
date of their nomination as may be specified by the employer.
13. Clause No. 2.9 of the said Office Memorandum dated 21st
December, 2022 is extracted herein below :-
"2.9 IO senior from the CO: DoPT, vide OM No. 7/1/70-Est.(A) dated
06.01.1971, requested all the Ministries/ Departments to note the
observations of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation (Fourth Lok
Sabha), which examined the question of appointment of inquiry officers
to conduct oral inquiry into the charges leveled against delinquent officer
under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The Committee observed that though they
agree that it may not be possible to entrust always inquires against
delinquent officer to gazette officers the inquiries should be conducted by
an officer who is sufficiently senior to the officer whose conduct is being
inquired into as inquiry by a junior officer cannot command confidence
which it deserves.
(emphasis supplied)"
14. Question revolves around the interpretation of the words and
the language "a woman employed at a senior level at workplace from
amongst the employees" used in Section 4(2)(a) of the said Act.
According to Dr. Warunjikar the requirement of the section is a lady
member, who must be a officer senior in rank to the officer against whom
allegations of sexual conduct are made. Per contra, Mr. Vishal Talsania
interprets the said section to mean a lady member working at a senior
level, who need not be senior in rank to the an officer against whom
allegations of sexual conduct are made.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
15. Principle of interpretation of statute in every system of
interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. All that is to be seen is
what does the provision say? The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph
No. 22 of the decision in M/s. Hiralal Rattanlal Etc. Etc. v/s. State of U.
P. and Another4 has observed as under :-
"22... In construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost
rule of construction is the literary construction. All that we have to see
at the very outset is what does that provision say? If the provision is
unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear,
we need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes.
The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only
when the legislative intention is not clear. ...".
16. The decision in the case of M/s. Hiralal Rattanlal (supra) was
followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B. Premanand
and Ors. v/s. Mohan Koikal and Ors. 5 Paragraph No. 9 of the said
decision, is extracted herein below :-
"9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost
principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation
is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation
e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be
resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to
no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of
the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and
unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of
interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB v.
SEBI [(2004) 11 SCC 641 : AIR 2004 SC 4219]"
17. A plain reading of Section 4(2)(a) of the said Act indicates that
the Presiding Officer of the Internal Complaints Committee shall be a
4. (1973) 1 SCC 216.
5. (2011) 4 SCC 266.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
woman employed at a senior level at the workplace from amongst the
employees. Proviso to the said section makes a reference to the
eventuality of a senior level women employee not available, then the
Presiding Officer shall be nominated from the other offices or
administrative units of the workplace. Intention of the legislation is
deduced from the words and language used in the said provision. There
is no ambiguity in the language of Section 4(2)(a) of the said Act. The
legislature has consciously used the word woman employee at a senior
level and not a woman at the workplace senior to the officer against
whom allegations of sexual conduct are made.
18. In the case of Smt. Shobha Goswami v/s. State of U. P. and 2
Ors.6 before the Allahabad High Court, the Petitioner therein had sought
for quashing of the order passed by the Internal Complaints Committee
on the ground that the said Committee was not constituted as required
under Section 4(2)(a) of said Act. Contention therein was that the
woman officer was required to be of a senior level rank, meaning thereby
that she must be senior to the officer against whom the allegations were
made. Negating the said contention, the Allahabad High Court observed
as under :-
"In my opinion, there is nothing in the Scheme of the section
which requires the lady member to be senior in rank to the
officer against whom the allegation of sexual harassment are
6. WRIT-A No.-31659 of 2015 decided on 27th May, 2015.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
brought. The language of Section 4 of the Act only requires the
lady member to be of Senior Level. What is to be noted is that
the Committee consists of four members out of which three are
women and one is from an NGO and is an independent member
altogether. It is not shown or even submitted that Smt. Navisa
Sharma, DGM, Planning does not belong to Senior Level.
Therefore, the submissions of Shri Ojha per se have to be
rejected."
