Shri Ajit Kishichand Shivani vs Shri Pawean Chandulal Khemani
2025 Latest Caselaw 2972 Bom

Bombay High Court

Shri Ajit Kishichand Shivani vs Shri Pawean Chandulal Khemani on 4 March, 2025

    2025:BHC-AS:10038


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                                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                               FIRST APPEAL NO.1566 OF 2019

                       Shri Ajit Kishinchand Shivani                               ]
                       Age 58 years, R/o. Flat No.304,                             ]
                       3rd Floor, Lisbon Co-operative Housing                      ]
                       Society, Bldg. No.A/21,                                     ]
                       Sashtri Nagar, Andheri (West),                              ]
                       Mumbai - 400 053                                            ]
                       at present Residing at A1 Sayegh                            ]
                       Apartment,Flat No.402, A1 Fashidi Road,                     ]
                       Bur Dubai, Dubai, U.A.E.                                    ]
                       Through his Constituted Attorney                            ]
                       Mr. Jagdish Bherumal Hardasani,                             ]
                       R/At A/42, Queens Park, Juhu Road,                          ]
                       Near SNDT College, Santacruz (W),                           ]
                       Mumbai - 400 044                                            ] ... Appellant.

                              Versus

                       Shri Pawan Chandulal Khemani,                               ]
                       Adult, R/o. Flat No.304, 3rd Floor,                         ]
                       Lisban CHS Ltd., Building No.A/21,                          ]
                       Shashtri Nagar, Andheri (West),                             ]
                       Mumbai - 400 053                                            ]    ... Respondent.

                                                      ----------
                       Mr. Bhavin Gada a/w. Mr.Dhaval Visawadia i/by Mr.Harakchand & Co.
                       for the Appellant.
                       Mr. Nitin Gaware Patil a/w. Mr.Jay Salunke for Respondent.
                                                      ----------

                                                             Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
                                                        Reserved on : January 23, 2025
                                                      Pronounced on : March 04, 2025
          Digitally
          signed by
          SANJAY
SANJAY    ASARAM
ASARAM    MANDAWGAD
MANDAWGAD Date:
          2025.03.04
          14:12:49
          +0530        sa_mandawgad                             1 of 17




                       ::: Uploaded on - 04/03/2025                        ::: Downloaded on - 04/03/2025 22:25:58 :::
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JUDGMENT:

1. First Appeal is at the instance of the original Plaintiff

challenging the order dated 11th March, 2013 passed by the City

Civil Court at Mumbai in Short Cause Suit No.4359 of 2011 (High

Court Suit No.2312 of 2011), answering the preliminary issue of

limitation framed under Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (for short, "CPC") against the Plaintiff, resulting in dismissal of

the suit.

2. Suit No.4359 of 2011 was filed for declaration that the

agreement for sale registered on 5th October, 1999 pertaining to

the suit property is without consideration and therefore, there is no

transfer of right, title and interest in favour of the Defendant and

the same be declared as null and void and for recovery of

possession. It was pleaded that the Plaintiff was the owner of the

suit premises alongwith his mother. The Defendant is the Plaintiff's

cousin and desired to purchase the suit premises and they entered

into registered Agreement dated 5th October, 1999 for purchase of

the suit premises for consideration of Rs.15,00,000/-. However the

Defendant did not pay the purchase consideration. After the

registration, the Plaintiff left India and the Plaintiff's mother

continued to stay in the suit premises till her death on 14 th June,

2003. The Society fraudulently transferred the suit flat in name of

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the Defendant. The Defendant has fraudulently opened bank

accounts in name of the Plaintiff and his mother and operated the

same. The cause of action is pleaded to have arisen in the year

2004, when the Plaintiff acquired knowledge that the Defendant

trespassed in the suit flat.

3. The Defendant filed Notice of Motion No.2000 of 2012 in

Suit No.2312 of 2011, under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC seeking

rejection of the suit as being barred by limitation. The motion came

to be resisted by the Plaintiff by filing his affidavit-in-reply dated

20th November, 2012 contending that the prayer clause (a) of the

plaint seeks recovery of possession and the limitation is of 12 years

under Section 66 of Limitation Act.

4. Though the application was filed under Order VII Rule 11(d)

of CPC, after hearing the parties, the Trial Court framed the

preliminary issue of limitation under Section 9A of the CPC as

under:

"Whether the suit filed is within limitation ?"

5. The Plaintiff filed his affidavit of evidence and was cross-

examined by the Defendant, however, the Defendant did not

adduce any evidence. The Trial Court after appreciation of the oral

and documentary evidence held that the suit is barred by law of

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limitation and dismissed the suit.

