Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 26111 Bom
Judgement Date : 3 October, 2024
2024:BHC-OS:15195
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2827 OF 2022
IN
TESTAMENTARY SUIT NO. 16 OF 2004
IN
TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO. 491 OF 2003
VISHAL
SUBHASH Laura D'Souza ...Applicant/
PAREKAR
Digitally signed by
Ori. Defdt. No.1
VISHAL SUBHASH
PAREKAR In the matter of
Date: 2024.10.03
21:47:27 +0530
Lalit Timothy D'Souza ...Plaintiff
vs.
1. Lawra D'Souza
2. Lorna D'Souza
3. Lavina Khan ...Defendants
Mr. Shanay Shah a/w Mr. Rahul Jain, Ms. Khushboo Rupani, Ms.
Akriti Shinha i/by HSA Advocates for Applicant in IA- 2827 of
2022 /Ori. Defendant No.1.
Mr. Karl Tamboly, Mr. Hrushi Narvekar, Mr. Atir Patel, Ms. Viloma
Shah i/by Ms. AVP Partners for Plaintiff.
CORAM : N. J. JAMADAR, J.
DATE : OCTOBER 3, 2024
----------
JUDGMENT :
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
2. This is an application for appointment of an Administrator
pendente lite under Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
(the Succession Act) for the estate described in the Schedule-I
appended to the Testamentary Petition, except for the properties
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listed at serial Nos.1 and 9. The principal prayer is to an appoint
the Court Receiver, High Court Bombay as the Administrator
pendente lite. In the alternative, the applicant has prayed that she
be appointed as an Administrator.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the background facts can be
stated as under:
(a) Timothey D'souza (the deceased) was the father of the
applicant-Defendant No.1, Lalit D'souza, the plaintiff, Lorna D'souza,
the Defendant No.2 and Lavina Khan, the Defendant No.3.
(b) According to the Applicant, the deceased died intestate, on 7th
April 2003. The plaintiff took complete and exclusive control of the
estate of the deceased. As disputes arose amongst the plaintiff and
defendants, Lorna D'souza, the Defendant No.2, instituted Suit
No.2889 of 2003 for the administration of the estate of the
deceased.
(c) The plaintiff propounded a Will dated 14th March 2003,
purportedly executed by the deceased, and filed Testamentary
Petition No.491 of 2003. The applicant filed Caveat. The Defendant
Nos.2 and 3 also filed the Caveats opposing the grant of probate. The
Testamentary Petition has thus been converted into instant
Testamentary Suit.
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(d) In Suit No.2889 of 2003, the Defendant No.2 filed Notice of
Motion No. 2679 of 2003 and the applicant took out the Notice of
Motion No.2743 of 2004 for appointment of the Court Receiver. By
an order dated 18th August 2005, a learned Single Judge of this
Court granted interim relief in both the Notices of Motion.
(d) The plaintiff assailed the aforesaid order by filing Appeal Nos.
773 and 774 of 2005. In the said Appeal, consent terms were filed
and the aforesaid interim order stood substituted by the
arrangement set out thereunder including an injunction against the
parties restraining them either by or through their agents from
transferring, disposing of, encumbering, transferring tenancies or
parting with possession in any manner of the properties
constituting the estate of the deceased.
4. In the aforesaid background, the applicant has preferred this
application asserting inter alia that the plaintiff had been convicted
by the Court of Sessions, Greater Bombay for the offence punishable
under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for having caused
grievous heart to Defendant No.2 by firing six gun shots at her and
was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and
pay fine. In appeals, a Division Bench of this Court found the
plaintiff guilty of the offence punishable under Section 307 of the
IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten
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years and pay fine. Plaintiff has been undergoing the sentence.
5. The applicant apprehends that the plaintiff might have
already created third party rights in respect of the estate of the
deceased in contravention of the consent order. Over the years,
according to the applicant, the plaintiff has misused the properties
and misappropriated the funds for his personal gain and to the
exclusion of other heirs. The estate of the deceased is of
considerable magnitude and, at present, there is nobody to
administer the huge estate of the deceased. The applicant is even
unaware as to what consists and forms part of the entire estate of
the deceased.
6. It is further asserted as the plaintiff has been convicted for
the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC and is
undergoing the sentence, it would be improper to allow such tainted
and incompetent person to administer the estate of the deceased.
Thus the applicant avers that the plaintiff is not fit and capable to
administer the estate of the deceased either personally or through
an agent. Since by consent of the parties, the Court Receiver has
already been appointed in respect of the two of the properties,
namely Lalit Bar and Restaurant and Lalit Refreshment, in order to
preserve the estate and protect the interest of the applicant and
other heirs, it is expedient that the Court Receiver is appointed as
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an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925.
7. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff.
Refuting the allegations that the deceased died intestate, the
plaintiff contends that the deceased left behind Last Will and
Testament dated 14th March 2003, whereunder the plaintiff has
been appointed as the sole executor. Thus, the application for
appointment of an Administrator pendente lite deserves to be
rejected on this count alone as an executor appointed by the
deceased would thereby be displaced.
