Bombay High Court
Lakhan S/O. Dindayal Chouhan vs State Of Maharashtra Thr. P.S.O. P.S. ... on 14 January, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:629
J.66.revn.121.17.odt 1/10
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.121 OF 2017
Lakhan s/o Dindayal Chouhan
Aged about 40 years, Occupation - Labourer,
R/o Ward No.1, Kuhi,
Tah. Kuhi, District Nagpur
...APPLICANT
VERSUS
State of Maharashtra,
through P.S.O.
P.S. Kuhi, Tah. Kuhi,
District Nagpur
...NON-APPLICANT
_______________________________________________________
Mr. A.K. Sorde, Advocate for the applicant.
Ms R.V. Sharma, APP for the State.
_______________________________________________________
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.
DATED : JANUARY 14, 2025.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
Heard finally with the consent of learned Counsel for the
parties.
2. The applicant is assailing the judgment dated 11/09/2014
passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kuhi in SCC No.380/2012
whereby the applicant is convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 294 of IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
three months and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- in default S.I. for 15 days. He
is further convicted of the offence punishable under Section 353 of IPC
and sentenced to suffer R.I. for three months and to pay fine of Rs.500/-
in default to suffer S.I. for 15 days. The applicant further convicted of
the offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC and sentenced to
suffer R.I. for three months and to pay fine of Rs.500/- and in default to
suffer S.I. for 15 days.
3. The applicant has challenged the judgment of conviction in
Criminal Appeal No.217/2014 which is dismissed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Nagpur vide judgment dated 04/08/2017.
4. The facts which are necessary for deciding the revision are
as under:
The complainant Sau. Madhuri Hirendra Lad was serving as
a Gramsevak. On 07/09/2012 at about 11.10AM she was present in the
office of B.D.O., Panchayat Samiti, Kuhi for her official work. When she
was searching some record, accused came there and obstructed her in
her official work. Accused was insisting for some information from her,
at that time she was collecting the data and informed to the accused that
she would provide the information subsequently, but the accused abused
her in a filthy language as "Bhosadachode Rande" and lifted nameplate
of B.D.O. and rushed towards the complainant to beat. So also, he threw
articles which were kept on the table and started abusing the
complainant. At that time other officials were present there. On the basis
of the said report, police have registered the crime against the present
applicant.
5. After registration of the crime, necessary investigation was
carried out and after completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet
was submitted against the accused. The prosecution has examined in all
5 witnesses in support of the prosecution case. The thrust of the
prosecution is on the evidence of PW-4 - Madhuri Hirendra Lad as well
as PW-2 - Dhanraj Keshavrao Gode and PW-3 - Premanand Uddhavrao
Kumbhare. As far as evidence of PW-1 is concerned who acted as a Panch
he is the formal witness. On perusal of the evidence on record, it reveals
that as far as the evidence of PW-2 is concerned which shows that at the
relevant time he along with the complainant was in the chamber of BDO
at the relevant time, present accused came, abused the complainant and
lifted nameplate of B.D.O. and attempted to throw it towards the
complainant. The evidence of PW-3 - Premanand Uddhavrao Kumbhare
is also on the similar line. Both the witnesses are cross-examined and
during cross-examination, it revealed that the applicant was insisting for
some information and as the complainant stated that she would provide
the information later on he got annoyed. The evidence of the
complainant also shows that she was abused by the present applicant by
saying "Bhosadachode Rande". She is also cross-examined. During her
cross-examination also it reveals that the applicant was insisting for the
information which was not provided, and therefore, the alleged incident
has taken place. On appreciating the evidence, learned Magistrate has
convicted the applicant of the offence punishable under Section 353 and
186 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned. As far as the offence
punishable under Section 353 of the IPC is concerned, the ingredients of
the offence shows that whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any
person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public
servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging
his duty and if anything is done or attempted to be done by such person
in the lawful discharge of his duty the person said to have committed the
offence punishable under Section 353 of IPC. Section 353 of the IPC is
reproduced hereunder for the reference :
353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant
from discharge of his duty-
Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person
being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such
public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that
person from discharging his duty as such public servant,
or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be
done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as
such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
6. On perusal of the evidence on record it reveals that the
allegation against the present applicant is that he lifted the nameplate.
As far as using criminal force on the complainant or any public officer
whoever present there, none of the witness have stated that either
present applicant has used any criminal force either on the complainant
or any other public officer or public servant or there was an attempt
either to throw the said article towards any other public servant or the
complainant. The only allegation is that he has lifted the said nameplate.
No further action was deposed by any of the witness. Thus, as far as the
ingredients of Section 353 of IPC are concerned, are not attracted.
Similarly, Section 186 of the IPC deals with obstructing public servant in
discharge of public functions. Section 186 of IPC reproduced hereunder:
186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public
functions.--
Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the
discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to
five hundred rupees, or with both.
