Bombay High Court
Balaji S/O. Malhari Devkate vs The State Of Maharashtra on 13 October, 2025
2025:BHC-AUG:29108-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 167 OF 2020
Balaji S/o. Malhari Devkate,
Age 43 years, Occ. Nil.
R/o. Phulenagar, Himayatnagar,
Tq. Himayatnagar, Dist. Nanded.
.. APPELLANT
VERSUS
1. The State of Maharashtra
2. XYZ.
.. RESPONDENTS.
Mr. Santosh K. Bhosale, Advocate for the appellant,
Mr. N.S. Tekale, APP for respondent No.1.
Ms. Naseembanu I. Deshmukh (appointed)
CORAM : SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE AND
MEHROZ K. PATHAN, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 9TH SEPTEMBER, 2025.
PRONOUNCED ON : 13TH OCTOBER, 2025.
JUDGMENT [ PER MEHROZ K. PATHAN, J] :-
1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant, thereby challenging
the judgment dated 14.1.2020, passed by Additional Sessions Judge,
Bhokar, District Nanded, whereby, appellant has been convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and
Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012.
2. The case of the prosecution is that, complainant PW 4 "A"
aged 50 years, is the grandmother of the victim and that she was residing
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with her husband, two daughters, 3 sons, one daughter in law and two
grand-daughters out of which one of the grand-daughters is the victim ,
aged 8 years.
3. That, on 16.3.2019, at about 5.00 p.m., her two grand-
daughters i.e. victim "X" and another grand-daughter were playing in an
auto-rickshaw in front of the house. After some time, when she came to
the courtyard of the house after cooking, she could not see the
granddaughters, who were playing there earlier. The son in law of the
complainant and the complainant "A" took search of the victim "X" and
another grand-daughter . However, they could not find them. After
taking search for some time, when they were returning to their home
they could see the victim "X", and another grand-daughter and another
minor girl "Y" coming to the house. When she asked the victim and
other grand daughter as to where they had been, at that time, victim "X"
started crying. There were remains of grass in her hair and on the back.
Victim "X" narrated her about the criminal act of the present appellant,
whom she referred as "Balumama" . That , another neighbouring girl
"Y" had taken victim "X" to the ditch, where Balumama was waiting.
While they were going to the ditch, one person was passing near the
ditch who asked the appellant ( Balumama), as to why he was present
there alongwith little girls. Accused told him that he came to answer the
nature's call and the girls were following him. When the victim "X" and
her sister tried to run away from the spot, at that time, appellant -
Balumama caught hold of the victim from her backside, removed her
Salwar and committed illegal act of intercourse upon the victim.
Balumama inserted his private part into the private part of the victim due
to which there was pain. The victim was crying and her sister was
shouting to leave the victim. After some time, accused - Balumama left
the victim "X" and thereafter the victim and her sister were returning to
her house. At that time, the victim found some sticky liquid appearing on
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the Salwar, which she referred to as, like "Shembud". The victim further
narrated that she was suffering pain in her private part and was finding it
difficult to discharge the urine.
The complainant then lodged the report against the present
appellant/accused for committing rape on the minor victim girl "X".
4. The Police Station Officer registered FIR under Section
376(A) and (B) of IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. After
completing investigation, the charge sheet was filed and the learned
Sessions Judge framed charge. The prosecution in all examined 9
witnesses to bring home the guilt of the accused having committed rape
on the minor girl "X" and has also relied upon various documents in
support of the prosecution case. The statement of accused under Section
313 was recorded. The defence of the accused was that of total denial
and false implication.
5. The learned Sessions Judge, after sifting the evidence led by
the prosecution and defence raised by the accused, in his cross
examination as well as his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. had
found that the prosecution has successfully proved the guilt of the
present appellant/accused and has thus, convicted him under Section
376(2)(i) and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment which shall
mean the remainder of accused persons natural life and to pay fine of Rs.
