Bombay High Court
Janardhan Laxman Pawar vs Yogesh Chandrabhan Pawar And Ors on 12 August, 2025
Author: N. J. Jamadar
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2025:BHC-AS:34785
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Arun Sankpal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 6362 OF 2025
Janardan Laxman Pawar
Age: 42 years,Occ: Agriculture,
R/at: Sonambe, Taluka Sinnar,
District Nashik ..Petitioner
Versus
1. Yogesh Chandrabhan Pawar,
Age: 46 years, Occ: Agriculture
2) Vikas Tukaram Pawar,
Age: 36 years, Occ: Agriculture
3) Subhash Balnath Jorve,
Age: 47 years, Occ: Agriculture
4) Vikas Kachru Pawar,
Age: 41 years, Occ: Agriculture
Nos. 1 to 4 residing at Sonambe, Taluka Sinnar,
District Nashik.
5) Gram Vikas Adhikari
ARUN Soname Gram Panchayat, Taluka Sinnar,
RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL
Dist. Nashik.
Digitally signed
by ARUN
RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL 6) The Additional Collector, Nashik,
Date: 2025.08.12
21:51:55 +0530
7) The Additional Commissioner, Nashik
...Respondents
Mr. Pratik B Rahade, with Akshata Nagrale, for the Petitioner.
Mr. Sachin Gite, for Respondent No.1.
Mr. Hamid Mulla, AGP, for Respondent Nos. 6 and 7-State.
1/25
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CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 29th JULY 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 12th AUGUST 2025
JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent of
the Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
2. The Petitioner takes exception to a judgment and order passed by
the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Nashik, dated 22 nd April 2025,
in Village Panchayat Appeal No. 100 of 2024, whereby the Appeal
preferred by Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein against a judgment and
order passed by the Additional District Collector, Nashik in Village
Panchayat Dispute Application No. 43 of 2023 was allowed by setting
aside the said order of the District Collector, and, consequently, the
Petitioner was declared to be disqualified to hold the post of member of
Village Panchayat, Sonambe, for the remaining term of the Village
Panchayat, under Section 14(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Village Panchyat
Act 1959 ("the Act of 1959").
3. Shorn of superfluities, the background facts can be stated as
under:
3.1 The Petitioner was elected as a member of
Sonambe, Gram Panchayat, in the election held
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in the year 2021. Subsequently, the Petitioner
came to be elected as the Sarpanch.
3.2 The Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed a dispute
before the District Collector, with the allegations
that the Petitioner had indulged in
misappropriation of the Village Panchayat funds
by accepting a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- vide Cheque
No. 812761, dated 13th July 2018, and another
sum of Rs.20,000/- vide Cheque No. 812829,
dated 13th August 2019. Thus, the Petitioner had
incurred disqualification under Section 14(1)(g)
of the Act of 1959.
3.3 The Petitioner contested the claim of the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 by filing an Affidavit in
Reply. It was denied that the aforesaid amounts
were paid to the Petitioner. It was contended that
the record did not reveal the purpose for which
the amount covered by those two cheques was
allegedly paid to the Petitioner. Moreover, the
amount covered by those cheques was allegedly
paid to the Petitioner in the previous term of the
Village Panchayat, i.e., 2014-2019. Therefore,
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the Petitioner cannot be disqualified from
holding the office of the member of the Village
Panchayat, in the current term, for the alleged
acts which transpired during the past term.
3.4 The Petitioner further contended that the
Petitioner was not directly or indirectly involved
in any work done by the order of the Panchayat
or in any contract with the Panchayat. Therefore,
the provisions contained in Section 14(1)(g) of
the Act of 1959 were not at all attracted.
3.5 The District Collector obtained reports from
the Village Officer, Sonambe. It was reported that
a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was paid to the
Petitioner from the account of the Village
Panchayat, Sonambe, by Cheque No. 812761
under Voucher No. 6. However, the
purpose/work for which the said amount was
paid to the Petitioner was not mentioned in the
cash book. Likewise, a sum of Rs.2,000/- was
paid to the Petitioner by cheque bearing No.
