[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Laxmi Sakharam Shinde Thr Poa Priyanka ... vs Chief Executive Officer, Nagar ... on 17 December, 2025
Author: N. J. Jamadar
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2025:BHC-AS:55751
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Santosh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 13214 OF 2025
Pukharaji Rupaji Choudhari through POA
Rajesh Pukharaj Choudhari ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
SANTOSH
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondent
SUBHASH WITH
KULKARNI
WRIT PETITION NO. 13216 OF 2025
Digitally signed by
SANTOSH SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Date: 2025.12.17
19:12:10 +0530 Surendra Singh Bhatiya through POA
Darshan Kaur Surendra Singh Bhatia ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 13218 OF 2025
Jayawanti Narayan Shigawan through POA
Raghunath Ramchandra Dhondage ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 13219 OF 2025
Laxmi Sakharam Shinde through POA
Priyanka Sakharam Shinde ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 13220 OF 2025
Dharamaraj Nandakai Kushawah ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondent
1/22
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WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 13222 OF 2025
Chandulal Motilal Gupta ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 13224 OF 2025
Pramod Raju Atikandan through POA
Shivaji Balkrushna Mhaske ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 13225 OF 2025
Sandip Anturam Verma ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 13226 OF 2025
Suresh Dattaram Hujare ...Petitioner
Versus
Chief Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat
Mangaon, District Raigad ...Respondents
Mr. Anil Anturkar, Senior Advocate. a/w Mr. Roshan
Pandhare i/by Mr. Atharva Date, for the Petitioner in
all WP.
Mr. S. M. Gorwadkar, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Sachin
Pawar, Mr. Sujay Gangal and Mr. Devang Mhatre, for
the Respondent in all WP.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON: 14th OCTOBER, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON: 17th DECEMBER, 2025
JUDGMENT:
-
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the
consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
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2. These petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India assail the legality, propriety and correctness of the
judgment and order dated 12th September, 2025 in the Misc.
Civil Appeals, whereby the District Judge, Mangaon, District
Raigad, was persuaded to allow the appeals preferred by the
respondent - defendant Nagar Panchayat and thereby set aside
the orders passed by the learned Civil Judge, Mangaon, on 15 th
July, 2024 in the suits instituted by the petitioners - plaintiffs to
restrain the respondent - defendant from causing obstruction to
the possession and enjoyment of the suit stalls on the basis of
the notice dated 16th May, 2024, issued by the defendant.
3. In fact, this is the second round of litigation before this
Court. The impugned orders have been passed by the learned
District Judge, post remand of the appeals pursuant to the
order dated 18th June, 2025 passed in WP/3795/2025 and
connected petitions, by this Court.
4. As all these petitions arise out of identical facts and raise
common questions, all these petitions were heard together and
are being decided by this common judgment. The facts in
WP/13214/2025 are taken as a representative case.
4.1 The petitioner, like the petitioners in the rest of the
petitions, runs a stall since the year 1960, being Stall No.10
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admeasuring 10 X 10 ft. under the name and style of 'Jay Ambe
Tobacco' at Mangaon ("the suit stall"). The petitioner claims the
land on which the suit stall is run was allotted to the petitioner
by the then Group Village Panchayat, Mangaon, the predecessor
of Mangaon Municipal Council, the defendant.
4.2 The petitioner has been carrying on the business in the
suit stall. Since the year 1960, the respondent has collected rent
as well as taxes from the petitioner. Receipts have been issued.
4.3 On 17th January, 2024, the respondent issued a notice to
the petitioner calling upon him to vacate the suit stall as the
suit stall was required to be demolished for the purpose of
construction of the new building for the Municipal Council. The
petitioner gave reply to the said notice on 18th January, 2024.