5,000/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for six months. The
learned Sessions Judge, has further convicted the appellant/accused for
the offence punishable under Section 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act and also
sentenced him to suffer Life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/-,
in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for 3 months. The sentences
were directed to run concurrently .
6. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this court, putting
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challenge to the said judgment and order on various grounds.
7. We have gone through the entire evidence led by the
prosecution and defence raised by the appellant/accused. We have also
scrutinized the record and proceedings with the assistance of the learned
counsel for the appellant and the learned APP .
8. It is found that Victim "X" PW-1 is the prime witness aged 8
years at the time of incident, who has narrated the entire incident as per
her statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. , wherein, she was ravaged by
the present appellant, who was the neighboring resident. The learned
Sessions Judge has verified the understanding of the victim by putting
her relevant questions and importance of oath. The victim PW-1 had
further stated that she and her sister were playing in the auto owned by
her father. The neighbouring minor girl "Y" had come on the spot and
asked her to come near the ditch. The victim thereafter stated that when
she started running , at that time, "Y" had caught hold of her and
appellant Balu referred as Balumama was present in the ditch and she
refused to go in the ditch. The girl "Y" had thereafter asked the appellant
to give her money as she had brought the victim "X" to him, upon which
the appellant asked her to wait. The victim "X" was made to sleep on the
earth by appellant and thereafter, her Salwar was removed and after
removing his own underwear, Balu is alleged to have slept on her for
some time doing bodily movement of up and down. After some time,
appellant Balu had woke up and asked victim to wear the Salwar and
gave Rs. 10/- note , she threw the note there and when she was coming
back to house, she found some sticky substance like "Shembud" on her
salwar and grass garbage in her head when the grandmother PW-2 asked
her about the whereabouts she informed her about the incident that the
appellant committed rape on her. The maternal uncle of the victim had
come to their home and thereafter complaint was lodged. The cross
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examination of the victim 'X' does not prove out any omissions or
contradiction from her previous statements .
9. The another witness, relied upon by the prosecution is PW-
6 ,grandmother of the victim, who has narrated the entire incident as
stated to her by the victim "X" on the date of incident. She had
corroborated the version of minor victim PW-1 and had also corroborated
immediate lodging of the report by her before the police station, on the
date of incident. The testimony of the aforesaid prime witnesses have not
been shaken in the cross examination. There is nothing to disbelieve her
testimony, which appears to be natural .
10. The prosecution has further relied upon the testimony of
PW-7 - Bashir Khan Ahmed Khan Pathan, who happened to be a chance
witness, and has last seen the appellant and the minor victim girl near
the ditch, where the villagers used to normally visit, for answering
nature's call. The said fact is also corroborated in the version of PW-1
victim, wherein, she had clearly stated about the presence of one uncle,
who had asked the accused as to why he is taking the girls. Said PW-7
Bashir Khan had also scolded the little girls including the victim to go to
their houses, as it was dark, about 6.30 P.M. The testimony of aforesaid
witnesses also appears to be cogent and reliable as there is nothing in his
cross examination to disbelieve the said witness. Nor there was any
enmity of the appellant with PW-7 Bashir Khan brought on record.
Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly believed the testimony
of PW-7 as a natural witness, who was present on the spot of incident,
where the appellant has committed rape upon the minor victim girl "X".
11. Another important circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution to support their case is the medical examination report
Exh.30 and the testimony of PW-8 Dr. Sunil Madhewad. The testimony of
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Dr. Sunil Madhewad - PW-8, shows that the victim was brought by the
police for medical examination. He had obtained consent of the mother
for medical examination on 17.3.2019. The history narrated by the
victim was noted in the medical examination papers and the victim was
thereafter examined. Important notings made by said Dr. Madhewad,
PW-8, pertaining to Column of Hymen in the Medical Examination
Report Exh.30 is as under ;
