Bombay High Court
Babu Ganpati Araje vs The Spl. Land Acq. Officer And Others on 31 January, 2025
Author: M.S.Sonak
Bench: M.S.Sonak
2025:BHC-AS:4802-DB wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
Digitally
signed by Darshan/Amol
DARSHAN
DARSHAN PRAKASH
PRAKASH PATIL
PATIL Date:
2025.01.31 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
16:49:27
+0530 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 3557 OF 1987
Babu Ganpati Arage, ]
village Shiradwad, Taluka ]
Shirol, Dist - Kolhapur. ] ...Petitioner
VERSUS
1. The Special Land Acquisition ]
Officer No.10, Kolhapur. ]
2. The Collector & Deputy Director ]
of Resettlement (Land), Kolhapur ]
3. The Deputy Director of ]
Resettlement, Revenue and Forest ]
Department, Mantralaya, ]
Bombay. ]
4. The Additional Commissioner, ]
Pune Division, Pune. ]
5. The District Resettlement ]
Officer, Kolhapur. ]
6. State of Maharashtra. ]
notices of all the Respondents ]
to be served upon the Additional ]
Government Pleader, High Court, ]
Appellate Side, Bombay ] ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 978 OF 2022
IN
Page 1 of 19
::: Uploaded on - 31/01/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 01/02/2025 12:56:14 :::
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
WRIT PETITION NO. 3557 OF 1987
Babu Ganpati Arage ...Applicant
(Org.Petitioner)
VERSUS
The Special Land Acquisition Officer
No.10, Kolhapur and ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 977 OF 2022
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 3557 OF 1987
Babu Ganpati Arage ...Applicant
(Org.Petitioner)
VERSUS
The Special Land Acquisition Officer
No.10, Kolhapur and ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION ST. NO. 30949 OF 2024
IN
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2456 OF 2021
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 3557 OF 1987
The Special Land Acquisition Officer
No.10/12, Kolhapur ...Applicant
In the matter between
Babu Ganpati Arage ...Petitioner
VERSUS
The Special Land Acquisition Officer
No.10/12, Kolhapur and ors. ...Respondents
Page 2 of 19
::: Uploaded on - 31/01/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 01/02/2025 12:56:14 :::
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2263 OF 1997
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 3557 OF 1987
Babu Ganpati Araje, ...Applicant
VERSUS
The Spl. Land Acq. Officer and ors. ...Respondents
__________________________________________________________
A PPEARANCES -
Mr Prajakt M. Arjunwadkar, a/w Ms Jui B. Gharat, Mr
Prathamesh S. Hande, Mr Raj S. Satam, Mr Dhananjay
B. Utture, for the Petitioner/Applicant and for
Respondent in IAST/30949/2024.
Mr A. I. Patel, Addl.G.P., a/w Ms S. R. Crasto, AGP, for the
Respondent-State.
__________________________________________________________
CORAM : M.S.Sonak &
Jitendra Jain, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 24 January 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 31 January 2025
JUDGMENT (Per MS Sonak J):
-
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Mr Patel learned Additional GP submitted that we
should first take up Interim Application (ST) No. 30949 of
2024 to recall our order dated 27 January 2022, by which we
allowed Interim Application No. 2456 of 2021 and restored
Writ Petition No. 3557 of 1987 to this Court's file along with
interim orders made therein.
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
3. Mr Patel submitted that the order dated 27 January
2022 made by the co-ordinate bench comprising R D
Dhanuka, J. (as His Lordship then was) and S. M. Modak, J.,
was required to be recalled because Interim Application No.
2456 of 2021 was instituted after considerable delay, and no
prayer sought condonation of such delay. He submitted that
even otherwise, no sufficient cause was shown for either
condonation of delay or restoration of the petition, which was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
4. Considering the above two grounds pressed by Mr Patel,
we see no reason to recall our order dated 27 January 2022.
