Bombay High Court
Gulshan Townplanners Llp vs Gulshan Co-Operative Housing Society ... on 30 September, 2024
2024:BHC-OS:14977
Digitally
signed by
MUGDHA
MUGDHA MANOJ
MANOJ PARANJAPE 1 Judgement-CARBP(L) 34078-23.doc
PARANJAPE Date:
2024.09.30
17:23:04
+0530
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.34078 OF 2023
Gulshan Townplanners LLP
A Limited Liability Partnership Firm
Registered under the provisions of
Limited Liability Partnership Act 2007
Through Auth. Partner Milind Madhukar
Masdekar, having registered Office
address at Office No 6, Arihant Complex
Building No. 2, Old Viva College Road,
Virar (W), Tal - Vasai, Dist - Palghar,
Maharashtra - 401303. ... Petitioner
V/s.
1. Gulshan Co-operative Housing
Society Limited
A Co-operative Society registered under
Provisions of Maharashtra Cooperative
Societies Act, 1960 having its office at
Gulshan Apartment, CTS No. 1163, F.P.
No. 282, TPS II, Dixit Road, besides
Sathaye College, Vile Parle (East),
Mumbai- 400 057.
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2. Baiju Mahendra Doshi
Age: Major; Occ: Business;
B-Wing, Gulshan Apartment, Dixit Road,
Besides Sathaye College, Vile Parle (E),
Mumbai- 400 057. ... Respondents
-----
Mr. Shanay Shah a/w Smit K. Nagda for the Petitioner.
Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar a/w Pankaj S. Pandey for Respondent No.1 (Society).
Mr. Simil Purohit, Senior Advocate a/w Arshil Shah i/by Parisha Shah a/w Smita
Durve, Rasesh Shah, Tanmay Gujarathi, Vishal Pattabiraman and Rutwij Bapat
for Respondent No.2.
-----
CORAM : ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.
RESERVED ON : 10TH SEPTEMBER 2024
PRONOUNCED ON : 30TH SEPTEMBER 2024
JUDGEMENT :
1. While at first blush the captioned Petition would appear to be the
usual Petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996
("Arbitration Act") in matters of redevelopment agreements entered into
between a Developer, (the Petitioner in the present case) and a Cooperative
Housing Society, (Respondent No. 1 "the Society" in the present case), the facts
of the present case would make plain that it is infact anything but so. Infact, in
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my view, as the facts of the present case would make clear, the present Petition
is nothing but a sheer attempt to misuse of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act.
2. The 'disputes' that are stated to have arisen are under a
Redevelopment Agreement ("RDA") and a Supplementary Agreement ("SA"),
both dated 20th July 2022 entered into between the Petitioner i.e., the
Developer, on the one hand and the Society which comprises of eleven
members on the other hand. The RDA has also been individually
signed/executed by each of the eleven members of the Society. Admittedly,
Respondent No. 2 is neither a member of the Society nor has Respondent No. 2
signed the RDA. Infact, the Petition itself describes Respondent No. 2 as
"Occupant on Respondent No. 1's property ".
3. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it is essential to set out
the following facts, viz.
i. The Petition concerns a plot of land measuring about 461.52 sq. meters,
bearing CTS No. 1163, Final Plot No. 282, T.P.S. II (1st variation final) of
Village: Vile Parle (East), Dist. Mumbai Suburban ("the said land"), and a
structure/building comprising of 'A' and 'B' Wings ("the said
structure/building") standing on the said land.
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ii. On 13th January 1986, M/s. Gulshan Construction, through a Deed of
Assignment, was granted development rights in respect of the said land
by its owner, stated to be one Pyaremal Sagormal. Subsequently, M/s.
Gulshan Construction built the said structure/building. The A-Wing
initially comprised of a ground floor and three upper floors, and B-Wing
comprising a ground floor and two upper floors. Later, a fourth floor
was added to the A-Wing.
iii. M/s. Gulshan Construction then sold all the flats in the A-Wing to
individual purchasers, i.e., the eleven members of the Society. The B-
Wing, which has one flat per floor, was initially kept unsold and
reserved by a partner of M/s. Gulshan Construction for his personal use.
