[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Milind S/O Madhukarrao Kale vs The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Its Anti ... on 19 December, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:14581
1 appeal-113-2013.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 113/2013
Milind S/o Madhukarrao Kale : APPELLANT
Aged about 44 years,
R/o Wani, Tq. Wani, Distt. Yavatmal
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra, : RESPONDENT
through its Anti Corruption Bureau,
Yavatmal
Mr. P. R. Agrawal, Advocate for Appellant,
Mr. Amit Chutke, Adll.P.P. for Respondent
CORAM: NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J.
Date of reserving the judgment : 17.12.2025
Date of pronouncing the judgment : 19.12.2025
JUDGMENT :
This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and
order dated 17.01.2013, passed by the learned Special Judge, Kelapur in
Special Case No. 3/2006, convicting the appellant under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act").
2. The prosecution case, is that on 23.05.2006 at about 9.00
a.m., Sumit Matte visited the office of the Anti-Corruption Bureau,
Yavatmal, and lodged his complaint. He stated that his maternal uncle
2 appeal-113-2013.odt
was the owner of agricultural land admeasuring 1.55 Hectares situated at
Gat No. 23 at village Manki, Tahsil Wani, District Yavatmal. In the year
2005, the said land was purchased by his father, and mutation entry in
that regard was effected in his father's name on 18.12.2005. The said
land was under tenancy of Sambhaji Madao Panchbhai and five others,
and their names continued to appear on the 7/12 extract.
2.1. Sumit Matte further stated that proceedings for deletion of the
tenants' names were initiated before the Tahsildar, Wani, and by order
dated 24.04.2006, the Tahsildar allowed the application and directed
deletion of the names of the tenants. One copy of the said order was
issued to Sumit Matte and another was forwarded to the appellant, who
was then working as Talathi of village Manki.
2.2. It was alleged that on 17.05.2006, Sumit Matte approached
the appellant for effecting deletion of the tenants' names from the 7/12
extract and for issuance of a fresh 7/12 extract. At that time, the
appellant demanded an amount of Rs.2,000/- as illegal gratification, and
later reduced the demand to Rs.1,500/-, making it clear that unless the
said amount was paid, the names of the tenants would not be deleted nor
would the 7/12 extract be issued.
2.3. Further, on 22.05.2006 at about 12.00 noon, when Sumit
Matte again met the appellant at the Tahsil Office, Wani, the appellant
reiterated the demand and instructed him to bring an amount of
Rs.1,500/- to his residence at Laxmi Nagar, Wani, on the following day,
3 appeal-113-2013.odt
failing which the work would not be done. Having no alternative, Sumit
Matte agreed to bring the amount on 23.05.2006. However, being
unwilling to pay the bribe, he decided to approach the Anti-Corruption
Bureau.
2.4. Upon verification of the complaint, a trap was arranged. The
complaint was reduced into writing, read over to Sumit Matte, and signed
by him. Two panch witnesses were secured and introduced to the
complainant. After explaining the trap procedure, Head Constable Raut
applied anthracene powder to three currency notes of Rs.500/-
denomination each, totalling Rs.1,500/-. The numbers of the said notes
were noted in the pre-trap panchanama. The tainted currency notes were
kept in the right pocket of the pant of the complainant Sumit Matte.
2.5. The raiding party thereafter proceeded to Wani and reached
there at about 4.30 p.m. On instructions, the complainant Sumit Matte
and Panch No.1 went to the residence of the appellant at Laxmi Nagar at
about 4.40 p.m. After the transaction, at about 5.00 p.m., the pre-
arranged signal was given.
2.6. Upon entering the premises, Panch No.1 disclosed that the
appellant had inquired whether the complainant had brought the money,
prepared and signed a 7/12 extract after deleting the names of the
tenants, and thereafter demanded the bribe amount of Rs.1,500/-. The
complainant then produced the tainted currency notes, which the
appellant accepted with his right hand and kept on the sofa cushion.
