Bombay High Court
Sudhakar Laxman Patil vs Murlidhar Laxman Patil And Ors on 23 October, 2024
2024:BHC-AUG:26157
(1) [fa784.20]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
FIRST APPEAL NO. 784 OF 2020
Sudhakar Laxman Patil .. Appellant
Age. 75 years, Occ. Agri., [ori.plaintiff
R/o. Makrandnagar, Varangaon, No.1]
Tq. Bhusawal, Dist. Jalgaon.
VERSUS
1. Murlidhar Laxman Patil .. Respondents
Age. 67 years, Occ. Lawyer, (Res.1&2- ori.
R/o. Lokdarshan, C wing 609, deft. & Res.3 -
6th floor, Marol Maroshi Road, ori. Plntf.No.2)
Military Road, Wamandayapada,
Andheri East, Mumbai.
2. Dilip Ananda Kolhe,
Age. 65 years, Occ. Business,
R/o. 78, Housing Society,
In front of Nutan Maratha College,
Jalgaon.
3. Tushar Madhukar Patil
Age. 47 years, Occ. Agri.,
R/o. Gandhi Chauk, Varangaon,
Tq. Bhusawal, Dist. Jalgaon.
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4416 OF 2023
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4694 OF 2023
Mr.Swapnil S. Patil, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr.V.D.Hon, Sr. Advocate i/b. Mr. A.V. Hon, Advocate for respondent No.1.
Mr.Girish Rane, Advocate for respondent No.2.
CORAM : KISHORE C. SANT, J.
RESERVED ON : 30.07.2024
PRONOUNCED ON : 23.10.2024
(2) [fa784.20]
JUDGMENT :
-
01. This appeal arises out of an order passed by the learned Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Jalgaon below application Exh.45 in Special Civil
Suit No.56 of 2018. By way of the impugned order, the learned Trial
Judge allowed the application filed by the defendants under Order VII
Rule 11 (a) and (d) and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and
rejected the plaint, vide order dated 16.10.2019.
02. The suit was filed by the present appellant for partition of the
suit properties, separate possession and for compensation of
Rs.25,00,000/-. Further injunction is prayed not to transfer suit
properties and not to create third party interest. The appellant is original
plaintiff No.1. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are original defendant Nos. 1
and 2. Plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 are real brothers. Plaintiff No.2
is nephew of plaintiff No.1 and defendant no.1, who is respondent No.3
in the appeal.
03. It is case of the plaintiffs that they are members of Hindu
joint family. Laxman Ramu Patil - Karta of joint family i.e. father of
plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 died on 26.08.2002, leaving behind
(3) [fa784.20]
three sons and four daughters. After death of Laxman, the properties
were shown in the name of defendant No.1. It is further case that
defendant No.1 happens to be a lawyer. By keeping the plaintiffs in dark,
he shown that Survey No.464/4B+5 out of property 1 Hectare was
shown to have been partitioned. It is shown that 1 Hectare land was
allotted to him and tried to get his name entered vide Mutation Entry No.
20272. The said entry was not approved by the Circle officer as there
was no document or order in respect of the said land. However, again by
showing that the properties are partitioned, he got the said land entered
in his name vide Mutation Entry No. 20962 in 1987. Said land thereafter
was divided into two properties. Land admeasuring 1 Hectare was shown
in the name of defendant No.1. Remaining 2 Hectare 87 R land was
shown to be Survey No. 464/5B. It is thus stated that though the land
ought to have been partitioned amongst all the brothers, defendant No.1
got the said land in his own name. It is further alleged that by
agreement to sell dated 05.04.1997, defendant No.1 entered into
agreement with defendant No.2 by getting the property converted into
non-agriculture land. Land 464/4B+5A was shown to be of 10,000 sq.
mtr. and Survey No.464/5B was shown to be of 28,700 sq. mtr.
