Bombay High Court
Alphonso D Souza And Another vs Apex Grievances Redressal Committee ... on 20 August, 2024
Author: M S Sonak
Bench: M. S. Sonak
Alphonso D'Souza and anr. v Apex Grievances
2024:BHC-OS:12683-DB Redressal Committee and ors.
wp.779-2023 (F).docx
Pradnya
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 779 OF 2023
1. ALPHONSO D'SOUZA,
Age: - 55 Occupation: - Unemployed
2. VANESSA D'SOUZA,
Age: - 52 Occupation: - Unemployed
Both Adults Indian Inhabitant
residing at Flat No.23, Thomas
Palace C.H.S.L., Jai Bhavani Mata
Road, Amboli, ...PETITIONERS
Andheri (West), Mumbai 400 058
~ versus ~
1. APEX GRIEVANCES REDRESSAL
COMMITTEE,
Slum Rehabilitation Authority,
Administrative Building, 4th Floor
Anant Kanekar Marg, Station Road
Bandra (East), Mumbai 400 051.
2. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
Slum Rehabilitation Authority,
Administrative Building,
Anant Kanekar Marg, Bandra (East),
Mumbai 400 051.
3. M/S. MASS JAKS ASSOCIATE VENTURES,
A partnership firm registered under
the Provisions of Indian Partnership
Act, 1932 having address at 7/49,
Sahyog Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd., Old Anand Nagar, MHB
Page 1 of 42
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Colony, Santacruz (East), ...RESPONDENTS
Mumbai 400 055.
A PPEARANCES
FOR THE PETITIONERS Adv. Nirmay Dave, with Adv.
Nandini Singh Modi, Adv.
Mohit Advani, Adv. Aditya
Khandeparkar, Adv. Mayuri
Karekar, Adv. Gaurav Patole,
i/b. Khandeparkar Law
Office.
FOR RESPONDENT NO .3 Adv. Mayur Khandeparkar, a/w
Adv. Arun Panickar, Adv.
Vinay Nair.
FOR RESPONDENT NO .2- Adv. Anoop Patil.
SRA
FOR RESPONDENT NO .1- Adv. Jagdish G. Aradwad
AGRC (Reddy).
CORAM : M. S. Sonak &
Kamal Khata, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 14th August 2024
PRONOUNCED ON : 20th August 2024
JUDGMENT (Per M S Sonak J):
-
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Rule. The rule is made returnable immediately at the
request of and with the consent of learned counsel for the
parties.
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3. The Petitioners, by instituting the present Petition, have
sought the following reliefs: -
a) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of
Certiorari or a writ, order and/or direction in the
nature of Certiorari or any other writ, order and/or
direction calling for the records and proceedings in
respect of the Impugned Order dated 5th January,
2022 passed in Application No.141 of 2021 and after
examining the validity, legality and propriety of the
Impugned Order, be pleased to set aside and quash the
same.
b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the
Respondent No. 2 to sanction plans which are in
conformity to the consent terms dated 9th May, 2012
and the Development Agreement dated 27th November,
2020 and revoke sanction granted to any other
previous plans which are contrary to the Consent
terms dated 9th May, 2012 and the Development
Agreement dated 27th November, 2020;
c) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the
present petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay
the operation, effect and implementation of the
Impugned Order dated 5th January, 2022.
d) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the
present petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to
restrain the Respondent No. 3, its servants, agents
putting up construction which is contrary to the
entitlement of the Petitioner No. 1 as recorded in the
Consent Terms dated 9th May, 2012 and the
Development Agreement dated 27th November, 2020.
e) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the
present petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to
restrain the Respondent No.2 and its officers from
granting approval to any plan in respect of
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redevelopment of the said plot which are contrary to
the entitlement of the Petitioner No.1 as recorded in
the Consent Terms dated 9th May, 2012 and the
Development Agreement dated 27th November, 2020.
f) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the
present petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to
restrain the Respondent No.3, its servants, agents,
assigns from creating third party rights in respect of
the shop on the ground floor of the building that is to
be constructed on the said plot for the Petitioner No.1
admeasuring 818 square feet with a 25-foot frontage
facing the 16th Road, TPS-III, Bandra (West) which is
shown on the approved plan.
g) Interim and Ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer
clause (d) to (g).
h) Cost of the Petition to be provided for.
i) Such other and further orders as may be
necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the co-
ordinate Bench comprising Revati Mohite Dere and Madhav J.
Jamdar, JJ. made the following interim order on 20th April
2022:-
"1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and
learned counsel for the respondent No.3.
2. By this petition, the petitioners have impugned
the order dated 5th January 2022, passed by the Apex
Grievance Redressal Committee ('AGRC'), in
Application No.141 of 2021 along with other
substantive reliefs.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that
the respondent No.3 - M/s. Mass Jaks Associate
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Ventures had filed an application before the AGRC
seeking the following substantive relief:-
"5. ..... .....
a) This Committee be pleased to issue an
Order or direction, against the Respondent
No.1 and its sub-ordinate officers not to take
cognizance of frivolous complaints made by
the Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in respect of their
purported entitlement to two commercial
premises each admeasuring 450 sq.ft in the
new building to be constructed on the said
Property in lieu of two stilt car parking space
each admeasuring 22.02 sq.mtrs in the Old
Building."
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that
instead of rejecting the said application, having regard
to the prayer sought for by the respondent No.3, the
AGRC passed an order stating therein that the
petitioners were not entitled to Two Commercial
Premises each admeasuring 450 Sq ft, in the new
building to be constructed on the said property 'in lieu
of Two stilt Car parking space each admeasuring
22.02 Sq Meters in the old building'. Accordingly, the
respondent No.1 - AGRC allowed the application filed
by the respondent No.3. Learned Counsel submits that
the said order is contrary to the order passed by this
Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that
Consent Terms were filed between the plaintiffs i.e.
Shekhar Vandana Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and M/s.
Urban Developer and the defendants i.e. Bandra Boon
Co-operative Hsg. Soc. Ltd.; Raymond D'souza and
Alphanso D'souza in Suit No.1994 of 2008. He
submits that the said Consent Terms were taken on
record in the said suit and accordingly the said suit
was disposed of in terms of the Consent Terms, which
were taken on record and marked 'X'. Learned Counsel
relied on the order dated 9th May 2012 passed in Suit
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No.1994 of 2008, which is on page 300 of the petition
and the Consent Terms which are on page 301 to 319
of the petition, in particular para 16 of the said
Consent Terms. The order dated 9th May 2012, passed
in Suit No.1994 of 2008, as well as the relevant para
16 of the Consent Terms are reproduced hereinunder;
Order dated 9th May 2012, passed in Suit No.1994 of
2008, reads thus; .
