Gajanan Machhindranath Taur vs The State Of Maharashtra And ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 15504 Bom

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            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                      BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 627 OF 2021

   Gajanan Machhindranath Taur
   Age : 29 years, Occu.: Agriculturist,
   R/o Shivangaon, Tq. Ghansawangi
   District Jalna.
   (At present detained in the
   Central Prison, Harsul, Aurangabad)           ... Petitioner

           Versus

   1. The State of Maharashtra
      Through its Principal Secretary,
      Home Department, Mantralaya,
      Mumbai.

   2. The District Magistrate /
      District Collector, Jalna,
      District Jalna

   3. The Superintendent of Jail,
      Central Prison Harsul, Aurangbad
      District Aurangabad.

   4. The District Superintendent of Police,
      Jalna.

   5. Police Inspector,
      Chandanzira Police Station,
      Jalna.                                     ... Respondents

                                    ....

   Mr. V.D. Sapkal, Senior Counsel i/b Mr. Amarnath S. Sakhare
   and Mr. S.T. Chalikwar, Advocates for the Petitioner
   Mr. Mahendra M. Nerlikar, APP for State / Respondent Nos. 1 to 5.

                                   ....


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                               CORAM : V. K. JADHAV AND
                                       SHRIKANT D. KULKARNI, JJ.

Reserved on : 24.08.2021 Pronounced on : 28.10.2021

JUDGMENT (PER : SHRIKANT D. KULKARNI, J.):-

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent

of the parties, the petition is heard finally at admission stage.

2. The petitioner is seeking two fold reliefs; (i) writ of

habeas corpus and (ii) challenge to the impugned order of

detention passed by the detaining authority by invoking

provisions of Articles 14, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 226 of the

Constitution of India.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. According to the petitioner, he is an agriculturist from

village Shivangaon, District Jalna. He has reputation in the

society. He has been implicated in false cases out of political

rivalry at the instance of his opponents. Total nine First

Information Reports (in short, "FIRs") came to be lodged against

the petitioner. Out of them, seven FIRs registered in the year

2019-2020. The petitioner has been acquitted in two case.

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He has been released on anticipatory bail and/or regular bail in

the remaining seven cases, which are pending for trial.

4. On 31.08.2021, respondent no.2/Police Inspector,

Chandanzira Police Station submitted the proposal for detention

of the petitioner under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra

Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers,

Drug-offencers, Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act, 1981

( hereinafter referred to as "MPDA Act"). It is submitted by the

petitioner that respondent no.3/District Magistrate, Jalna

without considering the evidence on record in a proper way

passed the order of detention. Even the period of detention is

not mentioned in the order. On 05.03.2021, the petitioner came

to be arrested and lodged in Central Prison Harsul at

Aurangabad. The copies of the detention order, committal order

and grounds for detention were served upon the petitioner on

05.03.2021, for the first time. On 06.01.2021, respondent

no.1/the State of Maharashtra through Principal Secretary,

Home Department was pleased to approve the detention order.

On 19.03.2021, the petitioner made the representation under

Section 10 of the MPDA Act before the Advisory Board.

According to the petitioner, the Advisory Board even did not

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consider his representation and arrived at erroneous conclusion

and turned down his representation. On 16.04.2021, the said

authority confirmed the order of detention on the erroneous

facts and concocted record.

5. Heard Mr. V.D. Sapkal, learned Senior Counsel i/b

Mr. Amarnath S. Sakhare and Mr. S.T. Chalikwar, Advocates for

the petitioner and Mr. Mahendra M. Nerlikar, learned APP for

the State / respondent Nos. 1 to 5.

6. Mr. V.D. Sapkal, learned Senior Counsel vehemently

submitted that the impugned order of detention is illegal,

arbitrary, malafide and against the principles of natural justice.

The initial detention order dated 31.12.2020 did not prescribe

period of detention. As such, the impugned order is illegal and

contrary to the provisions of Section 3(2) of the MPDA Act. He

submitted that if all the FIRs registered against the petitioner

are perused, then one would find that those are registered

against the petitioner by the individual persons. Even if the

offences alleged therein are considered to be true, the said

offences are not against the public at large, but same are against

the individuals. The MPDA Act is enacted for the preventive

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detention of the anti-social elements for preventing their

dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public

order. The detaining authority has not considered all these

aspects and passed the detention order on the basis of

extraneous consideration.