6. Mr.Gada, Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant would

submit that the impugned order was passed on 11 th March, 2013

when Section 9A was on the statute book and by an amendment of

the year 2018, Section 9A came to be deleted. He submits that in

the decision of Nusli Neville Wadia vs. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6

SCC 557, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has held that

under the provisions of Section 9A and Order XIV Rule 2, it is open

to decide preliminary issue if it is purely question of law and not a

mixed question of law and fact by recording evidence. He submits

that considering that evidence was led by the parties in the present

case, the suit could not have been decided on the preliminary

issue. He submits that it has been held by the Apex Court that

Section 2 of the Maharashtra Second Amendment Act, 2018, does

not change the legal scenario, as to what can be decided as the

preliminary issue under Section 9A. He submits that the said

decision has been subsequently followed in the case of Shyam

Madan Mohan Ruia vs. Messer Holdings Limited reported in

(2020) 5 SCC 252, where the Apex Court has held that the question

of limitation will have to be considered alongwith the other issues

arising for consideration. He submits that in view of the settled

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position of law as the issue of limitation is outside purview of

Section 9A, it will now have to be considered alongwith other

issues.

7. Per contra, Mr.Gaware Patil, Learned counsel appearing for

the Respondent would submit that the suit was clearly barred by

limitation as the Plaintiff had knowledge about the agreement for

sale in 1999 itself which is clear from the averments in the plaint.

He submits that though the Application was filed under Order VII

Rule 11(d) of CPC, the issue was framed under Section 9A of the

CPC on the aspect of the limitation which was accepted by the

Plaintiff. He submits that it is the Plaintiff who had led evidence

and after having failed, cannot now seek to set aside the judgment

on the basis of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nusli

Neville Wadia (supra). He submits that so far as Section 9A is

concerned, the position existing prior to the judgment of Nusli

Neville Wadia (supra), will have to be considered alongwith the

effect of admission in the pleadings and Section 6 of the General

Clauses Act.

8. Mr. Gaware-Patil points out Statement and Object of the

Maharashtra Ordinance No.XVIII of 2018 dated 27th June, 2018 and

would submit that the object was to provide for continuation of

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Appeals pending before the Appellate Court against the decision of

Trial Court holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit

under Section 9A as in such cases, the suit itself has been dismissed

finally. He would further submit that Sub-Section (3) of Section 3

of the Amendment Act of 2018 provides that notwithstanding the

deletion of Section 9A of the principal Act, where the preliminary

issue framed under Section 9A has been decided and challenge to

the decision is pending before the Appellate or Revisional Court,

the proceedings to continue as if Section 9A has not been deleted

and in event the matter is remanded for reconsideration to the Trial

Court, all the provisions of the Principal Act shall apply. He submits

that in the present case, the question of limitation is a pure

question of law and the pleadings would indicate an admission that

the suit is barred by limitation.

9. He would further submit that the Apex Court in the case of

of Narne Rama Murthy vs. Ravula Somasundaram reported in

(2015) 6 SCC 614, has held that when the limitation is a pure

question of law and from the pleadings itself became apparent that

the suit is barred by limitation, it is the duty of the Court to decide

limitation at the outset even in absence of plea. He submits that

the said decision has been followed in the recent decision of the

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Apex Court in the case of S. Shivraj Reddy (Died) Thr. His LRs v. S.

Raghuraj Reddy reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 963. He submits

that the decision of Nusli Neville Wadia (supra), notwithstanding

as the pleading makes it clear that the suit is barred by limitation,

the preliminary issue has been rightly answered.

10. The following point arises for determination:

(i) Whether the impugned decision on the preliminary

issue of limitation framed under Section 9A of CPC by the

Trial Court is required to be set aside in view of the decision

in Nusli Neville Wadia vs Ivory Properties. ?

AS TO ISSUE NO (i):

11. The Application preferred by the Defendant was for rejection

of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC as being barred by

law of limitation. The Trial Court after hearing, framed preliminary

issue of limitation under Section 9A of CPC as it existed on the

statute book at the relevant time. There was no objection raised to

the framing of preliminary issue and both parties acquiesced in the

issue being tried under Section 9A of CPC.

12. Section 9A of CPC was firstly introduced in the statute book

in the year 1970 and was re-enacted by the CPC (Maharashtra

Amendment Act, 1977) and read as under:

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"9A. Where at the hearing of application relating to interim relief in a suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the court as a preliminary issue.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, if, at the hearing of any application for granting or setting aside an order granting any interim relief, whether by way of stay, injunction, appointment of a Receiver or otherwise, made in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain such a suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be heard and disposed of by the court as expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case be adjourned to the hearing of the suit.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), at the hearing of any such application, the court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary, pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction."