However, in 1993, the partner of M/s. Gulshan Construction sold all
three flats in B-Wing to Respondent No. 2. In the year 2006 the
individual flat purchasers of A-Wing registered and formed the Society
on 22nd August 2006. It is not in dispute that (a) Respondent No. 2 is not
a member of the Society, (b) the B-Wing has been independently
assessed for property tax since 2001, which had at all times been paid
by Respondent No. 2, (c) B-Wing has independent water and electricity
connections for which separate bills are raised on and are paid by
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Respondent No. 2 (d) there is a compound wall between A-wing and B-
wing and separate entrances to both the wings and (e) the open space
around each wing was separately demarcated.
iv. In 2018, the Society, during a Special General Body Meeting (SGM) held
on 8th September 2018, resolved to undergo redevelopment. However,
the Petition asserts that due to the non-cooperation of Respondent No. 2,
the redevelopment did not proceed. The Society thereafter in the year
2019 applied for a unilateral deemed conveyance in respect of the said
land and structure/building. Respondent No. 2 contested the application
for deemed conveyance. The Competent Authority, however, by an order
dated 7th September 2020, allowed the application for deemed
conveyance. This order was challenged by Respondent No. 2 by filing
Writ Petition (St) No. 1253 of 2021 which Petition is presently pending.
v. On 3rd November 2020, the Petitioner submitted an offer to the Society
for the redevelopment of the said land and said structure/building.
Respondent No. 2 refused to consent to the redevelopment, claiming
exclusive possession of B-Wing and a greater entitlement than what was
being offered to the members of the Society. The Society however
proceeded to execute and subsequently register the RDA and SA. As I
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have already noted above, (a) the RDA and SA were executed between
Petitioner and the Society only (b) each member of the Society also
signed/executed the RDA and SA and (c) Respondent No. 2 has
admittedly not signed either the RDA and/or the SA and is also
admittedly not a member of the Society.
vi. The Society, thereafter through letters dated 29 th September 2022, 4th
February 2023, and 14th March 2023, informed Respondent No. 2 about
the execution and registration of the RDA and SA and called upon
Respondent No. 2 to consent to the redevelopment. Respondent No. 2
however did not consent. The Petitioner thereafter obtained an
Intimation of Disapproval (IOD) on 1st August 2023, as also the approval
of the MCGM to the plans for redevelopment.
vii. On 22nd August 2023, the Society informed Respondent No. 2 about the
IOD and also called upon Respondent No. 2 to execute and register the
Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) and handover
possession of the three flats. In response, Respondent No. 2, by a letter
dated 31st August 2023, expressed surprise at the redevelopment and
denied receiving any prior communication. Respondent No. 2 vide a
letter dated 12th September 2023 stated that he was not a member of the
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Society and that B-Wing and the land beneath it did not form part of the
Society's property.
viii. On 14th October 2023, the Petitioner addressed a letter to Respondent
No. 2, stating that Respondent No. 2 had never applied for membership
of the Society and had opposed the grant of the deemed conveyance by
suppressing the purchase agreements. The letter emphasized the
urgency of redevelopment and informed Respondent No. 2 that they
were entitled to the same benefits as members of the Society. Despite this,
Respondent No. 2 did not respond or comply. It is thus that the present
Petition came to be filed.
4. Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that with
the grant of deemed conveyance in favour of the Society, there could be no
dispute that the Society was the rightful owner of both the said land as also both
the 'A' and 'B' Wings. He thus submitted that there was no legal barrier
preventing the Society from redeveloping the property provided that the
redevelopment had been approved by the majority of the member of the society
and was otherwise in accordance with the law. He pointed out that in the
present case, all members of the Society had not only approved the
redevelopment, but they had also individually executed the RDA and SA.
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5. Mr. Shah then submitted that although Respondent No. 2 had
challenged the deemed conveyance by filing a Writ Petition, no steps had been
taken by Respondent No. 2 to expedite the hearing of the Petition. Nor had any
interim order been passed to stay the order of 7 th September 2020, by which the
Competent Authority had granted a deemed conveyance in favour of the
Society. Mr. Shah also submitted that although Respondent No. 2 claimed
ownership of three flats in the 'B' Wing, along with rights to the land beneath
those flats, no legal steps had been taken by Respondent No. 2 in furtherance
thereof.
