Gajanan Mahadeo Satpute vs Government Of Maha., Thr. Secretary, ...
2023 Latest Caselaw 12028 Bom

Bombay High Court

Gajanan Mahadeo Satpute vs Government Of Maha., Thr. Secretary, ... on 4 December, 2023

Author: Nitin W. Sambre

Bench: Nitin W. Sambre

2023:BHC-NAG:17681-DB
               WP 882-23                                       1                Judgment

                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
                                       NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
                                WRIT PETITION NO. 882/2023
               Gajanan Mahadeo Satpute, Age 50 years, Occupation -
               Nil, R/o Krushn Nagar, Ward No.13, Subhash Chandr
               Bos Marg, Wardha, District - Wardha.                       PETITIONER
                                               .....VERSUS.....
               1.     Government of Maharashtra, Through Secretary,
                      Ministry of Home, Mumbai.
               2.     Police Superintendent, Wardha,
                      Police Headquarter, District - Wardha.
               3.     Special IGP, Nagpur Region, Nagpur, Sadar Police
                      Station, Civil Line, Nagpur - 440 001.
               4.     Adl. Director of Police (Administration),
                      Ministry of Home, State of Maharashtra, Main
                      Building II Floor, Hutatma Square, Secretariat,
                      Mumbai - 400 032.                                  RESPONDENTS
                                 Shri T. Rahul, counsel for the petitioner.
                 Shri A.M. Deshpande, In-Charge Government Pleader for the respondents.

               CORAM :          NITIN W. SAMBRE AND ABHAY J. MANTRI, JJ.
               DATE      :      DECEMBER 04, 2023
                ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : NITIN W. SAMBRE, J.)

RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally

with consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

2. On April 07, 2010, the petitioner having facilitated the

escape of an undertrial namely Pramod Rewatkar was charge-sheeted

in Form-1 by the Authority.

3. Subsequent thereto, he was served with the charge-sheet

and an offence came to be registered against him vide Crime No.152 of

2010 for an offence punishable under Sections 224 and 225 of the

Indian Penal Code.

WP 882-23 2 Judgment

4. The petitioner thereafter was acquitted in the aforesaid

criminal trial vide judgment dated September 16, 2019 delivered by

the Judicial Magistrate First Class, (Court No.4), Wardha for an offence

punishable under Sections 225 and 119 of the Indian Penal Code.

5. On June 08, 2010, the Disciplinary Authority framed the

charges against the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority held the

petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. He was served

with the final order dated May 15, 2018 of dismissal from service in

exercise of powers vested under the Bombay Police (Punishments and

Appeals) Rules, 1956 (for short, 'the Rules of 1956').

6. Forming the acquittal by the Criminal Court as basis, the

petitioner approached the Appellate Authority. The Appellate

Authority by an order dated September 29, 2018 confirmed the order

of the Disciplinary Authority. The order of the Appellate Authority was

upheld by the Additional Director General of Police (Administration) in

the revision vide order dated July 01, 2019 thereby confirming both

the orders.

7. The petitioner being aggrieved, preferred Original

Application No. 738 of 2020 before the Maharashtra Administrative

Tribunal which was dismissed on September 21, 2022. As such, this

petition.

WP 882-23 3 Judgment

8. The contention of Shri T. Rahul, learned counsel for the

petitioner is, perusal of the order of dismissal delivered by the

Disciplinary Authority does not refer to the violation of any Rule or

breach of statutory provision. According to him, the available material

is not sufficient enough to order dismissal of the petitioner from

service. His further contention is, appropriate opportunity of hearing

was not offered by the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner. So as to

substantiate the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for the

petitioner would invite our attention to the observations in the order of

the Disciplinary Authority to urge that even though the enquiry was

ordered against the four delinquents, it is only the petitioner who was

punished in the present case thereby victimizing him.

9. The In-Charge Government Pleader would support the

orders impugned. According to him, all the three Authorities so also

the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal has in detail considered the

claim put forth by the petitioner and has reached to a conclusion that

the petitioner is prima-facie involved in the act of facilitating the

escape of an undertrial, who later on expired. According to him,

merely non-mentioning of the provision does not render the orders

illegal as long as it is not disputed that the powers vest with the

Authorities to order termination. As such, he would urge that the

petition is liable to be dismissed.

WP 882-23 4 Judgment

10. We have considered the rival claims based on the

documents available on record.