4 appeal-113-2013.odt
2.7. The appellant was immediately apprehended. On examination
under ultraviolet lamp, anthracene powder was detected on the fingers of
his right hand. The tainted currency notes, recovered from the sofa
cushion, also showed anthracene marks, and their numbers tallied with
those noted in the pre-trap panchanama. Anthracene powder was also
found on the sofa cushion. The copy of the Tahsildar's order and other
relevant documents were seized. The post-trap panchanama was drawn
between 5.15 p.m. and 8.30 p.m.
2.8 Thus, it is the prosecution case that the appellant, while
functioning as a public servant in the capacity of Talathi, abused his
official position by demanding and accepting illegal gratification of
Rs.1,500/- from the complainant on 23.05.2006 for deleting the names of
tenants and issuing a 7/12 extract, thereby committing offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
PC Act.
3. Crime No. 3085/2006 dated 23.05.2006 came to be registered
against the appellant for the offences punishable under the provisions of
the PC Act. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed
before the learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Yavatmal. The
learned trial Court thereafter framed Charge against the accused at
Exh.17 for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the said PC Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
5 appeal-113-2013.odt
4. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution
examined the following witnesses: PW-1 Sumit Padmakar Matte (Exh.30);
PW-2 Hemant Narayanrao Nikam (Exh.37); PW-3 Pralhad Shankarrao
Sapkal (Exh.45); PW-4 Vijay Gopinath Dhage (Exh.55); PW-5 Dildar
Baldar Tadvi (Exh.71); and PW-6 Harshadeep Shriram Kambale (Exh.84).
5. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence
adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court, by the impugned
judgment and order dated 17.01.2013, convicted the appellant and
sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a
fine of Rs.500/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one
month for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act and to undergo
simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in
default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the offence
under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The
learned trial Court directed both sentences to run concurrently.
Hence, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.
6. Heard Mr. P.R. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the appellant and
Mr. Amit Chutke, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.
7. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant:
7.1 Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the
impugned judgment and order of conviction is contrary to law and
6 appeal-113-2013.odt
evidence on record and suffers from serious infirmities warranting
interference by this Court.
7.2 Learned Counsel submitted on behalf of the appellant that the
prosecution has failed to establish the foundational requirement of a
demand for illegal gratification, which is a sine qua non for conviction
under Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act. The complainant (PW-1) himself
has categorically denied any demand or acceptance of a bribe at the time
of the alleged trap. Learned Counsel further submitted that the alleged
demand dated 17.05.2006 does not form part of the charges framed by
the Trial Court. The complainant is stated to have made a reference to a
demand on 22.05.2006 but did not approach the ACB office on the same
day, instead lodging the report only on 23.05.2006. Moreover, the
panchas were not present when the complaint was reduced to writing and
were called by the Investigating Officer only on 22.05.2006 to appear on
23.05.2006. The prosecution case, it is submitted, is not corroborated by
PW-3, and the absence of contemporaneous verification of the demand is
fatal to the prosecution case.
7.3. Learned Counsel invited attention to the clear admissions of
PW-1 that the appellant had already prepared and delivered the 7/12
extract and that, while the appellant had gone inside the house to bring
drinking water, the complainant himself placed the amount of Rs.1,500/-
on the sofa without the knowledge or consent of the appellant.
7 appeal-113-2013.odt
7.4. It is further submitted that PW-1 admitted that no
conversation took place between him and the accused prior to placing the
amount on the sofa, thereby completely negating the prosecution case of
demand and acceptance.
7.5. Learned Counsel contended that the alleged recovery is not
from the person of the appellant but from a sofa in his house, which by
itself cannot establish conscious acceptance. The presumption under
Section 20 of the Act, therefore, does not arise.
7.6 The evidence of both panch witnesses, PW-3 and PW-4, is
assailed on the ground that it suffers from material contradictions,
omissions, and improvements. Several crucial facts deposed before the
trial Court do not find mention in their police statements.
7.7. Learned Counsel further submitted that PW-3 and PW-4
admitted that the bribe amount was not sized from the appellant and that
their knowledge regarding events prior to the signal was either
incomplete or hearsay.