13. The State of Maharashtra promulgated an Ordinance on 27 th

June, 2018 deleting Section 9A. The Ordinance was replaced by

Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2018. Then

came the second Amendment Act which replaced Clause (1) of

Section 3 of the First Amendment. Relevant for our purpose is

Section 3 (3) of the Amendment Act which reads as under:

"In all cases, where a preliminary issue framed under Section 9A has been decided, holding that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and a challenge to such decision in pending before an Appellate or Revisional Court, on the date of commencement of the Amendment Ordinance, such appellate or revisional proceedings shall continue as if the Amendment Ordinance has not been enacted and Section 9A has not been deleted :

Provided that, in case the appellate or revisional Court, while partly allowing such appeal or revision, remands the matter to

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the trial Court for reconsideration of the preliminary issue so framed under Section 9A, upon receipt of these proceedings by the trial Court, all the provisions of principal Act shall apply."

14. In the present case, the issue was framed and decided against

the Plaintiff in the year 2013 i.e. prior to the deletion of Section 9A.

Against the dismissal of the suit as being barred by limitation, the

present Appeal has been filed. As per the Amendment Act, the

appellate proceedings are to continue as if Section 9A has not been

deleted. Notwithstanding the amendments by which Section 9-A

came to be deleted, the legal position as regards the pendency of

determination of Section 9-A before the Trial Court and the

pendency of appellate proceedings against a decision rendered

under Section 9-A holding that the Court does not have the

jurisdiction, is the same i.e. to proceed as if Section 9A has not been

deleted. Thus the validity of the impugned judgment has to be

tested as if Section 9A still continued on the statute book.

15. Section 9A provides that where an objection is taken to the

jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit, the Court shall

determine the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. Whether

the issue of jurisdiction will include an issue of limitation is the

question. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Nusli Neville Wadia (supra)

was deciding the issue referred by Hon'ble Division Bench of the

Apex Court doubting the correctness of the view taken in

Foreshore Coop Housing Society Ltd vs Praveen D. Desai, (2015) 6

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SCC 412, as to the interpretation of expression "jurisdiction of the

Court to entertain such suit used in Section 9A of CPC". The Apex

Court noted the view taken in Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe v.

Baburav Vishnu Javalkar, (2015) 7 SCC 321 that the issue of

limitation cannot be decided as preliminary issue of jurisdiction and

Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. (supra), which had opined

that the word "jurisdiction" used in Section 9A is wide enough to

include the issue of limitation.

16. The Hon'ble Apex Court noted that the word jurisdiction

occurring in Section 9A is qualified with the words "to entertain the

suit" and that the words" jurisdiction to entertain" has been used in

a narrower sense, and, held in paragraphs 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 56

as under:

50. When we consider what colour expression "jurisdiction" has in Section 9-A, it is clearly in the context of power to entertain, jurisdiction takes colour from accompanying word "entertain" i.e. the court should have jurisdiction to receive a case for consideration or to try it. In case there is no jurisdiction, court has no competence to give the relief, but if it has, it cannot give such relief for the reason that claim is time-barred by limitation or is barred by the principle of res judicata or by bar created under any other law for the time being in force. When a case is barred by res judicata or limitation, it is not that the court has no power to entertain it, but it is not possible to grant the relief. Due to expiry of limitation to file a suit, extinguishment of right to property is provided under Section 27 of the Limitation Act.

When court dismisses a suit on the ground of limitation, right to property is lost, to hold so the court must have jurisdiction to entertain it. The court is enjoined with a duty under Section 3 of the Limitation Act to take into consideration the bar of limitation by itself. The expression "bar to file a suit

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under any other law for the time being in force" includes the one created by the Limitation Act. It cannot be said to be included in the expression "jurisdiction to entertain" suit used in Section 9-A. The court has to receive a case for consideration and entertain it, to look into the facts constituting limitation or bar created by any other law to give relief, it has to decide the question on merits; then it has the power to dismiss the same on the ground of limitation or such other bar created by any other law. Thus, the meaning to be given to jurisdiction to entertain in Section 9-A is a narrow one as to maintainability, the competence of the court to receive the suit for adjudication is only covered under the provisions. The word "entertain" cannot be said to be the inability to grant relief on merits, but the same relates to receiving a suit to initiate the very process for granting relief.

