Bombay High Court
Pravin Rambhau Dhande vs Divisional Controller ... on 5 June, 2023
Bench: Avinash G. Gharote
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1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.1747/2023
Pralhad Ganapatrao Bharad
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1748/2023
M. Shabbir M. Yasin
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana and another
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1773/2023
Ganesh Narayan Chinchole
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1768/2023
Atmaram Kacharu Jadhav
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1760/2023
Mobinoddin Jamaloddin Kazi
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1761/2023
Dinkar Purnaji Dukare
...Versus...
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2
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1752/2023
Abdul Aarif Sheikh Raheman
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1762/2023
Sheikh Bashir Sheikh Lal
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1763/2023
Pawan Jankiram Palwe (Deceased) through L.R. Surekha Pawan Palwe
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1767/2023
Punjaji Tukaram Suroshe
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1769/2023
Vasantrao Ganapat Karhade
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1757/2023
Pratap Keruba Ambhore
...Versus...
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3
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana and another
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1750/2023
Dilip Vishwanath Lamkhede
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1758/2023
Pralhad Tukaram Wagh
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1751/2023
Pravin Rambhau Dhande
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1749/2023
Ashok Namdeo Deshmukh
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1765/2023
Pundlik Govindrao Ghube
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1771/2023
Bhagwan Digambar Udar
...Versus...
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4
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1759/2023
Shamprakash Narayanrao Gaikwad
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1774/2023
Akhtar Mohammad Khan Abdul Hamid Khan
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1770/2023
Kashinath Tukaram Bahekar
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1764/2023
M. Kalim M. Jamadar
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1756/2023
Atmaram Dattu Gadhave
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1772/2023
Sahdeo Vithoba Shegokar
...Versus...
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5
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1755/2023
Sanjay Jayram Khedekar
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1753/2023
Prakash Murlidhar Jadhav
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1766/2023
Gulabrao Ruprao Jeughale
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1754/2023
Eknath Mohan Sonune
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1775/2023
Vishwanath Kashinath Petare
...Versus...
Divisional Controller Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Buldana Division Buldana
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. B.M. Khan, Advocate for petitioner in all petitions
Mr. V.H. Kedar, Advocate for respondents/MSRTC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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6
CORAM : AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.
Date of reserving the order : 04/05/2023
Date of pronouncing the order : 05/06/2023
1. Heard Mr. Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioners and
Mr. Kedar, learned Counsel for the respondents/MSRTC.
2. All these petitions raise a common question, as to
whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of clause 49 of
the 1956 settlement independently of clause 19 of the 1985
settlement and Resolution No.8856. In all these petitions, except for
difference in the dates, rest of the plea is common and therefore
they are being decided by this common judgment.
3. Mr. Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits,
that under clause 49 of the settlement of 1956, the petitioners were
entitled to be placed on same time pay scale as of regular employees,
on having completed 180 days of service with the
respondent/MSRTC. Taking the facts in Writ Petition No.1747/2023
in hand, it is contended that the petitioner had completed 180 days
as a daily wager on 31/12/1990, but was not taken on temporary
time scale w.e.f 01/01/1991, but was on temporary time scale till
16/03/1992 and therefore was entitled to the difference in wages,
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prior to 16/03/1992. It is also claimed that the petitioner was
thereafter placed in daily rated Group-II on 05/07/1996. The
petitioner retired on 29/02/2020 and therefore it is claimed that the
petitioner is entitled for the benefit of time scale from 01/01/1991
till his retirement. It is also contended that the various settlements,
namely clause 49 of the 1956 settlement, Resolution No.8856 and
clause 19 of the 1985 settlement operate in different arenas and
therefore work independently of each other, in light of which, the
learned Industrial Court could not have rejected the claim for the
benefit of time scale to the petitioner. It is also contended that clause
49 of the 1956 settlement only relates to grant of regular time scale
to a daily rated employee on having completed 180 days of
continuous service and has nothing to do with any absorption. It is
also contended that clause 19 of the 1985 settlement and also
Resolution No.8856 relate to the absorption, and therefore have no
bearing whatsoever upon the operation of clause 49 of the 1956
settlement as they both operate independent of each other. In that
view of the matter, it is contended that the learned Industrial Court
has misconstrued the position by placing reliance upon clause 19 of
1985 settlement for the purpose of considering the benefits available
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under clause 49 of the 1956 settlement and therefore the impugned
judgment is liable to be quashed and set aside.