04. Pursuant to an agreement to sell dated 05.04.1997,
(4) [fa784.20]
defendant No.2 had filed a suit bearing Special Civil Suit No.271 of 2002
and Special Civil Suit No.273 of 2002. Special Civil Suit No. 271 of 2002
was against defendant No.1 and Special Civil Suit No. 273 of 2002 was
against defendant No.1 and other joint family members. Thus all the
properties were shown to be joint family properties. In the said suit,
compromise took place between the parties. In Special Civil Suit No.271
of 2002, defendant No.1 accepted the land to the extent of 273.75 sq.
mtr. In Special Civil Suit No. 273 of 2002 out of 27225.09 sq. mtr.
defendant No.1 accepted land admesuring 2329.44 sq. mtr. and
remaining land was given to defendant No.2. It is case that after the
compromise land admeasuring 7603.19 sq. mtr. was shown to be
property of joint Hindu family. It was decided to partition the said land
amongst members. The area of 846 sq. mtr. was to be given to the
sisters. The remaining land admeasuring 6757.19 sq. mtr. was to be
partitioned in three shares of plaintiffs and defendant no.1. Thus, each
of the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are having 1/3rd share in the said
property.
05. It is further alleged that, however, defendant No.1, thereafter
by using his legal knowledge got executed relinquishment deed and gift
deed in his favour and got the said plots allotted to himself. Total land of
(5) [fa784.20]
1483.44 sq. mtr. was thus transferred in the name of defendant No.1 by
relinquishment deed executed by all the family members. The land to
the extent of 939.90 sq.mtr. is still not given to other members by
defendant No.1. Plaintiff No.2 has also not yet received the area to the
extent of 768.95 sq. mtr. from defendant No.1. Though defendant was
entitled to receive only 2252.40 sq. mtr., however, he is in possession of
3961.25 sq. mtr. Thus, total area of 1708.85 sq. mtr. land is in
possession of defendant No.1 in excess to his share. With these
allegations and some other allegations, suit was filed. Ultimate prayer
was to put the plaintiff in possession of 2/3rd area as shown in para 10
to 15 of the plaint. Rs.25 lakhs was claimed by way of compensation
from defendant No.2.
06. Defendant No.1 appeared in the suit. He filed application
under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) and section 151 of the CPC. It is the
main ground that the plaintiffs have raised dispute about mutation entry
No.20962 dated 24.11.1987. Said entry was made under the orders by
the Tahsildar, Jalgaon dated 27.10.1987. The said entry ought to have
been challenged before the Appellate Authority. It is further case that
the suit is not maintainable, as it seeks to challenge compromise decree
dated 16.02.2008 in Special Civil Suit No. 273 of 2002 and Special Civil
(6) [fa784.20]
Suit no. 271 of 2002. The plaintiffs have not challenged the recording of
compromise and passing of the consent decree in the said Special Civil
Suits. There is no case that the said decrees are obtained by fraud,
coercion or misrepresentation. There are no particulars given etc.
07. The learned Trial Court accepted the case of defendant No.1
and rejected the plaint. The learned Trial Court also held that the
plaintiffs were aware of the fact that possessory rights in the said land
was transferred in the name of defendant No.1 in the year 1987 and still
the same was not challenged. Thus, there is no cause of action and the
suit is not maintainable. The Tahsildar's order taking entry dated
27.10.1987 is challenged after 31 years and thus barred by limitation.
The plantiff had knowledge of filing Special Civil Suit no. 271 of 2002,
wherein there was reference to revenue entries. They were parties to the
compromise decree dated 16.12.2008. The Trial Court did not accept the
theory of the plaintiff that recently they got the knowledge of giving 10%
more open space. The cause of action is taken to be imaginary. The
original plaintiffs are thus before this Court challenging the said
judgment and order.
08. The learned Advocate for the appellant Mr. Swapnil Patil
(7) [fa784.20]
vehemently argued that the learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate the
case of the plaintiffs and has wrongly rejected the plaint. In the plaint,
there is clear averment that the plaintiff got knowledge very recently and
immediately thereafter they filed the suit. The learned Trial Court failed
to appreciate this fact. The learned Trial Court has practically
adjudicated the plaint on merit at preliminary stage. While considering
the application under Order 7 Rule 11, the Trial Court has to proceed only
on the basis of averments in the plaint. Respondent No.1 is a lawyer by
profession. By using his knowledge he has got the documents prepared
in his name. Triable issues are involved and it is necessary to try the
suit. The case laws cited were not properly appreciated. He thus
submits that the order impugned in the appeal deserves to be quashed
and set aside by restoring the suit.