7. Mr. Sapkal, learned Senior Counsel submitted that

Section 2(b-1) of the MPDA Act defines dangerous person. The

alleged acts of the petitioner do not fall within the meaning of

dangerous person, and therefore, the impugned order of

detention is illegal and liable to be quashed. The petitioner

came to be acquitted by the concerned Court in two criminal

cases for want of evidence. In none of the cases, the petitioner is

convicted. The detaining authority was well aware about these

facts, but deliberately ignored this crucial aspect. The detaining

authority has failed to consider that FIRs lodged against the

petitioner are false and out of political rivalry. The petitioner

was released on anticipatory bail and/or regular bail by the

concerned Courts. The said fact is not considered by the

detaining authority.

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8. Mr. Sapkal, learned Senior Counsel further invited our

attention that no procedure has been followed before passing

the detention order. No opportunity of hearing was given to the

petitioner before passing the impugned order, which is violative

of basic principles of natural justice. The petitioner has been

illegally detained, which is violative of his fundamental rights

guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the

Constitution of India. The detaining authority has considered

two in-camera statements of those persons, who are hand in

gloves with the authorities. On perusal of grounds of detention

order, it is apparent from the face of record that the detaining

authority was not subjectively satisfied to the grounds for

detaining the detenu under the MPDA Act. Learned Senior

Counsel submitted that there was no incident reported to show

that it can be conclusively established that there is public unrest

or immediate threat to the law and order situation that could

not be regulated without the detention of the detenu. He

submitted that the impugned order of detention is illegal,

arbitrary, malafide, and therefore, the impugned order is liable

to be quashed and set aside.

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9. To buttress the argument, Mr. Sapkal, learned Senior

counsel has placed his reliance on following two citations in

support of his argument.

(i) Decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Banka Sneha Sheela Vs. The State of Telangana in Criminal Appeal No.733 of 2021 [arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4729 of 2021] decided on 02.08.2021.

(ii) The Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court in case of Mr. Shubham Rajendra Hingade Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (in Criminal Writ Petition No.559 of 2021) decided on 22.06.2021.

10. Per contra, Mr. Mahendra M. Nerlikar, learned APP for

the State/respondent nos. 1 to 5 supported the impugned order

passed by the detaining authority. Learned APP submitted that

the impugned order of detention passed against the petitioner

does not suffer from any legal error. The authority has followed

the proper procedure as contemplated under the MPDA Act.

Mr. Nerlikar, learned APP invited our attention to the

affidavit-in-reply filed by the District Magistrate, Jalna, more

particularly, para 69. He submitted that nine FIRs came to be

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registered against the petitioner at various police stations from

Jalna city. The petitioner is involved in commission of serious

cognizable offences including attempt to commit murder and

robbery, which are against the society. The Police Inspector of

Police Station Chandanzira, Jalna submitted the proposal for the

detention of the petitioner in the background of serious crimes

committed by the petitioner. The petitioner is a dangerous

person as defined under the MPDA Act.

11. Mr. Nerlikar, learned APP submitted that due to the

criminal and dangerous activities of the petitioner, the persons

residing in the jurisdiction of Police Station Chandanzira, Jalna

and the adjoining areas remained under constant fear and

terror. The persons in that area are not coming forward either to

lodge FIR or to give statements due to terror of the petitioner.

The detaining authority after having subjective satisfaction

arrived at conclusion that the petitioner is indulged in

dangerous and criminal activities which are prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order. After having subjective satisfaction,

the detaining authority has passed the order of detention on

31.12.2020. The detention order, grounds of detention

alongwith its translation and other relevant papers were served

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to the petitioner on 05.03.2021 and after following due

procedure, the petitioner has been detained in Central Prison at

Aurangabad. The detention order has been approved by the

State Government on 06.01.2021. The Advisory Board has also

considered the representation of the petitioner and turned down

the same. The detaining authority has also considered the FIRs

registered against the petitioner and two in-camera statements

and after subjective satisfaction, the detaining authority has

passed the order of detention of the petitioner. The impugned

order of detention is legal and valid and does not suffer from

any legal error. There is no merit in the petition challenging the

order of detention of the petitioner. The petitioner has been

detained after following due procedure as provided under the

MPDA Act. Learned APP urged to dismiss the petition.

