Bombay High Court
Priti W/O. Manoj Bundile vs Honble Minister, Rural Development, ... on 4 November, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:11410
0411WP2331-25.odt 1 Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 2331 OF 2025
Priti Manoj Bundile, Aged about 35 years, Occupation-
Household, R/o Mahuli Jahagir, Tah. And District Amravati. PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. Hon'ble Minister, Rural Development,
Mantralaya, Mumbai-32.
2. The Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati.
3. The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Amravati.
4. The Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Mahuli Jahagir,
Tahsil and District Amravati.
5. Sudhir Krushnarao Bijwe, Aged about 58 years,
Occupation-Agriculturist, R/o Mahuli Jahagir.
Tahsil and District Amravati. RESPONDENTS
______________________________________________________________
Shri N.A. Gawande, Counsel for the petitioner.
Shri S.V. Narale, Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent nos.1 and 2.
Shri J.B. Kasat, Counsel for the respondent no.3.
Shri B.J. Lonare, Counsel for the respondent no.4.
Shri R.N. Ghuge, Counsel for the respondent no.5.
______________________________________________________________
CORAM : PRAFULLA S. KHUBALKAR, J.
DATE ON WHICH ARGUMENTS WERE HEARD : SEPTEMBER 29, 2025
DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS PRONOUNCWED : NOVEMBER 04, 2025
JUDGMENT
RULE. Rule is made returnable forthwith and heard finally with
consent of the counsel for the parties.
2. Invoking powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner has assailed the orders passed by the Additional Commissioner
under Section 39(1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 (for
short, 'the Act of 1959') which is upheld by the Hon'ble Minister thereby
disqualifying the petitioner as Member and Sarpanch of the Gram
Panchayat.
0411WP2331-25.odt 2 Judgment
3. The crucial issue involved in the instant petition is as to whether
the petitioner who has been arrayed as an accused in an offence registered
against her and her husband under Sections 7, 7(A) and 12 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 could be disqualified as Member and
Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, even in absence of any material to show
the acceptance of bribe amount by the petitioner.
4. The factual matrix leading to the filing of the instant petition is
succinctly stated below:-
The petitioner was elected as member of Gram Panchayat Mahuli
Jahangir, Taluka and District Amravati, in the elections held on
15.01.2021. The elections for the post of Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch
were held on 16.02.2021 and the petitioner was elected as Sarpanch. The
term of Gram Panchayat is from 16.02.2021 to 15.02.2026. While the
petitioner was holding the post of Sarpanch, on the basis of a complaint
lodged by one Rambhau Ganesh Mondhe, First Information Report came
to be registered against her and her husband for offence under Sections 7,
7(A) and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the said report,
it was alleged by the complainant that husband of the petitioner has
demanded an amount of Rs.4,000/- for issuance of an experience
certificate to be signed by the Sarpanch, which post was held by the
petitioner. The report was lodged on 25.09.2023, and the verification of
demand was conducted on 26.09.2023. Thereafter, the trap was conducted
on 27.09.2023 in which the husband of petitioner was caught red-handed
while accepting the bribe amount of Rs.4,000/- and accordingly, the
offence was registered against the petitioner and her husband.
0411WP2331-25.odt 3 Judgment
5. In this background, the respondent no.5, who is a voter and
resident of the said village filed an application under Section 39(1) of the
Act of 1959 before the Additional Commissioner seeking removal of the
petitioner from the post of Sarpanch. Taking cognizance of the application,
the Additional Commissioner directed the Chief Executive Officer to
conduct an enquiry and submit its report. Accordingly, the Chief Executive
Officer submitted its report dated 09.01.2024 under Section 39(1) of the
Act of 1959. By considering the report, the Additional Commissioner
passed the final order on 07.08.2024 and the petitioner came to be
disqualified. Feeling agreed by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal
under Section 39(3) of the Act of 1959 before the Hon'ble Minister, which
came to be rejected by order dated 12.03.2025. The petitioner has raised
challenge to both these orders by way of instant petition.
6. The main thrust of submissions advanced by Shri N.A. Gawande,
learned counsel for petitioner rests on the contention that there is no
material to prove the acts of demand or acceptance of bribe by this petitioner
and mere allegations of demand and acceptance by her husband cannot be
a reason to disqualify the petitioner as Member and Sarpanch of the Gram
Panchayat. It is submitted that inference drawn by the Additional
Commissioner is based on surmises and the drastic decision of
disqualifying the democratically elected Member is unsustainable in law. It
is the case of the petitioner that the complaint is made against her out of
political rivalry and she is falsely implicated. The counsel for the petitioner
also submitted that the proceedings were conducted before the Additional
Commissioner by changing the dates of hearing on several occasions and
without affording proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is
0411WP2331-25.odt 4 Judgment
submitted that mere registration of the First Information Report under the
provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act does not amount to any
misconduct, much less a disgraceful conduct, and the invocation of
provisions of Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959 was unwarranted.