4. In order to substantiate his contention that the clauses
operate in a different field, reliance is placed by Mr. Khan, learned
counsel for the petitioners, upon the Full Bench judgment of this
Court in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation,
Nagpur Vs. Premlal s/o Khatri Gajbhiye 2003-II-LLJ 1108 . He also
places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case
of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Premlal 2007
(113) FLR 451 and specifically paras 7 and 8.
5. Mr. Kedar, learned counsel for the respondents/MSRTC,
opposing the petitions submits that it is not a case of the petitioner
that the benefits of the various settlements have not been given to
them, rather according to him, it is the admitted position that the
benefits have been given, however for the limited period of 180 days
prior to 31/12/1990, the benefit is being claimed. He further
submits that all the three settlements namely clause 49 of the 1956
settlement, Resolution No.8856 and clause 19 of the 1985
settlement, have to be read in conjunction with each other. Further,
he invites my attention to the judgment in the case of Pradeep
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Vyankatrao Shinde Vs. Divisional Controller, MSRTC, Nagpur and
another 2019 (2) Mh.L.J. 82 (pg 82), wherein it is contended that
this is the position which has been laid down by learned Single
Judge, in light what has been stated by Hon'ble Apex Court in
Premlal (supra). He also invites my attention to the judgment of this
Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Through
the Divisional Controller, MSRTC, Wardha Vs. Abdul Bashir s/o Sk.
Mehaboob (Writ Petition No.3129/2015 with connected petition,
decided on 03/04/2023) in which Premlal (supra) has been
considered. It is therefore submitted that the learned Industrial
Court has not fallen in any error in passing the impugned judgment.
He also invites my attention to the evidence and cross-examination
of the petitioner and contends that even presuming otherwise, this
is the case of no evidence, as there is nothing brought on record to
indicate the relevant factors for which he relies upon the cross-
examination of the petitioner (para 5, pg 54). It is, therefore,
contended that the impugned judgment ought not to be interfered
with. Reliance is also placed by him upon the judgment in the case
of Premlal (supra) (para 9). He also contended that there is
considerable delay on part of the petitioners to approach the learned
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Industrial Court and therefore on this count also the complaints
ought to have been dismissed.
6. Insofar as delay is concerned, the learned Industrial
Court has held relying on paras 26 and 27 of the judgment of the
learned Full Bench in Premlal (supra) that the default in
performance of obligation is a continuous wrong and the cause
therefore will continue to recur. I am therefore not inclined to
interfere on this ground.
7. The position as enunciated by clause 49 of the 1956
settlement; Resolution No.8856 and clause 19 of the 1985
settlement came up for consideration before the learned Full Bench
of this Court in Premlal (supra), in which it was held as under :-
"28. We, therefore, hold that Clause 49 of 1956
settlement is neither replaced nor revoked by Clause 19 of 1985
settlement. We also hold that the Resolution No.8856 is
unenforceable and not binding upon the respondents. The
Clause No.49 of 1956 settlement operates in totally different
field from Clause 19 of 1985 settlement inasmuch as that the
former relates to the scale of pay whereas the latter pertains to
absorption of the daily rated worker in permanent employment.
The appeals and the petition, therefore, lack merits and deserve
to be dismissed with the cross objections."
The decision of the Full Bench in Premlal (supra) was
carried to the Hon'ble Apex Court by the respondent herein, in which
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the position as held by the learned Full Bench in Premlal [(FB)
(supra)] was upheld as under :-
"7. According to the impugned judgment Clause 49 of 1956
Settlement and Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement operated in
different fields and consequently Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement
did not supersede Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement. Broadly, we
agree with the decision of the High Court. In our view, there is a
difference between the status of an employee on one hand and
the benefits accruing to the workmen on the other hand. As
stated above, in 1956 the Union presented to the Corporation
various demands. One of the demands was abolition of the daily-
wage system. Under Clause 49 of 1956 the Corporation agreed
to give to the workmen all the benefits available to a time scale
worker. On the other hand, under Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement,
subject to a worker fulfilling the eligibility criteria, the
Corporation agreed to absorb daily rated workmen who
completed 180 days of service. Therefore, the High Court was
right in holding that the above two Clauses operated in
different fields and, therefore, there was no question of Clause
19 of 1985 Settlement superseding Clause 49 of 1956
Settlement. Under Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement, the
Corporation agreed to provide benefits to employees working for
180 days continuously to be given all benefits available to time
scale workers.