"1. The Learned Advocates appearing for
the Parties have tendered Consent Terms
dated 9th May 2012. They submit that the
Consent Terms be taken on record and the
Suit be disposed of in terms of the Consent
Terms. The Consent Terms are taken on
record and marked 'X' for identification. The
Consent Terms are signed by the Plaintiff
Nos.1, 2 and Defendant Nos.1 to 3 and the
respective Advocates for the Plaintiffs and the
Defendants. The undertakings recorded in the
Consent Terms are accepted. The Suit is
disposed of in terms of the Consent Terms
marked 'X'.
2. Refund of Court Fees, if any, as per
rules."
Para 16 of the Consent Terms, reads thus;
16 (a) The Plaintiff No. 2 agrees and
undertakes to this Honorable Court that the
Plaintiff No. 2 shall provide to defendant No.
area with not less than 13 feet height having
not less than 15 feet frontage abutting and
facing 16th Road, TPS III Bandra (W) and
having maximum area of loft as per DCR
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with a height of not less than 5.00 feet and
connected by a stairway and the Plaintiff
No.2 further agree & undertake to provide to
sq. feet carpet area with not less than 13 feet
height having not less than 15 feet frontage
abutting and facing 16th Road, TPS III,
Bandra (W) and having maximum area of
loft as per DCR with height of not less than
5.00 feet and connected by a stairway in the
proposed new building to be constructed by
Plaintiff No.2 on the said property. Both the
said shop Nos. 1 and 2 shall be situated at
Ground level. The Plaintiff No.2 shall provide
rolling shutters and glass panels to both the
shops along with other amenities and toilet
within the shop premises. The shops shall
also have an entry on the rear side of the
respective shop premises with wooden doors
and collapsible gates. Both the Plaintiff No.2
and the Defendant No.1 agree to undertake
to this Honourable Court that no boundary
wall of the compound shall be constructed in
front of the said shop premises. The Plaintiff
No.2 shall provide one Exclusive toilet on the
ground floor of the proposed new building for
common use of Defendant Nos.2 and 3 &
their servants and agents. There will be no
any commercial shop on the ground floor
except 2 shops of Defendant No. 2 & 3.
total two independent car parking spaces in
the Parking Unit i.e. Rotary parking /
Podium / Basement each one in the name of
Defendant Nos. 2 & 3 respectively free of cost.
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(c) The Plaintiff No. 2 agrees and
shops and car parking spaces and other
amenities as mentioned in herein above free
of cost.
(d) The Plaintiff No. 2 agrees to ensure not
to create any obstruction including boundary
wall of the plot of land facing 16th Road to
obstruct the view and free passage of the shop
premises i.e., permanent alternate
accommodation agreed to be alloted to
Defendant Nos. 2 & 3."
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that
after the suit was disposed of, the respondent No.3
stepped in the shoes of the plaintiff - M/s. Urban
Developer. He submits that the respondent No.3 issued
an offer letter to the Chairman/Secretary of Bandra
Boon CHS. Ltd. The said letter is on page 323 of the
petition. Learned Counsel relied on clause - 10 and the
last para of the said letter, which reads thus:-
"10. We shall abide by the consent terms
filed between Alphonso Dsouza and the
previous Developer in the Hon'ble High court.
As you are aware that a previous
developer has been appointed by your society.
We hereby proposed that the NOC from the
previous developer will be obtained by settling
the term amount.
We also proposed to take over the
project directly from the appointed developers
and continue with the obligations of the
commitment done by the previous developer.
In other words the same terms & condition
agreed between the society members &
previous developer."
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6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that
infact even in the Development Agreement entered into
by the respondent No.3 - M/s. Mass Jaks Associate
Ventures with Bandra Boon Co-operative Housing
Society Limited in clause - 11.3, it is stated as under:-
"11.3 In continuation to whatever has
been stated in Clause 11.1 above, the
Developers hereby agree to provide to Mr.
Alphonso D'Souza as mentioned under Clause
g. of this Agreement 02 shops admeasuring
409 sq. ft. Rera carpet area each, totaling to
818 sq. ft. Rera carpet area, with not less
than 13 feet height, not less than 4.5 Mtr
frontage, abutting and facing 16th Road TPS
III, Bandra (West), and having maximum loft
area of per DCPR 2034/SRA. The Developer
shall also provide 02 independent car parking
spaces for both shops combined. The
Developer shall provide either rolling shutters
or glass panels to both shops along with other
amenities and 01 toilet each within the shop
premises. There shall be no boundary wall of
the compound constructed in front of the
shop premises."
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further
submits that the order passed by the AGRC is contrary
to the order passed by this Court in the suit in which
Consent Terms were accepted and respective
undertakings were given.
8. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.3 opposes
the petition. He seeks time to file an affidavit-in-reply.
Time granted. The same to be filed in the Registry,
within four weeks from today alongwith the latest
sanction plan.
9. Having heard the learned counsel for the
petitioners and having perused the documents, the
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petitioners have prima facie made out a case for grant
of ad-interim relief. Prima facie, we are of the opinion,
that the order dated 5th January 2022 passed by the
AGRC, attempts to nullify the order passed by this
Court in the Suit, in which Consent Terms were filed
and undertakings were given to this Court and
accepted by this Court. Also the same is contrary to the
registered agreement executed between the petitioners
and the respondent No.3. We are also appalled at the
prayer sought for by the respondent No.3 before the
AGRC and the relief granted by the AGRC.
