Bombay High Court
Uddhavrao Marotirao Dusunge And ... vs The State Of Maharashtra And ... on 19 October, 2023
Bench: R. G. Avachat, Sanjay A. Deshmukh
2023:BHC-AUG:22735-DB
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-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
983 CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.1863 OF 2021
1. Uddhavrao Marotirao Dusunge
2. Prashant Anil Dusunge
3. Mininath Eknath Dusunge
4. Amol Dattatray Kokate
..APPLICANTS
-VERSUS-
1. The State of Maharashtra
2. Nikhil Ashok Kapse ..RESPONDENTS
...
Advocate for Applicants : Mr. Narwade Narayan B.
APP for Respondent/State : Mr.P.N. Kutti
Advocate for Respondent No.2 : Mr. R.S. Kasar
...
CORAM : R.G. AVACHAT AND
SANJAY A. DESHMUKH, JJ.
DATED : 19th OCTOBER, 2023.
ORAL ORDER (Per Sanjay A. Deshmukh, J.) :-
1. This application is filed for quashment of First Information
Report (FIR) and proceedings in Special Case No.287 of 2020
pending before the Sessions Court Ahmednagar in pursuance of FIR
being Crime No.315 of 2020 registered with Nagar Taluka Police
Station, Dist. Ahmednagar for the offences punishable under sections
143, 147, 148, 149, 324, 323, 504 of the Indian Penal Code and
under section 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(v-a) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (for short, S.C. & S.T.
Act).
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2. Informant - respondent no.2 averred in the report that he
was proceeding back along with his friend Akshay Pathriya from
Pune-Nagar Highway by bullet at about 5.30 p.m. of 26.06.2020, the
vehicle bearing No.MH-16-BH-5619 came from back side and tried to
stop them. The informant did not stop the bullet. Thereafter, after
some distance, the informant stopped his bullet, at that time,
Uddhavrao Dusunge, Prashant Dusunge, Mininath Dusunge,
Ashirvad Dhage and driver Amol Kokate came out of that vehicle and
started to beat the informant by fist and kick blows. Applicant no.1 -
Udhavrao Dusugne assaulted by iron rod to the informant, which was
given by Ashirwad Dhage to him. He alleged that we have developed
enmity with them by loving his daughter. He threatened to kill and
assaulted on his head by iron rod. They also abused Akshay Pathriya
and beaten him by fist and kick blows. Then, they all ran away. They
also tried them to stop at Khedgaon Bypass but the informant and
Akshay Pathriya succeeded in escaping themselves. The report was
lodged accordingly.
3. The learned advocate for the applicants submitted that the
report does not disclose the abuses hurled on the caste to Akshay
Pathriya. After registration of the report, allegations are made about
hurling of abuses on the caste to Akshay. He submitted that earlier to
the incident, the complaints were made by daughter of applicant no.1
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to the Police about some earlier incidents which shows their enmity.
The applicants are falsely implicated in the crime. The injury
certificate shows simple injuries sustained to the informant. There is
no prima facie material against the applicants. The alleged abuses
hurled on the caste were not hurled in the public view. He lastly
payed to quash the proceedings in pursuance of the report and
charge-sheet.
4. The learned APP for the State strongly opposed the
application. The learned advocate for respondent no.2 - informant
submitted that the abuses were hurled at public place in presence of
informant to Akshay. There is strong evidence against the applicants
and other accused, which is supported by medical certificate. The
learned advocate for respondent no.2 strongly opposed the
application and prayed to reject the application.
5. Perused the FIR and charge-sheet. FIR discloses the
names of the applicants that they participated in the incident of
assault. There is injury certificate showing simple injuries sustained to
the informant in the said incident. Therefore, this application cannot
be allowed for quashing the report for the IPC offences.
6. The learned advocate for the applicants relied upon the
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authority of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hitesh Verma Vs.
State of Uttarakhand and another in Criminal Appeal No.707 of
2020 dated 5th November, 2020. In para no.14, it is held thus :-
"14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in "any place within public view:. What is to be
regarded as "place in public view" had come up for
consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as
Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing
Counsel & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 435. The Court had drawn
distinction between the expression "public place" and "in
any place within public view". It was held that if an offence
is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a
house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the
road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn
would certainly be a place within the public view. On the
contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some
members of the pubic are there (not merely relatives or
friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the
public view. The Court held as under :
"28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod
Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar")
when he stood near the car which was parked at
the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was
certainly a place within public view, since the
gate of a house is certainly a place within public
view. It could have been a different matter had
the alleged offence been committed inside a
building, and also was not in the public view.
However, if the offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the
lawn can be seen by someone from the road or
lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view. Also,
even if the remark is made inside a building, but
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some members of the public are there (not
merely relatives or friends) then also it would be
an offence since it is in the public view. We must,
therefore, not confuse the expression "place
within public view" with the expression "public
place". A place can be a private place but yet
within the public view. On the other hand, a
public place would ordinarily mean a place which
is owned or leased by the Government or the
municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha
or an instrumentality of the State, and not by
private persons or private bodies."
7. The learned advocate for the applicants submitted that the
abuses as alleged by Akshay Pathriya were not hurled in the public
view, therefore, he prayed to quash the report to the extent of offence
punishable under sections 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(v-a) of the S.C. & S.T. Act.
8. The report does not show the abuses hurled to Akshay
Pathriya on his caste. However, later on in the supplementary
statement and the statement of Akshay Pathriya, it is alleged that he
was abused on the caste. Why delay was caused for invoking
provisions of S.C. & S.T. Act is not clarified. Further, only the
informant was present there. Therefore, in the facts situation of the
present case, it is prima facie established that abuses were not
hurled in the public view. Therefore, in view of the ratio laid down in
the authority of Hitesh Verma (supra), there is prima facie no
evidence that applicants abused Akshay Pathriya on caste. Thus to
the extent of offence punishable under sections 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(v-a) of
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the S.C. & S.T. Act, F.I.R. and charge-sheet deserve to be quashed
as it is abuse of process of the Court. The application therefore
deserves to be partly allowed to the extent of offences punishable
under sections 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(v-a) of the S.C. & S.T. Act. Hence the
following order :-
ORDER
(i) The application is partly allowed. Special Case No.287 of
2020 pending before the Sessions Court, Ahmednagar on the basis
of the FIR bearing C.R. No.315 of 2020 and consequential charge-
sheet for the offence punishable under sections 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(v-a) of
the S.C. & S.T. Act is quashed.
(ii) The matter shall go to the learned Judicial Magistrate, First
Class from the Special Court, Ahmednagar.
(iii) No costs.
(SANJAY A. DESHMUKH, J.) (R.G. AVACHAT, J.)
sga/
