Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 15310 Bom
Judgement Date : 26 October, 2021
1 apeal-380-18final.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH: NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 380 OF 2018
1. Budru @ Dinesh @ Krishna S/o.
Rajwanshi Siram,
Aged: about 29 years, Occ. Labour,
R/o. Bhave, Post Etar, Tah. Chukhandanl,
Dist. Rajnandgaon (C.G.).
2. Dinesh @ Arjun @ Santaram S/o.
Maharu Madavi,
Aged: 26 years, Occ. Labour,
R/o. Errugatta, Post Kasansur,
Tah. Ettapalli, Dist. Gadchiroli. . . . APPELLANTS
...V E R S U S..
State of Maharashtra through
P.S.O. Chichgarh, Dist. Gondia. . . . RESPONDENT
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Shri H. P. Lingayat, Advocate for appellants.
Shri T. A. Mirza, A.P. P. for respondent/State.
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CORAM:- M. S. SONAK AND
PUSHPA V. GANEDIWALA, JJ.
RESERVED ON:- 21.10.2021
PRONOUNCED ON:- 26.10.2021
JUDGMENT (PER: M. S. SONAK, J.):-
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 17.05.2018 made by the learned Sessions Judge, Gondia in
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Sessions Trial No. 77/2012 convicting the appellant i.e. accused nos. 3
(A3) and accused no. 4 (A4) of the offenses punishable under Sections
143, 148, 120B, 302, 307 read with Sections 149 and 395 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC). By the same judgment and order, however,
the appellants were acquitted of the offenses punishable under
Sections 18, 20, and 23 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and
under Sections 3 and 4 of read with Section 25 of the Arms Act and
Section 5 of the Explosive Substance Act. Further by the same
judgment and order, the accused nos. 1 and 2 were acquitted of all the
charges leveled against them. This appeal is therefore instituted by the
Appellants i.e. original accused nos. 3 (A3) and accused no. 4 (A4) and
the same is restricted to that part of the judgment and order dated
17.05.2018 convicting and sentencing the Appellants inter alia, to
rigorous imprisonment for life.
3. The case of the prosecution is that on 01.12.2011 at about
7.30 a.m. API Raut (PW11), who was on duty at A.O.P. Ganutola
received a phone call from Fagnu Kallo (A1) that Naxalites had put up
posters and banners at Mispiri Dhamditola. Upon verifying this
information, API Raut (PW11) deputed five constables Ajay Bansod
(PW1), Hasil Bhandarkar (PW2), Santosh Chute (PW3), Raju
Nandeshwar (PW4), and Manoj Binzade (deceased), who came to the
site and removed the posters and banners. These police constables
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went on two motorcycles to the spot and while returning i.e. at a
distance of 1 k.m. from the spot where the posters and banners were
put up, these five police constables were confronted by a mob of about
60/70 Naxalites, who rushed towards them, hurled abuses and even
started firing on them. The five police constables left their motorcycles
at the spot and started running in the opposite direction with the
Naxalites chasing and firing at them.
4. The prosecution case is that some of the police constables
reached the house of Fagnu Kallo (A1), knocked at his door by
shouting "ekek cpkvks" but, nobody opened the door. Then they
managed to come to village Gujurbadga and with the help of cycles
that they found with two local boys, the police constables reached
village Kadikasa and thereafter to A.O.P. Ganutola through the forest
area. Here the constables found PC Bansod (PW1) who told them
that PC Binzade (deceased) was fired upon and killed by the Naxalites.
Based on all this, P.C. Bansod (PW1) lodged a report (Exh.31) at
Chichgrah Police Station. This was reduced in writing by PI Deshmukh
(PW15) and lodged as First Information Report (Exh. 32).
5. In the FIR, only Fagnu Kallo (A1) was named as accused
along with 70/80 unidentified Naxalites. It is the case of the
prosecution that involvement of the accused nos. 2, 3, and 4 was
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revealed only as the investigation progressed and ultimately a charge
sheet was filed against all the four accused persons alleging the
commission of several offenses under the IPC, Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, Arms Act, and Explosive Substances Act as detailed
above.
6. The record indicates that though the date of the incident
was 01.12.2011, the appellant i.e. Budru @ Dinesh @ Krishna S/o.
Rajwanshi Siram (A3) and Dinesh @ Arjun @ Santaram S/o. Maharu
Madavi (A4) were arrested only on 02.12.2012 i.e. after a year. The
charges were framed against the appellants on 09.08.2016 i.e. after
almost 5 years. The appellants denied their guilt and claimed to be
tried. The prosecution examined, in all, 18 witnesses, and the
appellants were questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to which they responded that they were falsely implicated in
the matter. Despite the opportunity, no defense evidence was led by
the appellants. Ultimately, the learned Sessions Judge, by the
impugned judgment and order, has convicted the appellants and
sentenced them, inter alia, to suffer life imprisonment. Hence, the
present appeal.