10. Accordingly, in the meantime, there shall be ad-
interim relief, in terms of prayer clauses 'c' to 'f', which
reads thus:-
"c) Pending the hearing and final disposal
of the present petition, this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to stay the operation, effect and
implementation of the Impugned Order dated
5th January, 2022.
d) Pending the hearing and final disposal
of the present petition, this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to restrain the Respondent No. 3, its
servants, agents putting up construction
which is contrary to the entitlement of the
Petitioner No.1 as recorded in the Consent
Terms dated 9th May, 2012 and the
Development Agreement dated 27th
November, 2020.
e) Pending the hearing and final disposal
of the present petition, this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to restrain the Respondent No.2 and
its officers from granting approval to any
plan in respect of redevelopment of the said
plot which are contrary to the entitlement of
the Petitioner No.1 as recorded in the Consent
Terms dated 9th May, 2012 and the
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Development Agreement dated 27th
November, 2020.
f) Pending the hearing and final disposal
of the present petition, this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to restrain the Respondent No. 3, its
servants, agents, assigns from creating thirty
party rights in respect of the shop on the
ground floor of the building that is to be
constructed on the said plot for the Petitioner
No.1 admeasuring 818 square feet with a 25-
foot frontage facing the 16th Road, TPS-III,
Bandra (West) which is shown on the
approved plan."
11. Stand over to 16th June 2022.
12. All concerned to act on the authenticated copy of
this order."
5. The 3rd Respondent, i.e. M/s. Mass Jaks Associate
Ventures challenged the above interim order by instituting
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.8836 of 2022
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. On 26th May 2022, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court made the following order: -
"The High Court by its order impugned stayed the
operation of the order passed by the Apex Grievance
Redressal Committee, Government of Maharashtra
dated 05th January, 2022.
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel has
submitted that as an interim arrangement and
without in any way prejudicing the rights and
contentions of the parties, Petitioner is willing to make
following offer:
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"The Petitioner submits that a shop
admeasuring 818 sq. ft. on the ground floor
of the subject under construction new
building is ready and the same has not been
allotted to anybody as yet. Further the same
shall not be allotted to any person and will
be kept vacant, till the final decision of the
writ petition, viz. W.P. (L) No. 8009/2022
that is pending before the Hon'ble Bombay
High Court."
Having considered the submissions made by both
the parties, we are of the opinion that this is a fair
arrangement only as an interim measure till the
disposal of the Writ Petition. We have not expressed
any opinion on the order dated 9th May, 2012 and in
particular the consent terms recorded in para 16 of the
order.
We would request the High Court to take up the
Writ Petition on the date specified in the order and to
dispose of the Writ expeditiously.
We make it clear that this interim arrangement
is subject to the final determination of the Writ
Petition in which respondent will be entitled to raise
all submissions available to them in law including the
maintainability. All contentions to be raised by the
parties are, therefore, kept open.
With the aforesaid observations, the Special
Leave Petition is disposed of.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed
of."
6. On 24 June 2024, after the Hon'ble Supreme Court's
order dated 26 May 2022 was shown to us, we posted the
Writ Petition for final disposal on 26 July 2024 at 2:30 p.m.
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The matter could not be reached on the said date, so it was
stood over to 5 August 2024 at 2:30 p.m. The matter was
ultimately taken up for final hearing on 14 August 2024, and
after the conclusion of final arguments, reserved for orders.
7. Mr Nirmay Dave learned counsel for the Petitioners
submitted that the proceedings initiated by the 3rd
Respondent vide Application No.141 of 2021 before the Apex
Grievance Redressal Committee ("AGRC") were entirely
misconceived since The AGRC lacked jurisdiction to entertain
such original proceedings given the clear and unambiguous
provisions of Section 35 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas
(Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971
("Slum Act").
8. Mr Dave submitted that the AGRC, in terms of Section
35 of the Slum Act, had only Appellate jurisdiction and,
therefore, could not have entertained Application No.141 of
2021, which was not challenging any of the orders referred to
in Section 35(1A) of the Slum Act. He submitted that the
assumption of jurisdiction by the AGRC in this matter was
improper and constituted an error apparent on the face of the
record. He submitted that the AGRC had purported to exercise
jurisdiction when it had no such jurisdiction vested in it by
any of the provisions of the Slum Act. Mr Dave submitted that
the impugned order made by the AGRC suffers from want of
jurisdiction and should, therefore, now be set aside.
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9. Mr Dave, without prejudice to the above contentions,
submitted that the AGRC has grossly erred and exercised
jurisdiction not at all vested in it by virtually rendering the
agreements entered into between the parties or their
predecessors in title and even consent terms filed and
accepted in this Court otiose or redundant by holding that
specific crucial clauses therein were not enforceable.
10. Mr Dave submitted that the Petitioners and the 3rd
Respondent have instituted suits before the Dindoshi Court
regarding the enforcement or otherwise of such crucial terms
and conditions of the development agreement or the consent
terms. Instead of letting the Civil Court decide on such issues,
the AGRC, without any jurisdiction in this regard, has made
the impugned order, which virtually nullifies specific crucial
clauses of the agreement and even the consent terms based on
which this Court made the consent orders. He also submitted
that for these reasons, the impugned order is likely to be
quashed and set aside.
11. Mr Dave, again, without prejudice, submitted that the
AGRC failed to consider the effect of the consent terms and
consent orders made by this Court and has virtually allowed
the 3rd Respondent to wriggle out from binding agreements
when, in fact, the AGRC has absolutely no jurisdiction to
decide the civil disputes between the parties.
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12. Mr Dave submitted that the consent terms, consent
orders and agreements between the parties were quite clear.
Based upon the same, the 2nd Respondent was not authorised
to sanction any plans conflicting with or rendering the
performance of any of the clauses of the development
agreements or the consent terms impossible. He submitted
that sanctions, contrary to the consent terms or the
development agreement, deserve to be quashed and set aside.
Therefore, relief ought to be granted in terms of prayer
clauses (a) and (b) of the Petition.
13. Mr Dave submitted that for all the above reasons, the
AGRC's impugned order dated 5 January 2022 may be set
aside, and the rule in this Petition may be made absolute in
terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b).
14. Mr Jagdish G. Aradwad (Reddy) appeared for AGRC
(Respondent No.1). He submitted that the AGRC's impugned
order dated 5 January 2022 speaks for itself. Therefore, there
was no question of his making any further submissions
supporting it or otherwise.
15. Mr Anoop Patil, learned counsel for the Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO") of Slum Rehabilitation Authority ("SRA")
(Respondent No.2), submitted that the SRA, through its Chief
Legal Consultant ("CLC") had already written to the 3rd
Respondent to abide by the terms of the registered
development agreement and to make suitable provision for
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the shops to be allotted to the Petitioners. He submitted that
the SRA was now bound by the impugned order dated 5th
January 2022 made by the AGRC even though no orders or
notices issued by the SRA had been challenged by the 3rd
Respondent before the AGRC. He pointed out that the AGRC
had not even set aside CLC's communication dated 24th
August 2021 issued to the 3rd Respondent vide the impugned
order dated 5th January 2022.