812829 under Voucher No. 22. But there was no
entry regarding the purpose for which the said
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amount was paid. The audit report, however,
revealed that the said amount under Voucher No.
22 was paid to the Petitioner for construction of
small stream (vksgG).
3.6 The District Collector was of the view that,
since the amounts were paid to the Petitioner
during the previous term, i.e., 2014-2019, when
the Petitioner was a member of the Village
Panchayat, the said acts cannot sustain the
disqualification of the Petitioner for the current
term. Therefore, the Dispute Application came to
be rejected.
preferred an Appeal before the Divisional
Commissioner, under Section 16 of the Act of
1959.
3.8 The Divisional Commissioner reversed the
order passed by the District Collector opining
that there was clear evidence to show that the
Petitioner had received the aforesaid amount by
cheques, and there was no explanation for the
same. Nor the Petitioner had placed on record
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any material to show that the said amount was
returned to the Village Panchayat. In the view of
the Divisional Commissioner, the fact that the
said amount was paid to the Petitioner during
the previous term of the Village Panchayat did
not dilute the complicity of the Petitioner and the
Petitioner incurred disqualification to continue as
a member of the Village Panchayat.
4. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has invoked the Writ Jurisdiction.
5. I have heard Mr. Pratik Rahade, the learned Counsel for the
Petitioner, Mr Sachin Gite, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1-
Disputant and Mr. Hamid Mulla, the learned AGP, for the Respondent-
State. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have
also perused the material on record including the record and
proceedings before the District Collector, which was summoned for the
perusal of the Court.
6. Mr. Rahade, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, canvassed
multi-fold submissions. First ad foremost, Mr. Rahade would urge, the
very invocation of the provisions contained in Section 14(1)(g) of the
Act of 1959 was wholly misconceived. By no stretch of imagination,
according to Mr. Rahade, the mere credit of the amount to the account
of the Petitioner, even if the case of the Respondents is taken at its face
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value, does not fall within the ambit of the provisions contained in
Section 14(1)(g) of the Act of 1959. For the applicability of the said
provision, it is necessary to first establish that the Petitioner had a share
or interest in any work done by the order of the Panchayat or any
contract with, by or on behalf of the Panchayat.
7. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Rahade, it was nowhere
alleged that the Petitioner was involved in any such work or contract
made or executed on behalf of the Village Panchayat. In the absence of
proof of such primary fact, the Petitioner could not have been
disqualified on the premise that certain amounts were credited to the
account of the Petitioner.
8. Secondly, Mr. Rahade would urge, it is the case of the Village
Panchayat itself that there was no record to indicate the work for, or the
propose in connection with, which the said amount was paid to the
Petitioner. If that is the case, according to Mr. Rahade, the imputation
against the Petitioner clearly falls outside the ambit of the Clause (g) of
Section 14(1) of the Act of 1959, as the disqualification is for having a
share or interest in the work or contract of the Village Panchayat.
9. To lend support to this submission, Mr. Rahade placed a very
strong reliance on a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court
in the case of Jyotitai Vikas Gawande Vs Additional Commissioner,
Amravati,1 and another order passed by the learned Single Judge of this
1 2009 (5) Mh.L.J. 486.
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Court in the case of Nilesh S/o Vinayakrao Deshmukh Vs The Additional
Commissioner, Amravati & Ors2 dated 9th June 2023.
10. Thirdly, Mr. Rahade would urge, the Respondents have belatedly
made an endeavour to establish the nexus between the Petitioner and
the Village Panchayat's work by placing reliance on the audit report.
However, said audit report tells a different tale. It records that the
amount of Rs. 20,000/- was paid to was Janadev Pawar, that too on 2nd
August 2019, and not to the Petitioner.
11. Lastly, Mr. Rahade would urge that, even if the acts of the
Petitioner were to be construed as misconduct, falling within the
mischief of Section 39 of the Act of 1959, a totally different procedure
was required to be followed as envisaged by the said Section. The
removal of a Sarpanch or member of the Village Panchayat for the
alleged misconduct under Section 39 of the Act of 1959 is a totally
distinct remedy than the disqualification of a member under Section
14(1)(g) of the Act of 1959. The two provisions operate in a completely
different sphere. One cannot be a substitute for another, submitted Mr.