19. The Government of India Ministry of Personnel, Public
Grievances and Pension Department of Personnel & Training
Establishment A-III Desk, Office, referring to the decision of the
Allahabad High Court issued Office Memorandum dated 9 th September,
2016, in respect of matters pertaining to seniority of Chairman of the
Complaints Committee :-
"F. No. 11013/2/2014-Estt.A-III
Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension
Department of Personnel & Training
Establishment A-III Desk
North Block, New Delhi-110001
Dated: 09.09.2016
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject: Prevention of Sexual Harassment of working women at workplace -
Seniority of the Chairperson of the Complaint Committee-regarding.
The undersigned is directed to refer to the DOPT OM no. 11013/2/2014-
Estt.A-III dated 16 July, 2015 as the Para 1 of the Guide attached to the OM, it was
clarified that the Complaints Committee set up to inquiry into charges of sexual
harassment should be headed by a women and at least half of its member should also
be women. In case a women officer of sufficiently senior level is not available in a
particular office, an office from another officer may be so appointed. It was also
indicated that to prevent the possibility of any undue pressure, the Complaints
Committee should also involved a third party either NGO or some other body which
is familiar with the issue of sexual harassment.
2. The issue of legality of a committee conducting inquiry against an officer
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
against whom there are allegations of sexual harassment but where the Chairperson
happens to be junior in rank to the suspect officer has been examined. It is clarified
that there is no bar either in the CCS (CCA) Rules or under the Sexual Harassment of
Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act. 2013 to the
Chairperson of the Complaints Committee being junior to the suspect officer or the
charged officer. Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has in Smt. Shobha Goswami vs State
of U.P. And 2 Ors, in WRITA No.-31659 of 2015 observed as follows:
"In my opinion, there is nothing in the Scheme of the section which requires
the lady member to be senior in rank to the officer against whom the
allegation of sexual harassment are brought. The language of Section 4 of the
Act only requires the lady member to the Senior Level".
This also does not in any way cause any prejudice to the charged officer.
3. Further, to ensure fair inquiry, Ministries/Departments may also consider
transferring the suspect officer/ charged officer to another office to obviate any risk of
that officer using the authority of his office to influence the proceedings of the
Complaints Committee.
4. Hindi Version will follow.
(Mukesh Chaturvedi)
Director (E)
Tel: 2309 3176"
20. In the wake of the above, the Office Memorandum which
would apply to the inquiries conducted in the work place of Respondent
No. 1 is the Office Memorandum dated 9th September, 2016 and not the
Office Memorandum dated 21st December, 2022. Respondent No. 1 in
Paragraph No. 6 of its Affidavit-in-Reply dated 20 th September, 2025 has
stated that the Presiding Officer of Respondent No. 2 is in the same grade
as the Petitioner. Though the Petitioner has attempted to raise a dispute
about the interse seniority between the Petitioner and the Presiding
Officer, however the rejoinder filed by the Petitioner does not dispute the
Presiding Officer of Respondent No. 2, being employed at a senior level
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
at the workplace.
21. Dr. (Smt.) Jeeva Philip is a member of Respondent No. 2
appointed under Section 4(2)(c) of the said Act. Respondent No. 1 in its
Affidavit-in-Reply has stated that Dr. (Smt.) Jeeva Philip, Designation-
ENT Specialist, is a independent medical professional having her own
private practice and a person having experience in sexual harassment
issues. Respondent No. 1 has further stated that Dr. (Smt.) Jeeva Philip is
not an employee of Respondent No. 1. Objection of the Petitioner to the
appointment of Dr. (Smt.) Jeeva Philip, essentially is based on the
agreement dated 25th July, 2024 executed between Respondent No. 1 and
Dr. (Smt.) Jeeva Philip, by which she has agreed to be a visiting ENT
Surgeon to give ENT consultation. Neither the said agreement indicates
any employer-employee relationship between Dr. (Smt.) Jeeva Philip and
Respondent No. 1 nor has the Petitioner placed any such material on
record to rebut Dr. (Smt.) Jeeva Philip being a person familiar with the
issues relating to sexual harassment. So also, the Petitioner has not
pleaded of any prejudice specifically caused to him, by her inclusion in
the Committee.