8. The plaintiff asserts, the application has been filed belatedly
after about 20 years of the filing of the Testamentary Petition with
an oblique motive to take undue advantage of the situation in which
the plaintiff finds himself. The application thus suffers from gross
delay and laches. In fact, the applicant has been guilty of breach of
the consent order and the plaintiff was constrained to file contempt
petition. Bald allegations that the plaintiff is a tainted and
incompetent person have been made. There is no material to
indicate that the estate of the deceased has not been administered
or is now not being administered. The plaintiff has taken all the
requisite steps to preserve and protect the estate in question.
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9. With regard to the alleged disqualification on account of the
prosecution of the plaintiff, it is asserted that those criminal
proceedings have been ongoing since the year 2008 and the issue is
subjudice before the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1627 of
2021. Yet, despite being aware of the prosecution of the plaintiff
since the year 2008, the applicant never questioned the competence
and qualification of the plaintiff. It is only with a view to take an
undue advantage of the situation, the instant application for
appointment of Administrator pendente lite has been filed. The
plaintiff categorically denies that the estate is in danger of being a
usurped, misappropriated or third party rights being created
therein. The applicant has never misused the estate and
misappropriated the funds for his personal gain. No case for
appointment of an Administrator Pendente Lite is thus made out.
10. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts and pleadings, I have
heard Mr.Shanay Shah, the learned Counsel for the
Applicant/Defendant No.1, and Mr.Karl Tamboly, the learned
Counsel for the Plaintiff, at some length.
11. The learned Counsel took the Court though the material on
record including the orders passed in the Notices of Motion No.
2679 of 2003 and 2743 of 2004 in Suit No. 2889 of 2003 and in
Appeal No. 773 and 774 of 2005 dated 21st October 2005 passed by
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the Appeal Bench.
12. Before adverting to note the submissions canvased on behalf
of the parties, it may be apposite to note that, at the heart of the
matter is the entitlement of the parties to succeed to the estate of
the deceased. The Defendants/daughters of the deceased, assert
that the deceased died intestate. The plaintiff, on the other hand,
has propounded the purported Last Will and Testament of the
deceased dated 14th March 2003. The core question as to whether
the deceased died testate or intestate, gave rise to the suit for
administration to the estate of the deceased and the instant
Testamentary Suit No. 16 of 2004.
13. There is not much controversy over the fact that the interim
order was initially passed in the Notice of Motion Nos. 2679 of 2003
and 2743 of 2004 in Suit No. 2889 of 2003 and with the consent of
the parties, the said order passed by the learned Single Judge dated
18th August 2005 was set aside and substituted by the arrangement
arrived at between the parties. The said consent order is still in
force and governs the rights and liabilities of the parties.
14. As is evident, the capacity of the plaintiff as the executor of
the Will of the deceased dated 14th March 2003 is borne out by the
said purported Last Will and Testament. Likewise, it is a matter of
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record that the plaintiff was initially convicted for an offence
punishable under Section 326 of the Penal Code and sentenced to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine and in Appeal
the said order passed by the learned Sessions Judge was set aside
and the plaintiff has been convicted for an offence punishable under
Section 307 the Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for ten years. Incontrovertibly, the plaintiff is
undergoing the sentence.
15. In the light of aforesaid rather uncontroverted facts, Mr.Shah,
the learned Counsel for the applicant, submitted that the executor
of the Will is in prison. Neither the applicant nor other heirs of the
deceased are aware about the status of the properties. There has not
been a true and faithful disclosure about the estate of the deceased,
by the plaintiff. Mr. Shah thus urged that the estate of the deceased
is in complete jeopardy.
16. Amplifying the aforesaid submissions, Mr.Shah would urge
that there are two pressing factors which warrant the appointment
of an Administrator pendente lite. First, the necessity of
appointment of an Administrator as there is nobody to manage the
estate. It is inconceivable that the plaintiff would be in a position to
manage the estate of the deceased, while being incarcerated. Mr.
Shah made an earnest endevour to draw home the point that, the
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applicant is not seeking appointment of an Administrator pendente
lite for the sole reason that the plaintiff has been convicted and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment. It is the necessity of the
management of the estate which is the prime factor.
17. Second, the estate of the deceased can only be preserved if the
Administrator pendente lite is appointed. There is an imminent
danger of the estate of the deceased being squandered away,
dissipated or otherwise lost. If the estate of the deceased is not
securely preserved, the applicant and other heirs of the deceased
would suffer an irreparable loss. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of
the case, the appointment of an Administrator is imperative.
18. To lend support to the aforesaid submissions, Mr.Shah placed
reliance on a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High
Court in the case of Priyambada Debi Birla Vs. Ajoy Kumar Newar &
Ors.1 and a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of
Inderjeet Singh Amardeep Singh Chadha Vs. Davinder Kaur
Amardeep Singh Chadha2.
19. Mr. Tamboly, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff countered
the submissions on behalf of the applicant by canvasing a multi-
pronged submission. First and foremost, according to Mr.Tamboly,
1 2006 SCC OnLine Cal 280.
2 (2019) 4 AIR Bom R 24
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the delay of about 20 years in taking out this application for
appointment of Administrator pendente lite singularly erodes the
credibility of the claim. During this period, the applicant neither
sought appointment of administrator pendente lite nor demanded
the accounts or even a disclosure. The applicant did not institute
any Suit for administration of the estate of the deceased. As a bolt
from the blue, the applicant has preferred this application, which is
actuated by a design to reap undue advantage of the situation.