09. The learned Sr. Advocate Mr. Hon for respondent No.1
submits that admittedly the property was a joint family property and
there was no dispute about the same. However, there was partition that
took place during the life time of father of plaintiff No.1 and defendant
No.1. Said partition was even acted upon by all the parties. The parties
were put in possession of the respective share in the property. The
plaintiffs have sold their land by demarcating plots. The defendant is in
(8) [fa784.20]
possession of only land which was allotted to his share in the partition.
Under the garb of suit for partition, the plaintiff are trying to grab
property of defendant No.1. The prayer of compensation is totally
misconceived. The plaintiffs are parties to the compromise that took
place in 2008 in Special Suit No. 273 of 2012. No parties can be
permitted to go behind compromise decree. This is to the knowledge of
the plaintiff and there is also averment to that effect in the plaint. The
mutation entries were taken by following procedure in the name of
defendant No.1. The Court has only seen the pleadings and the
documents. Mere reference to the documents cannot be said to be
deciding the case on merit. It can be seen by mere reading of the plaint
that the entries taken in the year 1987 are being challenged in the suit.
There is no specific averment showing as to when the plaintiff got exact
knowledge of the sale-deed. If the suit was for partition, then all the
sisters were also necessary parties. He submits that the learned Trial
Court has rightly held that there is no challenge to the earlier partition.
No interference is required in the well reasoned order passed by the Trial
Court.
10. Learned Advocate Mr. Rane for respondent No.2 submits that
Special Civil Suit Nos. 271 of 2002 and 273 of 2002 both were
(9) [fa784.20]
compromised. Father of plaintiff No.2 and plaintiff No.1 both have signed
the compromise. The annexures to the plaint are part of the plaint and
therefore looking to the annexures, the learned Trial Court can certainly
look into such annexures. In the earlier compromise decree, there is
reference to open space. Thus, it cannot be said that the parties were not
aware of the open space given to the share of defendant No.1. In the
compromise, all the properties are clearly mentioned including the area
of open space. Defendant No.2 is not liable to pay any compensation.
There is also no challenge to the compromise decree. There is no exact
date given of cause of action in the plaint. The pleadings in the plaint
are vague. He further submits that defendant No.2 is unnecessarily
added as party, when the dispute is only between family members. He
supports the order and prays for dismissal of the appeal.
11. In rejoinder the learned Advocate for the appellant submits
that in the present case compromise between the parties is not disputed.
The learned Trial Court has not considered case of Dahiben Vs.
Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gujra) dead through LRs. & Ors.,
(2020) 7 SCC 366. There is clear averment in the plaint that defendant
No.1 purchased the flat in Mumbai from the income of joint family
property. The issue of limitation in this case is an issue requiring trial. In
( 10 ) [fa784.20]
the present case, it is a question of fact. The Court has passed
impugned order on extraneous considerations.
12. To appreciate the arguments and submissions of the parties,
it would be helpful to go through the judgments relied upon by the
parties. Learned Advocate for the appellant relied upon judgment in the
case of Chhotanben and Anr. Vs. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar,
reported in 2019 (2) Mh.L.J.17. In the said case the Hon'ble Apex
Court held that while considering application under Order VII Rule 11(d),
the Court has to only see the averments in the plaint. In the said case,
the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the plaintiff had asserted that suit is
filed immediately after getting knowledge about fraudulent sale-deed
executed by original defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by keeping them in dark. In
the facts of that case it was held that the Trial Court has rightly held that
the issue of limitation in that case was triable issue and therefore plaint
could not have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
There is no doubt about said proposition.
13. In the case of Urvashiben and Anr.Vs. Krishnakant
Manuprasad Trivedi reported in 2019 (1) ALL M.R. 483, the Hon'ble
Apex Court considered provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC with
( 11 ) [fa784.20]
the Limitation Act. In that case also an application was filed for rejection
of plaint stating that the suit was barred by limitation. It was held that
the said issue in the fact of that case, was required to be adjudicated
after trial. It was further held that assuming that there was inordinate
delay and latches on the part of the plaintiff, same cannot be a ground
for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the CPC.