12. Mr. Nerlikar, learned APP has placed his reliance on the

following stock of citation in support of his argument.

(i) Magar Pansing Pimple Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2006 ALL M.R. (Cri.)

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(ii) Smt. Dagadibai Anand Jadhav Vs. S.C.

Malhotra and others reported in 1988 ALL M.R. (Cri.) 362.

(iii) Manoj @ Sonya S/o Ramdas Ghule Vs. The Commissioner of Police Pune City, Dist. Pune and others reported in 2018 ALL M.R. (Cri.)

13. The detaining authority/District Magistrate, Jalna has

considered the following criminal cases registered against the

petitioner at various police stations from District Jalna for taking

preventive action:-

    Sr. Name of the             Cr. No.     Sections     Date of            Current
    No. Police Station                                 registration         position
     1    Chandanjhira         109/2019 326, 34 of 28/03/2019 Under
          Jalna                         IPC r.w. 4/25         Investigation.
                                        of     Indian
                                        Arms Act.
     2    Kadim Jalna          268/2019 143,141, 188 17/07/2019 Pending
                                        of IPC                  before Court.
     3    Kadim Jalna          355/2020 307,160,188, 24/07/2020 Under
                                        269,270 of              Investigation
                                        IPC rw 3/25
                                        of    Indian
                                        Arms Act.
     4    Taluka Jalna         441/2020 425,323,04,5 24/07/2020 Under
                                        06,188,269,2            Investigation.
                                        70 of IPC rw
                                        51(b)      of
                                        Disaster
                                        Management
                                        Act.
     5    Ambad                359/2020 4/25     of 24/07/2020 Under
                                        Indian Arms            Investigation.

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                                        Act.
     6    Chandanjhira         260/2020 143,147,148, 25/07/2020 Under
          Jalna                         149,323,427,            Investigation.
                                        504,506,188,
                                        269,270 of
                                        IPC rw 51(b)
                                        of   Disaster
                                        Management
                                        Act.
     7    Kadim Jalna          365/2020 394,       34   of 01/08/2020 Under
                                        IPC.                          Investigation.



   Preventive Actions

    Sr. Name of Police Station         Chapter Case Section               Disposal
    No.                                No.
     1   Ghansavangi                   71/2019           110 (E)(G) of Final   Bond
                                                         Cr. P.C.      30.12.2019
     2   Ghansavangi                   12/2019           107 of      Cr. Final Bond
                                                         P .C.

14. Apart from that, the detaining authority has also taken

into consideration in-camera statements of two witnesses

(witness A and witness B).

15. It would be relevant to refer Section 2 of the MPDA Act,

1981, which defines 'dangerous person' as under:-

"2...........

(b-1) "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the

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commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959."

Under clause (a) of section 2, in the context of a dangerous person, "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order", means-

"(iv) in the case of a dangerous person, when he is engaged, or is making preparation for engaging, in any of his activities as a dangerous person, which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order."

The explanation appended to clause (a) of section 2 further clarifies the import of 'public order', for the purpose of the said clause, which reads as under :

"Explanation--For the purpose of this clause

(a), public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause directly or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause

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any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity, among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health; [or disturbs in public safety and tranquility or disturbs the day to day life of the community by black-marketing in the essential commodities which is resulting in the artificial scarcity in the supply of such commodities and rises in the prices of essential commodities which ultimately causes inflation][or disturbs the life of the community by producing and distributing pirated copies of music or film products, thereby resulting in a loss of confidence in administrations.]."

16. In the above background of the provisions of Section 2 of

the MPDA Act, it may be apposite to consider the distinction

between the concept of the "public order" and "law and order"

in the premise of submissions made by the learned Senior

Counsel and the learned APP for the State.

17. In case of Shubham Rajendra Hingade Vs. State of

Maharashtra and another (supra), the Division Bench of this

Court at principal seat at Bombay has observed in para 13 as

under:-

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"13. In the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions,

it may be apposite to first consider the distinction

between the concepts of "public order" and "law

and order". Public order is something more than

ordinary maintenance of law and order. A proper

test to distinguish between "law and order" and

"public order" is whether the complained acts led to

disturbance of the ordinary tempo of life of the

community so as to amount a disturbance of the

public order or it merely affected an individual

leaving the tranquility of society undisturbed. It is,

therefore, said that the essential distinction

between the concepts of "public order" and "law

and order" is not in the nature or quality of the act

but in the degree, potentiality and extent of its

reach upon society. The given act by itself may not

be determinant of its own gravity. It is the

propensity and potentiality of the act of disturbing

the even tempo of life of the community that

renders it as prejudicial to the maintenance of

public order."