Rahade.
12. Mr. Sachin Gite, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1,
supported the impugned order. Mr. Gite submitted that a clear case of
misappropriation of the Village Panchayat funds was made out, and no
explanation was offered by the Petitioner regarding the purpose for
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which the said amounts so withdrawn from the account of the Village
Panchayat and transferred to the account of the Petitioner, were used.
13. Realizing the indefensible situation, the Petitioner has taken a
technical objection that the conduct of the Petitioner does not fall within
the ambit of the provisions contained in Section 14(1)(g) of the Act of
1959. Once a clear case of the transfer of the amount to the account of
the Petitioner is made out, in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation, an inference is inescapable that the Petitioner took the
amount towards some share or interest in the work of, or contract with,
the Panchayat.
14. Moreover, in the case at hand, according to Mr. Gite, the audit
report establishes the nexus between the receipt of the sum of
Rs.20,000/- by the Petitioner and the work executed at the instance of
the Village Panchayat. Therefore, the Appellate Authority was fully
justified in overturning the order of the District Collector, who had taken
an hypertechnical view of the matter by observing that the alleged acts
pertained to the preceding term of the Panchayat, ignoring the vital fact
that the Petitioner was a member of the immediately preceding
Panchayat as well. Thus, no interference is warranted with the impugned
order submitted Mr. Gite.
15. To buttress these submissions, Mr. Gite placed reliance on a
judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Archana
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W/o Santosh Neharkar Vs Anil S/o Maruti Kshirsagar & Ors 3 and a
Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Rajkumar
Krishnarao Patil Vs Prakash Sandepan Kadam & Ors.4
16. Mr. Hamid Mulla, the learned AGP, supplemented the submissions
of Mr. Gite.
17. To start with it is imperative to note that, in the Dispute
Application No. 43 of 2023 before the District Collector a faint attempt
was made on behalf the Petitioner to contend that the amounts of
Rs.1,50,000/- and Rs.20,000/- were never transferred to the account of
the Petitioner by the said cheques, yet, progressively, it became
abundantly clear that the Petitioner was the payee of the two cheques
drawn on the account of the Village Panchayat bearing no.
62429664737, maintained with State Bank of India, Sonambe Branch.
18. The report of the Village Officer, Sonambe indicates that the sum
of Rs.1,50,000/- was paid to the Petitioner vide Cheque No. 812761,
under Voucher No. 6 and the sum of Rs.20,000/- was paid vide cheque
No. 812829, dated 2nd August 2019, under Voucher No. 22. The
statement of account of the Village Panchayat maintained with State
Bank of India reveals that the above numbered cheques were encahsed
on 13th July 2018 and 13th August 2019, respectively. The copies of
General Cash Book contain clear and explicit entries to the effect that
3 Air OnLine 2022 Bom 1128.
4 LPA No. 263 of 2005 in Writ Petition No. 6748 of 2005, decided on 10 th
March 2006.
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the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- was paid to the Petitioner (with his designation
as a member of the Village Panchayat) vide cheque No. 812761 under
Voucher No. 6 and the sum of Rs.20,000/- was paid under Voucher
No.22.
19. What seals the issue is the statement of account of the Petitioner
bearing No. 30241893529 maintained with the State Bank of India,
Sonambe Branch. It clearly reveals that on 13 th July 2018 a sum of
Rs.1,50,000/- was credited to the account of the Petitioner and the said
amount was withdrawn in cash in tranches till the 12 th August 2018.
Likewise, on 13th August 2019, a sum of Rs.20,000/- was credited to the
account of the Petitioner by way of transfer from the account of the
Village Panchayat and the said amount was instantaneously withdrawn
on the very day.
20. Thus, the fact that the Petitioner received a sum of Rs.1,70,000/-
from the account of the Village Panchayat, through banking channels,
stands established beyond the pale of controversy.