4.4 Apprehending highhanded action, the petitioner had
instituted a suit, being RCS/20/2024, assailing the legality and
validity of the said notice and to restrain the respondent from
acting on the basis of the said notice. In the said suit, on 26 th
February, 2025, an order of temporary injunction was passed by
the learned Civil Judge. The respondent preferred Misc. Civil
Appeal No.12/2024 before the District Court at Mangaon.
However, on 1st April, 2024, the said appeal was disposed of as
not pressed.
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4.5 The petitioner asserts, the respondent addressed second
notice on 16th May, 2024 alleging that the land covered by the
suit stall was allotted to the petitioner on temporary basis. The
petitioner had erected structure over the said land without
obtaining permission of the then village panchayat. The
petitioner has carried out unauthorized development and
encroachment. Secondly, there was no agreement between the
Municipal Council and the petitioner as envisaged by the
provisions contained in Section 92 of The Maharashtra
Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats And Industrial
Townships Act, 1965, ("the Act, 1965"). Thirdly, the suit stall
was within the control line of Mumbai-Goa National Highway
No.66. It was, therefore, necessary to remove the suit stall. The
petitioner was called upon to remove the structure and vacate
the suit stall within a period of 8 days lest the respondent would
initiate the action of removal.
4.6 The petitioner again instituted a suit being RCS/97/2024
assailing the legality and validity of the said notice and the
proposed action and sought declaration and consequential
injunctive relief. In the said suit, the petitioner filed an
application for temporary injunction.
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4.7 By an order dated 15th July, 2024, the learned Civil Judge,
Mangaon, was persuaded to grant temporary injunction and
thereby restrain the respondent Council from acting upon the
impugned notice dated 16th May, 2024 till the final decision of
the suit opining that a prima facie case was made out in favour
of the petitioner as the petitioner had been in the occupation of
the suit stall since the year 1960, the respondent Council has
accepted rent and taxes, the notice was vague on the aspect of
the extent of the alleged encroachment, and the fact as to
whether the petitioner was a tenant of the Municipal Council
warranted adjudication at the trial.
4.8 Being aggrieved, the respondent - defendant preferred an
appeal before the District Court. By the judgment and order
dated 20th February, 2025, the learned District Judge was
persuaded to allow the appeal primarily relying upon a map
placed on the record of the District Court by the respondent, to
show that the suit property fell within the control line from the
centre of the National Highway. The learned District Judge was
of the view that the fact that Municipal Council had accepted
the rent and taxes was of no significance. Since the
construction was unauthorized and illegal it was required to be
demolished. Support was sought to be drawn from the order
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passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 22 nd April, 2019
in PIL/42/2015, whereby directions were given to take action of
removal of encroachment over the National Highway.
4.9 In the WP/3795/2025 and connected petitions, preferred
by the petitioners, assailing the aforesaid order passed by the
learned District Judge, this Court was persuaded to intervene
as the learned District Judge had allowed the application for
production of the map tendered on behalf of the defendant on
20th February, 2025, and, on the very day, allowed the appeals
primarily relying upon the said map without providing an
adequate opportunity to the petitioner to meet the case sought
to be set up by the defendant - respondent, before the Appellate
Court. Thus, the impugned order in each of those petitions was
quashed and set aside, the order of temporary injunction passed
by the trial Court stood restored and the appeals were remitted
back to the Court of the learned District Judge, Mangaon, for
fresh determination, after providing an opportunity to the
petitioners - plaintiffs to file an affidavit to deal with the map
tendered before the Appellate Court on 20th February, 2025.
4.10 The petitioners filed an additional affidavit on 14 th July,
2025 before the District Judge. After fresh appraisal of the
material on record and the submissions canvassed on behalf of
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the defendants, by the impugned order, the learned District
Judge was again persuaded to allow the appeals preferred by
the defendants observing, inter alia, that the learned trial Judge
committed an error in laying emphasis on the factum of
occupation of the stalls by the petitioners without considering
the fact that the petitioners had no right to occupy the stalls,
which were within the proscribed limits of the control line of
Highway. In the view of the learned District Judge, the balance
of convenience was in favour of the defendants and general
public, which would be deprived of the right to use the National
Highway to the fullest.
5. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have again invoked the
writ jurisdiction.
6. I have heard Mr. Anturkar, the learned Senior Advocate for
the petitioners, and Mr. S. M. Gorwadkar, the learned Senior
Advocate for the respondent, at some length. With the
assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have
perused the material on record.
7. Mr. Anturkar, the learned Senior Advocate for the
petitioners, would submit that though the learned District
Judge followed the letter of the remand order, yet, did not
adhere to the spirit thereof. The learned District Judge did not
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appreciate the foundational objections taken by the petitioners
to the admissibility and reliability of the map, which indicates
that the suit structures are within the control line. It was
submitted that no material was placed before the learned
District Judge to show as to who has made the interpolation in
the map to show the control line in red. Though the learned
District Judge noted the inconsistency in the map, copy of
which has been duly furnished to the petitioners by the Deputy
Superintendent of Land Records, the learned District Judge
failed to fully appreciate the implications thereof. In the facts
and circumstances of the case, according to Mr. Anturkar,
reliance on the map was completely misplaced.
8. As a second limb of the submission, Mr. Anturkar would
urge, the learned District Judge downplayed the inconsistency
in the reasons ascribed by the officers of defendant No.1 - Nagar
Panchayat, in the two notices issued by the defendant - Nagar
Panchayat. The learned District Judge was in error in ignoring
the glaring inconsistency in the grounds on which the removal
of suit stall was sought, on the count that there was non-
compliance of the provisions contained in Section 92 of the
Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and
Industrial Townships Act, 1965 ("the Act, 1965"),
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9. Lastly, Mr. Anturkar would urge that, there is an
overwhelming material to show that, the petitioners have been
in possession of the subject stalls since more than 50 years.
The petitioners have paid the ground rent to the defendant -
Nagar Panchayat. All the requisite licences are in place. In this
view of the matter, even if there is non-compliance of the
provisions contained in Section 92(3) of the Act, 1965, the
petitioners cannot be evicted from the suit stalls and deprived of
their livelihood, without following the due process of law. In the
least, the petitioners are the licencees, and in the absence of
termination of licence, the learned District Judge ought not to
have interfered with the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by
the trial Court.
10. In opposition to this, Mr. Gorwadkar, the learned Senior
Advocate for the respondent - Nagar Panchyat, would urge that
the map in question was duly forwarded by the National
Highway Authority after making the necessary endorsement as
regards the structures within the control line. Therefore, the
endeavour on the part of the petitioners to draw a mileage by
pointing out some inconsistency in the earlier map and the map
which was tendered before the Appellate Court on 14 th February,
2025 can not be countenanced. Mr. Gorwadkar would urge that,
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the specific case of respondent - defendant that, the subject
stalls were within the control line, as spelled out in the show
cause notice dated 6th May, 2024, was not at all controverted by
the petitioners. Taking the Court through the contents of the
reply to the said notice on behalf of the petitioners, it was
submitted that the fact that the subject stalls are within the
control line has not been disputed at all. In view thereof,
according to Mr. Gorwadkar, the learned District Judge, was
justified in correcting the error which the learned Civil Judge
had committed.
11. Mr. Gorwadkar would urge in the face of statutory
restrictions in the matter of allotment of the property of the
Nagar Panchayat beyond nine years, even on a lease, the mere
longstanding occupation of the petitioners was of no avail and,
thus, no prima facie case was made out. In any event, the
balance of convenience firmly tilts in favour of the defendant as
the suit stalls are obstructing the free flow of traffic on a
National Highway thereby causing grave prejudice to general
public. The petitioners cannot be permitted to perpetuate their
unlawful occupation to the prejudice of the members of the
public.