14. Next case relied upon by the appellant in Merit Magnum
Construction Vs. Nand Kumar Anant Vaity & Ors., 2014(7) ALL MR
252. In the said case Division Bench of this Court held that for rejection
of plaint at the stage of deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC, the pleadings are required to be seen as they stand without
adding or subtracting any words or by changing their apparent
grammatical sense. It was further considered that the issue of limitation
is a mixed question of law and fact which requires trial for adjudication of
the said issue. There is no doubt about the proposition.
15. In the case of Smt. Sushilabai wd/o. Bomenshaw
Byramji Vs. Smt. Kamlarukh we/o. DPR Cassad through LRs. &
Anr. reported in 2014(2) ALL MR 629, it was held that compromise
decree can be challenged. Their allegation was that the decree in
( 12 ) [fa784.20]
question was obtained by practicing fraud upon the plaintiff. It was also
held that while rejecting plaint, the Court cannot travel beyond statement
in the plaint. In the said case also the Court held that the question of
limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and under such
circumstances, rejection of plaint as barred by limitation amounts to
exercise of excess jurisdiction. So far as proposition of law all the cited
judgments is concerned, there is no dispute as the position is well settled
by now. It need to be kept in mind that where issue of limitation is a
mixed question of law and fact, the said needs to be decided by trial.
16. Learned Sr. Advocate Mr. V.D. Hon for respondent No.1 relied
upon judgment in the case of Colonel Shrawan Kumar Jaipuriyar Vs.
Krishna Nandan Singh and Anr., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1358. Para
No. 10 of the said judgment is as under :-
10. This Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational
Society Represented by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational Trust
Represented by its Chairman/ Managing Trustee 1 has referred to the
earlier judgment of this Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Anotherv.
A.P. Agencies, Salem2 to explain that the cause of action means every
fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in
order to seek a decree and relief against the defendant. Cause of action
requires infringement of the right or breach of an obligation and
comprises of all material facts on which the right and claim for breach is
founded, that is, some act done by the defendant to infringe and violate
the right or breach an obligation. In T. Arivandanam v. T.V.Satyapal and
Another this Court has held that if the plaint is manifestly vexatious,
meritless and groundless, in the sense that it does not disclose a clear
right to sue, it would be right and proper to exercise power under Order
VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('Code', for short). A
( 13 ) [fa784.20]
mere contemplation or possibility that a right may be infringed without
any legitimate basis for that right, would not be sufficient to hold that the
plaint discloses a cause of action.
. The Hon'ble Apex Court ultimately allowed the application
filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
17. In the case of Sree Surya Developers and Promoters Vs.
N. Sailesh Prasad & Ors., (2022) 5 SCC 736, the Hon'ble Apex Court
considered the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A and Order7 Rule 11(d) of
the CPC. In that case the plaintiff had claimed declaration of title,
recovery of possession, cancellation and revocation of gift deed,
declaration for development-cum-general power of attorney and deed of
assignment, which was subject matter of earlier suit, in which thereafter
compromise had taken place. In that case, it was correctly held that the
Trial Court rightly rejected the plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7
rule 11(d) of the CPC.
18. So far as case of Dahiben (supra) is concerned, the Hon'ble
Apex Court considered that the Court has to read averments in
conjunction with documents relied upon in plaint as a whole. The Court
has to see the substance and not only the form in which it is presented.
( 14 ) [fa784.20]
It is also held that the pleas taken by defendant in written statement is
also not relevant at that stage. If the Court finds that the suit is
manifestly vexatious, not disclosing any right to sue, it would be justified
in exercise of power under Rule 11(a). About cause of action the Hon'ble
Apex Court held that the Court has to find out as to whether plaint
discloses real cause of action or illusory cause of action created by clever
drafting. The Court has to see camouflage or suppression and if the Court
comes to a conclusion that the suit is vexatious and would be an abuse of
process of Court, the Court can exercise drastic power under Order VII,
Rule 11 and reject the plaint.
19. In the case of Raghwendra Sharan Singh Vs. Ra.
Prasanna Singh (dead) by LRs. reported in (2020) 16b SCC 601,
the plaintiff had not prayed for setting aside gift deed. It was held that
said prayer is made cleverly, as in that case the suit would have been
clearly barred by limitation in view of Article 59 of the Limitation act. The
Court in that case held that rejection of plaint was proper and rejected
the suit.