In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner
placed heavy reliance on a judgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Writ Petition No.899 of 2023 [Rupali Dinesh Kale Versus The State of
Maharashtra & Others] and submitted that in an identical fact situation
the disqualification of a Member of Gram Panchayat was set aside by the
Court, despite registration of an offence under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. By attempting to draw an analogy of the reasoning,
learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in absence of any
conviction of the petitioner, she cannot be disqualified as Member or
Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat.
7. Per contra, learned learned Assistant Government Pleader as well as
respective counsel for the respondents have made elaborate submissions
opposing the petition. By inviting attention to the reasons recorded by the
Additional Commissioner and the Hon'ble Minister, learned Assistant
Government Pleader justified the impugned orders and submitted that the
commissioner has rightly invoked powers under section 39(1) of the Act
of 1959, which does not warrant interference on any count.
Shri R.N. Ghuge, learned counsel for respondent no.5 strenuously
submitted that in view of the registration of the First Information Report
against the petitioner and her husband and the entire conduct on their
part, invocation of powers under Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959 was
necessitated. He submitted that the husband of the petitioner was caught
0411WP2331-25.odt 5 Judgment
red-handed while accepting bribe of Rs.4,000/- for issuing an experience
certificate to be signed by the Sarpanch and without support of the
petitioner, her husband could not have made any demand and as such the
implication of the petitioner in the serious offence is a ground attracting
her disqualification as Member and Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. He
also submitted that in view of the nature of the act committed by the
petitioner leading to an offence, an action for removal from Office was
warranted and the Additional Commissioner has rightly passed the order
based on his subjective satisfaction, which needs no interference on any
count. In support of his submissions, reliance is placed on the judgment
of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Dr. Narendra Purushottam Ingole
Versus Hon'ble State Minister, Village Development Department & Others
[2019(3) Mh.L.J.368].
8. Learned counsel for the respective parties have made elaborate
submissions on rival contentions and the same fall for my consideration.
9. The undisputed facts relevant for considering the controversy are
that the petitioner was holding the post of Sarpanch during the period
when the offence came to be registered against her and her husband. The
petitioner's husband was caught red handed while accepting bribe of
Rs.4,000/- for issuing an experience certificate. The experience certificate
was to be issued by the petitioner who was holding the post of Sarpanch.
The verification of demand was conducted by the officials of the Anti-
Corruption Bureau, which confirmed the act of demand, as has been
recorded in the report dated 09.01.2024 submitted by the Chief Executive
Officer. Based on this factual set up, the Additional Commissioner has held
0411WP2331-25.odt 6 Judgment
that the petitioner indulged in disgraceful conduct and incurred the
disqualification. The Hon'ble Minister has concurred with the decision of
the Additional Commissioner and upheld the disqualification.
10. As such, even considering the undisputed facts, it is clear that the
actual demand of bribe and acceptance of the amount of illegal
gratification is by the husband of the petitioner. There is no material to
show that the petitioner has actually made any demand or has accepted
the amount of bribe. However, it is very crucial to note that the demand
of bribe was made by the husband for performing an act which was to be
essentially performed by the petitioner, who was holding the post of
Sarpanch. It is undisputed that the demand of bribe was made for
issuance of an experience certificate, which was to be signed and issued by
the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. As such, the husband of the
petitioner could not have independently made any demand of money, had
there been no express or implied consent from the petitioner. As such,
even in absence of any material to establish demand or acceptance of
money by the petitioner, the factual circumstances clearly show that the
petitioner in all probabilities has consented expressly or impliedly for the
demand of bribe. Thus, the question which arises for consideration is as
to whether under such circumstances in absence of any clear evidence of
demand or acceptance by the petitioner, she could still be disqualified
under Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959?
11. A perusal of the provisions of Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959
shows that any member or any Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch who has been
guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or of any disgraceful
0411WP2331-25.odt 7 Judgment
conduct, is liable to be removed from the office. For ready reference, the
provision of Section 39(1)(i) of the Act of 1959 is reproduced below:-
"39. Removal from office.- (1) The Commissioner may:-
(i) remove from office any member or any Sarpanch or Upa-
Sarpanch who has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his
duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or of neglect of or incapacity to
perform his duty, or is persistently remiss in the discharge thereof.