7. Here the evidence of the witnesses is completely silent as to
the act of the present applicant showing that he has either obstructed the
complainant or any other public servant while discharging of his public
functions. The allegations and the evidence on record shows that when
the complainant and other employees were in the chamber of the BDO at
that time, present applicant entered into the chamber and was insisting
the complainant to provide the information whereon she asked him to
come later on and she will provide the same and being annoyed with the
same, he has abused her. Thus, considering the nature of the allegation
and the evidence which is adduced on record, there is absolutely no
evidence to show that the applicant has made any attempt or any act
obstructing the public servant while discharging her public functions,
and therefore, Section 186 of IPC is also not attracted. Now, coming to
the offence punishable under Section 294 of IPC is concerned, the
evidence of PW-2 - Dhanraj Keshavrao Gode and PW-3 - Premanand
Uddhavrao Kumbhare and PW-4 - Madhuri Hirendra Lad who is the
complainant is consistent as to the words used by the present applicant
while abusing her. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the
applicant that mere abuses are not sufficient to attract Section 294 of
IPC. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the decision of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.S. Madhanagopal and anr. Vs. K.
Lalitha [2022 SCC Online SC 2030].
8. Section 294(b) of the IPC talks about the obscene acts and
the songs. Section 294 of IPC reads as under:
294. Obscene acts and songs -
Whoever, to the annoyance of others -
(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or
words, in or near any public place,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three
months, or with fine, or with both.
9. In order to secure a conviction the provision requires two
particulars to be proved by the prosecution, i.e. (i) the offender has done
any obscene act in any public place or has sung, recited or uttered any
obscene songs or words in or near any public place; and (ii) has so
caused annoyance to others. If the act complained of is not obscene, or is
not done in any public place, or the song recited or uttered is not
obscene, or is not sung, recited or uttered in or near any public place, or
that it causes no annoyance to others, the offence is not committed.
10. The concept of the obscenity is dealt by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of N.S. Madhanagopal and anr. Vs. K. Lalitha (supra)
wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that it is to be noted that the
test of obscenity under Section 294(b) of the I.P.C. is whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. By relying on
the judgment in the case of P.T. Chacko v. Nainan (1967 KLT 799) it is
held that:
"The only point argued was that the 1st accused has not
committed an offence punishable under Section 294(b)
IPC., by uttering the words above-mentioned. The courts
below have held that the words uttered were obscene and
the utterance caused annoyance to the public. I am not
inclined to take this view. In the Queen v. Hick- lin, [L.R.]
3 Q.B. 360 at 371 it was laid down the test of 'obscenity'
in these words:
"....... the test of obscenity is this, whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is
to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences" This test has
been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme
Court has accepted the correctness of the test in
Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1965 SC 881. In Samuel Roth v. U.S.A., 354 US
476 (1957), Chief Justice Warren said that the
test of 'obscenity' is the "substantial tendency to
corrupt by arousing lustful desires". Mr. Justice
Harlan observed that in order to be 'obscene'
the matter must "tend to sexually impure
thoughts". I do not think that the words uttered
in this case have such a tendency. It may be
that the words are defamatory of the
complainant, but I do not think that the words
are 'obscene' and the utterance would
constitute an offence punishable under S.
294(b) IPC".
11. It is further observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that it has
to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of words which will
involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or
words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b). None of the
records disclose the alleged words used by the accused. It may not be the
requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if
it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. It
is specifically observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that mere abusive,
humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence
under Section 294(b) IPC. To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC
mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a
further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is
lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they
felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words
uttered by the applicant accused annoyed others, it can not be said that
the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC is made out.
12. Applying this principles in the present case, admittedly, the
evidence of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 shows that there was utterance of the
abuse by the present applicant by mentioning "Bhosadachode Rande".
But there is no evidence that due to the speaking of the said obscene
words they felt annoyed. Thus, the evidence as to the ingredient that
due to the utterance of the obscene words by the applicant, the
witnesses and the complainant felt annoyed itself is absent in the present
case.
13. The averment made in the complaint are not sufficient to
constitute the offence under Section 294(a) or 294(b) of the IPC. In the
overall view of this case, I am of the view that no case is made out
against the applicant herein as alleged by the complainant.
14. In the result, the impugned judgments passed by the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kuhi in SCC No.380/2012 and Additional
Sessions Judge, Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No.217/2014 convicting the
applicant and sentencing him under Section 294, 353 and 186 of IPC are
hereby quashed and set aside.
15. The revision succeeds and is accordingly allowed.
16. The applicant is acquitted from the charges punishable
under Sections 353, 294 and 186 of the IPC.
17. The revision application is disposed of.
(URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.)
*Divya