7.8. It is argued that the Investigating Officer (PW-5) has admitted
that there is no mention of demand of bribe in the statement of Panch
No.1 and that no station diary entry was made regarding the initial
telephonic complaint, casting serious doubt on the fairness of the
investigation.
8 appeal-113-2013.odt
7.9. Learned Counsel further submitted that the complainant
himself admitted that he was annoyed and frustrated and lodged the
complaint despite the mutation having already been prepared, thereby
suggesting a motive for false implication.
7.10. It is submitted that mere recovery of tainted currency
notes, in the absence of proof of demand and voluntary acceptance, is
insufficient to sustain conviction.
7.11. Learned Counsel therefore prayed that the appeal be allowed,
the impugned judgment and order of conviction be quashed and set aside,
and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges. Learned Counsel for
appellant relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mir
Mustafa Ali Hasmi Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 489 &
Mukhtiar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 136.
8. Submissions on behalf of the State:
8.1. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor supported the
impugned judgment and order and submitted that the learned trial Court
has rightly convicted the appellant after proper appreciation of the
evidence on record.
8.2. It is submitted that the initial demand of bribe by the
appellant stands proved through the consistent version in the complaint
and the examination-in-chief of the complainant (PW-1), which is
corroborated by the panch witnesses and the Investigating Officer.
9 appeal-113-2013.odt
8.3. Learned Addl.P.P. contended that minor contradictions or
omissions in the testimony of witnesses are natural due to lapse of time
and do not go to the root of the prosecution case.
8.4. It is further submitted that the presence of anthracene powder
on the fingers of the appellant and on the sofa pillow, coupled with
recovery of tainted currency notes from the immediate vicinity of the
appellant, clearly establishes acceptance of illegal gratification.
8.5. Learned Addl.P.P. argued that the complainant turning hostile
or making contradictory statements during cross-examination does not
ipso facto demolish the prosecution case, particularly when other
evidence on record supports the prosecution version.
8.6. It is contended that both panch witnesses have substantially
supported the prosecution and have clearly stated that the accused
demanded and accepted the bribe amount and kept it on the sofa.
8.7. Learned Addl.P.P. further submitted that the presumption
under Section 20 of the PC Act squarely applies in the present case, as
recovery of tainted currency notes and positive ultraviolet test have been
proved.
8.8. It is argued that the sanction for prosecution has been validly
accorded by the Competent Authority (PW-6) after due application of
mind and no infirmity has been brought on record to discredit the same.
10 appeal-113-2013.odt
8.9. Learned Addl.P.P. submitted that the defence theory of planting
of money is an afterthought and is not supported by any cogent evidence.
It is therefore prayed that the appeal be dismissed and the conviction and
sentence imposed by the learned trial Court be confirmed.
9. Before proceeding to the reasoning, analysis, and final
conclusions, this Court finds it necessary to first examine and assess the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
10. PW-1 Sumit Padmakar Matte, the complainant, though in his
examination-in-chief attempted to support the prosecution version
regarding alleged demand of bribe, made material admissions in his cross-
examination which strike at the very root of the prosecution case.
11. PW-1 categorically denied that the appellant demanded the
bribe amount at the time of the trap or that the appellant accepted the
tainted currency notes from his hand. He specifically stated that no
conversation took place between him and the appellant prior to his
placing the amount of Rs.1,500/- on the sofa inside the house of the
appellant.
12. PW-1 further admitted that on 23.05.2006 the appellant
immediately handed over the 7/12 extract to him and thereafter went
inside the house to bring drinking water. During the absence of the
appellant, PW-1 himself kept the amount of Rs.1,500/- on the sofa cover.
11 appeal-113-2013.odt
He further admitted that till the arrival of the raiding party, the appellant
was not aware of the said amount having been kept on the sofa.
13. PW-1 also admitted that no demand of bribe was made by the
appellant on 22.05.2006 and that he lodged the complaint as he was
annoyed and felt harassed, despite the mutation having already been
prepared. These admissions completely demolish the prosecution case on
the aspect of demand.