21. Mr. Rahade, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, made an
earnest endeavour to impress upon the Court that mere deposit of the
amount in the account of the Petitioner, without anything more, is of no
consequence. To attract the provisions contained in Section 14(1)(g) of
the Act of 1959, it must be first shown that the said amount was in
connection with the work ordered by or the contract entered into by or
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on behalf of the Panchayat. Laying emphasis on the reports of the Village
Officer, Mr Rahade submitted that the record of Village Panchyat itself
indicates that the purpose for which the aforesaid amounts were paid to
the Petitioner does not find mention in any of the books of accounts, or
for that matter, the record maintained by the Village Panchayat.
22. To appreciate the aforesaid submission in a correct perspective, it
may be advantageous to extract the provisions contained in Section
14(1)(g) of the Act of 1959. It read as under:
"14. Disqualifications
[(1) No person shall be a member of a panchayat
continue as such, who--
(a) ... ... ...
.........
(g) has directly or indirectly, by himself or his partner,
any share or interest in any work done by order of the
Panchayat or in any contract with, by or on behalf of, or
employment with or under, the Panchayat; or
.........
Explanation 1.-- ... ... ...
Explanation 1A.-- A person shall not be disqualified
under clause (g) by reason only of such person,--
(i) having a share or an interest in any newspaper in
which any advertisement relating to the affairs of the
panchayat is inserted; or
(ii) having a share or a interest in the occasional sale to
the panchayat of any article in which he regularly
trades, or in the purchase from the panchayat of any
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article, of a value in either case not exceeding in any
financial year two hundred rupees; or
(iii) having a share or interest in the occasional letting
out on hire to the panchayat or in the hiring from the
panchayat of any article for an amount not exceeding in
any financial year twenty-five rupees or such higher
amount not exceeding one hundred rupees, as the
panchayat, with the sanction of the Collector may fix in
the behalf; or
(iv) having any share or interest in any lease for a period
not exceeding ten years, of any immovable property or
in agreement for the same, and before such lease or
agreement is executed, the Block Development Officer
certifies that no other suitable premises were available
to the panchayat on lease."
23. Section 14 of the Act 1959 enumerates various situations, based
on the acts or omissions on the part of a member of the Village
Panchayat which render his continuation as a member of the Village
Panchayat tenuous and, resultantly, he is disqualified to continue to be a
member of the Village Panchayat. The object of the various clauses of
disqualification of any member, including Clause (g) extracted above, is
to ensure transparency, probity and legitimacy in the administration of
affairs of the Panchayat. Clause (g) is but a manifestation of the
fundamental principle of avoiding a situation of conflict of duty and
interest. It is the bounden duty of the elected member of the Village
Panchayat to protect and preserve the property and interest of the
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Village Panchayat. The member of the Village Panchayat is thus not
expected to have such personal interest which would jeopardize the
interest of the Village Panchayat. The Legislature was alive to the reality
that the office of the member of the Village Panchayat provides
opportunity which could be abused for advancement of personal interest
at the cost of the interest of the Panchayat, in particular, and public
interest, in general. To obviate such situations of conflict of duty and
interest and curb the tendency to abuse the official position to advance
personal interest, the Legislature has provided the disqualification of the
nature covered by Clause (g).
24. The aforesaid backdrop and the legislative object deserves to be
kept in view while construing the ambit of the provisions contained in
Clause (g) of the sub-section (1) of Section 14. At the same time, the
Court ought to be sensitive to the fact that, the disqualification of an
elected member of legislative/local-self body is a serious matter. An
elected member cannot be unseated on the basis of mere surmises and
conjectures. The statutory requirement must be strictly fulfilled. An
order of disqualification of an elected member not only has the civil
consequences for such member but also ramifications on the
electorate/constituency which has elected him, as the latter is deprived
of the representation in the legislative/local body by a representative of
its choice. The law, therefore, insists that the ground of disqualification
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must be strictly proved. The procedure prescribed for the determination
of the issue as to whether such disqualification has been incurred is
scrupulously followed and the decision making process is in conformity
with the principle of natural justice and the person affected gets an
efficacious opportunity to defend himself.