6. Mr. Shah submitted that it made no difference that Respondent
No. 2 was not a member of the Society, since it was well settled that in a Petition
filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, reliefs could
be granted against third parties. He submitted that under Section 9, the Court
could pass orders to protect the subject matter of the arbitration agreement,
which, in this case, was the redevelopment of the Society's property. He placed
reliance upon the judgment in of this Court in the case of Choice Developers vs.
Pantnagar Pearl CHS Ltd. & Ors.1 and pointed out that this Court had in that
case, exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act directed a
1 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 786
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non-member of a cooperative housing society to vacate their respective flats in
society therein.
7. Mr. Shah also placed reliance on the Division Bench judgment in
Girish Mulchand Mehta & Anr. vs. Mahesh S. Mehta & Anr 2 and M/s Dem
Homes LLP vs. Taruvel C.H.S.L. & Ors 3., to submit that minority members or
occupants of a cooperative housing society could not obstruct redevelopment
that had been approved by the majority, based on any independent right or
dispute they may have with the society. He pointed out that Respondent No. 2
had not challenged any of the resolutions passed by the Society nor had
Respondent No. 2 challenged the RDA and SA. Therefore, Mr. Shah submitted
that Respondent No. 2 could not, under the guise of asserting independent
rights, delay the redevelopment, which was prejudicing the majority of the
society members.
8. Mr. Shah then from the Additional Affidavit in Reply filed by
Respondent No. 2, pointed out that the agreements for sale, upon which
Respondent No. 2 had placed reliance were infact unregistered, and in any
event did not create rights in respect of the said land. He pointed out that these
agreements made reference to one structure comprising two wings, A-Wing
2 2010 (2) Mh LJ 657
3 Order of this court dated 1st July 2024 in Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 13474 of 2024
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and B-Wing, and recorded that Respondent No. 2 had inspected the documents
under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act (MOFA). The agreements also
provided that the purchasers in the B-Wing would be admitted as members of
one cooperative housing society and that Respondent No. 2 could not demand
partition of the property as the building was indivisible. Moreover, it was
expressly stated that Respondent No. 2 would have no claim except for each
flat. Mr. Shah, therefore, submitted that once the Society was formed and
conveyance was registered in its favour under Section 11 of MOFA, there was
no question of Respondent No. 2 asserting a title adverse to that of the Society.
9. Finally, Mr. Shah submitted that Respondent No. 2 was not being
deprived of any right or entitlement as a result of the redevelopment. In fact,
Respondent No. 2 was being treated equally with the eleven members of the
Society and was being allotted an additional area of 22% over and above the
existing space occupied by Respondent No. 2. He pointed out that the RDA,
when crystallizing the entitlements of the members of the Society, did not use
the term 'occupant', the SA later amended Clause 5(c) of the RDA to incorporate
the term 'occupant' to ensure that Respondent No. 2 would receive equal
benefits under the redevelopment plan.
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10. Mr. Khandeparkar, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Society, at the outset, adopted the submissions made by Mr. Shah on behalf of
the Petitioner. He further submitted that the Writ Petition filed by Respondent
No. 2 had become infructuous due to the fact that pursuant to the order dated
7th September 2020 the Society had executed a unilateral Deed of Assignment
and Transfer dated 8th April 2021. He thus submitted that therefore there could
be no dispute that the Society was the owner of the land and both 'A' and 'B'
Wing of the said structure/building standing thereon. Mr. Khandeparkar then
from the Deed of Assignment and Transfer, pointed out that (i) recital (q)
explicitly clarified that the Society held the leasehold rights in respect of the
land and structures/building (ii) the covenant at internal page No. 11
specifically conveyed the land and structures standing thereon to the Society
(iii) the property schedule confirmed that all rights in the land and structures
had devolved upon the Society and (iv) the list of members included the name
of Respondent No. 2.
11. Basis the above, Mr. Khandeparkar submitted that with the
execution of Deed of Assignment and Transfer, the rights of the developer or
any assignee of the developer, including Respondent No. 2 in the said land
and/or the said structures/building, had been fully subsumed in favour of the
Society. He then pointed out that Respondent No. 2 had only challenged the
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order dated 7th September 2020 passed by the Competent Authority but had
admittedly not challenged the Deed of Assignment and Transfer itself.