22. Objection to the other member of Respondent No. 1 Smt. K. S.
Kalpanadevi is on the ground of she being the neighbour of the father of
the aggrieved woman, thus possibility of she influencing Respondent No.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
2 cannot be ruled out. Such objections are not found in the memo of
Petition and the same is raised in the Affidavit-in-Rejoinder. Apart from
a bald statement of Smt. Kalpanadevi being a neighbour of the aggrieved
woman, there is no material placed on record to even remotely indicate
presence of Smt. K. S. Kalpanadevi having influenced Respondent No. 2.
23. In the case of G. Sarana v/s. University of Lucknow7, the
Petitioner having participated in the selection process, upon his failure to
get appointment challenged the selection result, pleading bias against the
members of the Selection Committee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Paragraph No. 15 has observed as under :-
"15. We do not, however, consider it necessary in the present case to
go into the question of the reasonableness of bias or real likelihood or
bias as despite the fact that, the appellant knew all the relevant facts,
he did not before appearing for the interview or at the time of the
interview raise even his little finger against the constitution. of the
Selection Committee. He seems to have voluntarily appeared before
the Committee and taken a chance of having a favourable
recommendation from it. Having done so, it is not, now open to him to
turn round and question the constitution of the Committee. This view
gains strength from a decision of this Court in Manak Lal's case
(Supra) where in more or less similar circumstances, it was held that
the failure of the appellant to take the identical plea at the earlier
stage of the proceedings created an effective bar of waiver against
him. The following observations made therein are worth quoting:-
'9.......It seems clear that the appellant wanted to take a
chance to secure a favourable report from the tribunal
which was constituted and when he found that he was
confronted with an unfavourable report, he adopted the
device of raising the present technical point."
7. (1976) 3 SCC 585.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
24. In the case of P. D. Dinakaran v/s. Judges Inquiry Committee8,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 86 has observed as under :-
"86. In conclusion, we hold that belated raising of objection against
inclusion of respondent No.3 in the Committee under Section 3(2)
appears to be a calculated move on the petitioner's part. He is an
intelligent person and knows that in terms of Rule 9(2)(c) of the
Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969, the Presiding Officer of the Committee
is required to forward the report to the Chairman within a period of
three months from the date the charges framed under Section 3(3) of
the Act were served upon him. Therefore, he wants to adopt every
possible tactic to delay the submission of report which may in all
probability compel the Committee to make a request to the Chairman
to extend the time in terms of proviso to Rule 9(2)(c). This Court or,
for that reason, no Court can render assistance to the petitioner in a
petition filed with the sole object of delaying finalisation of the
inquiry."
25. Inquiry was conducted by Respondent No. 2 under Section 11
of the said Act. Inquiry Report was submitted under Section 13 of the
said Act. Section 18 of the said Act reads as follows :-
"18. Appeal.-(1) Any person aggrieved from the recommendations
made under sub-section (2) of section 13 or under clause (i) or clause
(ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13 or sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
of section 14 or section 17 or non-implementation of such
recommendations may prefer an appeal to the Court or tribunal in
accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the said
person or where no such service rules exist then, without prejudice to
provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, the
person aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such manner as may be
prescribed.
(2) The appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within a period
of ninety days of the recommendations."
26. Petitioner if aggrieved by the Inquiry Report of Respondent No.
1, could have availed remedies against the same under Section 18 of the
8. (2011) 8 SCC 380.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
said Act. Petitioner has not availed the said statutory remedy.
27. Another contention raised by the Petitioner is that the
proceedings initiated against him under the said Act were required to be
dropped in view of the conclusions of Respondent No. 2 in its report
dated 4th October, 2024. We are unable to accept the said contention.
Petitioner has made an attempt to misread the said report dated 4 th
October, 2024. Paragraph No. 14 of the Report dated 4th October, 2024
reads as follow :-
"14. Mr. Ghosh on behalf of her daughter mentioned in her statement
that they want to know about the action taken or being taken against him
for his un-punishable crimes (Exhibit-38).