20. In the case of Kesharbai alias Pushpabai Eknathrao
Nalawade (dead) By LRs. Vs. Tarabai Prabhakarrao Nalawade &
( 15 ) [fa784.20]
Ors., reported in (2014) 5 SCC 707, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that
once partition takes place in the family, presumption would be that all
properties stood partitioned. In such cases, burden would be on the
party to prove exclusion of certain property, who asserts the same to be
joint. In that case the learned Trial Court found that earlier there was
partition in the family by family arrangement and rejected the suit. Said
order was held to be correct.
21. In the case of N.V. Srinivasa Murthy and Ors. Vs.
Mariyamma (dead) by proposed LRs. & ors., reported in (2005) 5
SCC 548, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that by omitting to claim relief
necessary in the facts and claiming other relief, just to avoid bar of
limitation is not permissible.
22. Learned Advocate Mr. Rane for respondent No. 2 also relies
upon judgment in the case of Sree Surya (supra) by inviting attention
the fact that compromise decree was passed in a suit, when one of the
parties was minor. The compromise was entered into by his father. On
attaining majority, said person filed a suit through general power of
attorney for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit
properties. He prayed for revocation of gift deed as null and void.
( 16 ) [fa784.20]
Therein the defendant-appellant filed application for rejection of plaint on
the ground that suit for setting aside consent decree would be barred
under Order 23 Rule 3A of the CPC. This application came to be allowed
by the Trial Court holding that no independent suit would be maintainable
against compromise decree. It is this order, that was confirmed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court holding that the Trial Court rightly rejected the plaint.
. In the present case also, there was already a suit that was
compromised. Though the said compromise decree is not challenged but
a declaration is sought that the said compromise decree is not binding.
In the present case, it is considered mainly for the reason that the
parties were aware of the said compromise decree, wherein the present
suit property was involved.
23. Learned Advocate Mr. Rane for respondent No.2 further relied
upon judgment in the case of Rajendra Bajoria and Others Vs.
Hemant Kumar Jalan & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 764.
In the said case the Hon'ble Apex Court held that reading of the
averments made in the plaint should not only be formal but also
meaningful. Clever drafting creating illusion of cause of action needs to
be seen. Para No.17 of the said judgment reads as under :-
( 17 ) [fa784.20]
"17. It could thus be seen that the court has to find out as to whether in
the background of the facts, the relief, as claimed in the plaint, can be
granted to the plaintiff. It has been held that if the court finds that none
of the reliefs sought in the plaint can be granted to the plaintiff under the
law, the question then arises is as to whether such a suit is to be allowed
to continue and go for trial. This Court answered the said question by
holding that such a suit should be thrown out at the threshold. This Court,
therefore, upheld the order passed by the trial court of rejecting the suit
and that of the appellate court, thereby affirming the decision of the trial
court. This Court set aside the order passed by the High Court, wherein
the High Court had set aside the concurrent orders of the trial court and
the appellate court and had restored and remanded the suit for trial to
the trial court."
24. On this legal position, this Court has to deal with the
submissions of the parties to the present case. About the facts, which
are discussed in the initial paragraphs, there is no dispute that earlier
two suits were filed by respondent No.2, wherein compromise took place.
The plaintiffs have knowledge as they were also parties to the said suits
and also to compromise. Present suit property was also subject matter
of the suits. It has also come on record that in 1987 itself there was
partition and parties were put in possession of the respective shares. On
this accepted position, this Court has to carefully see as to whether any
cause of action is shown to have arisen in filing the present suit in 2018.
So far as averment in respect of date of cause of action, it is only stated
that the plaintiff recently got the knowledge that the defendant No.1 has
given some plots with open space to defendant No.2. In-fact, there it is
( 18 ) [fa784.20]
mentioned in the plaint about earlier facts, still while stating cause of
action, it is conveniently avoided to mention the said. Even date of exact
knowledge and how plaintiff got knowledge is not mentioned.
Conveniently even no prayer is made in respect of compromise decree.
This is clearly an instance of clever drafting.
