[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Rashtriya Shikshan Sanstha And Ors vs General Manager, Central Railway , ... on 9 December, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:53829
Neeta Sawant FC-WRIT PETITION NO. 1420 OF 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 1420 OF 2020
Rashtriya Shikshan Sanstha,
Manmad, Nashik and Ors. .....Petitioners
: Versus :
General Manager, Central Railways
and Ors. ....Respondents
Mr. Drupad Patil i/b. Mr. Devashish Godbole, for the Petitioners.
Mr. R.V. Govilkar, Senior Advocate with Mr. T.J. Pandian, Mr.
Gautam Modanwal, Ms. Noorjahan Khan and Ms. Shaba Khan, for
the Respondents.
CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
Reserved On: 27 NOVEMBER 2025.
Pronounced On: 09 DECEMBER 2025.
JUDGMENT :
1) By this Petition, Petitioner challenges the judgment and
order dated 30 January 2020 passed by the learned Principal
District Judge, Nashik dismissing Regular Civil Appeal No. 233 of
2019 and thereby confirming the eviction order dated 19 August
2019 directing eviction of the Petitioner from the premises of
Railways under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants), 1971 (Public Premises Act).
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Neeta Sawant FC-WRIT PETITION NO. 1420 OF 2020
2) Briefly stated, facts of the case are that for catering to
the needs of children of railway employees working at Manmad, the
then Great Indian Peninsula Railway (GIP) permitted the godown of
Manmad Workshop to be used for setting up a school at nominal
rent of Rs.1/-. Accordingly, the school was started in the godown
premises near Railway Station on 3 July 1922 under the name
Great Indian Peninsula Indian High School. A grant of Rs.80 was
given by the GIP per mensem towards expenses of staff of the
school. On 27 May 1926, GIP granted Rs.100/- for setting up a
garden at the school. Grant of Rs.1,000 was also sanctioned for
library and reading room for teachers, gymnasium etc. On 7 June
1929, Bridge Engineer, Manmad was nominated as ex-officio
Chairman of the Committee of the School. On 15 January 1934,
society under name Indian Education Society was registered which
was headed by Senior Railway Officer as President. According to the
Petitioner, General Manager of GIP Railways waved the condition
for execution of agreement between the society and railways. After
coming into effect of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950, the
Society was registered as a Public Trust with the name Rashtriya
Shikshan Sanstha. The name of the School was later changed as
'Rashtriya Central Railway High School'. In 1975, the School
received government approval for commencement of Junior
College, (11th and 12th grades). On 23 February 1995, bye-laws of
the society were approved by the Charity Commissioner by
sanctioning the Change Report.
3) This is how the Petitioner contends that the School is
running in the Railway premises since the year 1922. On 10 July
2018, Estate Officer of the Central Railways issued notice for
eviction of the society alleging that occupation of land and building
by it was unauthorised. The Society filed Regular Civil Suit No. 293
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of 2018 in the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, Malegaon
seeking injunction. In the suit, application for temporary injunction
was rejected by order dated 6 December 2018, inter-alia on the
ground of bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court. The Petitioners filed
Misc. Civil Appeal No.34 of 2018 before the District Court which
was dismissed on 31 December 2018. The Petitioners filed Writ
Petition No. 3902 of 2019 challenging the order of rejection of
temporary injunction, which was disposed of by order dated 7 June
2019 granting liberty to the Railways to initiate proceedings under
the provisions of Public Premises Act. Accordingly, Estate Officer of
Railways issued notice under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act
to the Petitioner on 12 June 2019. Petitioner submitted reply to
the notice. The Estate Officer passed order dated 19 August 2019
directing eviction of the Petitioner on the grounds of the land
belonging to Railways, School being situated at a distance of 3 mtrs
from foot-over-bridge and 10 meters from railway track and there
being no affiliation of any railway official with the Petitioner-
Society. Petitioner filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 233 of 2019 before
the learned District Judge who has proceeded to dismiss the same
by order dated 30 January 2020. Aggrieved by the order passed by
the learned Principal District Judge, the Petitioner has filed the
present Petition.
4) By order dated 12 February 2020, this Court recorded
statement on behalf of the Railways not to execute the eviction
order. The said statement was continued from time to time. During
the course of hearing of the Petition on 2 June 2020, when Covid-19
lockdown restrictions were operational, Petitioner pressed
Application for stay of the impugned order which was opposed by
the Respondent-Railways in order to ensure that Petitioner does
not secure an unfair advantage on account of continuation of
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lockdown. This Court stayed the eviction till hearing of the Petition
subject to the condition of non-admission of any students for
further academic sessions without express permission of the Court.