51. The provision has been carved out under Section 9-A CPC to decide, question of jurisdiction to entertain, at the stage of deciding the interim application for injunction and the very purpose of enactment of the same was that the suits were being instituted without serving a notice under Section 80, which at the time of initial incorporation of provisions could not have been instituted without serving a notice of two months. There was a bar to institute a suit. It became a practice that after obtaining injunction, suit was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to file fresh suit after serving the notice. To take care of misuse of the provisions, Section 9-A was introduced in the year 1970 and had been reintroduced again in 1977 to consider question of jurisdiction to entertain at the stage of granting injunction or setting aside. The provision has been inserted having the narrow meaning as at the stage of granting ex parte injunction; the question can be considered. The written statement, set-off and counterclaim are not filed, discovery, inspection, admission, production and summoning of the documents stage has not reached and after the stages described above, framing of issues takes place under Order 14. As per Order 14 Rule 1, issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other. The issues are framed on the material proposition, denied by another party. There are issues of facts and issues of law. In case specific facts are admitted, and if the question of law arises which is dependent upon the outcome of admitted facts, it is open to the court to pronounce the judgment based on admitted

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facts and the preliminary question of law under the provisions of Order 14 Rule 2. In Order 14 Rule 2(1), the court may decide the case on a preliminary issue. It has to pronounce the judgment on all issues. Order 14 Rule 2(2) makes a departure and the court may decide the question of law as to jurisdiction of the court or a bar created to the suit by any law for the time being in force, such as under the Limitation Act.

52. In a case, question of limitation can be decided based on admitted facts, it can be decided as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2(2)(b). Once facts are disputed about limitation, the determination of the question of limitation also cannot be made under Order 14 Rule 2(2) as a preliminary issue or any other such issue of law which requires examination of the disputed facts. In case of dispute as to facts, is necessary to be determined to give a finding on a question of law. Such question cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. In a case, the question of jurisdiction also depends upon the proof of facts which are disputed. It cannot be decided as a preliminary issue if the facts are disputed and the question of law is dependent upon the outcome of the investigation of facts, such question of law cannot be decided as a preliminary issue, is settled proposition of law either before the amendment of CPC and post amendment in the year 1976.

53. The suit/application which is barred by limitation is not a ground of jurisdiction of the court to entertain a suit. If a plea of adverse possession has been taken under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, in case it is successfully proved on facts; the suit has to be dismissed. However, it is not the lack of the jurisdiction of the court that suit has to be dismissed on the ground of limitation, but proof of adverse possession for 12 years then the suit would be barred by limitation such question as to limitation cannot be decided as a preliminary issue.

54. What is intended by Section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is the defect of jurisdiction. It may be inter alia territorial or concerning the subject-matter. The defect of jurisdiction may be due to provisions of the law. In Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand [Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand, AIR 1958 SC 827] , the execution of award of the

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decree was dismissed by the Court on the ground that decree was a nullity. The Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree of the partition of agricultural land. It held that defect of the jurisdiction in the court that passed decree became attached to decree itself as dismissal of the suit was on account of the defect of jurisdiction. Thus, in our considered opinion, it is only the maintainability of the suit before the court which is covered within the purview of Section 9-A CPC as amended in Maharashtra.

56. Within the ken of provisions of Section 9-A CPC, jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit has to be decided without recording of evidence. Recording of evidence is not contemplated even at the stage of framing issue under Order 14 Rule 2 much less it can be allowed at the stage of grant of injunction, it would be the grossest misuse of the provisions of the law to permit the parties to adduce the evidence, to prove facts with respect to a preliminary issue of jurisdiction to entertain a suit. In case it is purely a question of law, it can be decided within the purview of Section 9-A CPC as applicable in Maharashtra. The scope of Section 9-A is not broader than Order 14 Rule 2(2) CPC. The scope is a somewhat limited one. Two full-fledged trials by leading evidence are not contemplated in CPC, one of the preliminary issue and another on other issues. Until and unless the question is purely of law, it cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. In our opinion, a mixed question of law and fact cannot be decided as a preliminary issue, either under Section 9-A or under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. Before or after its amendment of CPC concerning both provisions, the position is the same."

17. The Hon'ble Apex Court has thus held that the suit which is

barred by limitation is not a ground of jurisdiction of the Court to

entertain the suit. It is only the maintainability of the suit before

the Court which is covered within the purview of Section 9A CPC as

amended in Maharashtra. The Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the view

taken in Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe (supra) that the issue of

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limitation cannot be decided as preliminary issue of jurisdiction

under Section 9A.