8. The grievance of the workmen in the present case is that
till today the Corporation has not given to them the benefits
available to time scale workers. In the present case, they are not
seeking absorption. In the present case, they are seeking wages
payable to time scale workers. The topic of absorption is covered
by Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement. It states that in all past cases
all daily wagers who are eligible for absorption will be given
absorption subject to their selection by the competent Select
Committee and subject to existence of clear vacancies. This
aspect was not there in Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement.
Therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the two
clauses operated in different fields. We agree with this
conclusion of the High Court in the impugned judgment. In the
circumstances, in the present case we are not required to
examine the authority of the Joint Committee to cancel Clause
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49 of 1956 Settlement. In the circumstances, in the present case
we are not required to examine the question as to whether the
workmen herein are entitled to be absorbed under Clause 19 of
1985 Settlement. These two aspects shall be a matter of separate
adjudication. We do not wish to go into these aspects. Suffice it
to state that Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement and Clause 49 of
1956 Settlement operate in different fields and, therefore, there
is no question of Clause 19 of 1985 superseding Clause 49 of
1956 Settlement."
It is, however, material to note that after holding that
Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement and Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement
operate in different fields and Clause 19 of 1985 did not supersede
Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Premlal (supra) went on to hold as under :-
"9. However, as stated above, we are required also to
consider the effect of Resolution no.8856 dated 31.8.1978
passed by the Corporation under which Clause 49 of 1956
Settlement stood cancelled. It is true that the Union had agreed
to the cancellation of Clause 49. However, the Union had also
placed their demand for substitution of Clause 49 and the
Corporation agreed to that substitution vide Resolution No.8856
passed by the Corporation under which persons in employment
casually or on daily-wages as on the date of the Resolution as
also those who were to be employed thereafter, were entitled to
be appointed temporarily in ephemeral vacancies in the time
scale of pay on completion of 180 days aggregate service in a
financial year. Under the said Resolution they were entitled to
the benefits admissible to regular employees on time scale of
pay subject to their satisfying the conditions prescribed for the
entitlement. As stated above, in the present case the workmen
are not seeking absorption. They are seeking benefits admissible
to regular employees on time scale of pay. In the present case,
the workmen seek benefits admissible to those employees on
time scale of pay. In the present case, the respondent-workmen
are in service after 31.8.1978. In the circumstances,
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notwithstanding cancellation of Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement
the workmen herein would be entitled to all benefits admissible
to regular employees working in the Corporation on time scale
of pay provided they satisfy the eligibility criteria of having
worked for aggregate service of 180 days and subject to their
satisfying all the conditions prescribed for their entitlement in
terms of the above Resolution No.8856 read with Clause 19 of
1985 Settlement."
(emphasis supplied)
What has been held in para 9 of Premlal [(SC) supra],
in my considered opinion, is against the argument canvassed by
Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners as the Hon'ble Apex
Court categorically holds that the workmen would be entitled to all
benefits admissible to regular employees working in the Corporation
on time scale of pay provided they satisfy the eligibility criteria of
having worked for aggregate service of 180 days and subject to their
satisfying all the conditions prescribed for their entitlement in terms
of Resolution No.8856 read with clause 19 of 1985 settlement. This
would indicate that clause 49 of the 1956 settlement; Resolution
No.8856 and clause 19 of the 1985 settlement have to be read in
conjunction with each other and not in isolation. The matter before
the hon'ble Apex Court in Premlal (supra) also related to grant of
time scale and not absorption, and therefore what has been stated
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therein, would apply on all four corners to the present matters too,
wherein also the claim is for a similar relief.
8. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Pradeep
Vyankatrao Shinde (supra) while considering the above in light of
what has been held in Premlal [SC (supra)] has held that both the
conditions : (a) of having worked for aggregate 180 days in a
financial year and (b) conditions stipulated in clause 19 of the 1985
settlement, have to be satisfied, by an employee claiming
entitlement to time scale and other benefits admissible to regular
employees working with the Corporation, in the following words :-
"8. The last few sentences of the above quoted paragraph
clearly show that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that
notwithstanding deletion of clause 49 of 1956 Settlement,
workmen would be entitled to time scale of pay and other
benefits admissible to regular employees working with the
respondent-Corporation provided that they satisfy the eligibility
criteria of having worked for aggregate of 180 days and subject
to their satisfying all the conditions prescribed for their
entitlement in terms of the resolution No.8856 read with clause
19 of 1985 Settlement. Thus, it becomes clear that the
workman/employee is required to satisfy twin requirements of
having worked for aggregate 180 days in a financial year with
the respondent-Corporation and condition stipulated in clause
19 of the 1985 Settlement. This position has been followed by
this Court in the judgment and order dated 6-3-2012 passed in
Writ Petition No.3466 of 2011 and connected writ petitions and
further in a bunch of writ petitions i.e. Writ Petition No.1453 of
2012 and connected petitions in order dated 21-1-2013."
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9. A similar view as been taken in Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation Chandrapur Division, Chandrapur Through
Divisional Controller Vs. Shri Arjun Gangaram Wajgikar and others
(Writ Petition No.3466 of 2011 and connected matters decided on
06/03/2012) [para 4 and 6]. In Abdul Bashir (supra), I have also
had the occasion to consider the issue and have held that Premlal
[SC (supra)] holds that clause 49 of the 1956 settlement; Resolution
No.8856 and clause 19 of the 1985 settlement have to be read
together in light of the mandate in para 10 of Premlal [(SC supra)].
Even Resolution No.8856 (which is in supersesion of clause 56 of
the 1956 settlement) holds that employees, who have completed
180 days of aggregate service in any one financial year shall be
appointed temporarily in ephemeral vacancies in time scale of pay of
the post in which they were appointed with effect from the date of
the resolution or from the date of their completion of 180 days
aggregate service in a financial year, as the case may be, and shall
also be entitled from the relevant date to the benefits admissible to
regular employee on time scale of pay provided they satisfy all the
conditions prescribed for their entitlement. When the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Premlal [SC (supra)] in para 10 holds that the entitlement
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of workmen to the benefits of admissible to regular time scale is
provided they satisfy the eligibility criteria of having worked for
aggregate service of 180 days and subject to their satisfying all the
conditions prescribed for their entitlement in terms of the Resolution
No.8856 read with clause 19 of the 1985 settlement, it cannot be
said that all three have to be read in isolation and not in conjunction
with each other. The contention in this regard is therefore liable to
be rejected.
10. It is also material to note that even on the facts of the
matter, the material brought on record is woefully inadequate, which
is reflected from the cross-examination of the complaint/petitioner
which is quoted as under :
"05- eyk egkeaMGkpk 1950 pk dk;nk ekghr ukgh- eyk
xSjvtZnkjkP;k lsok'krhZ ckcrph ekfgrh vkgs- eyk xSjvtZnkjkP;k 1956
P;k djkjkP;k 'krhZ o vVhaph iw.kZ dYiuk ukgh- eyk fn-06-02-2009 P;k