The ICC meticulously analyzed all the evidence, witness, testimony and
cross-examination. After, a thorough review of evidence and testimonies,
the ICC findings are as follows :
There is not sufficient evidence to support the complainant's allegations.
As a sole testimony is a prosecutrix, in a criminal case involving sexual
harassment and molestation would suffice it is otherwise reliable, there is
no justifiable reasons not to accept the sole testimony of a victim of
sexual harassment and molestation there is a standard of proof required
is that, preponderance of possibilities and not proof of beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, the preponderance of possibilities is very high.
Based on the above, finally the committee concluded that the allegations
levelled by aggrieved woman against Dr. Shyam Bihari sole testimony of
prosecutrix, sufficient for next course of action.
Submitted to competent authority."
28. We therefore conclude that the Petitioner has failed to make out
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
any case of any legal defect, much less any defect in the constitution of
Respondent No. 2(ICC). Constitution of the Respondent No. 2 (ICC) is
in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. Material placed on
record indicate Respondent No. 2 having complied with the principles of
natural justice as also with the other requirements of the service rules i.e.
NPCIL (Disciple & Appeal) Rules, 1996 while conducting the Inquiry.
29. Records placed in this Petition indicate Petitioner having
participated in the proceedings before Respondent No. 2 (which was
constituted on 29th July, 2024) till the conclusion of the Inquiry, without
any objection to the constitution of Respondent No. 2. There is no
material on record to suggest participation of the Petitioner in the said
Inquiry was under protest. It is by the present Petition filed on 22nd
August, 2025, that the Petitioner for the first time has chosen to raise
objection to the constitution of Respondent No. 2. Participation of the
Petitioner in the said inquiry without demur, gives an impression of the
Petitioner having waived his right to object to the constitution of
Respondent No. 2 and having acquiesced in the constitution of
Respondent No. 2. Having received an unfavourable result in the said
Inquiry, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the constitution of
Respondent No. 2. Useful reference can be made to the decisions of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court :-
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
a. In the case of Madanlal v/s. State of J & K9, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 9 held as under :-
"9. Before dealing with this contention, we must keep in view the
salient fact that the petitioners as well as the contesting successful
candidates being respondents concerned herein, were all found
eligible in the light of marks obtained in the written test, to be
eligible to be called for oral interview. Upto this stage there is no
dispute between the parties. The petitioners also appeared at the
oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the
Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the
contesting respondents concerned. Thus the petitioners took a
chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only
because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as
a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral
interview, they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a
candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview,
then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him,
he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of
interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly
constituted. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar
Shukla [1986 Supp SCC 285 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 644 : AIR 1986 SC
1043] it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned
Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the
examination without protest and when he found that he would not
succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said
examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to
such a petitioner."
(emphasis supplied)
b. In the case of ABP Pvt. Ltd. v/s. Union of India 10, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph Nos. 40 & 41 has observed as
follows :-
"40) On perusal of the materials available, we are satisfied that
the Wage Boards have functioned in a fully balanced manner.
9. 1995(3) SCC 486.
10. 2014 (3) SCC 327.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
Besides, it is a fact that the petitioners had challenged the
constitution of the Wage Board before the High Court of Delhi,
admittedly, the High Court had declined to grant interim relief.
The said order declining/refusing to grant interim relief attained
finality as the petitioners did not choose to challenge it before this
Court. Thereafter, the petitioners have participated in the
proceedings and acquiesced themselves with the proceedings of
the Board. In view of the fact that they have participated in the
proceedings without seriously having challenged the constitution
as well as the composition, the petitioners cannot now be allowed
to challenge the same at this stage. More so, it is also pertinent to
take note of the fact that the petitioners herein opted for
challenging the independence of the nominated independent
members only after the recommendations by the Wage Boards
were notified by the Central Government.
41) Hence, the attack of the petitioners on the independence of the
appointed independent members by saying that they were not
sufficiently neutral, impartial or unbiased towards the petitioners
herein, is incorrect in the light of factual matrix and cannot be
raised at this point of time when they willfully conceded to the
proceedings. Consequently, we are not inclined to accept this
ground of challenge."