Therefore, he submitted that the Writ Petition filed by Respondent No. 2 had
now become infructuous.
12. Mr. Khandeparkar also placed reliance on the proviso to Section
55(2) of the Transfer of Property Act, to submit that any independent claim
and/or right of that Respondent No. 2 might have, whether through the
erstwhile developer or under the purchase agreements as a flat purchaser,
ceased to exist upon the execution of the Unilateral Deemed Conveyance. He
submitted that Respondent No. 2, regardless of whether their claim was derived
through the erstwhile developer or as a flat purchaser, no longer had an
independent right to oppose the redevelopment after the deemed conveyance
was executed in favour of the Society.
13. Mr. Khandeparkar then also submitted that the fact that Wing 'A'
and Wing 'B' were part of a single conjoined structure was also beyond the pale
of dispute. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon (i) the
approved sanction plan of the Society (ii) the architect's certificate dated 18th
July 2024 (iii) recitals (E) and (K) of the Redevelopment Agreement (RDA), and
(iv) the full occupation certificate dated 7th January 2004. He submitted that all
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this unequivocally established that Wings 'A' and 'B' were part of a single,
conjoined structure.
14. He also pointed out that merely because Wing 'B' was being
assessed independently by the Municipal Corporation, or because Respondent
No. 2 had been paying property taxes, this would not by itself confer ownership
of Wing 'B' upon Respondent No. 2. He also submitted that Respondent No. 2,
being in exclusive occupation of Wing 'B', was required to pay the municipal
taxes either directly or through the Society. Paying municipal taxes, he
contended, did not establish ownership of Wing 'B' in favour of Respondent No.
2.
15. Mr. Khandeparkar emphasized that the aim of the present Petition
was to facilitate the redevelopment of both Wings, which was the subject
matter of the RDA. He pointed out that Respondent No. 2 was treated on par
with the members of the Society in the RDA and SA. He also placed reliance on
the judgment of this Court in Choice Developers (supra) to submit that the
Court had the authority to pass orders to evict non-cooperating, non-
members/occupants of the Society. He submitted that even if a third party was
not accepted as a member of the Society or was not a signatory to the
arbitration agreement, the Court still had the jurisdiction to pass orders
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directing such third parties to vacate the premises in question, which were
subject to redevelopment.
16. Mr. Khandeparkar submitted that Respondent No. 2, having full
knowledge of the RDA and the resolutions passed by the Society, and not having
challenged them, could not now oppose the redevelopment. He reiterated that
Respondent No. 2 had opposed the application for deemed conveyance before
the Competent Authority using identical defences as in the present Petition, all
of which had been negated. He further pointed out that the Writ Petition filed
by Respondent No. 2 challenged the deemed conveyance order and not the
resolution dated 28th February 2021, which appointed the Petitioner as
developer, or the RDA executed by the Society after the deemed conveyance
order. He thus submitted that since Respondent No. 2 had not challenged the
Indenture of Conveyance, they could not now make an adverse claim against
the Society. Basis this Mr. Khandeparkar submitted that this Petition may be
allowed.
17. Mr. Purohit, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
Respondent No. 2, at the very outset challenged the maintainability of this
Petition. He submitted that there was no Arbitration Agreement between the
Petitioner and Respondent No. 2. He pointed out that the RDA and SA were both
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between only the Petitioner and the Society. He also pointed out that the RDA
bore the signatures of all the eleven members of the Society and the Petitioner
had not signed the same nor the SA. Mr. Purohit then pointed out that the RDA
itself stated that the 'A' Wing was occupied by the members of the Society and
the 'B' Wing was occupied by 'Occupant'. He thus pointed out that there was no
association or contractual obligation linking Respondent No. 2 with the Society,
nor was Respondent No. 2 claiming any rights through or under any party to
the Arbitration Agreement.