16. Mr Mayur Khandeparkar, learned counsel for the 3rd
Respondent, vehemently defended the AGRC's impugned
order dated 5th January 2022.
17. Mr Khandeparkar submitted that the AGRC, a successor
body to the High Powered Committee ("HPC"), constituted in
terms of this Court's Full Bench decision in Tulsiwadi
Navnirman Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. & Anr. vs State of
Maharashtra & Ors.1 had original jurisdiction to entertain
complaints regarding the implementation of SRA's scheme or
issues regarding the complaints that SRA or any other
authority was not taking cognisance of. In support of this
submission, he relied on certain observations from the
Tulsiwadi Navnirman Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. & Anr. (supra) and
the Government Resolution bearing computer code
No.20071115125849001 (copy he handed over at the time of
arguments).
2008 (1) ALL MR 318
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18. Mr Khandeparkar submitted that the above-referred
Government Resolution ("G.R.") was, to date, not withdrawn
and, therefore, held the field. He submitted that in terms of
this Government Resolution, the AGRC, which was erstwhile
the HPC, had original jurisdiction to entertain the dispute
raised by the 3rd Respondent regarding the effective
implementation of the SRA's scheme. Therefore, Mr
Khandeparker disputed Mr Dave's contention about AGRC
lacking any original jurisdiction to entertain the 3rd
Respondent's Application No.141 of 2021, on which the
impugned order was made.
19. Mr Khandeparkar and Mr Dave relied upon yet another
Government Resolution, i.e. Notification dated 8th March
2017 constituting the AGRC (Exhibit "Z" on pages 1043 to
1045 of the paper-book). Mr Dave submitted that this
Notification clarified that the AGRC lacked any original
jurisdiction. However, Mr Khandeparkar submitted that this
Notification supports his contention that AGRC had original
jurisdiction and could have entertained the 3rd Respondent's
Application No.141 of 2021.
20. Mr Khandeparkar submitted that the scheme in the
present case involved the construction of Permanent Transit
Camps ("PTC"). Therefore, the provisions of DPCR 33(11)
were applicable. He submitted that these provisions
corresponded to Regulations 33(10)(II)(iv) and 33(14)(D) of
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the earlier Development Control Regulation 1991 ("DCR"). He
relied upon the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in Louis
Anthony Dias and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2 to
submit that the SRA was the competent planning authority in
such cases. Accordingly, he submitted that the AGRC had the
jurisdiction to entertain the 3rd Respondent's
complaint/Application No.141 of 2021 and exercise the
original jurisdiction vested in the AGRC to allow such
Application/complaint vide the impugned order.
21. Mr Khandeparkar submitted that the impugned order,
besides having been made by AGRC exercising the jurisdiction
vested in it, was also otherwise legal and proper. He submitted
that the 3rd Respondent was not a party to the proceedings in
which the consent terms were filed, or consent orders were
obtained. He submitted that the development agreement
entered into by the 3rd Respondent was entered in a hurry
and was based upon misrepresentation by the Petitioners. He
submitted that the Petitioners were office bearers of the co-
operative society. Without any agreement with the society, it
would have been difficult for the 3rd Respondent to undertake
redevelopment. He submitted that on 27th November 2020,
the 3rd Respondent entered into two separate agreements
with the society. The first was to cancel the earlier agreement
dated 12th September 2006, and the second was to undertake
the redevelopment work based on fresh terms and conditions.
Writ Petition (L) No.542 of 2014 decided on 4th March 2014
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Mr Khandeparkar, therefore, submitted that the consent terms
or the consent orders could not be regarded as binding on the
3rd Respondent.
22. In any event, and without prejudice, Mr Khandeparkar
submitted that the SRA or its officials were not entitled to
decide private disputes between the parties, and, therefore, it
was not for the SRA or its CLC to interpret the agreements
between the parties or even consent terms and consent orders.
He relied on Ashapura Ramdev Buildcon LLP, Through its
partner Mr Dhaval Bhadra and Others vs. State of
Maharashtra, Through the Housing Department and Others 3
to support this contention.
23. Mr Khandeparkar submitted that the Petitioners only
had rights to a stilt parking, which they unauthorisedly
converted into commercial premises without obtaining
permission from any authorities. He submitted that the
Petitioners were not entitled to any commercial premises in
lieu of such stilt premises. He submitted that the reasoning in
paragraphs 9 to 12 of the AGRC's impugned order dated 5th
January 2022 is incapable and warrants no interference.
24. Mr Khandeparkar, without prejudice, submitted that no
relief could be granted in terms of prayer clause (b) of the
Petition because both the parties had filed suits regarding the
enforcement or otherwise of the development agreement
2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2591
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dated 27th November 2020, and such suits were pending. He
submitted that the issues now raised by Mr Dave based upon
the consent terms, consent orders or development agreement
squarely arose in the two suits, and, therefore, such matters
ought to be avoided by this Court in the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction.
25. Mr Khandeparkar, for all the above reasons, submitted
that this Petition ought to be dismissed, and the 3rd
Respondent should be relieved of the statement made on its
behalf before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as recorded in the
order dated 26th May 2022.
26. By way of a rejoinder, Mr Dave once again submitted
that the AGRC lacked original jurisdiction and that, in any
case, its findings were perverse because it had completely
ignored the consent terms, the consent orders, and the
development agreements that bound the parties.
27. Mr Dave submitted that even though the 3rd
Respondent was not a party to the consent terms dated 9th
May 2012, the 3rd Respondent, in its letter on pages 323 and
324 of the paper book, had expressly agreed to abide by the
consent terms filed in the proceedings between the Petitioners
and the previous developer in this Court. He pointed out that
the 3rd Respondent had expressly agreed that it would be
bound by the same terms and conditions agreed between the
society members and the previous developer.
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28. Mr Dave submitted that Clause 11.3 of the development
agreement provided explicitly that the Petitioners would be
allotted premises as set out in the consent terms. Based on all
such material, he urged that the rule be made absolute in
terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) as prayed for by the
Petitioners.
29. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
30. The first issue to be determined in this matter is whether
the AGRC had any "original jurisdiction" to entertain the 3rd
Respondent's Application No.141 of 2021, in which the AGRC
has made the impugned order. If the AGRC did have any such
jurisdiction, the second issue is whether the AGRC's impugned
order, dated 5 January 2022, suffers from perversity and non-
application of mind.