5. Since Mr Patel stressed the circumstance that there was
no formal application seeking condonation of delay in filing
Interim Application No. 2456 of 2021, we are obliged to point
out that the order of which Mr Patel seeks a recall was made
on 27 January 2022. The Interim Application (ST) No. 30949
of 2024 was filed by the State only on 17 October 2024. On
perusal of the interim application, it is apparent that the State
seeks a substantive review of the order dated 27 January 2022
made by the co-ordinate bench. The application has been
styled for "recall" only to overcome the bar limitation. Even
this interim application is not accompanied by any application
for condonation of delay. There is not even any prayer for
condonation of delay.
6. Therefore, in the above circumstances, it is hardly
appropriate that the State seeks a recall of the order dated 27
January 2022 because a formal application for condonation of
delay did not accompany the application for restoration.
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
7. In any event, the reasons set out in Interim Application
No. 2456 of 2021 cover both delay and restoration since the
cause shown for both purposes was the same. Accepting the
cause for restoration would amount to accepting the cause for
condoning delay.
8. The order dated 27 January 2022 was passed after
hearing learned AGP. As such, there was no question of any
breach of principles of natural justice involved. The state also
alleged no fraud. In such circumstances, no application would
be maintainable only to seek a recall of the order dated 27
January 2022.
9. The order dated 27 January 2022, by which the
restoration was ordered, and positive discretion was exercised
in the matter of the delay involved in seeking restoration is
not vitiated by any perversity or non-application of mind.
Even on such grounds, it would not be open to a co-ordinate
division bench to recall the order dated 27 January 2022.
10. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. In M. Krishnamurthy 1, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that once the Court accepts
the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of a positive
exercise of discretion, and such an exercise should normally
not be disturbed unless it was on wholly untenable grounds,
arbitrary, or perverse. Even in such a case, it is for the
Superior Court, not merely the Coordinating Bench, to
interfere.
11. For all the above reasons, we see no good reason to
recall the order dated 27 January 2022. Interim Application
(1998) 7 SCC 123
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
(ST) No. 30949 of 2024 is liable to be dismissed, and it is
hereby dismissed.
12. The petitioner takes out Interim Application No. 977 of
2022 and seeks leave to amend the petition. Learned counsel
for the petitioner was heard on the main petition on the
premise that such leave was granted. Interim Application No.
978 of 2022 seeks interim relief. Again, since we are finally
disposing of Writ Petition No. 3557 of 1987, there was no
point in considering this application separately.
13. The petitioner by instituting the present petition
challenges Sections 4 and 6 notifications issued under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("LA Act") and notifications issued
under Sections 14 and 15 of the Maharashtra Resettlement of
Project Displaced Persons (Amendment and Validation) Act,
1985 ("Resettlement Amendment Act"). The petitioner had
also sought a declaration that the provisions of the
Resettlement Amendment Act were violative of Articles 14, 19
and 300A of the Constitution of India. However, Mr
Arjunwadkar, learned counsel for the petitioner, accepted that
such a challenge does not survive, and therefore, the
petitioner would not press for such a challenge in this
petition.
14. The petitioner claims to be the owner of agricultural
land bearing Gat No. 631 admeasuring 56 Ares situated at
Shiradwad, Taluka Shirol, District Kolhapur ("said property").
The said property was proposed to be acquired by the
impugned notification to resettle the displaced persons after
acquiring their properties for the Dhoodhganga Project in
Kolhapur District.
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
15. By notification dated 02 November 1978 under Section
11 of the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced
Persons Act, 1976 ("1976 Act"), provisions of the 1976 Act
were applied inter-alia, to the petitioner's village. Special
Land Acquisition Officer ("SLAO") of Kolhapur (Respondent
No.1) issued a notification under Section 4 of the LA Act on
02 July 1986 proposing to acquire the petitioner's property for
the public purpose of resettling the persons displaced by the
Doodhganga Project.
16. The petitioner objected to the acquisition of the said
property on the ground that the SLAO had no jurisdiction to
issue Section 4 notification dated 02 July 1986 given the
notification dated 02 November 1978 issued under Section 11
of the 1976 Act. Without prejudice, the petitioner submitted
that the proposed acquisition proceeded on an incorrect
assumption that the petitioner owned additional land bearing
Gat Nos. 624 and 628 admeasuring 1 Hectare and 12 Ares.