18. Mr. Purohit further submitted that Respondent No. 2 was not a
member of the Society, nor was Respondent No. 2 called upon to sign the RDA
or participate in its execution Mr. Purohit then placed reliance upon an order
of this Court in the case of Nissa Hoosain Nensey vs. Pali Hill Neptune CHSL &
Ors. to submit that this Court had, in similar facts, held that where
redevelopment agreements were also executed by individual members such
agreements would not however bind non signatory members of the Society. He
pointed out from the facts in the case of Nissa Hoosain (supra) that while the
Society and certain members had infact executed the redevelopment agreement,
certain other members who had not executed the redevelopment agreement
were sought to be included by mentioning their names in redevelopment
agreement as "existing members". He pointed out that this Court had then
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specifically held that it cannot be said that there was a contract between non
signatory member and the developer, by merely adding definition of 'existing
members' and purporting them to be included in such a contract without
signatures and names, while other members are named and signed the same
contract. He then pointed out that in the facts of the present case, not only was
Respondent No. 2 not a member of the Society but also that the SA described
Respondent No. 2 as Occupant on Respondent No. 1's property . It was thus he
submitted that there was no question of Respondent No. 2 being bound by the
RDA or the SA.
19. Mr. Purohit then from the Agreement dated 22 nd July, 1993,
entered into between Respondent No. 2 and M/s. Gulshan Constructions,
pointed out that the same specifically granted Respondent No. 2 exclusive
possession of certain common areas, the terrace, and the land surrounding B-
Wing. He pointed out that the Society had for the last thirty years always
acknowledged and acted upon this basis i.e., that 'B' Wing was independent. He
also pointed out that for the last thirty years, 'B' Wing was independently
assessed for property tax as also separate bills in the name of Respondent No. 2
were issued in respect of Respondent No.2. In support of his contention, he
placed reliance upon electricity and water charges bills which were at all times
paid by Respondent No. 2.
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20. Mr. Purohit also placed reliance upon a circular dated 30 th July
2004 issued by the Government of Maharashtra and pointed out that same set
out the requirements of registration of the Co-operative Housing Society which
inter alia were that a society should have separate entrance, electricity meter,
water tank & water meter and tax assessment. He pointed out that in the present
case, that Respondent No. 2 clearly conformed to all of the requirements as
enumerated in the said circular and therefore was clearly independent of the
Society.
21. Mr. Purohit additionally pointed out that Respondent No. 2 had
challenged the order granting the Deemed Conveyance which challenge was
pending before this Court. He submitted that even if the Deemed Conveyance
and Unilateral Deed of Assignment were valid, they pertained only to the land
beneath B-Wing, while Respondent No. 2 continued to be the owner of the
structure of 'B' Wing itself. Therefore, the Petitioner, would have no legal right
to in any manner disposes Respondent No. 2 from 'B' Wing.
22. Mr. Purohit then submitted that the Judgements of this Court in
Girish Mulchand Mehta (supra) and M/s. Dem Holmes (supra) would not be
applicable in this case, since in both those cases the dispute was between the
non-cooperative members of the Society and not non member occupant/s. He
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pointed out that it was well settled that the will of the majority would bind even
such non cooperative members and therefore such non cooperative member's
wish was the issue in hand in both these cases. Insofar as the Judgement of this
Court in the case of M/s. Choice Developers (supra), he pointed out that the
same was also distinguishable on facts, since the opposition to the
redevelopment in that case was by a person though not a member of the Society
in question but who was claiming membership of the Society. Hence in the said
judgment, the order of eviction followed only after the issue of membership was
resolved.
23. Basis the above, Mr. Purohit submitted that this Petition was not
maintainable and ought to be dismissed.
24. I had at the outset noted that though the reliefs sought for in the
present petition were seemingly the usual reliefs in Petition filed under Section
9 of the Arbitration Act, arising out of a of redevelopment agreement, the
Petition infact is an attempt to completely misuse the provisions of Section 9 of
the Arbitration Act. I say so for the following reasons, viz.
A. First, it is well settled that before granting relief under Section 9 of
the Arbitration Act, the Court must be satisfied about the existence of
an arbitration agreement. In the present case, admittedly there is no
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arbitration agreement between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2.
Also, admittedly, the RDA which contains the arbitration clause (i) is
entered into only between the Petitioner and the Society; (ii) is signed
by each member of the Society; (iii) Respondent No. 2 is not a
member of the Society; (iv) Respondent No. 2 had never applied for
membership of the Society and (v) Respondent No. 2 had never signed
the RDA. Therefore, not only is there no arbitration agreement
between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 but also, Respondent No.