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12. As the learned District Judge has interfered with exercise
of discretion by the trial Court, at the outset, it may be
appropriate to keep in view the jurisdictional limits in an appeal
against the discretionary order, on the one part, and also
interference by this Court in exercise of the supervisory
jurisdiction with the order passed by the Court below, on the
other part.
13. An appeal against a discretionary order is an appeal on
principle. Ordinarily the Appellate Court is not expected to
interfere with exercise of discretion in the matter of grant of
injunction by the trial Court and substitute its own view for the
one taken by the trial Court, except in cases it could be
demonstrated that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily
or perversely or the impugned order is contrary to the settled
principles of law.
14. In the case of Skyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd.
V/s. S.L.Vaswani and Anr.1, the Supreme Court after adverting
to the previous pronouncements, enunciated that once the
Court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse
to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of
discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material
1 (2010) 2 SCC 142.
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placed before the Court and is supported by cogent reasons, the
appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de
novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the Appellate
Court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie
case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity.
15. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, this Court is not
expected to re-evaluate, re-weigh and review the evidence/
material on the basis on which the Court/Tribunal below has
passed the impugned order. The High Court cannot act as an
Appellate Court would do. Nor can the High Court substitute its
view for the one taken by the Court below. The High Court can
legitimately intervene if the Court below has committed a
jurisdictional error or the impugned order suffers from patent
error of law or perversity which stares in the face.
16. The contours of writ jurisdiction were illuminatingly
postulated by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the
case of Rajendra Diwan vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and
another2 as under:
"85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is,
however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that
this power of judicial Superintendence must be exercised
sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the
limits of their authority. When a Tribunal has acted within its
jurisdiction, the High Court does not interfere in exercise of its
extraordinary writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage
2 (2019) 20 Supreme Court Cases 143.
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of justice or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article
227 cannot be exercised "in the cloak of an appeal in disguise".
86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence
and/or judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to
cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision;
perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of
principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation
of powers. The High Court does not re-assess or re-analyze the
evidence and/or materials on record. Whether the High Court
would exercise its writ jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent
Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances
of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be
converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because
there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of law."
17. In a case of the present nature, where the Appellate Court
has exercised the jurisdiction to correct the perceived error in
exercise of discretion by the trial Court, the inquiry by this
Court would be to assess whether there were circumstances
which justified the exercise of such appellate jurisdiction. If this
Court finds that there were circumstances which rendered the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction to correct the error in exercise
of discretionary jurisdiction by the trial Court, this Court would
not be justified in interfering with the order passed by the
Appellate Court, even if it were to take a different view of the
matter on merits.
18. To begin with, it is necessary to note that, the case with
which the petitioners approached the trial Court.
Incontrovertibly, the suit stalls abut Mumbai - Goa National
Highway. The plaintiffs claim that, the land underneath the
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stalls was given on lease to the plaintiffs, and they have
regularly paid the ground rent, apart from the taxes and cess.
The plaintiffs have been running diverse businesses in the suit
stalls. Initially a notice was served on 17 th January, 2024 to
vacate the suit stalls purportedly to facilitate the construction of
a new Nagar Panchayat Building. In the second show cause
notice dated 16th May, 2024 the legality and validity of which
was impugned in the instant suit, it was alleged that, the action
was required to be taken in pursuance of the directions in
WP/42/2015 dated 22nd April, 2019 to remove the encroachment
and the suit stalls were within the control line of Mumbai - Goa
National Highway. In addition, it was contended that, the
demolition of the suit stalls was necessary as the new Nagar
Panchayat Building cannot be constructed without removing the
suit stalls.
19. It is the aforesaid inconsistency in pre-suit notices, the
longstanding possession of the plaintiffs and the question of the
applicability of the provisions contained in Section 92 of the Act,
1965 being debatable, weighed with the learned Civil Judge to
grant the temporary injunction.