20. Mr. Tamboly urged with a degree of vehemence that, if there
was necessity of administration or protection of the estate, the
applicant ought to have approached the Court with a reasonable
promptitude. Even the ground that the plaintiff has been convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment, according to Mr. Tamboly, does not
enure for the benefit of the applicant as the plaintiff was initially
convicted by the Court of Sessions in the year 2012 itself. Yet for 12
years, no application for appointment of Administrator came to be
filed asserting that the plaintiff is a "tainted and incompetent
person".
21. Secondly, Mr. Tamboly would urge that the applicant is
making an invidious attempt to overreach the order passed by the
Division Bench in Appeal Nos.773 and 774 of 2005 dated 21 st
October 2005, and that too with the consent of the parties. The
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Court Receiver came to be appointed only in respect of the two
properties. The rest of the properties have been under the
administration and management of the plaintiff. The applicant
cannot be permitted to indirectly circumvent the said order by
seeking an appointment of Administrator pendente lite. If at all the
applicant desired to change the arrangement arrived at with the
consent of the parties, it was incumbent upon the applicant to move
in the administration suit seek modification of the said order.
22. Thirdly, taking the Court through the averments in the instant
application, Mr.Tamboly would urge that, Mr.Shah has canvased a
case which has not at all been pleaded. Neither the necessity of
appointment of the Administrator has been pleaded nor is it
contended that the plaintiff suffers from disability to manage the
estate of the deceased. No particulars of alleged acts in
contravention of the consent order, misutilization of the property
and misappropriation of the funds for personal use have been
furnished.
23. Lastly, Mr.Tamboly submitted that under Section 223 of the
Indian Succession Act, the persons who are disqualified for grant of
probate have been enumerated. A person who is incarcerated in
prison is not per se disqualified to continue to act as executor of the
deceased. Imprisonment of the executor, by itself, cannot be the
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justification for appointment of an Administrator pendente lite.
24. To lend support to the aforesaid submissions, Mr.Tamboly
placed reliance on Division Bench Judgments of Calcutta High Court
in the cases of Hara Coomar Sircar Vs. Doorgamoni Dasi3; and
Dharm Raj Tiwari Vs. Badri Prasad Tiwari 4; a decision in the case of
Thoppai Venkataramier Vs. A. Govindarayalier5; and a Judgment of
the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Prachi Prakash
Pandit and Ors. Vs. Pushpa sharad Ranade and Ors.6.
25. Mr. Shah joined the issue by canvasing a submission that
there are more than adequate pleadings in the application on the
aspects of both the necessity of appointment of an Administrator
and the dire need to preserve and protect the estate of the deceased.
Refuting the contention that the application suffers from delay and
laches, Mr. Shah submitted that the necessity arose in the year
2021 when the sentence imposed upon the plaintiff by the Court of
Sessions was enhanced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Mr.
Shah urged with tenacity that the provisions contained in Section
223 which proscribe grant of probate to a minor and a person of
unsound mind, cannot be so construed as to circumscribe the power
of appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247
3 (1893) ILR 21CAL 195.
4 2002 SCC OnLine Cal 716 5 (1926) The Law Weekly 462 6 MANU/MH/0801/2004
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of the Succession Act. It would be preposterous to urge that since
the plaintiff does not suffer from disqualification under Section 223,
he must be continued to be entrusted with the administration of the
estate of the deceased despite having incurred disqualification by
acts and conduct, urged Mr.Shah.
26. The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration.
27. Indisputably, the plaintiff is the named executor of the
purported Will and Testament of the deceased.
28. It may thus be appropriate to note the consequences that
emanate from the appointment of the executor by the testator.
Ordinarily, not only the intention of the testator in the matter of the
disposition of the property is to be given effect to but also the
intention of the testator to execute the testamentary disposition by
the named executor has to be respected. On the demise of the
testator, the estate of the testator vests in the executor. For all
purposes, the executor assume the character of the legal
representative of the deceased qua estate which is the subject
matter of the bequest.
29. The interplay between the provisions contained in sections
211 and 213 of the Succession Act deserves to be kept in view before
adverting to note the power of appointment of an administer
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pendente lite under section 247 of the Succession Act. Sections 211
and 213 of the Succession Act read as under:-
211. Character and property of executor or administrator as such --
(1) The executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such.
(2) When the deceased was a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh, Jaina or Parsi or an exempted person, nothing herein contained shall vest in an executor or administrator any property of the deceased person which would otherwise have passed by survivorship to some other person.
.... .....
213. Right as executor or legatee when established (1) No right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in 1[India] has granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, or has granted letters of administration with the will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the will annexed.
(2) This section shall not apply in the case of wills made by Muhammadans or Indian Christians, and shall only apply-
(i) in the case of wills made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina where such wills are of the classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of section 57; and
(ii) in the case of wills made by any Parsi dying, after the commencement of the Indian Succession (Amendment) Act, 1962 (16 of 1962), where such wills are made within the local limits of the ordinary-original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and where such wills are made outside those limits, in so far as they relate to immovable property situate within those limits.
30. On a plain reading of section 211, it becomes abundantly clear
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that the executor of the testator is the latter's legal representative
for all purposes, and the entire property of the deceased vests in
him in that capacity. Vesting of the property of the testator in the
executor is on the strength of the Will itself and not as a
consequence of the Probate. The Will gives the property to the
executor. Probate is a means which the law provides for establishing
the Will. Vesting of the property is, however, not to be equated with
the vesting of the beneficial interest in the property. To put in other
words, the property vests in the executor only for the purpose of
representation.
