Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 4030 Bom
Judgement Date : 18 June, 2025
2025:BHC-OS:9267
906-CARAP-119-2024.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO. 119 OF 2024
Mangal Credit And Fincorp Limited Through Its ...Applicant
Authorised Representative Mr. Dhirav Kishor Veera
Versus
GBL Chemical Limited & Ors ...Respondents
Mr. Pankaj Jain a/w Pradeep Purohit i/b P. D. Jain & Co. Jain &
Co., for the Applicant.
Mr. Chirag Mody, a/w Yash Momaya, Parag Khandhar, Tapan
Radkar, Anaheeta Verma i/b DSK Legal, for Respondent Nos.1 &
2.
CORAM : SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.
DATE : JUNE 18, 2025
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. This is an Application filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (" the Act") seeking reference of disputes and
differences between the parties pursuant to which the four Respondents
have been designated as borrowers in respect of a loan extended by the
Applicant. The Loan Agreement is dated March 30, 2024. The
arbitration clause is contained in Clause 8.2 (found at Page 46 of the Digitally signed by ASHWINI Application). In the interest of brevity, the arbitration agreement is not ASHWINI JANARDAN JANARDAN VALLAKATI VALLAKATI Date:
2025.06.24 10:45:11 +0530
June 18, 2025
906-CARAP-119-2024.doc
being extracted here. Suffice it to say, that this matter falls within the
jurisdiction of this Court.
2. The primary objection from the Learned Counsel on behalf of
Respondent Nos.1 and 2 is that the factual matrix underlying the loan
agreement would demonstrate that the loan was a product of fraud.
Learned Counsel on behalf of these Respondents would even suggest
that the Applicant may be party to the fraud. Consequently, he would
submit that since fraud vitiates all solemn acts and would lead to
disputes not being arbitrable, this Application under Section 11 ought
not to be entertained at all.
3. Learned Counsel on behalf of Respondent Nos.3 and 4 would
submit that since they are behind bars, she is unable to take instructions
to make submissions on their behalf.
4. Having examined the record, it is apparent that allegations of
fraud are indeed found in the course of the conduct between the parties.
While the loan agreement is dated March 30, 2024, the loan agreement
was recalled within three days on the premise that the documentation
submitted for the borrowing being approved contained discrepancy and
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inconsistency. However, Learned Counsel for the Applicant submits that
as far as the Applicant is concerned, the loan was indeed disbursed, the
document was executed by the then Chief Executive Officer and the
whole time director, and the monies were indeed remitted into a bank
account held by Respondent No.1 with a nationalized bank for the past
one and half years.
5. Learned Counsel for Respondent Nos.1 and 2 submits that an
entire device of fraud was unearthed upon investigations, and this
discovery of such fraud is a matter of public record, since the fraud was
also disclosed to the stock exchanges, Respondent No.2 being a listed
company. He would also submit that there are judgments which would
clearly indicate that serious allegations of fraud would not be arbitrable,
particularly, the fraud goes to the very validity of the contract which
contains the arbitration clause.
6. Toward this end, he would rely upon the judgments in the
decisions in A. Ayyaswamy v. A. Paramasivam & Ors1, Rashid Raza v.
Sadaf Akhtar2 and Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors v. HSBC Holdings
(2016) 10 SCC 386;
(2019) 8 SCC 710;
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(Mauritious) Limited3 to contend that disputes involving serious
allegations of fraud ought not to be arbitrable. The offshoot of this
submission is that this Court sitting in the jurisdiction of Section 11
should take a note of a fact that there are serious allegations of fraud
and forthwith dismiss the Application and not permit commencement
of arbitration.
7. Having examined the record with the assistance of the
Counsel and the march of the law in terms of the scope of the
jurisdiction under Section 11 Court, I am unable to agree that, at the
threshold, the Application should be dismissed because of the existence
of allegations of fraud which are said to be serious. Indeed, the Counsel
for Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 would submit that her clients are
incarcerated on the ground of fraud, which would point to the fact that
there is a fraud, and the Cuffe Parade Police Station has filed a charge-
sheet based on the FIR lodged by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. However,
whether these should lead to the disputes being non-arbitrable
essentially presents a mixed question of fact and law. To accept the
contentions of the Respondent Nos.1 and 2, some forum would need to
go into the veracity of the allegations and come to a finding that the case
(2021) 4 SCC 713
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of fraud made out is of such a nature that the dispute is not arbitrable at
all. For example (without meaning to pronounce upon the merits of this
case) if it is found that a listed company had lacked internal processes
which led to fraud, the implications for third party cannot become non-
amenable to arbitration merely because of the existence of the charge-
sheet in connection with the fraud, having taken place due to internal
laxity of a party to the agreement. All these present facets of merit and
mixed questions of fact and law, which will at least require a preliminary
view to be taken by the arbitral tribunal, it is not for the Section 11 Court
to examine evidence of this nature, particularly in view of Section 11(6A)
which statutorily restricts the role of this Court to "examining" the
existence of the arbitration agreement. The conscious choice of the word
"examination" as opposed to "adjudication" points to iteration by the
legislature that this Court must examine if the formal agreement is in
existence. The contention of the Applicant that the money was remitted
to a bank account which was in existence for one and half years is also
something only the arbitral tribunal can examine for its veracity and
fruitfulness.