25. A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to a decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Nisar Ahmad Ibrahim Khan Vs
Deolali Cantonment Board and Ors5 wherein the Supreme Court
emphasised the imperativeness of adhering to the procedure for removal
of an elected member. The observations of the Supreme Court in paras
13 and 14, read as under:
"13. It hardly requires any argument to demonstrate
the fallacy implicit in and underlying this process of
ratiocination which runs in the teeth of the specific
statutory mandate. It is no doubt true that the rule of
disqualification is based on a statutory principle that a
person who has financial obligations to the 'Board may
not be able to discharge his public office objectively and
in public interest. But the disqualification itself must be
determined in strict compliance with the statute.
14. There is no common law of elections. The
proceedings calling in question the validity of an election
are purely statutory proceedings. An election contest is
not an action at law or a suit in equity, but is purely a
statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and
5 1987 (Supp) SCC 562.
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that the Court possess no common law power. It is trite
proposition that in such proceedings statutory
requirements must strictly be established. It is also well
settled that the success of a candidate who has won at an
election should not be lightly interfered with.
(emphasis supplied)
26. In the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs The Collector, District
Raigad & Ors,6 the Supreme Court again expounded the necessity of
scrupulous compliance with the statutory requirement in the matter of
disqualification of an elected member from the point of view of its
consequences on the constituency/electorate. The observations in
paragraphs 34 and 37 are instructive and hence extracted below.
"34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the
incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for
which he has been elected unless his election is set aside
by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed
by the procedure established under law. The proceedings
for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice
and the decision must show that the authority has applied
its mind to the allegations made and the explanation
furnished by the elected office bearer sought to be
removed.
37. A duly elected person is entitled to hold office for
the term for which he has been elected and he can be
removed only on a proved misconduct or any other
procedure established under law like `No Confidence
6 (2012) 4 SCC 407.
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Motion' etc. The elected official is accountable to its
electorate as he has been elected by a large number of
voters and it would have serious repercussions when he is
removed from the office and further declared disqualified
to contest the election for a further stipulated period."
27. The aforesaid enunciation of law delineates the approach to be
adopted by the Tribunal/Courts in determining the issue of
disqualification of an elected member. In the first leg, the Tribunal/
Court must satisfy itself that the statutory ground of disqualification is
clearly attracted; there is sufficient material to substantiate the said
ground; the procedure prescribed by the governing statute is
scrupulously followed and the person, who is alleged to have incurred
the disqualification, gets a fair opportunity of hearing in adherence to
the fundamental principles of judicial process. However, once the
Tribunal/Court, on an objective analysis, comes to the conclusion that
the ground of disqualification is made out, then the consequences that
ensue the declaration of disqualification should not influence the
decision making process. In the second leg, the object of the legislature
in prescribing the disqualification commands primacy.
28. In fact, it is the in the interest of the constituency/electorate that
such person, who by his acts or omissions has incurred the
disqualification, shall not continue to represent it and further jeopardize
the public interest. For instance if a person is found to have abused his
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position to aggrandize himself at the cost of the Village Panchayat, of
whose property and interest he is duty bound to protect, continuation of
such a person as the member of the Village Panchayat would be counter
productive.
29. On the aforesaid touchstone, reverting to the construction of
Clause (g) of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1959, it becomes evident that
the disqualification is for having any share or interest in any work done
by order of the Village Panchayat or, any contract with, by or on behalf
of the Panchayat or employment with or under the Panchayat. The
legislature was cautious enough to clarify that such share or interest may
be direct or indirect. The word share may have a restrictive meaning.
However, the word interest is of wide import.
30. In P Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, the term "Interest" is
explained as under:
.........
The word is capable of different meanings, according to
the context in which it is used or the subject-matter to
which it is applied. It may have even the same meanings
as the phrase "right title and interest" but it has been said
also to mean any right in the nature of property, but less
than title. The word is sometimes employed synonymous
with estate, or property.