20. Indeed, in the first notice dated 17th January, 2024, there
was no reference to the fact that, the suit stalls were within the
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control line. The learned District Judge was of the view that the
aforesaid inconsistency, or for that matter, the omission on the
part of the officers of the defendant to mention the said fact,
was of no significance, if the controversy was viewed in the light
of the governing legal provisions and principles. Whether this
approach of the learned District Judge is justifiable?
21. Section 92 of the Act, 1965 reads as under:
"Section 92. (1) No Council shall transfer any of its immovable
property without the sanction of the State Government.
(2) A proposal of such transfer shall be accompanied by
resolution of the Council passed at a meeting by a majority of
not less than two-thirds of the total number of Councilors and
shall in no way be inconsistent with the rules made in this
behalf by the State Government.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a
Council may lease its immovable property for a period not
exceeding three years, and the lessee shall not be allowed to
make any permanent constructions on such immovable
property. Such lease may be renewed by the Council beyond the
period of three years. So, however, that the total period of any
lease shall not exceed [nine years].
No such lease or any renewal thereof shall be granted unless
supported by a resolution passed at a meeting of the Council.
[92A. Subject to the rules, if any, made in this behalf, the
Council may transfer any of its movable properties.]"
22. Evidently, there is a complete prohibition for transfer of
any immovable property by the Municipal Council without the
sanction of the State Government. A proposal to transfer the
Municipal property is required to be passed by a special
majority of not less than 2/3 of the total members of the
Council. Furthermore, such proposal cannot be in derogation of
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the rules made by the State Government. Though sub-section
(3) of Section 92 empowers the Municipal Council to give its
property on lease for a term not exceeding three years, yet, the
lessee cannot be permitted to make any permanent construction
on such property. The maximum term of lease is statutorily
capped at nine years. A lease or renewal thereof can only be
granted by a resolution passed in the meeting of the Council.
23. The legislature has provided aforesaid safeguards being
alive to the risk of the Municipal properties being
indiscriminately transferred and allotted for reasons which may
not subserve larger public interest. The restrictions on transfer
of the immovable property and even lease thereof are meant to
ensure that the public trust, in which the properties are held by
the Municipal Council, is not betrayed to advance private
interest.
24. In the case of Municipal Council, Pusad vs. Kundanal
Mohanlal Jaiswal and ors.3, on which reliance was placed on
behalf of the defendant, the object of Section 92 and the
approach expected of the Court in interpreting and applying the
said provision was expounded as under:
"8. ..... It is apparent that their individual grievance cannot
be compared with public injury and in absence of even a prima
3 2007 (3) All MR 86.
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facie right in their favour, they are not entitled to grant of
temporary injunction. Insistence upon observance of "due
procedure" by these respondents is totally unwarranted. Even if
all plaint allegations are presumed to be true, the same fall
short to make out any case of legal injury in their favour. The
application of mind by Appellate court is unsustainable.
Appellate court ought to have noticed that an action to be
binding on body corporate like petitioner or to operate to the
prejudice of general public must be stated and shown to be in
accordance with provisions of Municipal Act. The Appellate
Court was duty bound to notice this aspect and ought not to
have confused possession only as conferring any legal right
upon respondents. Resolution of Municipal Council or any of its
members or its chief officer cannot make their action binding
unless and until it is in accordance with provisions mentioned
above. Procuring of some trading licence or no objection from
Municipal Council, paying some charges to it towards such
occupation of land does not create any legal relationship
between Municipal Council and such person. Influential traders
or businessmen may try to take undue advantage of their
position by getting any orders or resolutions from such bodies
and therefore only, legislature has circumscribed those powers
by providing for appropriate measures by way of control. It is
apparent that Appellate Court has exercised jurisdiction not
available to it in the matter by protecting unauthorised and
apparently illegal possession of respondents to the prejudice of
public at large and has hampered the development work
specified by Development Plan. It is further to be noticed that
respondents after receipt of notice to remove encroachment
from Municipal Council, till today got sufficient time to make
alternate arrangements but then as already stated above the
wish to prosper at the cost of general public which cannot be
tolerated at all."