The petitioner pointed out that this additional land in fact
belongs to one Mr Faiz Mohd. Pathan. The petitioner had only
claimed tenancy rights to the same. However, the petitioner's
claim was rejected and therefore, this additional land should
not have been considered while determining the entire land
holding of the petitioner or his family members. The
petitioner submitted that his total holding as a manager of the
joint Hindu family was less than 8 Acre limit set by the 1976
Act and therefore, SLAO had no jurisdiction to acquire the
petitioner's property. Mr Arjunwadkar, whilst reiterating the
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
above objection relies upon Gulab Shankar Walve Vs. SLAO2
and Ganpat Pawar Vs. SLAO3.
17. Despite the petitioner's objections, a declaration under
Section 6 of the LA Act was issued on 10 February 1987.
Notifications under Sections 14 and 15 were issued under the
1976 Act on 24 December 1981 and 29 May 1982
respectively.
18. Some petitions Writ Petition Nos. 388, 2362, 3444 and
3458 of 1982 were instituted to challenge the notifications
under the 1976 Act on ground that such issue was without
following the procedure prescribed under the 1976 Act. The
above Writ Petitions were withdrawn after recording the
statement of the Government advocate that notifications
under the LA Act and Sections 14 and 15 of the 1976 Act
would be withdrawn. The statement further added that fresh
notifications would be issued after following the due process.
19. Mr Arjunwadkar submitted that the order recording the
statement made by the Government advocate and permitting
withdrawal of the above Writ Petitions was made on 13 July
1987. He submitted that in terms of this order, even the
acquisition notifications concerning the petitioner's properties
should have been withdrawn. He submitted that not
withdrawing the land acquisition notifications amounted to
contempt of this Court's order dated 13 July 1987.
20. Mr Arjunwadkar submitted that notification under
Section 15 of the 1976 Act was issued in breach of the
principles of natural justice and fair play. He submitted that
1981 MAH LJ 881
1984 MAH LJ 783
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
no opportunity for a hearing was given to the petitioner. The
map and the survey numbers relevant to the impugned
notifications were never published or made available to the
petitioner so as to enable the petitioner to object to the same.
He submits that these are good grounds to quash the
impugned notification under Section 15 of the 1976 Act.
21. Mr Arjunwadkar submitted that even the notification
under Section 6 of the LA Act warranted interference because
the petitioner was not granted any adequate opportunity
before such a declaration was made. He submitted that the
petitioner was not heard during the Section 5A enquiry, and a
copy of the report was also not furnished to the petitioner. He
submitted that an opportunity of hearing as contemplated
under Section 5A of the LA Act is mandatory, and without
granting such opportunity, Section 5A report and Section 6
declaration made based thereon is vitiated and liable to be set
aside.
22. Mr Arjunwadkar submitted that though some challenges
to the Resettlement Amendment Act were included in the
written submissions tendered to this Court, the petitioner was
not pressing those challenges. Mr Arjunwadkar however,
submitted that the public purpose indicated in the
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the LA Act did not
amount to any public purpose or any acquisition for the
purposes of the 1976 Act. He submitted that similar such
notifications were withdrawn by the State Government.
23. Mr Arjunwadkar submitted that the 1976 Act bars the
acquisition of lands less than 8 Acres for the purposes of
resettlement of persons displaced by the irrigation projects.
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
He submitted that in the present case, the petitioner's
property was less than 8 Acres. Therefore, the acquisition of
the petitioner's properties violated the provisions of the 1976
Act, the LA Act and the Constitutional provisions under
Articles 14 and 300A.
24. Mr Arjunwadkar submitted that the petitioner was being
discriminated against and consequently, there was a violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution. He submitted that the
impugned notifications under the LA or 1976 Act were
violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution as they
involved the acquisition of the petitioner's property without
following due process of law.