Petitioner accordingly applied for permission to admit new students
stating that the newly admitted students would be imparted
education exclusively outside the disputed premises. Accordingly,
this Court, by order dated 7 August 2020, permitted induction of
new students on condition of imparting education outside the
disputed premises. This is how the school continues to function in
the disputed premised. In pursuance of one of the orders passed by
this Court, Petitioner has filed additional affidavit stating, inter-alia
the position of students admitted in the school upto the Academic
Year 2023-24.
5) Mr. Patil, the learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioner submits that the learned Principal District Judge has
erred in dismissing the Appeal of the Petitioner without
appreciating the position that Petitioner's occupation of railway
premises cannot be termed as 'unauthorised occupation' within the
meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act. That
Petitioner's occupation is not without any authority since the
school is permitted to be set up by Railways in the premises and
that therefore Petitioner cannot be treated as an encroacher on the
railway line. That the authority granted to the Petitioner to occupy
premises has not expired in any manner. That such authority is
also not terminated by issuance of any communication to the
Petitioner. That since the authority to occupy premises is not
determined in any manner, the Petitioner cannot be treated as
unauthorised occupant for being evicted under the Public Premises
Act.
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6) Mr. Patil would further submit that the act of the Estate
Officer in issuing direct notice for eviction to the Petitioner is in
violation of principles of natural justice. That before initiation of
eviction proceedings, no opportunity was given to the Petitioner. In
support of his contention that eviction proceedings cannot be
initiated without following the principles of natural justice, Mr.
Patil would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in Management
of M/s. Nally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd Versus. State of Bihar and
Ors.1.
7) Mr. Patil would further submit that Respondents, being
Government Authority, has duty to act fairly and cannot seek to
arbitrarily evict the Petitioner, who is occupying the railway
premises with lawful authority. In support of his contention that
Government Authority is not supposed to act arbitrarily or
capriciously, Mr. Patil would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court
in State of U.P. and others Versus. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad
Singh and others2. Lastly, Mr. Patil would submit that eviction of
Petitioner and demolition of existing school is not the only option
left for the Respondents. That the case involves the issue of
educational prospects of thousands of children who would be
adversely affected by the decision of the Estate Officer. That being a
State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India,
Respondents have the duty to act fairly and accommodate
Petitioner in some alternate premises rather than mechanically
ordering their eviction.
8) Mr. Patil would submit that no reasons are recorded in
the impugned eviction order for treating the Petitioner as
unauthorised occupant and no additional reasons can be
1 {1990} 2 SCC 48
2 {1989) 2 SCC 505
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supplanted for justifying eviction order as held by the Constitution
Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill and another Versus. The Chief
Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others .3 Mr. Patil would
accordingly pray for setting aside the impugned judgment and
order passed by the learned District Judge, as well as eviction
order.
9) The Petition is opposed by Mr. Govilkar, the learned
Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent-Railways. He would
submit that the Petitioners have no authority to occupy railway
premises. That an informal permission for running the school in the
railway premises was initially granted since railway officials were
part of the Committee managing the School. Later, the affairs of the
School were taken over completely by a private management and
that the school does not have any connection as such with the
Railways. That therefore the management cannot continue to
occupy the railway premises forever and must vacate the same
since the land is required for setting up essential passengers
services at Manmad Railway Station. He would submit that the
Railways have undertaken construction of a new foot-over bridge,
which lands right into the land where the playground of the school
is located. He would submit that the School building stands now
completely on the platform. That it is otherwise dangerous to
impart education to children on a school standing on platform. That
Manmad is a crucial junction for Railways involving heavy traffic of
passengers and goods train requiring robust infrastructure. That
Respondents are unable to set up the requisite infrastructure
needed for railway operations on account of unauthorised
occupation of premises by the Petitioner next to the Railway
Station.