(emphasis supplied)
25. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that the alleged lease of
the land in favour of any of the plaintiffs was by a resolution
passed by the defendant Municipal Council or in conformity
with the provisions under Section 55 of the Maharashtra Village
Panchayats Act, 1959 when the land was initially allotted by
erstwhile Mangaon Village Panchayat, the precursor of the
defendant. Neither there is a Lease Deed nor any document was
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placed on record to support the claim of the allotment of the
land to the plaintiffs as lessees. In this backdrop, the mere
payment of the ground rent or taxes or cess for the occupation
of the suit stalls would not prima facie legitimize the occupation
of the plaintiffs. Had lease been executed in favour of the
plaintiffs, in a best case scenario, they would have been entitled
to occupy the land for nine years, in the maximum. The
plaintiffs claim to be in possession for over 50 years.
26. Realising the difficulty in pursuing a case of the plaintiffs
being lessees in respect of the suit properties, Mr. Anturkar
would urge that, in the least, the plaintiffs have been in the
occupation of the suit stalls as licencees. Still, the defendant
cannot evict the plaintiffs without following the due process of
law. Even the licence has not been terminated, urged Mr.
Anturkar.
27. I am afraid the aforesaid submission advances the cause
of the plaintiffs. The statutory restrictions in the matter of
transfer of the Municipal property absolutely, or transfer of
interest therein by way of lease, cannot be permitted to be
circumvented by contending that the plaintiffs being the
lecencees are entitled to protect their possession till they are
dispossessed by following due process of law.
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28. This takes me to the submission forcefully canvassed by
Mr. Anturkar that the map which was tendered before the
Appellate Court could not have been taken into account as there
is clear discrepancy in the endorsements on the said map and
the map that has been furnished to the plaintiffs by the Deputy
Superintendent, Land Records. Whether the suit stalls are
within the control line of Mumbai - Goa National Highway is a
matter which can only be adjudicated after the parties adduced
evidence. Thus, the learned District Judge committed an error
in law, in passing the impugned order on the basis of the map,
the genuineness and reliability of which is debatable.
29. At the first blush, the submission appears attractive.
However, there is material on record to indicate that the map in
question was forwarded to the Municipal Council by the
Executive Engineer, National Highways, Sub-Division, Mahad,
vide letter dated 14th February, 2025. It clearly records that,
the said Authority had indicated the Highway line and the
control line on the map prepared by the Deputy Superintendent,
Land Records. The Municipal Council was directed to take
steps to remove the structures which were within the control
line of the National Highway. This document singularly
demolishes the objection sought to be raised on behalf of the
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plaintiffs in regard to the genuineness and the reliability of the
map.
30. As noted above, the suit stalls abut the National Highway.
Indisputably the National Highway runs through Mangaon
town; which initially had a village panchayat. Under the
Government Resolution dated 5th August, 2019, in exercise of
the power under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Regiional and
Town Planning Act, 1966, the State Government has fixed the
control line at 3 to 6 meters from the edge of the National
Highway. The control line shown in the map from the edge of
the National Highway is prima facie in pursuance of the said
directive.
31. In the light of the aforesaid material on record, the learned
District Judge was justified in interfering with the exercise of
the discretion by the trial Court. As the plaintiffs occupation of
the subject stalls is in the teeth of the statutory restrictions in
the matter of the transfer of the Municipal property and there is
incontrovertible material to show that the suit stalls abut the
National Highway and fall within the control line, the learned
District Judge correctly exercised the jurisdiction to interfere
with the discretionary order. Resultantly, in exercise of
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supervisory jurisdiction, this Court does not find any justifiable
reason to interfere with the impugned orders.
32. The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that the
petitions deserve to be dismissed.
33. Hence, the following order:
:ORDER:
(i) The petitions stand dismissed.
(ii) Rule discharged.
No costs.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