2 could never be said to be bound by the RDA/Arbitration Agreement
through the Society.
B. Second, it is well settled that when a Petition is filed under Section 9
of the Arbitration Act, (pre award) there must be manifest intention
on the part of the party applying for reliefs under Section 9 to take
recourse to arbitral proceedings. In the present case, clearly no such
arbitration proceedings are intended and/or even contemplated, since
there is no dispute between the Petitioner and any member of the
Society. It is also well settled that a party who has no intention to
ultimately refer the disputes to arbitration and seek final relief cannot
be permitted to seek interim relief, since interim reliefs are only in aid
of the final relief. In the facts of the present case, given that there is
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no dispute between the Petitioner and the Society and/or any member
of the Society, clearly no arbitration is infact intended and hence
there is no question of arbitration being invoked by the Petitioner.
C. Third, the Petitioner's entire case to support the grant of interim relief
against Respondent No. 2 is predicated upon the judgements of this
Court in the case of Girish Mulchand Mehta (supra), Choice
Developers (supra), and Dem Homes (supra). However, in my view,
the said judgements would be of no assistance to the Petitioner as the
same are ex facie distinguishable on facts. In all the aforesaid cases
the individuals against whom reliefs were sought for were either
members of the Societies in question and/or had sought membership
of the Society which had entered into the development agreement
basis which the Petition under Section 9 had been filed. It was thus
that the identity of the members had merged with that of the Society,
and it is thus that they were held to be bound by the will of the
majority members of the Society.
D. Fourth, in the present case, the record bears out that (i) Respondent
No. 2 is an occupant on Society's property; (ii) the Society has itself
recognised Wing - B as a " Bungalow"; (iii) 'B' Wing is admittedly
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separately assessed for property tax and has an independent water
and electricity connections, and (iv) all taxes and charges in respect
B-Wing have at all times been paid/discharged only by Respondent
No. 2. Thus, the record as also the conduct of the Parties makes clear
that the Society has at all times treated 'B' Wing as separate and
distinct from the Society.
E. Fifth, and crucially in the aforesaid circumstances, since there is no
arbitration agreement between the Society and Respondent No. 2, had
the Society sought to either evict and/or take any legal steps/action
against Respondent No. 2 it would only be by way of an appropriate
legal proceeding and not by way of a Petition under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act. Therefore, there is no question of the Petitioner, who
is a developer and has absolutely no privity with Respondent No. 2
from using the machinery of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act to obtain
reliefs against Respondent No. 2, which reliefs even the Society could
not have obtained under Section 9.
F. Sixth, also, merely because the Society has obtained a deemed
conveyance in its favour would also not ipso facto entitle to evict
and/or bind Respondent No. 2 to the RDA. The same would also not
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conclusively determine questions of title that Respondent No. 2 might
raise. It is infact well settled that an order granting deemed
conveyance does not conclusively determine issues of title. In the
present case, it is not in dispute that Respondent No. 2 has challenged
the order, by which the deemed conveyance was granted in favour of
Respondent No. 2, well before the present Petition was even filed.
Admittedly, the Petition is still pending. Thus, by no stretch of
imagination can the facts of the present case be equated with the facts
of the judgements of this Court in the case of Girish Mulchand Mehta
(supra), Choice Developers (supra) and Dem Homes (supra).
25. Therefore, what emerges from the above is that the Petitioner who
is a developer and has absolutely no privity of contract and/or locus against
Respondent No. 2 has sought to, by way of a purely private agreement entered
into between the Society and its members, ride rough shod over Respondent No.
2. It is this which is in my view a complete and utter misuse of the provisions of
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. I have no hesitation in holding that the
Petitioner has indeed made a frivolous claim and has instituted a vexatious
proceeding wasting the time of the Court. Thus, this being a Commercial
Arbitration Petition, the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act would require
the imposition of costs.
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26. Hence, the following order, viz.
i. Petition is dismissed.
ii. Petitioner to pay Respondent No. 2 cost of Rs. 5,00,000/-
within a period of four weeks from the date of this order.
iii. In the event the costs are not paid, Respondent No. 2 shall
be entitled to recover the same as arrears of land revenue.
(ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.)
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