A Sarpanch or an Upa-Sarpanch so removed may at the discretion
of the Commissioner also be removed from the panchayat;"
On a careful reading of the provision, it becomes clear that the
Commissioner is empowered to remove any Member or Sarpanch or Upa-
Sarpanch, who has been found guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his
duties or of any disgraceful conduct etc. and the powers of removal are to
be exercised at the discretion of the Commissioner. It is crucial to note
that Section 14 of the Act of 1959 also contains a provision with respect to
disqualifications on account of various other situations. Section 14(1)(a)
of the same also deals with the situation of disqualification in case a
person is convicted of an offence. In the instant case, there is no
conviction for any offence. However, the disqualification is ordered on the
basis of registration of First Information Report against the petitioner and
her husband. Thus, the issue is whether the petitioner can be said to have
been indulged in any misconduct or disgraceful conduct as required under
Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959, to such an extent of incurring
disqualification to hold the post of Member or Sarpanch? On careful
consideration of the provisions of Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959, it is
clear that there is no necessity of any conviction to be the basis for
disqualification. The nature of the act committed by the Member or
Sarpanch while in office has been given the central focus warranting an
0411WP2331-25.odt 8 Judgment
action under Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959. The provision clearly
shows that subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner about the act being
a 'disgraceful conduct' is of primary importance.
12. The position of law in this regard is very well elucidated by the
judgment in Dr. Narendra Purushottam Ingole (Supra) and the relevant
paragraphs from the said judgment are reproduced below:-
"10. The expression "disgraceful conduct" as employed in section
39(1) of the said Act has to be construed keeping in mind the object
sought to be achieved by said provision. The removal of an elected
member or Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch from office is a drastic action
and the exercise of such power is based on the subjective
satisfaction of the Commissioner in the light of any disgraceful
conduct of the concerned member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch. In a
way, the power of removal has been conferred on the Commissioner
for being exercised in a situation which otherwise is not a
disqualification prescribed under the said Act. For example, a
member who is being proceeded against in a Court of law as as
accused for a serious or heinous crime would not be disqualified
until he is so convicted for being disqualified under section 14(1) of
the said Act. But if the alleged offence is committed during the
term as member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch and in the opinion of
the Commissioner, such act amounts to disgraceful conduct on his
part, then to meet such situation which though does not become a
disqualification till conviction could still be a reason to remove such
member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch from the post held by him
which would make him ineligible to contest for such post for the
remainder of the term.
In other words, a situation has been contemplated which empowers
the Commissioner to remove a member or a Sarpanch or Upa-
Sarpanch from the post held by him if it is found that such elected
member is guilty of either misconduct in the discharge of his duties
or of any disgraceful conduct for the remainder of his term.
12. In the present case the report of the Chief Executive Officer
indicates that pursuant to a complaint lodged by one Narayan
Gaikwad, the petitioner is alleged to have demanded an amount of
Rs.2500/- by way of illegal gratification for issuing a notice to one
Shri Lohakare on account of the construction erected by him. The
0411WP2331-25.odt 9 Judgment
said amount was demanded for taking action in that matter by the
petitioner in his capacity as the Sarpanch. The petitioner was
trapped red-handed in that process after which an offence under
sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 came
to be registered against him. The petitioner was arrested in that
process and the Chief Executive Officer in that background sought
permission to make an enquiry under section 39(1) of the said Act
against the petitioner. The action in question is based on the arrest
of the petitioner pursuant to a trap led by the Anti-Corruption
Bureau on the basis of a complaint received by it. The act of
demanding illegal gratification and subsequent arrest by the Anti-
Corruption Bureau has been treated as an act amount to disgraceful
conduct on the part of the petitioner warranting his removal.
13. It is to be seen that action of removal has been initiated
against the petitioner on account of his aforesaid conduct. The
same is based on the powers given to the Commissioner under
section 39(1) of the said Act. As noted above, there is a distinction
between a disqualification prescribed which disqualifies a person
either from becoming a member of the Panchayat or continuing as a
member of Panchayat. Removal from office under section 39(1)
does not require such conviction and it is based on the conduct of
the person concerned while he is a member or Sarpanch or Upa-
Sarpanch. What is to be seen is the commission of an act by such
person amounting to disgraceful conduct. The said act in question
may lead to a future conviction or acquittal, but for the purposes of
section 39(1) of the said Act that aspect is not relevant. The nature
of the act committed while in office has been given importance
warranting actionfor removal from office. In other words, it is the
subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner who has been granted
such power to remove a member or a Sarpanch or a Upa-Sarpanch
who has been found guilty of such disgraceful conduct."
13. Applying the legal position, in the instant case, it has to be seen that
the Additional Commissioner has inferred that the conduct of petitioner
who appears to have impliedly or expressly supported the demand of
illegal gratification by her husband, falls in the category of the term
'disgraceful conduct'. Based on the material before it, the Authority has
arrived at its own conclusion to disqualify the petitioner under Section
0411WP2331-25.odt 10 Judgment
39(1) of the Act of 1959. As such, it is clear that the decision of the
Commissioner is based on his own subjective satisfaction, which does not
appear to be irrational or arbitrary.