25. Mr Arjunwadkar relied on the following decisions in
support of his contentions: -
(a) Dhulgonda Dada Patil and etc. Vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer No.15, Kolhapur and others.4
(b) My Palace Mutually Aided Co-operative Society Vs. B.
Mahesh and Others.5
(c) Sharad Mukunda Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra and
Others6
(d) Nivrutti s/o Shankar Shewale since deceased through
LRs. Chandrakant s/o Nivrutti Shewale Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Others7
AIR 1989 BOMBAY 286
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1063
1992 Mh.L.J. 443
2004 (4) Mh.L.J. 147
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
(e) Sharad Jijaba Kakade and another Vs. Land Acquisition
Officer, Pune and another8
26. Mr Patel, the learned AGP, submitted that none of the
grounds raised supporting the petition were tenable. He
submitted that full opportunity was granted to the petitioner
during the Section 5A enquiry. He submitted that the
petitioner chose not to participate in the Section 5A enquiry
despite notice. He submitted that Section 6 notification was
published in the gazette on 10 February 1987 and on the
Chawadi Board on 20 April 1987. He submitted that Section 9
notices were issued to the petitioners.
27. Mr Patel submitted that the petitioner challenged
Sections 4 and 6 of the LA Act by instituting this petition and
obtained interim relief on 22 July 1987 restraining the
respondents from taking over possession of the petitioner's
property. However, there was no stay on further proceedings
under the LA Act. Mr Patel submitted that the SLAO declared
an award on 30 March 1988. The compensation amount was
also deposited in the Court since there was an interim stay
from dispossessing the petitioner. He submitted that it is
always open to the petitioner to pursue the issue of
compensation, however, no case is made out to interfere with
the impugned notifications under the LA Act or the 1976 Act.
28. Mr Patel submitted that this petition may, therefore, be
dismissed leaving it open to the petitioner to pursue the issue
of compensation.
29. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
2005 (2) Mh.L.J. 429
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
30. The petitioner's main contention in this petition was
that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 issued under the
LA Act were without jurisdiction because the SLAO lacked
jurisdiction to acquire the petitioner's property which was less
than eight acres. Mr Arjunwadkar contended that property
under Gat Nos. 624 and 628, which did not belong to the
petitioner, or his family was incorrectly assumed as belonging
to the petitioner and his family on account of the tenancy
claim made by the petitioner against the landlord Mr Faiz
Pathan. He submitted that the petitioner and his family lost
this claim and therefore, had no rights to the property bearing
Gat Nos. 624 and 628.
31. The petitioner could not point out any provisions under
the LA Act based upon which the above contention could be
sustained. The petitioner made general averments about
violating natural justice or denying adequate opportunity
because certain details of measurements and maps were
allegedly not supplied to the petitioner. However, the record
shows that the petitioner was served with a notice to attend
the 5A proceedings. The petitioner may not have attended or
participated in these proceedings. But, the affidavit filed by
the State Government in response to the Interim Application
states that a 5A report was prepared and even an award was
made.
32. The purpose of rehabilitation of persons whose lands
were submerged in the Dhoodhganga project is certainly a
public purpose. Therefore, the arguments that the lands of the
displaced persons were never submerged or that the
acquisition was for persons unaffected by any project cannot
be accepted. The petitioner has not placed any material to
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
support such contentions. Such contentions cannot be
entertained based on mere averments without any backing
documents or other evidence. Thus, no case is made out to
interfere with the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the
LA Act.
33. By seeking leave to amend the petition, the petitioner
wishes to challenge the award dated 30 March 1998.
Significantly, this amendment application was filed on 18
February 2022 i.e., after 34 years since the award was made.
There is no explanation for this inordinate delay for 34 years.
The application seeking leave to amend the petition merely
refers to 'subsequent facts' and claims that no prejudice will
be caused to the respondents if the amendment is allowed.
34. Even after taking the most liberal view, we note that the
amendment application contains no additional grounds to
challenge the impugned award dated 30 March 1988. The
award is challenged on the same grounds on which the
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the LA Act were sought
to be challenged. Since the said grounds nowhere point out
any breach of the provisions of the LA Act, the challenge to
the impugned award dated 30 March 1988 on the grounds of
either the violation of principles of natural justice or the
breach of the provisions of the LA Act would not sustain.