3 (1978) 1 SCC 405
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10) Mr. Govilkar would submit that Railways have followed
due process prescribed under the Public Premises Act while
directing eviction of the Respondent. That there is no requirement
for issuance of letter/communication before issuance of notice
under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act. That Petitioner is a not
a licensee of Railways whose license was required to be terminated
by a independent letter/communication. Mr. Govilkar would rely
upon judgment of this Court in Shivamoori Jagatdev Kushwaha
Versus. Assistant Division Engineer and others 4 in support of the
contention that there is no necessity of bringing to an end authority
to occupy the railway premises before initiation of the eviction
proceedings. Without prejudice, Mr. Govilkar would submit that
letter dated 10 July 2018 issued prior to initiation of eviction
proceedings clearly constituted notice to the Petitioner of
termination of the authority to occupy the railway premises, if it is
held that any communication to that effect was necessary. That the
said letter dated 10 July 2018 became subject matter of
substantive suit filed before the Civil Court, orders passed wherein
were challenged before this Court. That therefore it is ludicrous on
the part of the Petitioner to contend that it did not have notice of
termination of authority to occupy railway premises. Relying on
provisions of Government Grants Act, 1895 Mr. Govilkar would
submit that the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 do not
apply to government grants. That therefore Petitioner cannot claim
any rights in capacity as lessee, tenant or as licensee under the
Transfer of Property Act,1882.
11) Lastly, Mr. Govilkar would submit that Respondents do
not have any obligation to provide alternate land/premises to the
Petitioner. He would rely upon Railway Board Circular dated 5
4 Writ Petition No. 6821 of 2022 decided on 20 August 2025
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November 2001 in support of the contention that no lease of
railway land can ever exceed 30 years except in land leased out to
Kendriya Vidyalaya, which can have lease period for 99 years.
Therefore, even if it is assumed that there is a lease in favour of the
Petitioner in respect of the railway land, the same cannot continue
beyond 30 years. That it is more than 100 years that Petitioner has
been occupying railway land, which is needed by the Railways for
expanding of infrastructure at Manmad station. Mr. Govilkar would
accuse Petitioner of admitting new students in the school run at the
railway premises in violation of interim orders passed by this
Court. He would submit that the school is being run by private
management having no semblance of relation with the railways.
That therefore such private school cannot be permitted to be run on
railway land. He would pray for dismissal of the Petition.
12) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my
consideration.
13) Petitioner runs a school in the railway premises located
in the vicinity of Manmad Railway Station and has faced eviction
order passed under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. The
Petition is filed after unsuccessful attempt to challenge the eviction
order before the learned Principal District Judge.
14) The first contention raised by the Petitioner is that for
initiation of proceedings under the Public Premises Act, the
person/entity against whom the proceedings are initiated must fit
into the definition of the term 'unauthorised occupation' within the
meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act. The term
'unauthorised occupation' is defined under Section 2(g) of the
Public Premises Act as under :-
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(g) "unauthorised occupation", in relation to any public
premises, means the occupation by any person of the public
premises without authority for such occupation, and includes
the continuance in occupation by any person of the public
premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any
other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy
the premises has expired or has been determined for any
reason whatsoever.
15) According to the Petitioner, their occupation of the
railway premises cannot be termed as 'unauthorised occupation'
within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act.
Definition of the term 'unauthorised occupation' covers three
instances where (i) the occupation is without authority, (ii)
continuation of occupation is after expiry of authority or (iii)
continuation of occupation is after determination of authority.
According to the Petitioner, the case does not fit into the first
eventuality as Petitioners were authorized to occupy the railway
premises by the then said GIP and the said authority has
subsequently been continued by the Indian Railways/Central
Railways. There appears to be not much difficulty about this
position as it is not the case of the Railways that Petitioners have
encroached upon the railway land without any authority. The
School operations apparently commenced to cater to the
educational needs of railway employees at Manmad. It was
apparently a combined effort by railways and railway employees to
set up a school which is a reason why during initial days, a Senior
Railway Officer was ex-Officio Secretary/Chairman of the School
Committee. Over the period of time however, the School
Management has got transferred completely to a private
management. There is no dispute to the position that Railways has
not been playing any role in operation or management of the School
over the last several years. Be that as it may, suffice it to conclude
that Petitioners are not encroachers on the railway property.
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16) However, the present case would squarely fit into the
other two eventualities where the authority to occupy railway
premises by Petitioners has either expired or has been determined.
Railways do not desire to continue occupation of their premises by
the Petitioners. Occupation of premises by the Petitioners is
permissive in nature since no express document is executed, no
specific order of grant is made in favour of the Petitioners, on the
strength of which they can continue to exercise any rights in
respect of the land or the building. Therefore, occupation of the
premises by Petitioners will have to be necessarily treated as mere
permissive occupation. Railways have now revoked the permission
and do not desire that the School should be operated in their
premises.