18. The determination in the present case ought to rest here

considering the enunciation of law that limitation cannot be

decided as preliminary issue under Section 9A. However, it will be

necessary to deal with the submission of Mr. Gaware-Patil that the

question of limitation in facts of present case is pure question of

law and pleadings will indicate that the suit is barred by limitation

by relying on Narne Rama Murthy vs. Ravula Somasundaram and

Ors. (supra) and S. Shivraj Reddy (Died) Thr. His LRs v. S. Raghuraj

Reddy (supra). The submission stands answered in Nusli Neville

Wadia (supra), where the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the

decision in Narne Rama Murthy (supra) and held that the question

of limitation in no case can be said to be a question of jurisdiction

of Court in the context it has been used in Section 9A of CPC.

19. In the facts of present case, the issue of limitation came to be

framed as preliminary issue under Section 9A of CPC. Evidence was

led and the impugned judgment was passed by considering the

evidence and the admissions in cross examination. The issue of

limitation could have been raised under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC

as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 68 of Nusli Neville

Wadia (supra) that it cannot be laid down as proposition of law

under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC that plaint cannot be rejected as

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barred by limitation and it is permissible to do so, mainly in a case

where the plaint's averment itself indicates that cause of action to

be barred by limitation and no further evidence is required to

adjudicate the case. However, in case of an application under Order

VII Rule 11(d), it is only the averments in the plaint which are

germane and if upon meaningful reading of the plaint, it can be

found that the suit is barred by limitation, that the suit can be

dismissed. The exercise carried out by the Trial Court was not in the

context of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC as evidence was permitted

to be led and suit came to be rejected by considering the evidence.

Thus the contention of Mr. Gaware-Patil that the plaint averments

itself indicates that the suit is barred by limitation does not assist

the case of the Respondent.

20. The position post and pre deletion of Section 9A is immaterial

as the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraph 88 and 89 as

under:

"88. Given the discussion above, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction to entertain has different connotation from the jurisdictional error committed in exercise thereof. There is a difference between the existence of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. The expression "jurisdiction" has been used in CPC at several places in different contexts and takes colour from the context in which it has been used. The existence of jurisdiction is reflected by the fact of amenability of the judgment to attack in the collateral proceedings. If the court has an inherent lack of jurisdiction, its decision is open to attack as a nullity. While deciding the issues of the bar

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created by the law of limitation, res judicata, the court must have jurisdiction to decide these issues. Under the provisions of Section 9-A and Order 14 Rule 2, it is open to decide preliminary issues if it is purely a question of law not a mixed question of law and fact by recording evidence. The decision in Foreshore Coop. HousingSociety Ltd. [Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai, (2015) 6 SCC 412 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 333] cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. We have considered the decisions referred to therein, they are in different contexts. The decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Meher Singh [Meher Singh v. Deepak Sawhny, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 452 : (1998) 3 Mah LJ 940] holding that under Section 9-A the issue to try a suit/jurisdiction can be decided by recording evidence if required and by proper adjudication, is overruled. We hold that the decision in Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe [Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe v. Baburav Vishnu Javalkar, (2015) 7 SCC 321 :

(2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 595] has been correctly decided and cannot be said to be per incuriam, as held in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. [Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai, (2015) 6 SCC 412 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 333]

"89. Section 2 of the Maharashtra Second Amendment Act, 2018 which provides that where consideration of preliminary issue framed under Section 9-A is pending on the date of commencement of the CPC, the said issue shall be decided and disposed of by the court under Section 9-A as if the provision under Section 9-A has not been deleted, does not change the legal scenario as to what can be decided as a preliminary issue under Section 9-A CPC, as applicable in Maharashtra. The saving created by the provision of Section 2 where consideration of preliminary issue framed under Section 9-A is pending on the date of commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2018, can be decided only if it comes within the parameters as found by us on the interpretation of Section 9-A. We reiterate that no issue can

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be decided only under the guise of the provision that it has been framed under Section 9-A and was pending consideration on the date of commencement of the (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2018. The reference is answered accordingly."

21. The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court takes the issue of

limitation out of purview of Section 9A of CPC and that being the

enunciation of law, the Trial Court could not have decided the issue

of limitation as preliminary issue under Section 9A of CPC.

22. In view of the clear enunciation of law in Nusli Neville Wadia

(supra), the issue of limitation could not be answered as preliminary

issue under Section 9-A of CPC. Point No (i) is accordingly answered

in favour of the Appellant.

23. Resultantly, the following order is passed:

- ORDER -

(a) First Appeal stands allowed.

(b) The Impugned Judgment and order dated 11th March,

2013 is hereby quashed and set aside.

(c) Short Cause Suit No.4359 of 2011 is restored to the file

of Trial Court.

24. In view of the disposal of Appeal, pending Interim/Civil

Applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and stands

dismissed.

                                               [Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]

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