11. It is not in dispute that the Appointing Authority of the

petitioner is the respondent no.2-Superintendent of Police. The

respondent no.2 accordingly issued the charge-sheet and after

considering the material placed on record imposed punishment of

dismissal from service on the petitioner. Such order is passed by the

respondent no.2 in exercise of Rule 3(1), (A-2) and 3 of the Rules of

1956. A specific finding is recorded by the Disciplinary Authority that

the conduct of the petitioner is quite serious as he has involved himself

in the most irresponsible and mala fide act not befitting the status of a

police official. In support of the said finding, the Disciplinary

Authorities has appreciated the material available on record including

that of the documentary evidence.

12. The Disciplinary Authorities accordingly imposed the

punishment of dismissal from service vide final order dated May 15,

2018. The said order was challenged before the Appellate Authority

viz. Special Inspector General of Police, Nagpur Range. The said

Authority vide order dated September 29, 2018 reconsidered the entire

claim of the petitioner, re-appreciated the evidence and factual matrix

and has confirmed the order of the Disciplinary Authority.

WP 882-23 5 Judgment

13. Similarly, the Revisional Authority while dealing with the

revision preferred by the petitioner has considered the evidence and

the claim put forth by the petitioner in entirety. The said Authority

was also sensitive to the statutory provisions and the proportionate

punishment awarded to the petitioner as against the charges proved

against him.

14. The petitioner thereafter approached the Maharashtra

Administrative Tribunal questioning all the three orders. The Tribunal

while considering the case of the petitioner has specifically recorded a

finding that the petitioner's defence before the Disciplinary Authority

was far away from truth as it was duly proved that the petitioner

facilitated the escape of the undertrial since the petitioner's vehicle

was used by the undertrial for escaping from the custody. Since based

on the material placed on record, all the three Authorities have

recorded a concurrent finding that the charges levelled against the

petitioner are proved, this Court is not required to re-appreciate the

entire evidence in the backdrop of defence raised by the petitioner.

The undertrial who ran away from the custody of the Police with the

help of the present petitioner was subsequently found to be dead.

15. The conduct of the petitioner was found to be undisciplined,

irresponsible, illegal and not befitting the status of a Police Officer and WP 882-23 6 Judgment

as such he was served with the order of dismissal from service by the

Disciplinary Authority which was maintained by the Appellate as well

as the Revisional Authority.

16. As far as the contentions of the petitioner that; (a) vague

charge was levelled against him, (b) the punishment awarded is not

proportionate to the charges levelled, (c) the orders do not refer to the

violation of which provision of the Rules of 1956 and (d) the violation

of principles of natural justice by the Disciplinary Authority are

concerned, the fact remains that the orders of all the three Authorities

i.e. the Disciplinary, Appellate and Revisional Authorities in categorical

terms offer a complete opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in the

matter of defending his case in the disciplinary proceedings. The order

in categorical terms not only deals with the case against the petitioner

but also analyzes the evidence against the petitioner in the light of

defence raised by the petitioner. The petitioner is unable to

demonstrate from the record that at which stage of the proceedings he

was denied the opportunity of hearing by all the three Authorities.

17. The fact remains that in the orders impugned, there is

specific reference to the provisions under which the petitioner is being

proceeded against and also the serious default committed by him

regarding his conduct which is unsuitable for the status as a Police

official. From the perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that the WP 882-23 7 Judgment

petitioner was asked to show cause as to why the punishment specified

under Rule 3 of the Rules of 1956 be not imposed upon the petitioner.

The perusal of the said Rules depicts that it provides for penalty of

dismissal from service. As such, there exist a provision which

empowers the Authority to impose punishment of dismissal from

service after conducting a departmental enquiry. The conduct of the

petitioner helping an accused to flee away from the custody of the

police comes within the category of grave misconduct and the same

amounts to loss of confidence of the employer. The petitioner has

failed to demonstrate any specific instance of violation of the principles

of natural justice or denial of opportunity of hearing. The charge

levelled against the petitioner has to be viewed as a serious one and

rightly so the misconduct of the petitioner has been held to be proved

by the Disciplinary Authority. In the aforesaid background, the

punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the petitioner

cannot be said to be disproportionate to the misconduct committed.