25. From reading of the judgment it is clear that annexures and
the documents annexed to the plaint are also need to be seen as a part
of plaint. The contention of the plaintiff that the Court has to look inly to
the averments in the plaint and should not look into annexures without
any substance. The learned Court in the present case rightly looked into
the annexures. The reliance of the appellant on the judgment in the case
of Chhotanben (supra) is of no any help to him. The judgment in the
case of Urvashiben (supra) is also of no help.
26. Looking to the plaint in the present case the limitation is not
a mixed question of fact and law. There are two admitted facts, first that
in 1987, the partition took place and secondly that in 2002, there were
two suits filed and those were compromised. Plaintiff No.1 and father of
plaintiff No.2 were parties to those compromise decrees. Merely no relief
is sought in respect of compromise decrees, will not free the plaintiffs
( 19 ) [fa784.20]
from the clutches of the Limitation Act. Limitation is, therefore, in the
present case, purely a question of law, as the facts are admitted. It can
be easily made out that in 1987, there was cause of action and also there
was cause of action in 2002. Thus, no trial is required to decide the
limitation in the present case. Thus, reliance on Merit Magnum
(supra) is misplaced. Further argument that the exclusion of certain
property from partition would require trial is also without any substance
as in the present case the suit itself is beyond limitation. This Court,
thus, is not in a position to accept the arguments of learned Advocate for
the appellant.
27. So far as arguments by defendant No.1 are concerned, it is
argued that it is duty of the Court to see that the suit is within limitation,
the documents referred in the plaint and annexed to the plaint forms
basis of the plaint. This submission is based on judgment in the case of
Dahiben (supra). This Court does not find any difficulty in accepting
this submission. There are documents on record showing that father of
plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 was a tenant, his name was entered in
record in 1976. The material entries are on record showing that the
partition of land has taken place on 34.11.1987. Same was even
certified on 09.12.1987. Copy of Mutation Entry was obtained by the
( 20 ) [fa784.20]
plaintiff on 26.02.2008. From the record, it is clear that the plaintiff had
knowledge of the partition, when there is mention about the suit
properties.
28. Keeping in mind above submissions and judgments cited by
the parties, we need to examine the order passed by the learned Trial
Court. This Court finds that the Trial Court has rightly considered all the
aspects. It considered that the compromise decrees are passed on
16.02.2008. The plaintiffs did not take any objection to the compromise
decrees. On the contrary they are the parties to it. So far as Mutation
Entry No. 20962 in respect of 1 Hectare of land taken in 1987 is
concerned, it also shows that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the
partition. Even the present suit land was a part of Special Civil Suit No.
271 of 2002. The learned Trial Court has thus considered that defendant
No.1 was exclusive owner of the suit property in Special Civil Suit No.
271 of 2002. So called gift deed dated 14.04.2016 also shows that there
is already a partition between the members of the joint family of plaintiff
and defendant No.1 and as such now there is no joint family in existence.
The learned Trial Court further rightly considered that the plaintiff failed
to show that the property described in plaint para No. 2B is joint family
property. The learned Trial Court also considered that the cause of action
( 21 ) [fa784.20]
is illusory and vague. This Court finds that the judgments are rightly
appreciated by the Trial Court. This Court does not find any illegality or
perversity in the order passed by the learned Trial Judge. No
interference is called for in the impugned order. This Court has no
hesitation to record that no case is made out to call for interference in
the impugned order at the hands of this Court. The appeal, therefore,
deserves to be dismissed. Hence, the following order :-
ORDER
(i) First Appeal No. 784 of 2020 is dismissed with no order
as to costs.
(ii) In view of disposal of the First Appeal, pending Civil
Applications also stand disposed off.
[KISHORE C. SANT, J.]
. At this stage, learned Advocate for the appellant requests for
continuation of status-quo order passed by this Court earlier. Said
request is opposed by learned Advocates for both the respondents,
stating that the appellant is claiming land to the extent of 939.90 sq. mtr.
only.
. Considering above, there shall be status-quo only to the
extent of the land claimed by the appellant in the plaint for a period of 8
(eight) weeks from today.
[KISHORE C. SANT, J.]
snk/2024/oct24/fa784.20