31. A useful reference in this context can be made to a decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Jalandhar Division
vs. Mohan Krishan Abrol & Another7 wherein it is observed that-
10] A bare reading of section 211 shows that the property vests in the executors by virtue of the will and not by virtue of the probate. Will gives property to the executor; the grant of probate is only a method by which the law provides for establishing the will. In the case of Kulwanta Bewa v.
Karamchand, AIR 1938 Calcutta 714, it has been held that section 211 provides that the estate of the deceased vests in the executor; that the vesting is not of the beneficial interest in the property; but only for the purposes of representation. ....
(emphasis supplied)
32. Section 213 of the Succession Act, provides that the rights
under the Will by executor or legatee cannot be established unless
7 (2004) 7 SCC 505.
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the Probate or Letters of Administration was obtained. However, for
the purpose of representation to the estate of the testator, grant of
Probate is not peremptory. Vesting of the right is enough for the
executor or administrator to represent the estate of the testator.
Section 211 and 213 of the Succession Act operate in different
spheres.
33. In the case of FGP Limited vs. Saleh Hooseini Doctor and Anr. 8
the distinction between sections 211 and 213 of the Succession Act
was postulated, inter alia, as under:-
47] Therefore, it is Section 211 and not Section 213 that deals with the vesting of property. This vesting does not take place as a result of probate. On the executor's accepting his office, the property vests on him and executor derives his title from the Will and becomes the representative of the deceased even without obtaining probate. The grant of probate does not give title to the executor. It just makes his title certain.
48] Under Section 213, the grant of probate is not a condition precedent to the filing of a suit in order to claim a right as an executor under the will. This vesting of right is enough for the executor or administrator to represent the estate in a legal proceeding.
.... ......
51] But Section 213 operates in a different field. Section 213 enjoins that rights under the Will by executor or a legatee cannot be established unless probate or letters of administration are obtained. Therefore, Section 211 and Section 213 of the said Act have different areas of operation.
52] Even if Will is not probated that does not prevent the vesting of the property of the deceased on the executor/administrator and consequently
8 (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 223.
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any right of action to represent the estate of the executor can be initiated even before the grant of the probate.
34. In the light of the aforesaid position in law, as regards vesting
of the property in the executor and, consequently, the rights and
obligations of the executor qua the estate of the deceased, the
prayer for appointment of an administrator pendente lite deserves
to be appreciated. Section 247 of the Succession Act, reads as
under:-
247. Administration pendente lite--Pending any suit touching the validity of the will of a deceased person or for obtaining or revoking any probate or any grant of letters of administration, the Court may appoint an administrator of the estate of such deceased person, who shall have all the rights and powers of a general administrator, other than the right of distributing such estate, and every suet. administrator shall be subject to the immediate control of the Court and shall act under its direction.
35. From the text of section 247 of the Succession Act, the
grounds on, and the circumstances under, which the testamentary
Court can invoke the said power do not become explicit. Evidently,
the power appears to be of a discretionary nature. The guiding
factor would, however, be the preservation of the estate of the
testator and effective management thereof till the determination of
issue of grant of Probate or Letters of Administration. In the case of
Inderjeet Singh (supra) on which reliance was placed by Mr. Shah, a
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Division Bench of this Court, elucidated the contours of the power to
appoint the administrator pendente lite. The observations in
paragraph 25 read as under:-
25] From the phraseology of the aforesaid Section, it becomes evident that it incorporates an enabling provision and invests the testamentary Court with power to appoint an administrator pendente lite. The text of aforesaid section does not, in terms, spell out the circumstances in which an administrator pendente lite may be appointed. Undoubtedly, the testamentary Court, in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the given case, ought to be satisfied as to the necessity for appointment of an administrator pendente lite. The object of conferring jurisdiction upon the testamentary Court to appoint an administrator pendente lite is implicit. The object appears to be to ensure that the estate of the testator is effectively managed and securely preserved for the benefit of the persons who are ultimately found to be entitled to succeed to it. This broad object subsumes in its fold a situation wherein it is brought on record that the act and conduct of the person in possession of the estate of the testator are detrimental to the protection and preservation of the estate. The afore- extracted section gives ample discretion to the Court as to the person who can be appointed as an administrator pendente lite. There is no apparent prohibition for appointment of a party to the testamentary proceedings as an administrator pendente lite. However, the provision expressly puts two limitations on the powers of the administrator pendente lite : (i) he has no right to distribute the estate; and (ii) he is subject to the immediate control of the Court and shall act under its direction.
36. In the light of the aforesaid enunciation of law, reverting to the
facts of the fact, the primary hurdle which the applicant is required
to surmount is the order passed by the Appeal Bench pursuant to
the consent terms arrived at between the parties. As noted above,
by the said order, dated 21st October, 2005, with the consent of the
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parties, interim arrangements were put in place with regard to the
estate of the deceased. The consent terms, inter alia, record that the
interim orders will continue till the final hearing and disposal of the
administration Suit No. 2889 of 2003 and Testamentary Petition
No. 491 of 2003, which has since been converted into Testamentary
Suit No. 16 of 2004. Under the said consent order, the Court
Receiver, High Court, has been appointed Receiver in respect of
Hotel Lalit Refreshment and Hotel Lalit Bar and Restaurant. Lorna
D'Souza, the defendant No. 2 has been appointed as an agent for
conducting the business in respect of Hotel Lalit Bar and Restaurant
and Lawra D'Souza, the defendant No. 1 has been appointed as an
agent for the conducting the business in respect of Lalit
Refreshments.