14. It is well settled that proof of demand of illegal gratification is
a sine qua non for constituting offences under Sections 7 and 13 of the PC
Act. In the absence of proof of demand, mere recovery of tainted currency
notes, that too not from the possession of the appellant, is insufficient to
sustain a conviction.
15. The evidence of PW-3 Pralhad Sapkal, Panch No.1, also does
not inspire confidence. He admitted that the tainted currency notes were
not recovered from the person of the appellant but were taken from the
sofa pillow. He further admitted that several material facts deposed by
him before the Court were not stated in his police statement.
16. PW-3 further admitted that there was no independent
identification mark on the currency notes except their numbers and that
the notes were not seized from the hands or pockets of the appellant.
12 appeal-113-2013.odt
These admissions materially weaken the prosecution version regarding
conscious acceptance of the bribe amount by the appellant.
17. PW-4 Vijay Dhage, Panch No.2, similarly admitted that the
bribe amount was not seized from the appellant but from the sofa. He
further admitted that his knowledge regarding the events that took place
inside the house prior to the signal was hearsay and that several facts
stated by him in Court do not find mention in his police statement.
18. Both panch witnesses admitted that copies of their statements
were supplied to them prior to their deposition and that material
omissions exist between their police statements and court testimony,
thereby affecting their credibility.
19. PW-5 Dy.S.P. Tadwi, the Investigating Officer, admitted that no
station diary entry was made regarding the initial telephonic call of the
complainant. He further admitted that the demand of bribe is not
specifically mentioned in the statement of Panch No.1. He also admitted
that the tainted amount was not recovered from the physical possession of
the appellant.
20. Though PW-2 proved the registration of the FIR and PW-6
proved the sanction for prosecution, their evidence does not advance the
prosecution case on the crucial aspects of demand and acceptance.
13 appeal-113-2013.odt
21. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions,
examined the impugned judgment, and scrutinised the oral and
documentary evidence on record. The central issue is whether the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the essential ingredients
of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, so as to sustain the
conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
PC Act.
22. It is well settled that proof of demand of illegal gratification is
sine qua non for constituting offences under Sections 7 and 13 of the PC
Act. Mere recovery of tainted currency notes, divorced from proof of
demand, cannot lead to conviction. This legal position has been
authoritatively laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Jayaraj v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55, and consistently reiterated
thereafter. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh , (2015)
10 SCC 152. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that mere
possession and recovery of currency notes, without proof of demand, is
insufficient to establish the offence under the PC Act.
23. Upon consideration of the submissions, it is noted that the
demand of illegal gratification is a vital element of offences under
Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act. The record indicates discrepancies in the
dates and presence of panch witnesses, and the complainant's own
testimony does not conclusively establish a demand at the time alleged.
The lack of immediate reporting and the absence of contemporaneous
14 appeal-113-2013.odt
verification weaken the prosecution's claim of demand. These factors,
therefore, call for careful scrutiny in evaluating the credibility and
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction under the said provisions.
24. In the present case, the prosecution primarily relies upon the
testimony of PW-1, the complainant. Though PW-1 supported the
prosecution in his examination-in-chief, his cross-examination contains
material admissions which go to the root of the case. PW-1 has
categorically admitted that on the date of the trap the appellant
immediately handed over the 7/12 extract to him and thereafter went
inside the house to bring drinking water. PW-1 further admitted that
during the absence of the appellant, he himself placed the amount of
Rs.1,500/- on the sofa and that the appellant was not aware of the same
till the arrival of the raiding party. PW-1 has also denied any demand or
acceptance of bribe at the time of the trap. He has specifically stated that
no conversation regarding money took place prior to his placing the
amount on the sofa.
25. In Mukhtiar Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
categorically held that where the complainant does not support the
prosecution case with regard to the demand of illegal gratification and
there is no independent corroborative evidence, the accused is entitled to
the benefit of acquittal. We find merit in the submission advanced by the
learned Counsel for the appellant placing reliance on the aforesaid
15 appeal-113-2013.odt
decision, as the ratio laid down therein squarely applies to the facts of the
present case.