(I) evidence of fresh hymenal tears present at 3.00 O'Clock,
6.00 O'Clock, 7.00 O'Clock .
(ii)Edges - inflamed
(iii) Bleeding - Absent
(iv)Oedema -present
12. The medical examination provisional report which is at
Exh.30, would clearly show that the same was conducted on the next
date of incident 17.3.2019 at 8.30 a.m. and the incident is dated
16.3.2019 The Doctor PW 08 has stated about the evidence of fresh
hymnal tears present at 3.00 O'Clock, 6.00 O'Clock, 7.00 O'Clock with
edges were inflamed with slight oedema present clearly corroborates the
allegation of rape as reported by the victim. Thus the ocular testimony
of PW-8 is also supported by the medical evidence in the form of medical
report ex.30. There is nothing in the cross examination of the witness
PW-8, which would shatter his testimony about the findings in the report
at Exh.30.
13. The forensic evidence relied upon by the prosecution is the
Chemical Analyzer (CA) report Ex.50, which shows that kurta Exh. 4 of
victim was having two semen stains, each of about 1 cm diameter on the
back portion and the semen detected at Exh.4 is human. The said finding
of the forensic expert also corroborates the prosecution case and
testimony of the victim wherein, she has narrated the incident of rape
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committed by the present appellant.
14. The PW4 Dr. Devidas Gaikwad had examined the accused
about his fitness to commit sexual inter-course and has given positive
report. PW 5 Gangadhar Komwad was examined by the prosecution to
establish the date of birth from the school admission register. The date
of birth of the victim as appearing from the school extract Exh.21 is
recorded as 24.5.2010. Thus, the learned trial court has rightly
considered the age of the victim as 9 years and was a child under the
definition of POCSO Act. The trial court has rightly relied upon the
judgment of Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana, 2013 All MR (Cri.) 2946,
in coming to the conclusion that the age of the victim can be proved
through the School Admission register, which is one of the 3 documents
mentioned in the said judgment which can be relied upon to prove the
date of birth of the victims under the POCSO Act.
15. Thus, having found that the prosecution has proved the
commission of rape by the appellant on the minor victim girl who was a
child as per the definition under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act,
corroborated by the medical and CA report, the learned trial court has
rightly considered the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the
POCSO Act , which provides that a where a person is being prosecuted
for committing offence under the POCSO Act, and where the victim is a
child below age of 16 years, the Special Court shall presume that such
person committed offence unless contrary is proved by the accused. The
learned sessions Judge has rightly found that age of the victim was nine
years as proved from document Ex.22 and that the independent witness
Bashirkhan and grandmother of the victim had also supported and
corroborated the version of the victim. The medical evidence also
supports the prosecution case . Therefore, the trial court has rightly
found the appellant guilty of commission of offence under Section 376(2)
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(i) of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. We therefore do
not find any ground for interfering with the findings of the learned Trial
Court.
16. It is pertinent to point out here that the charge was framed
under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC and the date of commission of offence is
16.3.2019. The perusal of Section 376(2)(i) shows that the said
provision was deleted from the Indian Penal Code on 21.7.2018 by way
of amendment to IPC vide Act No. 22 of 2018.The learned counsel for the
appellant therefore submits that the appellant was convicted of offence
under Section 376(2)(i) even though the same was deleted from Indian
Penal code . The charge was therefore, erroneous and that the appellant
was wrongly convicted under Section 376(2)(i). The conviction of the
appellant under Section 376(2)(i),may therefore be quashed and set
aside .
17. It is further submission of the appellant that as per Section
42 of the POCSO Act, 2012, any act or omission constitutes offence under
the POCSO Act as also other offences under the IPC mentioned in section
42, then, either of the sentence under the POCSO Act or the IPC,
whichever is greater in degree is to be imposed. The learned Trial court
has committed an error in sentencing the appellant of both the sentences
under 376(2)(i) of IPC as well as sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act
2012 and directed them to run concurrently .