31. Regarding the first issue, it is well settled that the
tribunal, like the AGRC, is a creature of the Statute and
derives its powers from the express provisions of the Statute.
[see Rajeev Hitendra Pathak and Ors. vs. Achyut Kashinath
Karekar and anr.4].
32. Sections 34A and 35 of the Slum Act are relevant to
determining whether the AGRC has any original jurisdiction
or whether it exercises only Appellate jurisdiction.
2011 (9) SCC 541
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33. Section 34A was inserted by Maharashtra Act 33 of
2023 dated 7th August 2023 but with retrospective effect
from 8th March 2017. Thus, with retrospective effect, Section
34A of the Slum Act provides for the constitution of the
AGRC, its powers and functions, and the same reads as
follows: -
"34A. Constitution of Apex Grievance Redressal
Committee
(1) The State Government shall, by notification in the
Official Gazette, constitute, the Apex Grievance
Redressal Committee consisting of the Chairperson and
such number of members as the Government may
deem fit, for the purposes of exercising the powers and
performing the functions as may be assigned to it
under this Act.
(2) The Apex Grievance Redressal Committee shall
exercise the powers and perform the functions, as
follows, namely :--
(i) to hear and dispose off appeals against
orders of the Chief Executive Officer or any
Officer to whom the powers are delegated by
the Chief Executive Officer, as provided under
this Act ;
(ii) any issues or matters referred to it by
the State Government.
(3) The qualifications of the Chairperson and the
members of the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee,
the procedure to be followed for transacting its
business and quorum for its meetings, shall be such as
may be prescribed."
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34. Section 34A(1) provides that the AGRC shall be
constituted by notification in the Official Gazette "for the
purposes of exercising the powers and performing the functions
as may be assigned to it under this Act."
35. Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 34A of the Slum Act
provides that the AGRC shall exercise powers and perform the
functions as follows, namely:--
(i) to hear and dispose off appeals against orders of
the Chief Executive Officer or any Officer to whom the
powers are delegated by the Chief Executive Officer, as
provided under this Act ;
(ii) any issues or matters referred to it by the State
Government.
36. Thus, Section 34A of the Slum Act refers to AGRC
hearing and disposing of 'Appeals' against orders of the CEO or
any other officer to whom the powers are delegated by the
CEO as provided under this Act. In addition, the AGRC can
exercise powers and perform functions regarding any issues or
matters "referred to it by the State Government". Admittedly,
the dispute raised by the 3rd Respondent vide its application
No.141 of 2021 was not any issue or matter referred to it by
the State Government. This was not even the claim of the 3rd
Respondent.
37. Similarly, Section 35 of the Slum Act is crucial and is,
therefore, transcribed below for the convenience of reference:
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"35. Appeals
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,
any person aggrieved by any notice, order or direction
issued or given by the Competent Authority, may
appeal to the Appellate Authority, who shall be a
person holding a post not below the rank of Additional
Collector, in respect of the areas of Municipal
Corporations and "A" Class Municipal Councils, and
not below the rank of Deputy Collector, in respect of
areas of other Municipal Councils, to be notified by the
State Government, within a period of thirty days from
the date of issue of such notice, order or direction.
[(1A)Any person,--
(a) aggrieved by any notice, order or direction issued
or given by the Appellate Authority under sub-section
(1), may file an appeal within a period of thirty days
from the date of receipt of such notice, order or
direction, before the Grievance Redressal Committee;
(b) aggrieved by any notice, direction, circular,
decision, order, permission or approval issued or given
by the Chief Executive Officer of Slum Rehabilitation
Authority or any Officer to whom the powers are
delegated by the Chief Executive Officer, may file an
appeal within thirty days of receipt of such notice,
direction, circular, decision, order, permission or
approval, before the Apex Grievance Redressal
Committee.
(2) Every appeal under this Act shall be made by
petition in writing accompanied by a copy of the
notice, order or direction appealed against.
(3) Any appeal shall not operate as a stay order
appealed from except so far as the Appellate Authority
may grant by reasoned order, nor shall execution of
any order be stayed by reason only of an appeal
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having been preferred from, but the Appellate
Authority may for sufficient cause order stay of
execution of such order and if the notice, order or
direction against which appeal is made and is set aside
by Appellate Authority on an appeal disobedience
thereto shall not be deemed to be an offence.
(4) No appeal shall be decided under this section
unless the appellant had been heard or has had a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in person or
through a legal practitioner.
(5) The decision of the Grievance Redressal
Committee and the Apex Grievance Redressal
Committee on appeal shall be final and shall not be
questioned in any court."
38. Section 35(1A), upon which Mr Khandeparkar placed
reliance, also refers to the filing of an appeal against any
notice, order or direction issued or given by the Appellate
Authority under sub-section (1) within thirty days from the
date of receipt of such notice, order or direction before the
Grievance Redressal Committee ("GRC"). In this case, the 3rd
Respondent never approached the GRC. Therefore, the
Application on which the impugned order has been made was
not an Appeal against any notice, order or direction given or
issued by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (1) or the
GRC.
39. Section 35(1A)(b) also provides that any person
aggrieved by any notice, direction, circular, decision, order,
permission or approval issued by the CEO, SRA, or any officer
to whom the CEO delegates the powers may file an Appeal
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within thirty days of receipt of such notice, direction, circular,
decision, order, permission or approval before the AGRC.
Again, Application No.141 of 2021, on which the AGRC has
made the impugned order, was not an Appeal by the 3rd
Respondent against any notice, direction, circular, decision,
order, permission or approval issued or given by the CEO, SRA
or any other officer to whom the CEO, SRA, delegates the
powers. Even the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (5)
repeatedly refer to "Appeal" and the powers and functions of
AGRC as an "Appellate Authority."
40. Therefore, at least based upon the provisions of Sections
34A and 35, we cannot accept Mr Khandeparkar's contention
that the AGRC has any original jurisdiction to entertain
complaints or Applications of the nature made by the 3rd
Respondent to it. Even if the provisions of Section 34A are left
out of consideration because this provision was introduced in
the Statute on 7th August 2023, though with retrospective
effect from 8th March 2017, still, based even on the
requirements of Section 35 of the Slum Act alone, we cannot
agree with Mr Khandeparkar's submissions that the AGRC has
original jurisdiction and its functions are not restricted to
exercising Appellate jurisdiction, unless of course any issues or
matters are referred to it by the State Government given the
provisions of Section 34A(2)(ii) of the Slum Act.