(emphasis supplied)
c. This Court in the case of Kishore v/s. Joint Commissioner
and Vice Chairman11, in Paragraph No. 6 has held as under :-
"6. We would have considered these objections had it been the case
that the petitioner had not taken any part in the proceeding before
the Scrutiny Committee in the present case. here, the petitioner
participated in the proceedings before the Scrutiny Committee and
when he found that the Scrutiny Committee's decision was against
him, it dawned upon the petitioner that the constitution of the
Committee was improper. A person, who has taken a chance in this
way, it is settled law, cannot be permitted to turn around and raise a
challenge which ought to have been made before his participation
in the process. Therefore, we are not inclined to entertain any
challenge to the validity of section 6 of the Act of 2000 and Rule 9
of the Rules, 2003, raised herein. Similar is the view taken by
another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajaykumajr
Yadaorao Nikhare vs. State of Maharashtra and ors., 2011 Mh.L.J
Online 92 = 2012(1) ALL MR 280. The view commends to us.
Accordingly, the constitutional challenge is rejected."
11. 2020(6) Mh.LJ. 117.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
(emphasis supplied)
30. In the case of Punjab and Sind Bank (supra) relied by Dr.
Warunjikar, the Petitioner therein had raised the objection to the
constitution of committee before the ICC, which objections were dealt by
the ICC in its report. Similarly, the facts of the case in Dr. A.
Manimekalan (supra), are neither similar nor identical to the case of the
Petitioner herein. The Office Memorandum dated 9 th September, 2016
was not placed before the Single Judge of the High Court of Madras.
31. Respondent No. 1 vide said Notice has called upon the
Petitioner to offer/make representation/submission in writing to the
Disciplinary Authority. Mr. Vishal Talsania submits that the said notice is
issued in terms of Clause No. 5 of the NPCIL (Disciple & Appeal) Rules,
1996. Said Clause No. 5 reads as follows :-
"5.0 ACTION ON INQUIRY REPORT
5.1 After receipt of an Inquiry Report, the Disciplinary Authority
shall where it agrees with the findings of the ICC & Inquiring Authority,
forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the Inquiry Report to the
Complainant and Respondent Employee with the direction that the
Complainant and Respondent Employee, may if they so desire, make any
representation or submission in writing within 15 days of the receipt of
the Inquiry Report.
5.2 The Disciplinary Authority shall after consideration of the
written representation or submission made by the employee, record its
own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the
purpose.
5.3 If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties
specified under the provisions of NPCIL (Discipline & Appeal) Rules
should be imposed on the employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in any other provisions make an order imposing such penalty.
5.4 If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to the findings on all
or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that no penalty is called
for, it may pass an order exonerating the employee concerned."
32. Petitioner would thus have the opportunity to meet, explain and
controvert the matter on merits. Useful reference can be made to the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad And Others v/s. B. Karunakar And Others12
in Paragraph Nos. 26 and 27 has observed as under :-
"26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry
officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at
the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings
recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the
disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into
consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in
advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if
any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary
authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have
been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by
misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the
documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles
of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair
opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It
is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the
employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the
enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it.
Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at
its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is
also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration
the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on
record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do
constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which
is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to
record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority,
12. (1993)4 Supreme Court Cases 727.
901-WP-11696-2025-J.odt
that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary
authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However,
when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated
above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are
contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an
additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into
consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its
conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as
the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the
disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent
employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's
findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the
evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the
employee against it.
27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than
the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two
stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its
conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the
delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the
disciplinary authority decides to impose a penalty on the basis of its
conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary
proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right
to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of
defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to
him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his
innocence in the disciplinary proceedings."
33. For the above said reasons, no case is made out for interference
of this Court. This Writ Petition is devoid of merits, as such
dismissed. Rule discharged.
34. No order as to costs.
[ASHWIN D. BHOBE, J.] [RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.]
GITALAXMI KRISHNA
KRISHNA KOTAWADEKAR
KOTAWADEKAR Date:
2025.10.14
18:58:03 +0530