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18. In case of Banka Sneha Sheela Vs. The State of

Telangana and others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

observed in para 12 by referring its earlier decision in case of

Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State of Bihar (1966) 1 SCR 709 as

under:-

12. As is well-known, the expressions 'law and

order', 'public order', and 'security of state' are

different from one another. In Ram Manohar Lohia

v. State of Bihar (1966) 1 SCR 709 the question

before this Court arose under a Preventive

Detention Order made under Rule 30 of the Defence

of India Rules, which permits apprehension and

detention of a person likely to act in a manner

prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This

Court set out the distinction between a mere law

and order disturbance and a public order

disturbance as follows:

"The Defence of India Act and the Rules

speak of the conditions under which

preventive detention under the Act can be

ordered. In its long title and the preamble

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the Defence of India Act speaks of the

necessity to provide for special measures to

ensure public safety and interest, the

defence of India and civil defence. The

expression public safety and interest

between them indicate the range of action

for maintaining security peace and

tranquillity of India whereas the expressions

defence of India and civil defence connote

defence of India and its people against

aggression from outside and action of

persons within the country. These generic

terms were used because the Act seeks to

provide for a congeries of action of which

preventive detention is just a small part. In

conferring power to make rules, Section 3 of

the Defence of India Act enlarges upon the

terms of the preamble by specification of

details. It speaks of defence of India and

civil defence and public safety without

change but it expands the idea of public

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interest into maintenance of public order,

the efficient conduct of military operations

and maintaining of supplies and services

essential to the life of the community. Then

it mentions by way of illustration in clause

(15) of the same section the power of

apprehension and detention in custody of

any person whom the authority empowered

by the rules to apprehend or detain (the

authority empowered to detain not being

lower in rank than that of a District

Magistrate), suspects, on grounds appearing

to that authority to be reasonable--

(a) of being of hostile origin; or

(b) of having acted, acting or being about to

act or being likely to act in a manner

prejudicial to--

(i) the defence of India and civil defence;

(ii) the security of the State;

(iii) the public safety or interest:

(iv) the maintenance of public order;

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(v) India's relations with foreign states:

(vi) the maintenance of peaceful conditions

in any part or area of India: or

(vii) the efficient conduct of military

operations.

It will thus appear that security of the state,

public safety or interest, maintenance of

public order and the maintenance of

peaceful conditions in any part or area of

India may be viewed separately even though

strictly one clause may have an effect or

bearing on another. Then follows Rule 30,

which repeats the above conditions and

permits detention of any person with a view

to preventing him from acting in any of the

above ways. The argument of Dr Lohia that

the conditions are to be cumulatively

applied is clearly untenable. It is not

necessary to analyse Rule 30 which we

quoted earlier and which follows the

scheme of Section 3(15). The question is

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whether by taking power to prevent Dr

Lohia from acting to the prejudice of "law

and order" as against "public order" the

District Magistrate went outside his powers.

page 738-739]

xxx xxx xxx

We have here a case of detention under Rule

30 of the Defence of India Rules which

permits apprehension and detention of a

person likely to act in a manner prejudicial

to the maintenance of public order. It

follows that if such a person is not detained

public disorder is the apprehended result.

Disorder is no doubt prevented by the

maintenance of law and order also but

disorder is a broad spectrum which includes

at one end small disturbances and at the

other the most serious and cataclysmic

happenings. Does the expression "public

order" take in every kind of disorders or

only some of them? The answer to this

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serves to distinguish "public order" from

"law and order" because the latter

undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public

order if disturbed, must lead to public

disorder. Every breach of the peace does not

lead to public disorder. When two drunkards

quarrel and fight there is disorder but not

public disorder. They can be dealt with

under the powers to maintain law and order

but cannot be detained on the ground that

they were disturbing public order. Suppose

that the two fighters were of rival

communities and one of them tried to raise

communal passions. The problem is still one

of law and order but it raises the

apprehension of public disorder. Other

examples can be imagined. The

contravention of law always affects order

but before if can be said to affect public

order, it must affect the community or the

public at large. A mere disturbance of law

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and order leading to disorder is thus not

necessarily sufficient for action under the

Defence of India Act but disturbances which

subvert the public order are. A District

Magistrate is entitled to take action under

Rule 30(1) (b) to prevent subversion of

public order but not in aid of maintenance

of law and order under ordinary

circumstances.