37. Under clause (h) thereof, an injunction operates till the
disposal of administrative suit and the instant suit, against the
parties restraining them from transferring, disposing of,
encumbering, transferring tenancies or parting with possession in
any manner of the properties constituting the estate of the
deceased.
38. In the context of the aforesaid order, two issues deserve
consideration. One, whether the Court would be justified in
appointing an administrator pendente lite during the currency of
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the aforesaid order passed by the Appeal Bench in the
administrative suit as well as the instant suit. Two, whether the
interim measures, under the consent order, are not adequate to
protect the estate of the deceased and the interest of the parties ?
39. The submissions of Mr. Shah seeking appointment of
administrator pendente lite was premised on two planks. First,
there is an emergent necessity of appointment of administrator on
account of acts and conduct of the plaintiff. An endeavour was made
to urge that the plaintiff has either created third party rights in the
estate of the deceased or was in the process of creating the third
party rights, the plaintiff has misutilized the estate of the deceased
and converted the estate for his personal use. These contentions
were sought to be substantiated by asserting that the plaintiff has
never furnished accounts of the estate of the deceased. Thus, there
is a genuine apprehension that the plaintiff might have created
third party rights in the estate of the deceased and/or usurpped the
estate of the deceased.
40. I have carefully perused the averments in the application. The
averments appear to be in the nature of apprehensions and
inferences. These contentions are required to be appreciated in the
light of the fact that there is an injunction which runs against all the
parties from transferring, alienating or otherwise disposing of the
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estate of the deceased. In the face of such injunction order, which is
of wide amplitude, in my considered view, mere allegations that the
plaintiff might have created third party rights or is in the process of
creating third party rights in the estate of the deceased do not
sustain the weight of the submissions sought to be canvassed on
behalf of the applicant.
41. Likewise, the allegations that the assets have been misused
and funds have been misappropriated by the plaintiff for his
personal use and to the exclusion of other heirs of the deceased, are
general in nature. The parties were fully cognizant of the fact that
the plaintiff had taken full control of the estate of the deceased. The
parties agreed to an interim arrangement wherein the Court
Receiver came to be appointed only in respect of two of the
establishments. Thus, at this stage, the applicant cannot be
permitted to urge that the plaintiff had unjustifiably taken control of
the estate of the deceased to the exclusion of his siblings. In the
least, the applicant could have placed on record the material to
demonstrate, albeit prima facie, the instances of alleged misuse of
the estate and misappropriation of the funds and conversion of the
estate of the deceased by the plaintiff for his personal use. The
submissions of Mr. Tamboly that the case set up in the application
regarding apprehension of creation of third party rights and alleged
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misappropriation and misapplication of the estate of the deceased,
is not borne out by material on record, thus carries substance.
42. This leads me to the second limb of the submission of Mr.
Shah. As the plaintiff has been convicted for an offence punishable
under section 307 of the Penal Code and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for 10 years, Mr. Shah would urge, appointment of an
administrator becomes imperative for two reasons. First, the
administration of the estate of the deceased cannot be entrusted to
a tainted and incompetent person like the plaintiff who has been
convicted for an attempt to commit murder of his sister. Second, on
account of plaintiff's incarceration there is an emergent necessity of
appointment of administrator pendente lite to manage the estate
left behind by the deceased, apart from the aforesaid two hotels, in
respect of which the Court Receiver has been appointed. The
necessity of appointment of an administrator is of critical
importance as there is nobody to manage the estate of the deceased.
43. Mr. Shah, it must be noted, made an earnest endeavour to
advance a calibrated submission. At the outset a disclaimer was
sought to be made that the applicant does not seek appointment of
an administrator pendente lite for the sole reason that the plaintiff
has been convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. The said
factor, according to Mr. Shah, is one of the concomitant
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circumstances which warrants exercise of the power under section
247 of the Succession Act with a view to preserve and protect the
estate of the deceased and the interest of the heirs of the deceased.
It was further submitted that an inevitable consequence of the
imprisonment of the plaintiff is, inordinate delay in the disposal of
the suit.
44. In the case of Priyambada Debi Birla (supra) a lerned single
Judge of the Calcutta High Court elaborately considered the
principles and precedents in the matter of appointment of an
administrator pendente lite and enunciated that apart from the
Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the
Probate Court has inherent power to take measures to protect the
estate and properties of the deceased whenever the Court thinks fit
and appropriate.
45. In the facts of the said case, one of the circumstance which
weighed with Calcutta High Court, in the appointment of an
administrator pendente lite, was that the named executor was an
accused in a proseuction for criminal breach of trust. The
observations in paragraph 56 on which a strong reliance was placed
by Mr. Shah read as under:-
56] There were proceedings initiated in the past against executor under Companies Act, 1956. At present and there
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is a criminal prosecution against the executor. The executor Lodha is to defend the criminal prosecution, as he is one of the accused persons and his challenge in the criminal prosecution at the initial stage failed right up to Supreme Court. He is facing trials before the appropriate Court. Proceedings were initiated for search and seizure in connection with these proceedings. It is difficult for the Court to allow a person who is the accused to control and manage huge and vast estate of the deceased when he is facing charge of criminal breach trust, not qua executor. He has to defend this case personally. Appropriate Court, prima facie, found that there are allegations amongst other against the Lodha for trial of criminal prosecution. I am not oblivious of thought that mere initiation of proceedings does not render a particular person to be untrustworthy or incompetent to hold an office, but it is question of image of key person at whose hands large number of companies are rested for de facto control and management. Sitting in Probate Court I do not think a tainted person should be allowed to manage or handle the estate. It is one of the instances of necessity.