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41. Mr Khandeparkar, however, relied upon specific
observations in paragraph 118(D) of Tulsiwadi Navnirman Co-
op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. & Anr. (supra). They read as follows: -
"118. In the result, we answer the question framed
hereinabove as under : -
A) .....
B) .....
C) .....
D) As far as disputes and questions involving the
slum dwellers and Slum Rehabilitation
Authority/Public Body/State, Co-operative Housing
Society of Slum Dwellers and Developers, Registered
Cooperative Housing Society of Slum Dwellers on one
hand and proposed Cooperative Society on the other,
Developers and S.R.A./State, a Writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not lie
or would be entertained unless and until the parties
exhaust the remedy of approaching the High Powered
Committee referred to above."
42. The above observations, in no manner, support Mr
Khandeparkar's contention. Firstly, the directions in Tulsiwadi
Navnirman Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. & Anr. (supra) were issued
when there were no statutory provisions like Section 34A or
35 of the Slum Act covering the field. Secondly, we are not
concerned with any proceedings before HPC in this case. We
are concerned with proceedings before the AGRC, now a
statutorily constituted authority under the Slum Act.
Therefore, based on the above observations, we cannot accept
that the AGRC had any original jurisdiction and could have
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entertained the 3rd respondent's complaint directly as it did.
Thirdly, the above observations refer to the exhaustion of
alternate remedies provided by the decision before petitioning
the writ court in the first instance. Based on such
observations, therefore, no original jurisdiction to entertain
the petition of the type made by the 3rd Respondent could be
sourced to the AGRC.
43. Since not much support was to be gained from the
provisions in Sections 34A and 35 of the Slum Act, Mr
Khandeparkar heavily relied upon G.R. bearing computer code
No.20071115125849001, a copy of which he handed over to
us at the time of arguments. He pointed out that this G.R., in
its title, refers to AGRC as "erstwhile HPC". He pointed out
that in terms of this G.R., the area of operation of HPC would,
inter alia, be:-
4. Disputes for not implementing the scheme on
time or improper implementation of scheme.
5. ....
6. Issues regarding the complaints that Slum
Rehabilitation Authority or any other authority is not
taking cognizance of the complaints/problems.
7. ....
8. Issues which Hon. Chairman will feel necessary
for implementing Slum Rehabilitation Scheme
smoothly.
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44. Mr Khandeparkar submitted that the G.R. mentioned
above vested "original jurisdiction" in the AGRC, a successor
body to the "HPC". He submitted that this G.R. continued in
force and was not superseded by Section 35 of the Slum Act.
He submitted that Section 35 of the Slum Act does not
exhaustively list the powers vested in AGRC. Therefore, he
submitted that there was nothing wrong in the AGRC directly
entertaining the 3rd Respondent's complaint and exercising
original jurisdiction.
45. Mr Khandeparkar also referred to the Notification dated
8th March 2017 constituting the AGRC (Exhibit "Z" on pages
1043 to 1045 of the paper book). He submitted that this
Notification empowered the AGRC to decide any issue
referred by the State Government by executive orders, any
issue referred by the Hon'ble High Court or the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, or any issue not specifically assigned to other
GRCs. He submitted that such jurisdiction was not vested in
AGRC under Section 35 of the Slum Act but was vested in the
AGRC under the Notification dated 8th March 2017. From
this, he deduced that the provisions of Section 35 of the Slum
Act are not exhaustive regarding the jurisdiction of the AGRC.
46. For several reasons, we cannot accept Mr
Khandeparkar's submissions that, based on the G.R. or the
Notification dated 8th March 2017, the AGRC could have
entertained the 3rd Respondent's complaint, which virtually
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sought to restrain all authorities like SRA, GRC, etc. from even
taking cognisance of or entertaining any of the Petitioners'
complaints.
47. Firstly, the blanket proposition that the G.R. dealing
with the area of operation of HPC continues and applies even
after the HPC has become extinct cannot be accepted. Merely
because the G.R., in its title, refers to AGRC as the erstwhile
HPC, we cannot hold that the AGRC, which is a statutory body
governed by the provisions of, inter alia Sections 34A and 35
of the Slum Act, continues source some jurisdiction under the
G.R. relied upon by Mr Khandeparkar. The G.R. does not
merely supplement but, if interpreted literally, would supplant
the statutory provisions of Sections 34A and 35 of the Slum
Act and alter the legislative scheme.
48. The G.R., if interpreted literally as suggested by Mr
Khandeparkar, would alter the statutory scheme under
Sections 34A and 35 of the Slum Act and convert the AGRC
from being an Appellate Authority to some super authority
exercising both original as well as Appellate jurisdiction over
practically all matters concerning a slum redevelopment
scheme. Such an interpretation might render even the GRCs
constituted under the Slum Act completely redundant or
otiose. Depending upon what is "convenient", parties would
then be in a position to completely disregard the statutory
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scheme and approach the AGRC for any and every relief not
even contemplated by the provisions of the Slum Act.
49. The present matter indicates what would happen if the
contention now raised on behalf of the 3rd Respondent is
accepted, and the AGRC is conferred with practically
unlimited jurisdiction to decide any and every matter related
to a slum redevelopment scheme. The 3rd Respondent, in this
matter, applied for the following substantive reliefs before the
AGRC:-
"a. that this Hon'ble Committee be pleased to issue
an order or direction, against the Respondent No.1
and its Sub-ordinate officers not to take cognisance of
frivolous complaints made by the Respondent Nos.2 &
3 in respect of their purported entitlement to two
commercial premises each admeasuring 450 sq.ft. in
the new building to be constructed on the said
Property in lieu of two stilt car parking space each
admeasuring 22.02 sq.mtrs in the Old Building;
b. that this Hon'ble Committee be pleased to
declare that the Respondents Nos.2 & 3 are only
entitled for two residential units each admeasuring
225 sq.ft. and two stilt car parking space in the new
building to be constructed on the said Property by the
Applicant;
c. that this Hon'ble Committee be pleased to issue
an order or direction, against the Respondent No.1 by
himself, his subordinate officers, agents, servants or
assigns or any other person/s claiming through or
under the Respondent No.1 from in any manner
taking any action and/or acting in furtherance of the
complaints made by the Respondent Nos.2 & 3."