'Interest means concern, advantage, good: share, portion,
part, or participation.'
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A person interested is one having an interest; i.e., a right
of property, or in the nature of property, less than title.
The word 'interest' is the broadest term applicable to
claims in or upon real estate, in its ordinary signification
among men of all classes. It is broad enough to include
any right, title, or estate in or lien upon real estate. One
who hold's a mortgage upon a piece of land for half its
value is commonly and truly said to be interested in it.
31. In the context of the object of disqualification under clause (g) of
Section 14(1) of the Act 1959, the word 'interest' takes pecuniary
connotation. The disqualification is for deriving pecuniary interest from
the work, contract or employment qua, by or with the Panchayat, by
taking undue advantage the office which the member holds.
32. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, considered the
nature and import of the such restriction in the case of Gulam Yasin
Khan Vs Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar & Anr. 7 In the said case, in the
context of the provisions contained in Section 15(1) of the Central
Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act 1922, the Supreme enunciated
that in order to incur disqualification what the clause requires is,
"interest or share" in any contract: it may either be a share or an
interest; and if it is an interest, the interest may be direct or indirect. But
7 AIR 1966 SC 1339.
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it is plain that the interest to which the clause refers, cannot mean mere
sentimental or friendly interest; it must mean interest which is
pecuniary, or material or of a similar nature. If the interest is of this
latter category, it would suffice to incur disqualification even if it is
indirect.
33. Keeping in view the aforesaid position in law and the legislative
object, the decision in the case of Jyotitai Vikas Gawande (Supra), on
which Mr. Rahade placed a very strong reliance, is required to be
considered. In the said case, the Petitioner was a Sarpanch of Village
Panchayat. It was alleged that the husband of the Petitioner had
withdrawn the amount from the account of the Village Panchayat. It was
not disputed that the husband of the Petitioner had withdrawn the
amount of some cheques drawn under the signature of the Petitioner
and the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat. It was the case of the
Petitioner therein that, the said amounts, though withdrawn by the
husband of the Petitioner, were deposited with the Secretary of the Gram
Panchayat and the same were, in fact, spent for the purpose for which
they were withdrawn.
34. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the learned Single Judge
held that there was no allegation that the Petitioner or her husband had
any share or interest in the work or contract done by any party for the
Gram Panchayat. There has to be material on record to suggest that the
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amount which was withdrawn by the husband of the Petitioner therein,
was payable in respect of any contract or work done for the Gram
Panchayat. Thus, in the absence of such allegation, much less proof, no
inference could be drawn against the Petitioner. Holding thus, the
learned Single Judge reversed the orders passed by the authorities under
the Act 1959.
35. Evidently, the learned Single has taken a constricted view of the
provision. Moreover, the case at hand stands on a slightly different
pedestal. The allegations in the case at hand are not against any of the
relative or partner of the member. The Petitioner himself has been paid
the amount while he was a member of the Village Panchayat.
36. The crucial question that comes to the fore is, whether the
aforesaid provision ought to receive narrow or object oriented
construction. In my considered view, if the object of prescribing
disqualification is to maintain purity in the administration of the local-
self-government bodies, the plain words of the statute cannot be
construed in a constricted manner. In the case of Gulam Yasin Khan
(Supra), keeping in view the object of the provision, the Constitution
Bench has ruled that such a provision should not receive an unduly
narrow or restricted construction. The aforesaid pronouncement was
followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Zelia M Xavier Fernandes E
Gonsalves Vs Joana Rodrigues & Ors 8 in regard to the construction of
8 (2012) 3 SCC 188.
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such provision, keeping in view the object of the enactment, though on
facts, the aforesaid judgment in the case of Gulam Yasin Khan (Supra)
was distinguished.
37. A useful reference can also be made to the Division Bench
Judgment of this Court in the case of Rajkumar Krishnarao Patil (Supra)
on which reliance was placed by Mr. Gite.