18. It is thus submitted by the appellant that, the learned
Sessions Judge, without applying its mind the the fact that Section
376(2)(i) of IPC had already been deleted, for which charge No.1 was
framed, had awarded punishment of life which shall mean remainder of
life. The learned Judge has also failed to take into consideration the fact
that the appellant has been punished with life imprisonment under
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Section 6 of the POCSO Act again without even discussing the mitigating
or aggravating circumstances., though the offence was earlier made
punishable with minimum punishment of 10 years rigorous punishment
which may extend to imprisonment for life and also be liable to fine .
19. The learned APP Shri Tekale submits that the Honourable
Supreme Court while deciding the case in the reported judgment in the
matter of Dalvir Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2004(5)SCC Pg 334 considered
Sections 222 and 464 of Cr.P.C. The observations pertaining to Section
464 CrPC are as under :-
" Chapter XXXV deals with irregular proceedings and their effect.
This chapter enumerates various kinds of irregularities which have
the effect of either vitiating or not vitiating the proceedings. Section
464 of the Code deals with the effect of omission to frame, or
absence of, or error in, charge. Sub-section (1) of this section
provides that no finding, sentence or order by a court of competent
jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no
charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or
irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges,
unless, in the opinion of the court of appeal, confirmation or
revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
This clearly shows that any error, omission or irregularity in the
charge including any misjoinder of charges shall not result in
invalidating the conviction or order of a competent court unless the
appellate or revisional court comes to the conclusion that a failure
of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby."
20. It is submitted by learned APP that though the charge was
only under Section 376(2)(i) an offence under Section 376(3)which was
in existence at the time of the commission of crime was clearly made out
from the evidence led by the prosecution . Thus, in view of the judgment
in the matter of Dalvir Singh (Supra) , even though the charge is not
framed under Section 376(3) conviction of the appellant under Section
376(2)(i) cannot be set aside only on the ground of error/omission or
irregularity in view of Section 464 of Cr.P.C. and the appellant can be
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convicted under section 376(3) which provided for the identical
quantum of imprisonment as is imposed by the learned Trial court .
21. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the appellant and the learned APP Shri Tekale for the State
on the point of the sentence awarded by the learned Trial Court while
pronouncing the appellant guilty of committing rape and aggravated
sexual assault on the victim below 12 years . After going through the
relevant provisions i.e. Section 376(2)(i) of IPC and Section 5 and 6 of
the POCSO Act 2012 as it was then was on the date of commission of
crime i.e.16.3.2019 , it is found that there is an error committed by the
learned Trial Court in framing the charge as well as sentencing the
appellant .
22. The charge under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC ought not to have
been framed in the first place by the learned Sessions Judge. However,
though Section 376(2)(i) was deleted by the Act No. 22 of 2018, a new
clause in the form of Section 376(3) was added by the legislature vide
the same Act no 22 of 2018 w.e.f. 21.4.2018 which is identical with with
the earlier deleted section except for the minimum sentence of 20 years
Rigorous imprisonment .
23. It would be apposite to refer to the Landmark Constitution
Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
William Slaney Vs State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1956 S.C. 116 wherein it
is held as under :-
"Before we proceed to set out our answer and examine the provisions of
the Code, we will pause to observe that the Code is a code of procedure
and, like all procedural laws, is designed to further the ends of justice
and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities.
The object of the Code is to ensure that an accused person gets a full
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and fair trial along certain well-established and well-understood lines
that accord with our notions of natural justice. If he does, if he is tried
by a competent court, if be is told and clearly understands the nature of
the offence for which he is being tried, if the case against him is fully
and fairly explained to him and he is afforded a full and fair
opportunity of defending himself, then, provided there is substantial
compliance with the outward forms of the law, mere mistakes in
procedure, mere in consequential errors and omissions in the trial are
regarded as venal by the Code and the trial is not vitiated unless the
accused can show substantial prejudice. That, broadly speaking, is the
basic principle on which the Code is based."
24. Reference can also be had to the three Judge Bench
Judgment of the Apex Court in Dalbir Singh Vs The State of U.P. 2004 (5)
SCC 334.