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50. The above reliefs virtually invite the AGRC to direct the
SRA and its officers "not to take cognisance of the frivolous
complaints made by, or that may be made" by the Petitioners
herein regarding their entitlement to two commercial
premises in the new building to be constructed by the 3rd
Respondent-Developer. The second relief virtually invites the
AGRC 'to issue a declaration about the entitlement' of the
Petitioners, thereby completely overriding the consent terms,
consent orders and even the development agreement entered
into by the 3rd Respondent and the society, expressly
acknowledging that the consent terms and consent orders
concerning the previous developer and the society would bind
the 3rd Respondent as the successor developer. The third
substantive relief is similar to the first in that it invites the
AGRC to restrain the SRA and its officers from taking "any
action" against the 3rd Respondent in furtherance of the
complaints made by the Petitioners.
51. Merely because the G.R. relied upon by the 3rd
Respondent, in its title, refers to AGRC as erstwhile HPC, we
cannot give a go-bye to the statutory provisions contained in
the Slum Act conferring Appellate jurisdiction upon the AGRC
and vest the AGRC with almost unlimited powers to entertain
any complaints directly regarding the implementation of the
SRA's scheme. Such an interpretation would do violence to the
statutory scheme under the Slum Act regarding the powers
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and functions of GRC and AGRC, which are now statutory
bodies under the Slum Act.
52. The argument based on the Notification dated 8th
March 2017 is also entirely misconceived. The notification
refers to the constitution of the AGRC. Significantly, such a
constitution is different from the constitution of the erstwhile
HPC, which was only an executive body made under the
orders of this Court because there were no statutory
provisions dealing with several issues and complaints
concerning the implementation of a slum redevelopment
scheme.
53. The Notification of 8th March 2017 refers to the scope
of the AGRC, involving any issue referred to by the state
government through its executive orders. Possibly to ward off
the challenge that such a power could not have been vested in
the AGRC, given the extant provisions of Section 35 of the
Slum Act, the legislature introduced Section 34A in the Slum
Act with retrospective effect from 8th March 2017 itself,
vesting in the AGRC, powers to decide any issues or matters
referred to it by the State Government. It is significant to
record that the Notification now relied upon is 8th March
2017, and the amendment by which Section 34A was inserted
in the Slum Act was also made effective from 8th March 2017.
This indicates that the power and jurisdiction of the AGRC
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were always intended to be governed by the statutory
provisions of the Slum Act.
54. There was no necessity for any legislation or executive
instructions regarding any issue referred by this Court or the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. As a matter of abundant caution,
however, the Notification dated 8th March 2017 refers to the
scope of AGRC involving any issue referred by this Court or
the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The same applies to a certain
extent to matters not specifically assigned to other GRCs.
Significantly, this Notification does not say that the AGRC can
exercise any powers or jurisdiction not vested in it by any of
the provisions of the Slum Act. Only issues that may not have
been specifically assigned to other GRCs and not to AGRC
could be looked into by the AGRC. This provision is like some
residuary powers over matters that may not have been
specifically assigned to other GRCs.
55. There is no expansion of jurisdiction regarding
administrative control and coordination over the functioning
of other GRCs, as notified by the State Government from time
to time. This notification clause has nothing to do with the
AGRC's exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers. In this
case, no argument was advanced or pressed about the
application before the AGRC being an appeal against the
CLC's communication. Mr Khandeparkar pointed out that CLC
was not an employee of the SRA but more of a legal
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professional concerned with the SRA. Therefore, the CLC's
communication was more like his opinion on the subject that
might have been referred to him.
56. Therefore, based upon the G.R. bearing computer code
No.20071115125849001 or the Notification dated 8th March
2017, we cannot accept the contention that the original
jurisdiction is vested in the AGRC, in the exercise of which the
AGRC was competent to entertain the 3rd Respondent's
complaint, which virtually was an invitation to stifle the SRA
and its officers from even exercising its statutory duties and
functions or to set at nought contracts between the parties or
even consent terms, based upon which Courts may have made
consent orders. This kind of power cannot even be sourced to
the existing appellate jurisdiction, let alone the non-existing
original jurisdiction.
57. For all the above reasons, we hold that the AGRC, in the
present matter, had no jurisdiction to entertain the 3rd
Respondent's complaint or to exercise any original jurisdiction
and make the impugned order in the exercise of such non-
existent original jurisdiction. On this ground alone, without
adverting to the merits or demerits of the directions issued by
the AGRC, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and is
hereby set aside.
58. Mr Dave and Mr Khandeparkar, at some point in the
course of their arguments, agreed that the AGRC lacked
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jurisdiction to decide upon contractual disputes between the
parties. Still, the learned counsel attempted to justify the
respective versions of the parties they represent. Mr
Khandeparkar submitted that the SRA or its officials could not
go into the issues of interpretation and enforcement of private
agreements or contracts between the parties. By the same
logic, Mr Dave urged that the AGRC was not authorised to
nullify or render otiose the private agreements or contracts
between the parties.
59. Mr Dave vehemently submitted that there were clear
agreements between the erstwhile developer and the
Petitioners and/or the society under which two commercial
premises had to be allotted to the Petitioners in lieu of the
demolished premises. He submitted that since the dispute
arose regarding such entitlement, a civil suit was filed, and
such dispute was resolved by filing consent terms in this Court
on 9th May 2012. Based on the consent terms, this Court
made the consent order on 9th May 2012.
60. Mr Dave submitted that the erstwhile developer
defaulted, was removed and was eventually replaced by the
3rd Respondent. He submitted that at this stage, a fresh
development agreement was executed by the 3rd Respondent
after cancelling the previous development agreement. But in
this fresh development agreement, the 3rd Respondent
expressly acknowledged to be bound by all the terms and
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conditions in the development agreement with the erstwhile
developer. He pointed out correspondence in which the 3rd
Respondent agreed to bind itself by the consent terms and the
consent orders in the proceedings with the erstwhile
developer. He submitted that the 3rd Respondent could not
wriggle out of such solemn commitments and undertakings
after all this. In any case, he submitted that the AGRC, by
exercising jurisdiction which was not even vested in it, could
not have declared that the 3rd Respondent was not bound by
any of the solemn commitments and undertakings or that the
Petitioners were not entitled to any of the benefits and
entitlements assured to them under the agreements, consent
terms and consent orders.