(emphasis supplied)
46. Mr. Tamboly, learned counsel for the plaintiff would urge that
the aforesaid observations in paragraph 56 of the decision in the
case of Priyambada Debi Birla (supra) cannot be read in isolation
and torn out of context. Mr. Tamboly would urge that it is not the
personal attribute of the executor but the necessity of appointment
of the administrator pendente lite that is of determinative
significance. In the aforesaid case, the Calcutta High Court has
explicitly recorded that the element of necessity is of paramount
importance. Reliance was placed on the observations, in paragraph
40, which read as under:-
40] However Courts of our country it seems to me did not blindly follow the principles laid down in case of Bellew v.
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Bellew or of Horrell v. Witts. In the case of Brindaban Chandra Saha v. Sureswar Shaha Paramanick and Ors. 10 CLJ 263 Division Bench of this Court taking note of the English case Bellew v. Bellew, ruled that the Court of Probate would grant APL in all cases where necessity for the grant is made out; and this is so because while the suit is pending there is not one legally entitled to receive or to hold the assets or to give discharges. In the case of Jogendra Lal Chowdhury v. Atindra Lal Chowdhury XIII CLJ 34 the Division Bench of this Court was again of the view while dealing with the corresponding provision of present Section 247 (Section 34 of the Indian Probate and Administration Act, 1881) that not only there must be a contest in the probate proceedings there must be necessity for such appointment.
(emphasis supplied)
47. It would also be contextually relevant to extract the
observations in paragraph 46 in the aforesaid judgment, wherein
the Calcutta High Court has extracted the observations of the
Division Bench of the same Court in the case of Sudhirendra Nath
Mitter vs. Arunendra Nath Mitter9 which exposit the concept of
"necessity". They read as under:-
46] In the case of Sudhirendra Nath Mitter v. Arunendra Nath Mitter and Ors. while discussing all the case decided in past on the question of appointment of administrator pendente lite, the learned single Judge of this Court held that in all cases where necessity is made out appointment be made. The word necessity was also explained in this judgment as an illustration in paragraph 14 of the said judgment. It was spoken therein:-
"...the necessity arises when there are assets to be collected; there is no representative to collect them; there is a 'bona fide' litigation respecting the title to that representation.
48. To buttress the submission that, the fact that the plaintiff has
9 AIR 1952 Cal. 418
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been sentenced to imprisonment, by itself, does not constitute a
legal disability to continue to act as an executor of the deceased, Mr.
Tamboly invited the attention of the Court to the observations of the
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Hara Coomar
Sircar (supra) wherein it was observed that, there was no provision
in the Probate and Administration Act, V of 1881, which gives the
District Judge any discretion to refuse an application for probate by
an executor named in the Will on the ground that, in the opinion of
the Judge, he is not a fit and proper person to be entrusted with that
office. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of
Thoppai Venkataramier (supra), wherein, following the decision in
the case of Hara Coomar Sircar (supra), it was enunciated that, it
was well settled that the Court can not refuse an executor probate
because it considers him unfit to be executor, unless the unfitness is
of the nature of legal incapacity, that is, minority or unsoundness of
mind.
49. In another Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High
Court, Dharm Raj Tiwari (supra), it was reiterated that where an
application for Probate was made by executor, the Court can not
refuse the Probate on the count that the applicant was unfit on the
ground of his poverty or insolvency. The restriction with regard to
grant of Probate under section 223 is restricted to minors and
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persons of unsound mind and association of individuals not being a
company, satisfying the condition of the rules prescribed by the
Government.
50. The aforesaid decisions, in my considered view, lay down that
if the executor applies for Probate and is not otherwise disqualified
under section 223 of the Succession Act, the Court cannot refuse to
grant Probate on the ground that in the opinion of the Court, the
named executor is not a fit person. These decisions simply lay down
that the Judge can not by recording a subjective satisfaction rule
that the named executor does not deserve to be entrusted with the
execution of the Will. However, to urge that the provisions contained
in section 223 of the Succession Act control the exercise of the
jurisdiction under section 247 of the Succession Act, is to miss the
true import of the power conferred on the Testamentary Court as a
Court of conscience.
51. If there is an objective material on the basis of which the
testamentary Court comes to the conclusion that the named
executor deserves to be divested of the estate of the deceased, the
provisions contained in section 223 of the Succession Act cannot be
pressed into service to urge that the named executor is not
disqualified thereunder. A provision which incorporates the grounds
of disqualification for grant of Probate cannot be so construed as to
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control the powers of the Court under section 247 of the Succession
Act to appoint an administrator pendente lite. These two provisions
operate in different fields. Lest , if the submission of Mr. Tamboly is
acceded to, in no case the Testamentary Court would be in a position
to appoint an administrator pendente lite where the testator names
an executor who is not otherwise disqualified under section 223 of
the Succession Act.