"Therefore, in view of Section 464 Cr.P.C., it is possible for the
appellate or recessional court to convict an accused for an offence
for which no charge was framed unless the court is of the opinion
that a failure of justice would in fact occasion. In order to judge
whether a failure of justice has been occasioned, it will be
relevant to examine whether the accused was aware of the basic
ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted and
whether the main facts sought to be established against him were
explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to
defend himself."
25. Perusal of the aforesaid judgments would show that even
though the charge under Section 376(3) IPC was not framed and there is
an error in framing charge under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC, which was not
in existence at the time of commission of offence, nor at the time of
framing of charge, however, it appears from record that the
understanding of the nature of offence was given to the accused for
which he was tried and the case against him was fully explained to him.
The provision of Section 376(3) IPC is an identical offence except that
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the minimum sentence provided is 20 years of rigorous imprisonment .
26. The charge under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC ought not to have
been framed in the first place by the learned Sessions Judge. However,
though Section 376(2)(i) was deleted by the Act No. 22 of 2018, a new
clause in the form of Section 376(3) was added by the legislature vide
the same Act no 22 of 2018 w.e.f. 21.4.2018 which is identical with with
the earlier deleted section except for the minimum sentence of 20 years
Rigorous imprisonment. The evidence led by the prosecution clearly
makes out an offence as against the appellant under Section 376(3) of
IPC, which provides as under :-
"376(3)Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of
age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the
remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to
fine:Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the
medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:Provided further
that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the
victim".
27. In view of the provisions of Section 464 of IPC, no finding,
sentence or order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed to
be invalid, merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the
ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any
mis-joinder of charges only in the opinion of the Court of appeal,
confirmation or revision , failure of justice has in fact been occasioned
thereby.
28. After having gone through the charge framed by the learned
Sessions Judge, and the evidence led by the prosecution and the
provisions of Section 376(2)(i) which is deleted and provision of Section
376(3) which is newly added on the same date, we are of the considered
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opinion that there is hardly any failure of justice and therefore, the
finding and sentence rendered by the Sessions Judge cannot be be
deemed to be invalid and hence is not liable to be quashed and set aside.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the conviction of the appellant will
have, to be converted from the one under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC to the
one under Section 376(3) of IPC. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
the conviction of the appellant will have to be converted from the one
under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC to the one under Section 376(3) of IPC.
29. Another factor involved in the present case is the
punishment imposed upon, by the learned Sessions Judge,
simultaneously under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, wherein, the appellant
was imposed with punishment of life imprisonment by the learned
Sessions Judge ignoring the provisions of Section 42 of the POCSO Act.
The perusal of Section 42 of the POCSO Act would show that the if the
act constitutes an offence punishable under the POCSO Act and also
under the concerned Sections of IPC, then notwithstanding anything
contained in any Act for the time being in force, the offender found guilty
shall be liable to be punished under the POCSO Act or under Indian
Penal Code as provides for punishment which is greater in degree.
30. Perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned
Sessions Judge has imposed punishment not only under Section 376(2)
(i) but also under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Moreover, the substantive
sentences are also directed to run concurrently by the special court.
31. Since the provision of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, provides
for punishment which is greater in degree shall be imposed, we find that
the provision of Section 376(3) of IPC provides for greater punishment,
inasmuch as, the same provides for imprisonment for life which shall be
remainder of that persons natural life, but also provides for a minimum
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sentence of 20 years Rigorous imprisonment. On the other hand,
provision of Section 6 of the POCSO Act though provides for identical
punishment of life imprisonment which shall mean remainder of the life
of person, or death and the minimum sentence to be that of 20 years,
however, it is pertinent to note that the said punishment of minimum 20
years and maximum for remainder of life or death was only inserted in
the statute book by way of amendment to the POCSO Act, 2012 vide Act
No. 25 of 2019 w.e.f. 16.8.2019. The punishment of aggravated
penetrative sexual assault was liable for punishment on the date of
incident i.e. 16/03/2019 only with minimum sentence of 10 years and
extended upto maximum sentence of imprisonment of life without there
being any clause for life which shall mean remainder of natural life of
that person. The incident which has taken place on 16.3.2019 is prior to
the amendment to the POCSO Act vide Act No. 25 of 2019 w.e.f.