35. Regarding the challenge about the SLAO having no
jurisdiction to initiate the acquisition proceedings Mr
Arjunwadkar referred to the provisions of Sections 16 and 17
of the 1976 Act, which we transcribe below for the
convenience of reference: -
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
"16. Power to require land for purposes of this Act.-(1) The
State Government may enter into an agreement with any
person for the purchase or exchange, of any land required for
carrying out the purposes of this Act.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, the State
Government may also for carrying out the purposes of this Act
compulsorily acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (1 of 1894) and the acquisition of any land for the said
purposes shall be deemed to be a public purpose within the
meaning of that Act.
(3) The State Government may also acquire lands
included in gaothan in the affected zone as far practicable
according to the provisions of Part I of Schedule-A hereto.
(4) For the purpose of resettling displaced persons on
land, the State Government may, subject to any rules made in
this behalf, acquire land from holdings in the benefited zone
or from any village or area specified under Section 10 as far as
practicable according to the provisions of Part II of Schedule A
hereto.
(5) All lands acquired under this section shall form
part of the land pool.
17. Extent of land to be granted to displaced persons
according to certain provisions.-(1) The State Government
may, subject to the provisions of this section, grant land (not
being gaothan land) to displaced persons as far as practicable
according to the provisions of Part I of Schedule B hereto and
subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.
(2) If the number of members in a family exceeds 5, an
additional 40.47 areas of land may be given for every 3
additional members, subject to the condition that the total
area of land granted to a family does not exceed 2 Hectares
and 83.28 areas (7 acres).
(3) Land equal to 40.47 areas in extent may be granted to
displaced agricultural laboruers if they leave their village in
the affected zone along with the other displaced persons and
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
such other displaced persons are resettled on land under this
Act.
(4) Dry (Jirayat) lands from sources other than the benefited
zone may be granted at the rate of a minimum of 1 Hectare
and 61.87 areas (4 acres) to each displaced person or
agricultural labourer provided that the maximum limit is in
accordance with any rule made under the Code for disposal of
Government land.
(5) The State Government may grant plots of land to
displaced persons in a new gaothan or extended part of an
existing gaothan according to the provisions of Part II of
Schedule B hereto.
(6) In granting alternative land to a displaced person, the
value of such land shall ordinarily be of the same amount
which the displaced person has received in respect of his land
in the affected zone which is acquired for the Project and the
act of the alternative land to be granted shall, notwithstanding
anything contained in this section, be so determined that the
total extent of the holding of the displaced person after such
grant does not exceed the economic holding provided by the
rules made under the Code for the disposal of Government
land.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the
State Government may, subject to the condition of previous
publication by notification in the Official Gazette amend
Schedule A, regard being had to the provisions of the
Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act,
1961, (Mah. XXVII of 1961) the number of displaced persons
to be resettled, and the extent of land available according to
Schedule A for resettlement."
36. Section 16(1) empowers the State Government to enter
into an agreement with any person for the purpose of
exchange of any land required for carrying out the purposes of
the 1976 Act. This Section does not say that the State
Government is bound only to acquire lands for the purposes of
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
1976 Act by entering into an agreement with any person. This
Section only clarifies that it would be open to the State
Government to enter into such agreement where any land is
required for carrying out the purposes of the 1976 Act.
Therefore, based upon the Section 16(1) of the 1976 Act, no
jurisdictional bar can be inferred restraining the SLAO from
issuing the impugned notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of
the LA Act.
37. Section 16(2) of the 1976 Act specifically empowers the
State Government to compulsorily acquire land under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for carrying out the purposes of
the 1976 Act. This Section further provides that the
acquisition of any land for the purposes of 1976 Act "shall be
deemed to be a public purpose within the meaning of that
Act".
38. Section 16(3) refers to acquisition of lands in Gaothan.
This is an issue with which we are not concerned in this
petition because the petitioner has not claimed that the
property which is the subject matter of this petition was a
Gaothan land.
