Bombay High Court

Kailash Pritamdas Sarba Alias Kailash ... vs State Of Maharashtra Thr Pso Ps ... on 6 November, 2025

2025:BHC-NAG:90-DB


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                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

                                                 NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR


                                   CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL)NO.1509/2025

                             MR. KAILASHDAS S/O
                             PRITAMDAS SARBA alias MR.
                             KAILASH S/O PRITAMDAS
                             PANAKA, Aged 43 Years,
                             Occupation Labour, resident of 17,
                             Ghoghari Raiyat Village, Tahsil-
                             Ghansour, District- Seoni, Madhya
                             Pradesh
                                                                                            ... APPLICANT
                                               ...VERSUS...

                     1.      THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA,
                             Through Police Station Officer,
                             Police Station Hinganghat,
                             District - Wardha
                             (Maharashtra State)

                     2.      SAVITRI KUWARSINGH UIKEY
                             Crime No. 1068/2018, Police
                             Station - Hinganghat, Wardha
                                                                                      ...NON-APPLICANTS
                     ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Shri C.J. Dhruv, Advocate for applicant
                     Ms S.S. Dhote, APP for non-applicant No.1/State
                     Shri N.R. Jadhav, Advocate for non-applicant No.2
                     ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             CORAM :           URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE AND
                                               NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, JJ.

                             RESERVED ON                        : 10.10.2025
                             PRONOUNCED ON                      : 06.11.2025
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JUDGMENT (PER : NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.)

Heard. Admit. Heard finally with the consent of learned

Counsel for both the parties.

2. This is an application filed by the applicant seeking quashing

of the First Information Report No. 1068/2018, dated 21.07.2018,

registered with the non-applicant No.1, Police Station Hinanghat,

District Wardha, for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)

(n) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,

and also, the final report/charge-sheet No. 231/2018, dated

30.10.2018, registered with the non-applicant No.1, Police Station

Hinanghat, District Wardha, for the offences punishable under

Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections

3(1)(w)(i)(ii) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, as also the Criminal Trial

before the Additional Sessions Judge, Hinganghat vide Spl. (Atro)

C. No. 09/2018.

3. It is the case of the non-applicant No.2, and as can be seen

from the First Information Report in question that the non-applicant

No.2 is a labourer who has migrated to Hinganghat from her village

in Madhya Pradesh, in search of work, and joined a contractor

named Imran Ansari for the construction of Nagar Parishad

building. It is further stated that the contractor made arrangements

for all the labourers to reside in another building in Cotton Market

in Hinganghat. The applicant, while working in the said Nagar

Parishad building, came in contact with the non-applicant No.2, and

after a few days they started to reside together as husband and

wife. It is further stated in the First Information Report that the

applicant subjected the non-applicant No.2 to sexual intercourse on

the pretext of marriage on multiple occasions. On 12.06.2018, the

applicant left for his village for the purpose of paddy sowing,

stating that he would return within five days. However,

subsequently, the non-applicant No.2 found that she was pregnant.

Furthermore, when the applicant did not return, the non-applicant

No.2 on 21.07.2018, lodged the First Information Report as stated

above for the offences punishable under various sections. On

30.10.2018, charge-sheet No. 231/2018, was filed in the matter.

The present application is being filed for quashing of the First

Information Report and the consequent charge-sheet filed by the

Investigating Agency, on completion of investigation.

4. We have heard Shri C.J. Dhruv, learned Counsel for the

applicant, Ms S.S. Dhote, as also, learned Additional Public

Prosecutor for the non-applicant No.1/State, and Shri N.R. Jadhav,

learned Counsel for the non-applicant No.2.

5. Shri Dhruv, the learned Counsel for the applicant states that

the parties to the matter have amicably settled the matter and

accordingly an affidavit is filed by the non-applicant No.2, in the

present matter. He further submits that even otherwise, no offence

as contemplated under the sections stated supra is made out from

the meaningful reading of the First Information Report. We have

personally verified the contents of the affidavit from the parties

who were present before us and have been identified by their

respective Counsel on 10.10.2025.

6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, however, opposes the

contentions made by the learned Counsel for the applicant and

states that mere settlement between the parties cannot be a reason

to quash the First Information Report and the consequent charge-

sheet.

7. Learned Counsel for the non-applicant No.2, Shri Jadhav,

however, fairly submits that the matter has been settled and prays

for quashing of the First Information Report and the charge-sheet.

8. In light of these submissions, we have perused the material

on record. As can be seen from the said, the First Information

Report was lodged on 21.07.2018. It is noteworthy to mention that

the applicant is 43 years of age, while the non-applicant No.2 is 21

years of age. Thus, both of them are adults, major, and are able to

understand the consequences of entering into and continuing the

live-in relationship. It is a matter of record that the non-applicant

No.2 has filed an affidavit, wherein, she has made the following

averments.

"5. I have voluntarily entered into a complete and amicable settlement with the Applicant without any coercion, pressure, threat, or undue influence

whatsoever. I am an adult of sound mind and have taken this decision after full deliberation with my family and after receiving legal advice. The settlement is genuine and made in good faith.

6. I clarify that the relationship between me and the Applicant was consensual in nature based on mutual affection and consent between two adults. The physical intimacy was with my full knowledge and voluntary consent without any force, coercion, or misrepresentation. The complaint arose from emotional distress when the Applicant left for his village, coupled with the discovery of my pregnancy."

9. True it is that the offences complained of are non-

compoundable in nature, but as stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

the judgment of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra

and another, (2019) 9 SCC 608, after exhaustively dealing with the

case laws related to the subject, this Court held as under :

"16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In

Deepak Gulati this Court observed: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) "21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her."

18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect

to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."

10. It is thus the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court that, even if,

the offences are non-compoundable that would not deter this Court

from exercising powers available under Section 482 of the Criminal

Procedure Code, for quashing the proceedings, if the contingencies

are mentioned therein are present. In the present case, looking at

the age of the parties and more particularly the allegations, we are

of the considered view that the relationship is between two adults

and major persons who are able to understand the consequences of

any act or omission to be done by them. Thus, the only inevitable

conclusion is that the relationship was of a consequential nature.

The fact is amplified by the affidavit in reply, filed on record by the

non-applicant No.2. It would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to

continue the proceedings any further, as there are no chances of

conviction, in view of no objection by the complainant. It would

therefore be a fit case to exercise inherent jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, (Section 528 of the

Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita), and to quash the proceedings,

as the continuance would amount to nothing but an abuse of

process of the Court. It can, however, be seen that the entire police

machinery and the Investigating Agency have spent their valuable

time and efforts in filing a charge-sheet in the matter by recording

the statements of the witnesses and collecting other material on

record. It would be therefore, in the interest of justice to impose

costs on the applicant and the non-applicant No.2, to compensate

the Investigating Agency. We therefore, proceed to pass the

following order :

ORDER

i) The application is allowed.

ii) The First Information Report No. 1068/2018, dated

21.07.2018, registered with the non-applicant No.1, Police Station

Hinanghat, District Wardha, for the offences punishable under

Sections 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989, and also, the final report/charge-sheet No.

231/2018, dated 30.10.2018, registered with the non-applicant

No.1, Police Station Hinanghat, District Wardha, for the offences

punishable under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal

Code and Sections 3(1)(w)(i)(ii) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, as also

the Criminal Trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Hinganghat

vide Spl. (Atro) C. No. 09/2018, are hereby quashed and set aside,

subject to payment of cost of Rs.20,000/-, each by the applicant and

the non-applicant No.2, within two weeks from the date of this

order.