17) Petitioners have raised an objection that authority to
occupy premises has not been determined by any express
letter/communication. It is contended that issuance of a letter
terminating authority to occupy railway premises is sine-qua-non
for maintaining a valid eviction action under the Public Premises
Act. I am unable to agree. Termination of authority to occupy
railway premises may be necessary in a case where there is valid
and continuing arrangement recognized by express document like
lease or license. If Railways was to grant lease of the land in favour
of the Petitioner and during subsistence of lease, Railways wanted
eviction, it would be necessary to first determine the lease and
thereafter initiate eviction proceedings by issuance of notice under
Section 4 of the Public Premises Act. However, when there is
continuing arrangement for occupation of premises by the
Petitioner, it is not necessary to bring an end such arrangement by
issuance of any specific letter or communication. In my view,
therefore considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, where Petitioners are continuing to occupy railway premises
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merely as permissive users, their expectation of determination of
such permission by an express communication is clearly erroneous.
18) Even otherwise, the ultimate objective of issuance of
any express communication for determining or terminating
permission is to make the factum of withdrawal of permission
known to the permissive user. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, Petitioners cannot contend that they were taken by
surprise by issuance of notice dated 12 June 2019 under Section 4
of the Public Premises Act. There is precursor to the said notice.
Respondents had earlier issued a notice dated 10 July 2018 calling
upon Petitioners to vacate the railway premises. The said notice led
to a filing of a civil suit. Thus, Petitioners were fully aware, much
prior to issuance of Section 4 notice, that the Railways were not
desirous of continuing the authority to occupy the premises. Thus,
the objective behind issuance of express communication for
determination of authority is fully achieved in the present case.
19) I am not impressed by the contention raised on behalf of
the Petitioners that even earlier notice dated 10 July 2018 was
issued under the Public Premises Act or that therefore the same
cannot be treated as determination of authority to occupy the
premises within the meaning of premises under Section 2(g) of the
Public Premises Act. As observed above, Petitioners are not holders
of any lease or license. They are not permitted to occupy premises
upto a particular tenure. This is not a case where tenure of
lease/license is continuing and that railways are seeking to recover
possession of the premises during continuance of lease/license.
Therefore, strict requirement of issuance of notice of termination is
not a sine-qua-non in the facts and circumstances of the present
case. What was needed was just expression of intention of
determination of authority to occupy the premises. Such intention
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is clearly expressed and communicated to the Petitioner in the form
of notice dated 10 July 2018 and therefore it is difficult to accept
the contention of the Petitioners that the eviction proceedings are
rendered illegal on account of non-issuance of any express
communication terminating the authority to occupy the premises.
20) In Shivamoori Jagatdev Kushwaha (supra) similar
argument was raised before this Court that there was no lawful
termination of allotment. In case before the learned Single Judge of
this Court, the notice under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act
was issued without issuing any separate notice of termination of
allotment of railway premises. The eviction order was challenged,
inter-alia, on the ground that in absence of lawful termination of
allotment by a termination notice, it was impermissible to initiate
eviction proceedings. This Court repelled the contention by holding
in paras-29 to 31 as under :-
29. Nonetheless, this Court considers it appropriate to briefly
delve into the aforesaid grounds of exception to the impugned
order, assiduously canvassed by Mr. Sanglikar. An effort was
made by Mr. Sanglikar to draw home the point that the allotment
in favour of the society was not lawfully terminated. Attention of
the Court was invited to an admission in the cross-examination of
PW-1 that the Railways had not issued a termination notice as
such. Taking the Court through the contents of the notice dated
18th October 2017, styled as departmental show cause notice, Mr.
Sanglikar, would urge that the said notice can never be construed
to be a termination notice.
30. The learned Principal Judge was not persuaded to accede to
the aforesaid submission The learned Principal Judge was of the
view that a notice of termination need not be construed very
strictly. This view of the learned Principal Judge is legally
impeccable. It is well-recognized the title or nomenclature of a
document is not of decisive significance. If the notice dated 18th
October 2017 is read as a whole, it becomes abundantly clear that
the Railways had called upon the society as well as the Petitioner
to vacate the subject premises. The notice refers to the acts of
commission and omission on the part of the society in breach of
the terms and conditions of allotment. The society was specifically
informed that the society had entered into the Conducting
Agreement with the Petitioner in breach of the terms and
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conditions of the allotment of the subject premises and without the
consent and knowledge of the Railways. Qua the Petitioner, it was
categorically stated that the Petitioner (Noticee No.2) had no
legitimate right to continue to occupy the Railways property. The
occupation of the Petitioner was wholly unauthorized. The society
and the Petitioner were put to notice that they were liable to be
evicted under the Public Premises Act 1971.