18. Merely because the petitioner is acquitted by the Criminal

Court that by itself would not make the petitioner entitled to seek

relief of reinstatement from this Court as both the proceedings i.e. the

domestic enquiry and the criminal prosecution cannot be considered to

be at par with each other. In the proceedings of domestic enquiry the

provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 do not apply. However, the WP 882-23 8 Judgment

enquiry is required to be conducted in a fair and reasonable manner

and the presence of reasons for reaching to a conclusion in an enquiry

report with regard to the charges levelled against the delinquent is

mandatory. Whereas, the Evidence Act, 1872 is stricto-sensu

applicable to the criminal trials. To justify the aforesaid, reliance can

be placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohd. Yunus

Khan Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [(2010) 10 SCC 539],

particularly paragraph 16 thereof which reads as under :-

"16. ... Though the technical rules of procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 do not apply in a domestic enquiry, however, the principles of natural justice required to be observed strictly. Therefore, the enquiry is to be conducted fairly and reasonably and the enquiry report must contain reasons for reaching the conclusion that the charge framed against the delinquent stood proved against him. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the enquiry officer. Punishment for misconduct can be imposed in consonance with the statutory rules and principles of natural justice. (See Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, Union of India v. H.C. Goel, Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, Moni Shankar v. Union of India and Union of India v. Prakash Kumar Tandon.)"

19. Apart from above, merely because the provisions under

which the punishment is imposed is not explicitly referred in the order,

that by itself will not disentitle the Authorities to impose punishment

or render the order of imposing punishment illegal as long as the WP 882-23 9 Judgment

Statute confers such lawful right on the Authority. So as to

substantiate the aforesaid, support can be drawn from the judgment of

the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of P.K. Palanisamy Versus N.

Arumugham & Another [(2009) 9 SCC 173], and more particularly

paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 which read as under :-

"27. Section 148 of the Code is a general provision and Section149 thereof is special. The first application should have been filed in terms of Section 149 of the Code. Once the court granted time for payment of deficit court fee within the period specified therefor, it would have been possible to extend the same by the court in exercise of its power under Section 148 of the Code. Only because a wrong provision was mentioned by the appellant, the same, in our opinion, by itself would not be a ground to hold that the application was not maintainable or that the order passed thereon would be a nullity. It is a well settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of a provision does not invalidate an order if the court an/or statutory authority had the requisite jurisdiction therefor.

28. In Ram Sunder Ram v. Union of India it was held : (SCC pp. 260-61, para 19) "19. ..... It appears that the competent authority has wrongly quoted Section 20 in the order of discharge whereas, in fact, the order of discharge has to be read having been passed under Section 22 of the Army Act.

'9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law merely because while exercising that power the source of power is not specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not WP 882-23 10 Judgment

vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source available in law.' (See N. Mani v. Sangeetha Theatre, SCC p. 280, para 9) Thus, quoting of wrong provision of Section 20 in the order of discharge of the appellant by the competent authority does not take away the jurisdiction of the authority under Section 22 of the Army Act. Therefore, the order of discharge of the appellant from the army service cannot be vitiated on this sole ground as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant."

29. In N. Mani v. Sangeetha Theatre it is stated : (SCC p. 280, para 9).

'9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law merely because while exercising that power the source of power is not specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source available in law.'"

20. In the aforesaid background, if we consider the issue as

regards awarding of disproportionate punishment, the fact remains

that the evidence on record in categorical terms establishes that the

petitioner, a Police Constable, by providing his personal vehicle and

also with the help of other logistic support, facilitated escape of an

undertrial who was in the custody of the Police Authorities. Such an

act of the petitioner is proved in the departmental proceedings. Once,

the aforesaid act of the petitioner of facilitating the escape of an

undertrial is proved, it cannot be said that the award of punishment of WP 882-23 11 Judgment

dismissal from the service can be said to be a disproportionate

punishment. The Revisional Authority has also gone through the entire

record to observe the hardships likely to be suffered by the petitioner to

feed his family and has still maintained the punishment of dismissal

from service.

21. In the aforesaid background, we are of the view that all the

Authorities including the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal have

recorded the concurrent findings. It cannot be said that there is an

illegality or irregularity noticed in the orders impugned which warrant

interference in extraordinary jurisdiction.

22. That being so, no case for causing interference is made out.

The writ petition as such is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. No

costs.

                                      (ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.)               (NITIN W. SAMBRE, J.)

                            APTE




Signed by: Apte
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/01/2024 13:23:44