38. In the said case, the Appellant was the Sarpanch of the Village
Panchayat. In respect of work of link road, which was completed in the
preceding term of the Village Panchayat; of which also the Appellant was
a member, at the instructions of the Appellant, the Gramsevak had
drawn a Cheque of Rs. 4,35,600/- in favour of the Appellant. The
cheque was withdrawn and, thereafter, the amounts were disbursed to
different agencies, which allegedly constructed the link road.
39. The Division Bench repelled the submission that since the work
was completed in the preceding term no disqualification was incurred. It
was held that even if it was accepted that the construction of the link
road was in fact done and payments were liable to be released in favour
of the different agencies, such payment ought to have been made by
following the established procedure and observing all norms for any
payment by the Panchayat. The Sarpanch had no reason or justification
for transferring the amount in his personal account, withdraw the same
in cash and, thereafter, allegedly pay the same to the different agencies.
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40. Holding thus, the Division Bench concluded as under:
"15. ... ... ... The manner in which the appellant got
the amount transferred in his personal account and
had withdrawn the same in cash and then allegedly
made over to the sub-contractors, we are satisfied that
the appellant did take share or interest in the work of
link road and, therefore, has rightly been disqualified
under section 14(1)(g) of the Act. The provisions of
section 14(1)(g) were introduced for maintaining the
purity of administration and are, therefore, required
to be construed accordingly."
41. In light of the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Gulam Yasin Khan (Supra) and Zelia M Xavier Fernandes E Gonsalves
(Supra) and the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of
Rajkumar Krishnarao Patil (Supra), I am not inclined to take a very
constricted view of the matter and construe the provisions contained in
Section 14(1)(g) in an unduly narrow or restricted manner so as to
denude the said provision of its meaning and content.
42. In the facts of the case at hand, there is overwhelming material to
indicate that the Petitioner derived pecuniary interest by receiving the
amount of Rs.1,70,000/- in his account. As noted above, the entire sum
of Rs.1,50,000/- was withdrawn in cash from the account of the
Petitioner, under a months time, in tranches. So far as the amount Rs.
20,000/- the audit report reveals that it was paid towards the work of
construction of small stream (vksgG).
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43. The endeavour of Mr. Rahade to draw mileage from a slight
discrepency in the first name of the person to whom the said amount
was paid does not advance the cause of the Petitioner. There is
overwhelming documentary evidence to show that the said amount of
Rs.20,000/- under Voucher 22, was credited to the account of the
Petitioner.
44. Conversely, the Petitioner did not offer any explanation, much
less satisfactory one, regarding the credit of such substantial amount in
his account. A feeble attempt was made by Mr. Rahade to wriggle out of
the situation by affirming that the Village Officer had transferred the
amount to the account of the Petitioner unbeknownst of the Petitioner.
The contemporaneous conduct manifested by instantaneous withdrawal
of the said amount, in cash, militates against the explanation sought to
be offered by Mr. Rahade.
45. The submission of Mr. Rahade that, if at all, the acts attributed to
the Petitioner might have constituted misconduct in the discharge of his
duties, and thus the procedure envisaged by Section 39, with its in-built
protection of an enquiry by the Chief Executive Officer, ought to have
been followed, is also devoid of substance. It is not inconceivable that
the same act may fall within the ambit of both Section 14(1)(g) and
Section 39(1)(i) of the Act of 1959. Deriving undue pecuniary interest
by way of share or interest in the work or contract of the Village
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Panchayat, in a given case, may also amount to misconduct under Clause
(i) of sub-Section 1 of Section 39. Thus, the submission of Mr. Rahade
that these two provisions operate in water-tight compartments does not
merit acceptance.
46. In the totality of the circumstances, I am impelled to hold that the
material on record is sufficient to draw an inference that the Petitioner
did incur the disqualification under Section 14(1)(g) of the Act of 1959.
The Appellate Authority was thus justified in reversing the findings of
the District Collector who had exonerated the Petitioner by taking an
erroneous view of the matter.
47. Resultantly, no interference is warranted with the impugned
order in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.
48. Hence, the following order:
:ORDER:
(i) The Petition stands dismissed.
(ii) Rule discharged.
(iii) No costs.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