31. If the notice dated 18th October 2017 is read a whole, it
becomes abundantly clear that the Railways has adverted to all
the material facts, including the breach on the part of the society
and the nature of the occupation of the Petitioner, the cause which
constrained the Railways to seek vacant possession of the subject
premises. Therefore, the submission on behalf of the Petitioner
that there was no lawful termination of allotment does not carry
any substance.
21) Thus in Shivamoori Jagatdev Kushwaha, letter issued
to the society about unauthorised agreement with the Petitioner
therein was treated as sufficient intimation of unauthorised
occupation and termination of authority to occupy, even though the
letter was not styled as 'termination notice'. This Court held that
mere title or nomenclature is not decisive of a document. Therefore,
in the present case also, the earlier notice dated 10 July 2018
(even though the same was issued under Section 4 of the Act),
constituted sufficient knowledge on the part of the Petitioners that
the permission to occupy was revoked. In my view therefore it
cannot be contended that occupation of premises by Petitioners
does not fit into definition of the term 'unauthorised occupation'
within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act.
22) The second contention raised by the Petitioners is that
initiation of proceedings without issuance of any notice amounts to
violation of principles of natural justice. The reasoning adopted
while deciding the first contention would equally apply to the
second contention raised by the Petitioners. There is no necessity
of giving any prior notice to the Petitioner for initiation of eviction
proceedings. Public Premises Act does not mandate issuance of any
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such prior notice before initiation of eviction proceedings. Reliance
by the Petitioner on judgment of the Apex Court in Management of
M/s. Nally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd (supra) is clearly misplaced.
The case arose out of transfer of proceedings from one Labour
Court/Tribunal to another and need to grant pre-decisional hearing.
It is held by the Apex Court that affording of opportunity of pre-
decisional hearing before transfer of proceedings from one Labour
Court to another was required. The ratio of the judgment would
have no application to the facts of the present case where notice
issued under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act by itself amounts
to following of principles of natural justice. Additionally, in the
present case, Petitioner was given intimation of unauthorized
occupation of railway premises in the form of earlier notice dated
10 July 2018.
23) The third contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner is
about duty to act fairly on the part of Railways in the present case.
In my view this contention is stated only to be rejected. Merely
because a School is being run in the disputed premises, it would not
mean that it can function endlessly regardless of requirement of
Railways of the land for infrastructural purposes. Railways also
have duty towards members of public as well by providing requisite
infrastructural facilities at the Railway Station. The private
interest of the Petitioner-Management to run a School in the
Railway premises cannot take precedence over the general public
interests of having the requisite infrastructural facilities for
running of railway operations and also in not having a school on the
platform of a Railway Station.
24) It cannot be contended by any stretch of imagination
that Respondent-Railways are acting unfairly or arbitrarily in
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expecting Petitioners to move out their School from the Railway
premises. It is not that the Railways are seeking to evict the
Petitioners without any reason. It is also not that the requirement
pleaded by the Railways is fanciful. It is also not that the railways
are arbitraility seeking possession of whole school eventhough
possession of part of the premises could be sufficient. In fact the
railways have acted fairly in the present case. In the past when part
of the land was needed, they only secured that portion of land from
the school instead of seeking possession of the entire school
premises. However now, it is impossible for railways to permit
running of the school in view of landing location of the footover
bridge in the premises of the school and requirement of adjoining
premises to handle the flow of passengers using the said bridge. In
fact, running of the School at proximity of railway tracks and right
on the railway platforms is against the interest of the students.
Continuation of the School at the present premises would in fact be
detrimental to the interests of the students. Just because it suits
the interest of the private Management in using premises free of
cost, does not mean that the Railways are acting unfairly by
directing Petitioners to move out from its premises. Therefore, the
contention of Respondents failing to perform their duty to act fairly
deserves outright rejection.
