Bombay High Court
Samyak Bahuuddeshiya Shikshan ... vs The Presiding Officer, School ... on 6 April, 2022
Bench: Manish Pitale
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 921 OF 2019
Samyak Bahuddeshiya Shikshan Sanstha and another
-Vs.-
The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nagpur and others
WRIT PETITION NO. 924 OF 2019
Samyak Bahuddeshiya Shikshan Sanstha and another
-Vs.-
The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nagpur and others
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Office notes, Office Memoranda of
Coram, appearances, Court's orders Court's or Judge's Orders.
or directions and Registrar's orders.
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Mr.N.D.Khamborkar, counsel for the petitioners in both writ
petitions.
Mr.K.L.Dharmadhikari, AGP for respondent No.1 in both writ
petitions.
Mr.D.A.Mohgaonkar, counsel for respondent No.2 in both
writ petitions.
CORAM : MANISH PITALE, J.
DATE : 06.04.2022
By these writ petitions, the Management and the
School have approached this Court challenging identical
orders passed by the School Tribunal, Nagpur on
29/11/2018, whereby delay of 93 days in filing appeals
by the respondent-employees has been condoned.
2. The petitioners contend that the reasons
recorded by the Tribunal while condoning delay of 93
days are unsustainable.
3. The material available on record shows that
according to the respondents-employees, they were
restrained from performing their duties as Assistant
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Teachers in petitioner No.2-School from 25/11/2013.
They claimed that in such a situation, they approached
respondent No.3-Education Officer (Primary) to
ventilate their grievance. On 03/02/2014, respondent
No.3-Education Officer (Primary), pursuant to hearings
conducted before him, passed an order directing that
the respondents-employees shall be permitted to join
their duties in petitioner No.2-School. Yet, the
respondents-employees were not permitted to join their
duties and eventually they filed appeals before the
School Tribunal on 27/03/2014. On this basis, delay of
93 days was calculated and applications for
condonation of delay were filed on behalf of the
respondents-employees. As noted above, by the
impugned orders, the applications for condonation of
delay have been allowed.
4. Mr.Khamborkar, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners in both the petitions, submitted that the
respondents-employees have failed to demonstrate
sufficient cause for condonation of delay and
approaching respondent No.3 could not be a reason for
condonation of delay, because respondent No.3 has no
authority in the matter. Reliance was placed on
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, reported in
2016 (6) ALL MR 480 in support of such contention.
5. On the other hand, Mr.D.A.Mohgaonkar,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents-
employees in both the petitions, submitted that in the
present case, the termination of service was not by a
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written order and it was when the respondents-
employees were restrained from performing their duties
on 25/11/2013, that they had a cause of action. It was
submitted that despite the Education Officer (Primary)
having directed that the respondents-employees should
be permitted to join their duties, the petitioners failed
to comply with the same and in this backdrop, on
23/07/2014, the respondents-employees were
constrained to file the appeals before the School
Tribunal. This was appreciated by the Tribunal in the
correct perspective while condoning the delay. Reliance
is placed in support of the contention on behalf of the
respondents-employees on judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Balkrishna Waman
Zambare v. Siddheshwar Shikshan Sanstha, Dongarsoni
and others, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 446.
6. This Court has considered the impugned orders
passed by the Tribunal. It is found that the Tribunal in
paragraph 13 of both the orders assigned reasons for
condoning delay. It was observed that since there was
no written communication and both the cases were of
oral termination of service, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the respondents-employees
having approached the Education Officer (Primary),
sufficient cause of action was made out for condonation
of delay. This Court has considered the material placed
on record. An order dated 03/02/2014 was passed by
the respondent-Education Officer (Primary) directing
that the respondents-employees shall be permitted to
join their duties. Reference is made to a hearing
conducted on 15/01/2014. It is specifically stated by
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the respondents-employees that pursuant to such
proceedings before the respondent-Education Officer
(Primary) and the order passed on 03/02/2014, they
had approached the petitioners for joining duties and
despite their repeated entreaties and representations,
nothing positive worked out. In this situation,
eventually, on 27/03/2014, the respondents-employees
filed the appeals, which were found to be delayed by 93
days.
7. Whether the Education Officer (Primary) was
the appropriate authority for ventilating their
grievances by the respondents-employees, could be a
matter of debate, but the fact that they did approach the
respondent-Education Officer (Primary), who
conducted hearings and passed orders dated
03/02/2014 shows that after the respondents-
employees were restrained from performing their
duties, they had taken up the matter and ventilated
their grievance before the respondent-Education Officer
(Primary). Thereupon, when the petitioners refused to
abide by directions given by the Education Officer
(Primary), the respondents-employees had no other
option, but to file the appeals before the Tribunal. It is
evident that the respondents-employees had nothing to
gain and everything to lose by approaching the Tribunal
after delay of about 93 days. The question is whether
sufficient material was brought on record on behalf of
the respondents-employees to explain the delay and to
place on record the efforts that they made in respect of
their grievance. The said question has to be answered in
the affirmative in the context of the material brought on
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record.
8. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (supra) is
clearly distinguishable because on facts in the said case,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the huge delay of
778 days was not sufficiently explained by the applicant
and that therefore, the said delay could not be
condoned. On the other hand, the judgment relied
upon by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents-employees, in the case of Balkrishna
Waman Zambare v. Siddheshwar Shikshan Sanstha,
Dongarsoni and others (supra), does take the case of
the respondents-employees further, for the reason that
in the said case, delay of two years, ten months and
fourteen days was condoned, wherein the services of
the employee concerned had also been terminated
orally.
9. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion
that no interference is warranted in the impugned
orders passed by the School Tribunal. Accordingly, the
writ petitions are dismissed.
10. Needless to say, the observations made in the
order passed today by this Court are related to the
question of condonation of delay. The School Tribunal
shall proceed on the merits of the matter, uninfluenced
by the observations made herein.
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JUDGE
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