It will thus appear that just as "public order"

in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited)

was said to comprehend disorders of less

gravity than those affecting "security of

State", "law and order" also comprehends

disorders of less gravity than those affecting

"public order". One has to imagine three

concentric circles. Law and order represents

the largest circle within which is the next

circle representing public order and the

smallest circle represents security of State. It

is then easy to see that an act may affect law

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and order but not public order just as an act

may affect public order but not security of

the State. By using the expression

"maintenance of law and order" the District

Magistrate was widening his own field of

action and was adding a clause to the

Defence of India Rules."

[page 745-746]

19. In case of Smt. Dagadibai Anand Jahav Vs. S.c. Malhotra

and others (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held

that, it is always a question of degree of harm and its effect

upon the community while considering the case of the petitioner

under the MPDA Act, 1981. It is held that, "if the detenu and

his associates involved in serious crimes like robbery, extortion

and assault, it has potentiality to affect the even tempo of the

life and covered under clause (iv) of Section 2(a) of the MPDA

Act, 1981.

20. In case of Manoj @ Sonya S/o Ramdas Ghule Vs. The

Commissioner of Police Pune City, Dist Pune and others (supra),

by considering facts of the case, it is held by the Division Bench

of this Court that, "in-camera statements of two witnesses and

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criminal cases registered against the petitioner established that

the detenu had created terror amongst public at large. The acts

of the detenue were within the four corners of the acts of

dangerous person as defined under the MPDA Act and he was

creating disturbance of public order." The detention order

passed by the detaining authority held to be proper and after

having subjective satisfaction. The writ petition came to be

dismissed.

21. In case of Magar Pansingh Pimple Vs. State of

Maharashtra (supra), the Division Bench of this Court held that,

"the MPDA Act does not require the detaining authority to

specify the period which the detenue is required to be detained.

The contention of the detenue that period of detention is not

mentioned in the order and therefore the order stands vitiated

was turned down.

22. Having regard to the legal position made clear by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court

referred above, the law is now well settled in respect of

detention matters.

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23. Now coming to the factual scenario in order to

determine whether the petitioner falls in the definition of

dangerous person as defined in Section 2(b-1) of the MPDA Act,

1981. As pointed earlier, seven criminal cases seem to have

been registered against the petitioner at various police stations

from Jalna District. In addition to that two preventive actions

under Section 110 and 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

seem to have been taken by the authorities. Even for the sake of

argument, it is accepted that the petitioner came to be acquitted

in two criminal cases, we cannot overlook the factual position

emerging from the record. It is evident from the above chart

that Crime No.365/2020 came to be registered against the

petitioner and others at Kadim Jalna Police Station for the

offence punishable under Section 394 read with Section 34 of

IPC on 01.08.2020. The said crime is under investigation.

Section 394 of IPC relates to voluntarily causing hurt in

committing robbery and provides sentence of

imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment which may

extend to ten years so also be liable to fine. The offence

of robbery cannot be said to be only against an

individual. The offence of robbery is against the society. The

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petitioner alleged to have involved in an offence of robbery

alongwith his associates and that crime is under investigation.

24. There is one more offence registered against the

petitioner and others at Kadim Jalna Police Station vide Crime

No.355/2020 for the offences punishable under Sections

307,160,188, 269,270 of IPC rw 3/25 of Indian Arms Act. The

said crime is also found to be under investigation. The said

offence also cannot be said to be only against the individual, but

it is against the society. The details of the crime seem to have

been given in the FIR pertaining to Crime No.355/2020

registered at Kadim Jalna Police Station as to how and in what

manner the petitioner alongwith his associates alleged to have

created chaos at public place in the presence of police by using

fire arm and created terror and threat to the life of persons.