25) It is contended by the Petitioners that eviction of
Petitioners is not the only option available to the Respondents for
satisfying their need of land for expanding infrastructural facilities
at Manmad Railway Station. It is contended that Petitioners could
have been directed to vacate part of the premises commensurate to
the land required by the Railways while the school can still
continue in the remaining premises. Alternatively, it is suggested
that being a public authority, it is the duty of Railways to provide
alternate land for running of the School. Both the contentions do
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not appeal to this Court. Petitioners cannot dictate terms to
Railways. They cannot decide the quantum of land/premises
necessary for expansion of infrastructural facilities at the Railway
Station. Also, there is nothing on record to indicate that Railways
have any obligation to provide alternate land to the Petitioners.
26) Mr. Govilkar has in fact placed on record photographs
which depict precarious condition in which the School is being run
by the Petitioner-Management. The School is right on the platform
of Manmad Railway Station. Railways have undertaken
construction of new footover-bridge which terminates right in the
school premises. Construction of the foor-over bridge is at an
advanced stage and if Petitioners do not vacate the premises, the
bridge cannot be made operational. The surrounding land would be
required by the Railways and by the passengers for movement, as
well as, for parking. Thus, apart from genuine need of Railways,
running of school in the existing premises is otherwise not in the
interest of students. If Petitioner-Management is keen on providing
educational activities to the students, it must take immediate steps
for relocation of the School in some other premises as it is
otherwise dangerous to run a School at close proximity to railway
tracks and railway platform.
27) It is also seen that the activities of Petitioner-School are
reducing with passage of each year. There appears to be substantial
reduction in the strength of students during past 25 years. This is
clear from the figures disclosed by the Petitioners by way of
additional affidavit. From the said information, it appears that the
students strength has gradually dwindled from over 2000 students
to just about 800 students with passage of time. For the last five
long years, Petitioners are restrained by this Court from admitting
any new students for imparting education from the disputed
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premises. This would further reduce the student strength. It is
difficult to comprehend as to how the Petitioner-Management is
admitting new students with restriction of imparting them
education from the disputed premises. It has apparently made some
arrangements for accommodation of students admitted in last 5
years in some other premises or, as contended by Mr. Govilkar,
they have breached the interim order of this Court and are
imparting education to such newly admitted students from the
disputed premises. However, one thing is certain that the school
operations are already hampered for the last 5 years on account of
restriction of imparting education to newly admitted students. If
the school has made alternate arrangements for imparting
education to students admitted in last 5 years (which would, by
now, constitute a fairly large number), they can make such
alternate arrangements for remaining students as well. The
purpose of initiation of litigation by the management has served as
it has successfully delayed eviction for the last 7 long years and has
made alternate arrangements in the meantime. Be that as it may. It
is high time that the Petitioners move out of the disputed premised.
However, it is clarified that the discussion over Petitioner's ability
to make alternate arrangements or operation of the school on
platform being adverse to the interest of the students are not the
main factors for deciding the present Petition. These aspects are
discussed only for the purpose of dealing with Petitioner's
contention of eviction order adversely affecting interests of the
students. Petitioners otherwise do not have any legal right to
remain in occupation of the railway premises.
28) Considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of
the view that no serious flaw can be traced in the order passed by
the learned Principal District Judge. Pendency of proceedings have
already enabled the Petitioners to occupy the premises for the last
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7 years. They cannot occupy the premises endlessly. Time has come
for them to make alternate arrangements for either running of the
school from some other premises or for transfer of the students to
other schools. From additional affidavit, it appears that some
arrangements are already made or attempted to be made by the
Petitioners. Some reasonable time can be granted to the Petitioners
for making such alternate arrangements. However, considering the
fact that the completion of work of foot over bridge would get held
up thereby inconveniencing the railway operations and increasing
the financial burden for railways, it is also expedient that the time
to vacate cannot be unreasonably long. Such time can be till end of
the current academic year.
29) In my view, therefore no case is made out for
interference in the impugned judgment and order passed by the
learned Principal District Judge or in the impugned eviction order.
The Writ Petition therefore deserves to be dismissed.
30) Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. However,
Petitioners are permitted to occupy the premises till 30 April 2026,
after which the eviction order shall be implemented in case
Petitioners fail to hand over possession of the premises. However,
the existing arrangement of continuation of School without any new
admissions for imparting education in the disputed premises shall
continue to operate only till 30 April 2026. Considering the facts
and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
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PAGE NO. 18 of 18
09 DECEMBER 2025