8. In these circumstances, considering the nature and scope of
the jurisdiction of this Court, it would not be appropriate for the Section
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11 Court to delve any deeper into the facet of fraud and write a finding
about the fraud having vitiated arbitration at this stage. Needless to say,
that is a facet left to the arbitral tribunal and, given the weight of the
facts presented by Respondent Nos.1 and 2, the arbitral tribunal is
requested to treat this as a preliminary issue and rule upon it up-front,
so that the time and cost of the parties are saved. Should the tribunal
eventually come to a view that the facts present a framework that
renders the dispute not arbitrable.
9. The scope of review under Section 11 is explicitly set out in
Section 11(6A) of the Act. It is now trite law, with particular regard to
the decisions of a seven-judge bench in the Interplay Judgement4
followed by multiple others, including SBI General5 and Patel6 that the
Section 11 Court ought not to venture beyond examining the existence of
a validly existing arbitration agreement that has been formally executed.
Even questions of existential substance is a matter that falls squarely in
the domain of the arbitral tribunal, in view of Section 16 of the Act.
10. Learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 also submits
In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreement under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899 (2024) 6 SCC 1
SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Krish Spinning, 2024 SCC OnLine 1974
Ajay Madhusudan Patel Vs. Jyotindra S. Patel, 2024 SCC OnLine, 2597
June 18, 2025 Ashwini Vallakati
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that the aforesaid judgments never opposed or dealt with a case of
fraud, and towards this end, he would also rely upon Vidya Drolia and
Ors v. Durga Trading Corporation 7 which also states that the contention
of fraud cannot be dealt with by the arbitral tribunal. The law has moved
on since Vidya Drolia and, in fact, Interplay, it has been acknowledged
that Vidya Drolia did not notice the fact that deletion of Section 11(6A)
was never notified. Vidya Drolia was rendered under the belief that the
scope of jurisdiction of this Court was not restricted to examining the
existence of the arbitration agreement, a facet which has been graciously
acknowledged and articulated in depth in the Interplay judgment.
11. Consequently, it would follow that this Application deserves
to be allowed, making it clear that the arbitral tribunal may frame
whether the dispute is not arbitrable on account of fraud as a
preliminary issue. The Application is finally disposed of in the following
terms:-
A) Justice (Retired) Akil Kureshi, a former judge of this
Court, is hereby appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to
adjudicate upon the disputes and differences between
the parties arising out of and in connection with the
(2021) 2 SCC 1
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Agreement referred to above;
Office Address:-
617, Raheja Chambers,
Nariman Point, Mumbai.
Email ID: [email protected]
B) A copy of this Order will be communicated to the
Learned Sole Arbitrator by the Advocates for the
Applicant within a period of one week from the date of
upload of this order. The Applicant shall provide the
contact and communication particulars of the parties
to the Arbitral Tribunal along with a copy of this
Order;
C) The Learned Sole Arbitrator is requested to forward
the statutory Statement of Disclosure under Section
11(8) read with Section 12(1) of the Act to the parties
within a period of two weeks from receipt of a copy of
this Order;
D) The parties shall appear before the Learned Sole
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Arbitrator on such date and at such place as indicated,
to obtain appropriate directions with regard to
conduct of the arbitration including fixing a schedule
for pleadings, examination of witnesses, if any,
schedule of hearings etc. At such meeting, the parties
shall provide a valid and functional email address
along with mobile and landline numbers of the
respective Advocates of the parties to the Arbitral
Tribunal. Communications to such email addresses
shall constitute valid service of correspondence in
connection with the arbitration;
E) All arbitral costs and fees of the Arbitral Tribunal shall
be borne by the parties equally in the first instance,
and shall be subject to any final Award that may be
passed by the Tribunal in relation to costs.
12. Needless to say, nothing contained in this order is an
expression of an opinion on merits of the matter or the relative strength
of the parties. All issues on merits are expressly kept open to be agitated
before the arbitral tribunal appointed hereby.
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13. All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall
be taken upon receipt of a downloaded copy as available on this Court's
website.
[ SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.]
June 18, 2025 Ashwini Vallakati
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