ifji=dkph iw.kZ dYiuk ukgh- eyk lu 1985 P;k Bjko dz- 8556 e/khy
dye 19 ph ekfgrh ukgh- eh xSjvtZnkjkdMs jkstankjhoj T;k rkj[ksyk #tw
>kyks] R;kckcrpk ek>k #tw vgoky eh vfHkys[kkoj nk[ky dsyk ukgh- gs
Eg.k.ks cjkscj vkgs dh] eyk lq#okrhyk fnysY;k] rkRiqjrh use.kwdhP;k
vkns'kkr vls fyfgys gksrs dh] vko';drsuqlkj] tsOgk dke miyC/k jkghy
rsOgk eyk dke fnY;k tkbZy- vkt jksth eyk gs vkBor ukgh dh] ekÖ;k
rkRiqjR;k use.kwdhP;k vkns'kkr vls EgVys gksrs dh] eyk dk;e lsok
ns.;kdjhrk lnjph rkRiqjrh use.kwdhph lsok xzkg~; /kjrk ;s.kkj ukgh- gs
Eg.k.ks cjkscj vkgs dh] eyk lq#okrhyk rkRiqjrh use.kwd fnyh rsOgk]
xSjvtZnkjkdMs dks.krsgh eatwj fjDr in] miyC/k uOgrs] ijarq dke miyC/k
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vlY;keqGs eyk rkRiqjrh use.kwd ns.;kr vkyh gksrh- gs Eg.k.ks cjkscj vkgs
dh] ekÖ;k rkRiqjrh use.kwdhP;k vkns'kkr eyk 180 fnolkaph lsok vFkok
brj Bjkfod fnolkaph lsok >kY;kuarj] eyk lsosr dk;e dj.;kr ;sbZy
vFkok fu;fer ixkj ns.;kr ;sbZy v'kh dks.krhgh vV uOgrh- ek>h
lq#okrhph jkstankjhph use.kwd >kyh rsOgk] ekÖ;k fuoM lferhr dks.k&dks.k
vf/kdkjh gksrs ;kph eyk dYiuk ukgh- fuoM lferhus eyk eqyk[krh lkBh
cksykoys vFkok ek>h eqyk[kkr ?ksryh gs n'kZfo.;kdjhrk ekÖ;kdMs
dks.krsgh nLr miyC/k ukgh-
06- gs Eg.k.ks cjkscj vkgs dh] tlstls eatwj fjDr in miyC/k gksr xsys
rlsrls eyk o brj jkstankjhojhy deZpk&;kaauk fu;fer dj.;kr vkys- gs
Eg.k.ks cjkscj vkgs dh] VsEijjh VkbZe Ldsy o VkbZe Ldsy ;k nksUgh osruJs.kh
lkj[;kp vkgsr o R;kr dks.krkgh Qjd ukgh- eyk lq#okrhyk jkstankjhoj
ykxY;kuarj useds dks.kR;k fno'kh 180 fnol iw.kZ >kys] gs n'kZfo.;kdjhrk
eh dks.krsgh nLr vfHkys[kkoj nk[ky dsys ukgh- eyk lsosr dks.kR;k o"khZ
10 o"kZ o 12 o"kZ >kys gs n'kZfo.;kdjhrk ekÖ;kdMs ekÖ;k lsokiqLrhdsP;k
O;frfjDr] brj dks.krsgh nLr miyC/k ukgh- eyk osruJs.kh m'khjk
fnY;kckcr eh dks.kR;kgh vf/kdk&;kdMs rdzkj dsyh uOgrh- r'kh rdzkj u
dj.;kps dkj.k eh lkaxw 'kdr ukgh- gs Eg.k.ks cjkscj vkgs dh] ekÖ;k
lsokiqLrhdsrhy uksasnh cjkscj vkgsr- gs Eg.k.ks cjkscj ukgh dh] eyk
xSjvtZnkjkdMwu osGksosGh loZ Qk;ns feGkys Eg.kwu eh xSjvtZnkjkdMs rdzkj
dsyh ukgh- gs Eg.k.ks cjkscj vkgs dh] lnjph rdzkj eh xSjvtZnkjkps
fn- 06-02-2009 ps ifji=dkizek.ks Qk;ns feG.;kdjhrk nk[ky dsyh vkgs-
gs Eg.k.ks cjkscj vkgs dh] fn-06-02-2009 P;k ifji=dkuarj ns[khy] eyk
R;kuqlkj ykHk feG.;kdjhrk eh dks.krhgh rdzkj vFkok vtZ fouarh dsyh
ukgh-"
11. Mr. Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioners does not
dispute that the cross-examination of the complainants in all the
complaints is more or less the same.
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12. The cross-examination of the petitioner/complainant
would demonstrate that the necessary factual material, essential for
determining the controversy has not been brought on record at all.
The date on which aggregate 180 days in a year were completed; the
date on which the petitioner was taken on temporary time scale, all
are absent. Except for the service- book nothing is claimed to be
available.
13. Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners during the
course of his arguments has not made any submissions on the basis
of the service-book. This would clearly indicate that even on merits,
the evidence necessary to establish the plea for claiming entitlement
to benefits of regular time scale, are absent. This is therefore a case
where in absence of material dates and documents supporting them,
even if the arguments advanced by Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the
petitioners are to be accepted, no relief can be granted for lack of
relevant material, which is apart from the fact that on the legal
proposition, the matters are covered by Premlal (supra) and Pradeep
Vyankatrao Shinde (supra).
14. Considering the above position, I do not see any reason
to interfere in the impugned judgment of the learned Industrial
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Court. The writ petitions are therefore dismissed. No order as to
costs.
(AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.)
Deshmukh/Wadkar