61. On the other hand, Mr Khandeparkar submitted that the
commitments made by the erstwhile developer would not
bind the present developer, i.e. the 3rd Respondent. He
submitted that the Petitioners had unauthorisedly converted
the stilt parking area into commercial spaces without any
permission from any authorities. He submitted that in lieu of
such an unauthorised user, there was no question of the
Petitioners claiming two commercial premises as recorded in
the development agreements, consent terms or consent
orders. He submitted that the clauses suggesting such
commitments, in any event, have already been terminated by
the 3rd Respondent. The issue of such termination was writ
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large in the Commercial Suit (L) No.288 of 2022 instituted by
the 3rd Respondent in the Dindoshi Court.
62. Mr Khandeparkar, without prejudice, submitted that he
was authorised to make a statement that the AGRC's
impugned order need not affect the progress of the civil suits
instituted by the Petitioners and the 3rd Respondent in the
Dindoshi Court. He submitted that AGRC's impugned order
was relevant only in the context of the planning authorities
issuing occupancy certificates or other clearances. He
submitted that, ultimately, the civil rights of the parties could
be sorted out in the civil suits filed by the Petitioners and the
3rd Respondent in the Dindoshi Court. He, however, agreed
that this statement could be made without prejudice if, with
this clarification, this Petition was being disposed of without
interfering with the AGRC's impugned order.
63. Mr Dave submitted that the AGRC's order was entirely
without jurisdiction and, in any case, was perverse because
the AGRC should never have made such an order by virtually
ignoring or rendering to the agreements between the parties
and even consent orders made by the Courts including this
Court, otiose. He submitted that the AGRC's impugned order,
apart from being without jurisdiction, was vulnerable even on
merits because of errors apparent on the face of the record
and the non-application of mind.
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64. In Ashapura Ramdev Buildcon LLP, through its partner Mr
Dhaval Bhadra and Others (supra), a co-ordinate division
bench has held that authorities like SRA are not the proper
ones to go into private civil disputes between the parties. This
principle would have to be extended to AGRC, an Appellate
Authority, against any orders, notices or directions issued by
the SRA and its officers. Therefore, based on this decision, we
hold that the AGRC, in this case, was not justified or the
proper authority to go into and decide the private civil
disputes between the parties.
65. However, since Mr Dave and Mr Khandeparkar insisted
on advancing the above arguments, we have recorded them.
At least prima facie, we disapprove of the AGRC's approach of
virtually rendering the agreements between the parties and
even the consent orders made by this Court otiose. Except for
this prima facie observation, we do not think that it would be
appropriate on our part to deal with the rival contentions on
merits, particularly now that the Petitioners and the 3rd
Respondent have instituted suits before the Dindoshi Court,
wherein, precisely, such issues arise and could be adjudicated.
66. For the same reason, it would not be appropriate for us
to decide on the relief in prayer clause (b) of this Petition. Any
consideration of this prayer clause would amount to this
Court ruling on the merits of the private civil disputes
between the parties when such private civil disputes are writ
20th August 2024
Alphonso D'Souza and anr. v Apex Grievances
Redressal Committee and ors.
wp.779-2023 (F).docx
large in the civil suits instituted by the Petitioners and the 3rd
Respondent in the Dindoshi Court. Therefore, by leaving open
all contentions of all parties to be agitated in the civil suits,
we decline to go into the contentions, based on which the
relief is sought under prayer clause (b) of the Petition.
67. However, regarding the above, we clarify that we are
not deciding on or going into the relief issue regarding prayer
clause (b). This does not mean that we have either rejected or
granted such relief; it only means that we have declined to
discuss the issues concerning relief in terms of prayer clause
(b) for the above reasons.
68. As noted earlier, by its order dated 20th April 2022, this
Court granted the Petitioners ad-interim relief in terms of
prayer clauses (c) to (f). However, this relief was modified by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court's order dated 26th May 2022 after
accepting the statement made on behalf of the 3rd
Respondent that it would not alienate the shop measuring 818
sq. ft. on the ground floor of the new building.
69. Mr Khandeparkar, in response to our query as to what
would happen if we set aside the AGRC's impugned order but
declined to go into relief in terms of prayer clause (b),
submitted that the interim order granted by this Court or
modified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would come to an
end. He further submitted that possibly, the 3rd Respondent
would then be in a position to dispose of the shop measuring
20th August 2024
Alphonso D'Souza and anr. v Apex Grievances
Redressal Committee and ors.
wp.779-2023 (F).docx
818 sq. ft, on the ground floor of the subject new building
since he had no instructions to continue the statement made
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court even for some reasonable
period within which the Petitioners could move the Dindoshi
Court and seek interim reliefs.
70. Considering the material on record, including, in
particular, the development agreement entered into by the 3rd
Respondent, the communication (Exhibit "K" on pages 323
and 324 of the paper book) by which the 3rd Respondent
expressly agreed to be bound by the consent orders involving
the erstwhile developer, we direct that the 3rd Respondent
shall not sell, transfer, alienate or part with possession of the
shop admeasuring 818 sq. ft on the ground floor of the subject
new building for three months from today. In the meantime, it
will be open to the Petitioners to apply for appropriate interim
reliefs in the civil suit they instituted before the Dindoshi
Court. If such an application is filed, the Dindoshi Court
should dispose of such application following law and on its
own merits as expeditiously as possible.
71. This Petition is accordingly disposed of by the following
order: -
ORDER
(a) The impugned order dated 5th January 2022
made by the AGRC in Application No.141 of 2021
(Exhibit "A") is quashed and set aside.
20th August 2024
Alphonso D'Souza and anr. v Apex Grievances
Redressal Committee and ors.
wp.779-2023 (F).docx
(b) For three months from today, the 3rd Respondent
is restrained from selling, transferring, alienating, or
parting with possession of the shop measuring 818 sq. ft
on the ground floor of the subject new building.
(c) If the Petitioners and/or the 3rd Respondent file
any applications for interim relief before the Dindoshi
Court in S.C. Suit No.3352 of 2023 or Commercial Suit
(L) No. 288 of 2022, the Dindoshi Court is requested to
dispose of such applications following law and on its
own merits as expeditiously as possible.
72. The rule is made absolute in the above terms without
any cost order.
(Kamal Khata, J) (M. S. Sonak, J)
Signed by: Pradnya Bhogale
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge 20th August 2024
Date: 20/08/2024 17:31:46