25. On going through the impugned order of detention, it is

found that the detaining authority has considered all the crimes

and details thereof as well as preventive actions taken earlier

against the petitioner. The detaining authority after having

subjective satisfaction, arrived at conclusion to detain the

petitioner under the MPAD Act. The detaining authority has also

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considered two in-camera statements (witnesses A and B). The

detaining authority has discussed in detail as to how those two

in-camera statements give picture about the criminal activities

of the petitioner, which amount to not only law and order, but

disturbed public order, something more than ordinary

maintenance of law and order.

26. It is evident from the record made available by the

learned APP that the criminal activities of the petitioner of such

a degree that it has potentiality of disturbing even tempo of life

of the community and it may be prejudicial to the maintenance

of public order.

27. On careful study of the impugned order passed by the

detaining authority, we noticed that the detaining authority has

considered entire material produced by the police machinery.

The detaining authority has given the grounds for detention of

the petitioner after having subjective satisfaction. The grounds

for detention given by the detaining authority are based upon

sound material and foundation.

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28. Mr. Sapkal, learned Senior Counsel pointed out that

period of detention was not mentioned in the initial order

issued by the detaining authority and as such, the impugned

order is liable to be quashed and set aside. In T. Devaki V.

Government of Tamil Nadu and others air 1990 SC 1086 , it is

held by the Apex Court that, "the order of detention not

specifying the period of detention does not make the order

invalid."

29. It is observed by the detaining authority in the impugned

order that due to criminal activities of the petitioner there is

constant threat to the life and property of the general public at

large. The criminal activities of the petitioner are harmful for

public order in Jalna District. The detaining authority has also

considered two in-camera statements in detail and concluded

how the persons out of that area are not coming forward to

lodge FIR or to give statement before the police. The large

number of society are under constant terror of the petitioner

and as such, needs his detention to maintain public order.

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30. Two in-camera statements seem to have been personally

verified by the concerned SDPO about its truthfulness and

rightly acted upon by the detaining authority.

31. On careful scrutiny of the impugned order, it is noticed

by us that the principles of natural justice are followed by the

detaining authority before passing the impugned order. The

detaining authority has also followed the procedure

contemplated under the MPDA Act, 1981. We find that the acts

attributed to the detenu are such as would bring him within the

ambit of Clause (iv) of Section 2(a) of the Act. It is seen from

the grounds of detention that the detenu and his associates are

involved in serious crimes like robbery, extortion and assault

which is bound to create fear psychosis in the minds of the

people residing in the locality of the Chandanzira Police Station,

Jalna. The criminal acts attributed to detenu/petitioner had the

potentiality to affect the even tempo of the life. We, therefore,

overrule the contention of Mr. Sapkal, learned Senior Counsel

that the grounds communicated to the detenu do not disclose

that he is involved in activities which were prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order. Two in-camera statements

(witnesses A and B) also revealed that the criminal activities of

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the petitioner has affected the tempo of the life of such as

degree that magnitude to affect public order.

32. It is needless to say that the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution of India do not sit as an appellate Court

while deciding the orders of preventive detention. The High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has to see

whether procedure contemplated under MPDA Act, 1981 has

been followed. Whether the formalities enjoined by Article

22(5) have been complied with by the detaining authority. If

the formalities have been complied with, the Court cannot

examine the materials before it and find that the detaining

authority should not have been satisfied on the materials before

it and detained the detenu under the Preventive Detention Act,

for, that is the function of an appellate Court. We do not see any

merit in the submissions of Mr. Sapkal, learned Senior Counsel

that detaining authority has not applied its mind and arrived at

an erroneous conclusion. There is no merit in the submissions

that there was no subjective satisfaction at the hands of

detaining authority before passing the impugned order of

detention of the petitioner.

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33. For the reasons discussed herein above, we find that the

police machinery had presented sufficient material regarding

criminal activities of the petitioner, which were either

prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial the maintenance of public

order. We do not see any scope to interfere with the subjective

satisfaction of the detaining authority or to find fault in the

same. Hence, we proceed to pass the following order:-

ORDER

(i) The criminal writ petition stands dismissed.

   (ii)        Rule discharged.


   (iv)        No order as to costs




    [ SHRIKANT D. KULKARNI ]                           [ V. K. JADHAV ]
            JUDGE                                            JUDGE


   S.P. Rane




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