52. Normally, where an executor is named by he testator, the
Court is not inclined to appoint an administrator pendente lite
unless there is gross misconduct or mis-management or waste of
the estate on the part of executor. In the very appointment of the
executor by the testator is the implicit confidence that the testator
has reposed in the executor. Strong grounds are, therefore, required
to appoint an administrator pendente lite displacing the executor.
The moot question that comes to the fore is, whether the
imprisonment of the plaintiff is such a circumstance as to warrant
the appointment of an administrator pendente lite.
53. In the facts of the case, the following factors, bear upon an
answer to the aforesaid question.
(i) What is the extent of the estate of the deceased which vest
in the executor ?
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(ii) Is the estate in the state of, "in medio" ?
(iii) Does the imprisonment of the plaintiff hinders the
administration and management of the estate ?
(iv) Whether the administrator pendente lite is imperative for
the effective management and preservation of the estate of
the testator for the purpose of devolution on the persons who
are ultimately found entitled to succeed to the same ?
54. From the perusal of the Schedule I to the testamentary suit, it
becomes evident that there are large number of immovable
properties and running business concerns which were left behind
by the deceased. Apart from the liquid and financial assets, as many
as 22 properties are in the nature of immovable properties or
running concerns or businesses operated from the immovable
properties. The necessity of management of these properties can
hardly be questioned. The submission on behalf of the plaintiff that
the plaintiff has not been called upon to explain as to how he is
managing the affairs of the estate, despite being incarcerated,
though appears attractive at the first blush, does not carry much
substance.
55. The necessary corollary of the incarceration of the plaintiff is
that the plaintiff is incapacitated to manage and administer the
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estate of the deceased, personally. It is one thing to say that a
person who is incarcerated is not disqualified to be an executor, or
for that matter, for the grant of Probate. It is a completely different
thing where the inevitable consequence of incarceration is that
executor is disabled from managing the estate of the deceased. If the
estate is such that it does not require active management as is in the
case of a passive investment, the incarceration of the executor may
not have a bearing. However, whether the estate is large and
comprises running business ventures, which require day to day
management, it would be difficult to accede to the submission that
the incarceration does not operate as a legal disability.
56. In the facts of the case, having regard to the large number of
properties, which include business concerns, it would be naive to
believe that the incarceration of the plaintiff does not affect the
management and administration of the estate of the deceased.
57. The submission of Mr. Tamboly that the application suffers
from delay and laches and even the ground of prosecution of the
plaintiff which is now urged to assail the character and competence
of the plaintiff to continue to act as an executor has been available
since 2012, may not be wholly misplaced. However, the sequence of
events cannot be lost sight of. It was on 13 th September, 2021 the
plaintiff was convicted by the Division Bench of this Court for an
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offence punishable under section 307 of the Penal Code and
sentenced to suffer 10 years rigorous imprisonment. This
development bears upon the claim for appointment of an
administrator pendente lite. Incontrovertibly, though the plaintiff
has filed a Criminal Appeal before the Supreme Court, the sentence
has yet not been suspended and the plaintiff continues to be
incarcerated.
58. In my considered view, the consequences which emanate from
the sentence of 10 years imprisonment constitute a significant
change in circumstances, from the one which prevailed when the
plaintiff was accused of an attempt to commit murder and the Court
of Session found him guilty of an offence under section 326 of the
Penal Code and imposed sentence of 3 years imprisonment. The
aspect of delay and laches, if viewed from the aforesaid prism, does
not detract materially from the claim of the applicant.
59. I am conscious of the fact that, theoretically, it cannot be
urged that the estate of the deceased is, "in medio". Upon the death
of the testator, the estate vested in the plaintiff under section 211 of
the Succession Act. There is no qualm on the point that the plaintiff
took complete and effective control of the estate of the deceased
and, in fact, that is the grievance of the defendants. However, the
implication of the imprisonment of the plaintiff cannot be
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completely brushed aside.
60. In the totality of the circumstances, in my view, despite
interim measures which are in operation pursuant to the consent
order passed by the Appeal Bench, the exigency of the situation
brought about by incarceration of the plaintiff, warrants some
measures to protect and preserve the estate of the deceased.
61. Should that measure be the removal of the plaintiff as the
executor, bothered the Court. As noted above, by naming an
executor the testator expresses his utmost confidence in the
executor and, ordinarily, such named executor must be allowed to
continue to act as the executor and represent the estate of the
deceased and also continue to manage the same, albiet so long as the
named executor does not betray the trust and confidence. In the
facts of the case, the contention on behalf of the defendants that the
plaintiff has mismanaged or mal-administered the estate or
misappropriated or converted it for his personal use, are in the
realm of allegations.
62. Section 301 of the Succession Act which empoers the Court to
suspend, remove or discharge an executor, reads as under:-
301. Removal of executor or administrator and provision for successor.--
The High Court may, on application made to it, suspend, remove or discharge any private executor or administrator
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and provide for the succession of another person to the office of any such executor or administrator who may cease to hold office, and the vesting in such successor of any property belonging to the estate.