26. Once the complainant himself disowns the allegation of
demand and acceptance, the foundational facts necessary to attract
Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act are not established. The prosecution
cannot succeed merely on the basis of recovery.
27. The evidence of the panch witnesses, PW-3 and PW-4, does
not improve the prosecution case. Both admitted that the tainted currency
notes were not recovered from the physical possession of the appellant
but were seized from the sofa. They also admitted material omissions
between their police statements and Court testimony.
28. In Krishan Chander v. State of Delhi, (2016) 3 SCC 108, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where recovery is not from the
person of the accused and demand is not proved, conviction cannot be
sustained. The relevant paragraphs 37 and 38 of the said judgment read
thus:
"37. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy, it was held by this Court
as under : (SCC 159, paras 21-23)
"21. In State of Kerala v. C.P. Rao, this Court,
reiterating its earlier dictum, vis-à-vis the same offences,
held that mere recovery by itself, would not prove the
charge against the accused and in absence of any evidence
to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused had
voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe,
conviction cannot be sustained.
16 appeal-113-2013.odt
22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern
the imperative prerequisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the
Act, it has been underlined in B. Jayaraj in unequivocal
terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes
from an accused without proof of demand would not
establish an offence under Sections 7 as well as 13(1)(d)
(i)&(ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the
absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the
use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a
public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of
demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable
essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence
under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the
Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it
has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence
under Section 7 and not to those under Section 13(1)(d)
(i)&(ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to
do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal
gratification, it was emphasized, could follow only if there
was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in
absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under
Section 20 of the Act would also not arise.
23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus,
is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)
(d)(i)&(ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably
the charge therefore, would fail. Mere acceptance of any
amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery
thereof, de hors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would
thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these
two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the
prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification
would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the
person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the
Act would not entail his conviction thereunder."
(emphasis supplied)
38. Further, in Satvir Singh v. State of Delhi, this Court
has held thus: (SCC pp. 157-158, paras 34-35)
"34. This Court, in K.S. Panduranga case has held that the
demand and acceptance of the amount of illegal
gratification by the accused is a condition precedent to
constitute an offence, the relevant paragraph in this regard
from the abovesaid decision is extracted hereunder: (SCC
pp. 740-41, para 39)
17 appeal-113-2013.odt
"39. Keeping in view that the demand and acceptance
of the amount as illegal gratification is a condition
precedent for constituting an offence under the Act, it is to
be noted that there is a statutory presumption under
Section 20 of the Act which can be dislodged by the
accused by bringing on record some evidence, either direct
or circumstantial, that money was accepted other than for
the motive or the reward as stipulated under Section 7 of
the Act. When some explanation is offered, the court is
obliged to consider the explanation under Section 20 of the
Act and the consideration of the explanation has to be on
the touchstone of preponderance of probability. It is not to
be proven beyond all reasonable doubt. In the case at
hand, we are disposed to think that the explanation offered
by the accused does not deserve any acceptance and,
accordingly, we find that the finding recorded on that score
by the learned trial Judge and the stamp of approval given
to the same by the High Court cannot be faulted."
35. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has also
placed reliance upon the case of Banarsi Dass referred to
supra wherein it was held that: (SCC pp. 456-57, para 24)
"24. In M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala this Court in
somewhat similar circumstances, where the tainted money
was kept in the drawer of the accused who denied the
same and said that it was put in the drawer without his
knowledge, held as under: (SCC pp. 723-24, para 8)
'8. ... It is in this context the courts have cautioned
that as a rule of prudence, some corroboration is necessary.
In all such type of cases of bribery, two aspects are
important. Firstly, there must be a demand and secondly,
there must be acceptance in the sense that the accused has
obtained the illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself is
not sufficient to establish the offence. Therefore, the other
aspect, namely, acceptance is very important and when the
accused has come forward with a plea that the currency
notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, then
there must be clinching evidence to show that it was with
the tacit approval of the accused that the money had been
put in the drawer as an illegal gratification." '"
(emphasis supplied)
18 appeal-113-2013.odt
29. PW-4 further admitted that his knowledge of events prior to
the signal was hearsay. Such testimony cannot be treated as reliable
corroboration of the complainant on the vital aspect of demand.