14. At this juncture, it is fruitful to refer to the enunciation of law as
made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yeshwant Bhoir Versus District
Collector, Raigad & Others [AIR 2012 SC 1339]. While dealing with the
concept of disgraceful conduct in paragraph 15, it is observed as under:-
"15. The expression 'disgraceful conduct' is not defined in the
statute. Therefore, the same has to be understood in given
dictionary meaning. The term 'disgrace' signifies loss of honour,
respect or reputation, shame or bring disfavour or discredit.
Disgraceful means giving offence to moral sensibilities and
injurious to reputation or conduct or character deserving or
bringing disgrace or shame. Disgraceful conduct is also to be
examined from the context in which the term has been employed
under the statute. Disgraceful conduct need not necessarily be
connected with the official duty of the office-bearer. Therefore, it
may be outside the ambit of discharge of his official duty."
15. On considering the factual aspects of the case, it is clear that the
demand of illegal gratification was although made by the husband of the
petitioner, same cannot be without her support since she was holding the
post of Sarpanch. The demand of money was apparently for performance
of an act in the exclusive domain of the Sarpanch. The contention that
there is no material to establish the demand by the petitioner can be a
part of defence in the criminal case, however, the same is of no
importance for diluting the act of the petitioner to be a disgraceful
conduct. Further, issue as to whether such was the modus operendi of
the petitioner and her husband would be a matter of trial of the criminal
case. For the purpose of considering the issue of disqualification based
0411WP2331-25.odt 11 Judgment
on the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner, the primary issue is
whether the Commissioner has exercised his discretion perversely or
irrationally. On a careful reading of the order passed by the Additional
Commissioner, there appears no perversity much less any irrationality.
16. As regards the reliance placed by the counsel for petitioner on the
judgment in Rupali Dinesh Kale (supra), it is crucial to note that there
was a failure of trap in the said case and the complaint was found to be
false. It was found that the Anti-Corruption Bureau was not clear about
any demand being made by the petitioner therein and therefore, this
Court had concluded that the disqualification was unwarranted. The
said case is clearly distinguishable from the case in hand. In the instant
case, the demand by the petitioner's husband and acceptance of bribe
amount is proved. The demand was apparently made for issuance of an
experience certificate, which could have been issued only by the
petitioner who was holding the post of Sarpanch. As such the implied
consent of the petitioner for the demand of bribe, can be said to be a
relevant factor for the Commissioner to pass an order of disqualification
under Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959. As such, the judgement in Rupali
Dinesh Kale (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner.
17. Although the counsel for petitioner submitted that the Additional
Commissioner has passed the order without affording proper opportunity
of hearing to the petitioner, it appears from the record and even from the
order that opportunity of hearing was afforded to all the parties,
including the petitioner. The petitioner has participated in the hearing
of the matter at every stage of the proceedings. It is also revealed that
0411WP2331-25.odt 12 Judgment
the petitioner has challenged an order passed by the Commissioner,
rejecting her request for supply of documents vide Writ Petition no.3057
of 2024 and in view of pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner also
submitted adjournment applications before the Additional Commissioner.
However, the petitioner thereafter did not pursue with the petition and
the matter was heard by the Additional Commissioner at the stage of
final hearing. As such, the petitioner has participated in the proceedings
and has even made her submissions at the stage of final hearing. There is
nothing on record to show that there was denial of opportunity of hearing
to the petitioner. There is nothing on record to show that the dates of
hearing were changed by the Commissioner. On the contrary, it appears
that the petitioner has raised several contentions and even filed petitions
during pendency of the proceedings which was an attempt to prolong
the decision of the case. In view of this, it is clear that the contentions
raised alleging denial of opportunity of hearing are not at all appealing.
18. Having regard to the overall factual and legal aspects, I am of the
firm view that indulgence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
is not at all warranted in the instant case. The impugned order passed
by the Additional Commissioner based on his subjective satisfaction,
does not appear to be arbitrary or irrational. The conduct on the part of
the petitioner in supporting the demand of illegal gratification by her
husband is rightly held to be a disgraceful conduct, thereby attracting
disqualification under Section 39(1) of the Act of 1959. The petitioner
has failed to demonstrate any perversity or illegality with the impugned
orders. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
0411WP2331-25.odt 13 Judgment
19. In that view of the matter, no interference is called for with the
orders passed by the Additional Commissioner and the Hon'ble Minister.
The writ petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule stands
discharged.
(PRAFULLA S. KHUBALKAR, J.)
APTE
At this stage, a request is made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner for continuation of the interim relief, which was granted by
this Court and which operated during the pendency of the instant
petition. The request for continuation of the interim relief is strongly
opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents.
However, considering the fact that the interim relief was operating
during the pendency of the instant petition, same is continued for a
period of three weeks from today. The interim relief shall cease to
operate on expiry of the period of three weeks.
(PRAFULLA S. KHUBALKAR, J.)
APTE
Signed by: Apte
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 04/11/2025 17:41:41