63. A useful reference in this context can be made to a Division
Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of
Dr.Smt.Kusum Kurre and Anr. vs. Dharam Singh 10 wherein the
circumstances in which the Court can invoke the power under
section 301 of the Succession Act was succinctly postulated. The
Madhya Pradesh High Court observed, inter alia, as under:-
It is pertinent to note that in the text of this section no specific grounds have been included/enumerated for removal of any private executor or administrator. The executor so named in the will, therefore, should be removed only when proper case in that behalf is made out for last wishes of the deceased as expressed in his will nominating a person and an executor should be highly respected. While exercising power u/s 301 of the Indian Succession Act, the Court must guard itself against any frivolous attempts for collateral purposes to remove the executor. If the Court finds that the person making an application has not come out with a clear title or has not come with clean hands, the application should be refused. However, if the Court finds on proper enquiry that the executor is acting contrary to the interest of the beneficiary, is not honesdy carrying out wishes of the deceased, has started claiming title in the property adverse to the deceased or the legatee, is withering away the property to the detriment of the interest of the legatee, it shall be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under this provision in removing the executor and succeeding him by another. In such cases main guide must be the welfare of the beneficiary. Want of honesty or want of proper capacity to exercise duties or want of reasonable fidelity may well justify an order under this section directing removal of the executor.
10 ILR 1986 MP 415
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64. At the same time, in the instnat case, the plaintiff is
incapacitated from managing the vast estate of the deceased on
account of the incarceration deserves consideration. In such a
situation, in my view, appointment of an administrator pendente lite
straightaway displacing the executor may not be justifiable. Having
given anxious consideration to situation which obtains, in my
considered view, it would be imperative to first have a complete
picture of the assets of the deceased. The persons who are in the
occupation of the properties, the current status of the businesses,
the persons who are conducting and/or managing those businesses
and the financial health thereof. For that purpose, the Court
Receiver needs to be associated with the executor as a joint
administrator. The Court Receiver will not, however, disrupt the
existing situation. Appointment of the Court Receiver to take stock
of the situation and file a comprehensive report, without interfering
with the day today management of the properties / business, will
equip the Court to pass further orders, if required, with a view to
protect and preserve the estate of the deceased.
65. For the foregoing reasons, I am inclined to appoint the Court
Receiver, High Court as a joint administrator pendente lite, subject
to certain conditions.
Hence, the following order.
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ORDER
(a) Application stands partly allowed.
(b) The Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay, is appointed
as a joint Administrator pendente lite with the plaintiff in
respect of the properties at serial Nos. 2 to 8, 10 to 13, 15 to
18 and 23 to 26 described in Schedule-I appended to the
Petition subject to the following conditions:
(i) The Court Receiver shall not take possession of any of
the properties either physical or symbolic.
(ii) It will not be necessary to display the board of the
Court Receiver at any of the properties.
(iii) The Court Receiver is not to change the present status
as to possession, tenancies, management and/or conducting
of the businesses in any of the properties.
(iv) The carriage of the businesses/commercial entities
shall continue to remain with the plaintiff and/or his
attorney, or agent, manager appointed by the plaintiff.
(v) The Court Receiver, any officer/official of the Court
Receiver, or any professional or person appointed by the
Court Receiver shall have access to the above properties
and shall be entitled to take inspection of the properties
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after giving 3 days notice to the occupants/manager/
caretaker of the premises.
(vi) The plaintiff and/or his agent, attorney and/or assign
or any other person carrying on the business and/or
management of the aforesaid properties shall provide
access to the Court Receiver or any officer or professional
appointed by the Court Receiver to the account books,
records and all the relevant documents in respect of the
aforesaid properties.
(vii) The Court Receiver is entitled to take the assistance of
empanelled accountant and/or any other professional/
service provider.
(viii) The Court Receiver shall compile data qua each of the
properties comprising of the present occupant, in case of
residential premises, the Manager and/or the person
conducting the business at the commercial entities
/ventures, the character in which such person occupies the
premises or carries on the business therein, whether the
business is a running concern and the income and
expenditure statement at the end of December 2024.
(ix) A comprehensive report regarding the status of each
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of the properties, including the points enumerated above, be
filed by the Court Receiver by 24 th January 2025 and its
copies served on all the parties.
(x) The applicant will lodge the matter with the Court
Receiver and pay initial charges as per Rule 591 of Bombay
High Court (Original Side) Rules within a period of one week
from the date of uploading of this order.
(xi) The applicant will also bear the charges and expenses
of the Court Receiver in the event the Court Receiver and
/or official of the Court Receiver is required to visit the
premises situated beyond the limits of Greater Mumbai.
(xii) The charges, expenses and costs to be borne by the
applicant shall be subject to further orders.
(xiii) The report to be filed by the Court Receiver pursuant
to the aforesaid directions, be listed before the Court on 10 th
February, 2025.
(xiv) Parties will be at liberty to seek further order/
directions based on the Court Receiver's Report.
Application disposed.
(N. J. JAMADAR, J.)
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1. At this stage, Mr. Tamboly, the learned Counsel for the
plaintiff, submits that the steps to be taken by the Court Receiver
pursuant to this order be kept in abeyance for a reasonable period
so as to facilitate the plaintiff to consider his position and seek
redressal.
2. Since the plaintiff is incarcerated, the request seems
justifiable.
3. The Court Receiver shall not take steps pursuant to this order
for a period of two weeks.
4. Consequently, the period stipulated in the order for
compliance by the Court Receiver shall stand correspondingly
extended by two weeks.
(N. J. JAMADAR, J.)
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