39. Section 16(4) provides that for the purpose of resettling
displaced persons on land, the State Government may, subject
to any rules made in this behalf, acquire land from the
holdings in the benefited zone or from any village or area
specified under Section 10 as far as practicable according to
the provisions of Part II of Schedule A hereto. Section 16(5)
provides that all lands acquired under this section shall form
part of the land pool.
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
40. The provisions of Section 16(4) are only enabling in
nature. In any event, there are no clear pleadings regarding
the benefitted zone and how the provisions of Section 16(4)
are applicable to the facts of the present case. The argument
about the petitioner not owning property in excess of eight
acres and therefore, there bing some statutory bar to
acquiring the petitioner's property was not substantiated by
the petitioner either on facts or by reference to any of the
provisions of the 1976 Act.
41. The petitioner did refer to Section 17 of the 1976 Act
but again, failed to substantiate how or why the said
provisions constituted a statutory bar on the SLAO issuing
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the L A Act. In the
absence of proper pleadings backed by proper material to
support the pleadings, we cannot hold that the SLAO
exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notifications.
Neither the provisions cited by Mr Arjunwadkar nor the
decision relied upon by him further the case of the petitioner.
42. We have perused the decisions cited by Mr Arjunwadkar
as allegedly supporting the petitioner's case. However, we fail
to understand how the cited precedents are relevant to the
petitioner's case. No material was shown to us based upon
which we could hold that the factual and legal issues involved
in the present petition were those that were involved in the
cases relied upon by Mr Arjunwadkar and therefore, the ratio
of the said decisions would assist the petitioner in questioning
the jurisdiction of the SLAO in issuing the impugned
notifications. Accordingly, based upon the legal provisions
referred to or the precedents cited, we find it difficult to
interfere with the impugned notifications.
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
43. The challenge was also thrown to the notifications
issued under Sections 14 and 15 of the 1976 Act. Again, these
challenges were far from elaborated or substantiated. Nothing
was shown to us based upon which we could have considered
or concluded any infirmity regarding notifications under the
1976 Act.
44. The argument about the incorrect assumption regarding
the petitioner's land holding or total land holding was raised
but not substantiated. Since there was no clarity about either
the interpretation or application of the provisions of Sections
16 and 17 of the 1976 Act, neither the notifications under the
1976 nor the notifications under the LA Act warrant
interference on the ground about any alleged incorrect
assumption in determining the petitioner's total land holding.
Nothing is on record to show that the petitioner raised such
pleas before the land acquisition authorities. Even though the
petitioner was notified about the Section 5A hearing, no
grounds have been made out even to challenge the award
made under the LA Act.
45. Mr Patel relied on Jiten Agro Land and Farm Pvt. Ltd
and Ors Vs The Ministry Of Environment and Forest and Ors 9
to submit that time-barred objections for the acquisition of
land should not be entertained. This decision was in the
context of the peculiar provisions of the Railways Act and
therefore, may not be much relevant. However, the fact
remains that no objections of the kind now sought to be raised
appear to have been raised before the land acquisition
authorities during the Section 5A enquiry. Besides, there is no
2022 (2) ABR 145
wp.3557-1987 ors (F).docx
clarity about the objections. The objection about the
jurisdictional bar is raised in this petition but not made good
by reference to the legal provisions or the precedents.
46. Upon cumulative consideration of the aforesaid facts
and circumstances, we see no reasonable grounds to grant the
petitioner any relief in this petition. This petition is liable to
be dismissed and is hereby rejected even after considering the
averments in the amended petition, which shall be deemed to
have been allowed by us.
47. This petition is dismissed. However, since there was a
stay on the dispossession, we extend the stay by eight weeks
should the petitioner wish to challenge this judgment and
order in accordance with law. Petitioner, however, should
maintain status quo in relation to the said property.
48. This petition is accordingly dismissed without any cost
for order. Pending applications will not survive and are
disposed of. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of
this order.
(Jitendra Jain, J) (M. S. Sonak, J)