16.3.2019. In view of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, the
appellant cannot be punished for an offence much higher in degree than
the offence which was on the date of commission of offence. Thus,
considering the entire provisions involved in the present case, we are of
the considered opinion that appellant can be sentenced either under
Section 376(3) of IPC or under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, as on the
date of commission of offence which ever is greater in degree . We
therefore find punishment u/s 376 (3) IPC as on the date of commission
of the offence i.e. on 16.03.2019 provided punishment greater in degree
than Section 6 of POCSO Act.
32. The learned advocate for the appellant argued on the
quantum of punishment contending that the maximum punishment is
imposed upon by the learned Sessions Judge, without even considering
the minimum punishment provided by the said provision. The learned
advocate for the petitioner submits that the appellant is now aged 50
years and if he is required to undergo imprisonment for life which shall
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mean remainder of his natural life, there would be no chance of the
appellant coming out of jail and if the life imprisonment is converted to
20 years of R.I., it can be said to be adequate punishment commensurate
with the offence committed by the accused as the section also provides
for minimum punishment in the case of aggravated sexual assault. It is
further submitted by learned advocate for the appellant that the
appellant is a married man and has a family to look after and would
never be in a position to come out of jail if remainder of life punishment
is imposed. It is contended that the trial court has failed to take into
consideration the mitigating circumstances and then pronounced the
punishment. However, in the appeal, learned advocate for the appellant
has advanced alternate arguments on the point of sentence. He would
submit that if this court is not inclined to interfere with the conviction of
the appellant, then atleast the appeal could be considered for reduction
in the sentence, looking to the advanced aged of the appellant.
33. We have considered the arguments on quantum of the
punishment . The appellant was aged 43 years at the time of commission
of offence and is presently aged around 50 years and if the appellant is
imposed with minimum sentence of 20 years from the date of offence
even then he would be released only after completing 63 years of age .
The Honble Supreme court in the judgment delivered Pintu Thakur @
Ravi etc. vs. State of Chhattisgarh (arising out of SLP Cri. Nos. 16689-
16690/2024), reported in MANU/SC/0804/2025 was pleased to observe
as under : -
8. However, the minimum sentence under Section 6 of the
POCSO Act is twenty years. Bearing in mind the fact that
the appellants herein were in their early twenties when the
incident took place and the fact that now they have
completed only five years of incarceration and even for
completion of the minimum sentence it would mean another
fifteen years, we find that the appellants are now in their
mid-twenties and even if the minimum sentence is to be
completed they would be in their early forties.
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9. We find that the interest of justice would be served in the
instant case, if we reduce the sentence imposed on them
from imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment
for the remainder of natural life to twenty years."
34. We have therefore, considered the advanced age of the
appellant at the time of commission of offence i.e. 43 years. As of now,
the appellant has already put in 6 years of imprisonment and another 14
years of imprisonment means, the appellant could not be released till the
age of 63 of years, if minimum sentence of 20 years RI is imposed.
35. We, therefore, find that it would be appropriate in the
interest of justice that the sentence of the appellant shall be reduced from
imprisonment of life which shall mean remainder of natural life of the
appellant, to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years, which is the minimum
sentence provided under Section 376(3) of IPC. As a result thereof, we
partly allow the appeal filed by the appellant, by reducing the sentence
from imprisonment for life which shall mean remainder of natural life of
appellant to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years.
36. The appeal is partly allowed in aforesaid terms. Fees of the
counsel appointed to represent respondent No.2 be quantified as per
Rules.
[MEHROZ K. PATHAN] [SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE]
JUDGE JUDGE
grt/-