30. The Investigating Officer (PW-5) admitted that the demand of
bribe does not find mention in the statement of Panch No.1 and that no
station diary entry was made regarding the initial telephonic complaint.
These omissions assume importance in light of the doubtful primary
evidence.
31. In N. Vijayakumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed in paragraphs 26 and 27 which are reproduced hereinbelow:
"26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself
cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the
accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this
Court in the case of C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI and in B.
Jayaraj v. State of A. P. In the aforesaid judgments of this
Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)
(i)and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is
reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt that accused voluntarily accepted
money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand
for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of
currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In
the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption
under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand
for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is
also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence
in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal
recorded by the trial court.
27. The relevant paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in
the case of B. Jayaraj(supra) read as under :
"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned,
it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal
gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence
and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute
19 appeal-113-2013.odt
the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted
the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position
has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of
this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made
to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. and C.M.
Girish Babu v. CBI.
8. In the present case, the complainant did not support
the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is
concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other
witness, present at the time when the money was
allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant,
to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made
by the accused. When the complainant himself had
disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext.
P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to
prove that the accused had made any demand, the
evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be
relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above
material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by
the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the
learned trial court as well as the High Court was not
correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the
accused as proved. The only other material available is
the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the
possession of the accused. In fact such possession is
admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and
recovery of the currency notes from the accused without
proof of demand will not bring home the offence under
Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as
the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is
concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for
illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means
or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to
be established.
9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn
under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such
presumption can only be in respect of the offence under
Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can
be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such
gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do
any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal
gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand.
As the same is lacking in the present case the primary
20 appeal-113-2013.odt
facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under
Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent."
The above said view taken by this Court, fully supports the
case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed
by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on
behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand
for and acceptance of bribe amount and cell phone by the
appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having
regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by
the trial court is a "possible view" as such the judgment of
the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording
conviction under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption
Act, courts have to take utmost care in scanning the
evidence. Once conviction is recorded under provisions of
Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the
person in the society apart from serious consequences on the
service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that
whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view
or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each
case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to
evidence on record."
32. The prosecution has relied upon the presence of anthracene
powder on the fingers of the appellant and on the sofa cover. However, in
C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held that chemical test and recovery evidence, by themselves, are
insufficient unless demand is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
33. In N. Vijayakumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
reiterated that the presumption under Section 20 does not arise
automatically and can be invoked only after the prosecution establishes
demand and acceptance.
34. In the present case, in view of the categorical admissions of
PW-1, the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are not proved.
21 appeal-113-2013.odt
Consequently, the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act
does not arise.
35. The defence explanation that the amount was planted on the
sofa cannot be brushed aside, particularly when it finds support from the
complainant's own testimony. In V. Sejappa v. State, (2016) 12 SCC 150,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where two views are possible, the
one favouring the accused must be adopted.
36. Though the sanction for prosecution has been duly proved, it
is settled law that a valid sanction cannot compensate for failure to prove
the substantive offence.
37. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court and the evidence on record, this Court finds that the
prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the essential
ingredients of demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification by
the appellant.
38. The evidence, when assessed cumulatively, gives rise to
serious and reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case. The learned
trial Court failed to properly appreciate the binding legal principles
governing offences under the PC Act and the material admissions on
record, and thus erred in convicting the appellant.
22 appeal-113-2013.odt
The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt.
The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence cannot be
sustained and deserve to be set aside. Hence, I proceed to pass the
order :
Order
(i) Criminal Appeal is allowed.
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 17.01.2013, passed by the
learned Special Judge, Kelapur in Special Case No. 3/2006 is hereby
quashed and set aside.
(iii) The appellant is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections
7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
(iv) Bail bonds of the appellant stand discharged.
(v) Fine, if any, paid by the appellant be refunded to him.
(NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J)
MPDeshpande
Signed by: Mr. M.P. Deshpande
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 19/12/2025 18:36:43