7. Mr. H. P. Lingayat, learned counsel for the appellants at
the outset submitted that testimony of alleged eye-witnesses PW1 to
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PW4 was not at all credible, particularly, on the aspect of identification
of the appellants. He points out that these witnesses, in their
statements to the police, had neither described the appellants nor at
any time claimed that they were in a position to identify the
appellants. He points out that Test Identification Parade (TIP) was
entirely defective and took place after almost a year from the date of
the incident. He points out that TIP took place after almost 5 weeks
after the date of arrest of the appellants. He points out the serious
breaches in holding the TIP. He points out that the so-called
identification of the appellants in the course evidence was after almost
5 years from the date of the incident. He points out that if the
prosecution version is to be believed then PW1 to PW4, at the highest,
had some fleeting vision of the assailants. He points out that 70/80
persons are alleged to have attacked PW1 to PW4. He points out that
these witnesses were on the run and the so-called identification from a
distance of over 50 meters and was inherently improbable. He submits
that the appellants have been unnecessarily roped into this matter and
there is no ground to sustain the conviction recorded against them. He
relied on Subhas & Shiv Shankar Vs. State of U. P. [AIR 1987 SC 1222] ,
Musheer Khan @ Badshah Khan Vs. State of M. P. [2010 ALL MR (CRI)
933 (SC)] and Narayn Kanu Datavale Vs. State of Maharashtra [1997
CRI. L.J. 1788] in support of his contentions on this aspect.
6 apeal-380-18final.odt
8. Mr. Lingayat also referred to the Criminal Manual and
pointed out how the TIP in the present case was contrary to the several
Regulations framed in the matter regarding the conduct of such TIP.
He submitted that proper TIP was a must in the present case and in the
absence of the same, no reliance can be placed on the so-called
identification of the Appellants by the PW1 to PW4 in the Court during
the trial.
9. Mr. Lingayat also pointed out the several inconsistencies in
the prosecution's case and submitted that evaluation of evidence by
learned Sessions Judge was not proper and consistent with the well-
settled legal principles in such matters. He submitted that there was
no legal evidence on record to convict the appellants, particularly after
A1 and A2 were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge based almost
on the same or similar evidence.
10. Mr. Lingayat, for the aforesaid reasons submitted that
conviction of the appellants and the sentences imposed upon them
warrant interference.
11. Mr. T. A. Mirza, learned A.P.P. for respondent/State has
defended the impugned judgment and order based on reasoning
reflected therein. He submitted that there was no infirmity in the TIP
and in any case, holding such a parade was not even a mandatory legal
7 apeal-380-18final.odt
requirement. He submitted that PW1 to PW4 in the present case had
sufficient opportunity to notice the appellants, who had fired on them
and therefore, identification of the appellants by PW1 to PW4 in the
Court was itself substantive evidence that was rightly relied upon by
the learned Sessions Judge. He submitted that presence of PW1 to
PW4 at the site was not even disputed or in any case, was
undisputable. He submitted that these eye-witnesses had no good
reason to implicate the appellants falsely. He submitted that evidence
of PW1 to PW4, who were natural witnesses, was trustworthy and
reliable. He submitted that even in the absence of TIP, such evidence
ought to have been relied upon and was correctly relied upon.
12. Mr. Mirza submitted that guidelines in the Criminal Manual
for the conduct of TIP are mere administrative instructions and some
non-compliance with them does not vitiate the parade. He relies on
Ms. S Vs. Sunil Kumar [2015 ALL MR (CRI) 2001 (SC)], Ashok
Debbarama @ Achak Debbarma Vs. State of Tripura [(2014) ALL MR
(CRI) 1521], Lawrence Dias Vs. State [2018 ALL MR (CRI) 2600] and
Ajaykumar Sunilkumar Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra [2014 ALL
MR (CRI) 2534] in support of his contentions.
13. Mr. Mirza submitted that there is overwhelming evidence
on the record to sustain the conviction of the appellants and therefore,
this appeal is liable to be dismissed.
8 apeal-380-18final.odt
14. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
15. The most crucial issue in the present appeal concerns the
identification of the appellants as a part of a mob of about 70/80
persons, who are alleged to have confronted and fired upon the police
constables 01.12.2011. Unless the prosecution succeeds in establishing
this crucial aspect beyond a reasonable doubt, we believe that it would
be quite unsafe and even contrary to the well-established principles of
law to sustain the conviction of the Appellants in this case. Therefore,
quite correctly, both Mr. Lingayat and the learned APP focused on this
crucial aspect in this matter.
16. The present Appellants were arraigned as accused nos. 3
and 4 (A3 and A4) and one Fagnu Kallo was arraigned as accused no.
1 (A1) and Prakash @ Devidas @ Adawe Gawde was arraigned as
accused no. 2 (A2) in this matter. By the impugned judgment and
order, A1 and A2 have been acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge.
A1 was acquitted, inter alia, on the ground that he had only informed
the police authorities about the posters and banners put up by the
Naxalites, and further, he had only done his duty as Sarpanch by giving
such information to the police authorities. The learned Sessions Judge
did not find any legal evidence on record to sustain the several charges
9 apeal-380-18final.odt
framed against A1. The case of A1 can therefore be regarded as
different from the case of the Appellants and A-2.
17. But even going by the prosecution version, there was no
significant difference between the role ascribed to A2- Prakash and the
Appellants herein since all the three were alleged to be a part of the
mob of about 70-80 that attacked the police constables. The learned
Sessions Judge has, however, acquitted A2- Prakash, inter alia, on the
ground that there was no TIP conducted insofar as A2 was concerned
and in the absence of T.I.P., it would be unsafe to convict A2- Prakash
for the offenses for which he was charged.
18. Thus, implicitly, the learned Sessions Judge has accepted
the importance of identification of the accused persons in the matter of
this nature, including by holding a proper TIP that might corroborate
the so-called identification of the accused persons in the course of the
trial. Based on this very principle A2- Prakash came to be acquitted by
the learned Sessions Judge. However, when it comes to the
Appellants, we think that the learned Sessions Judge has not bestowed
sufficient consideration to the aspect of whether the TIP held in their
case was fair and proper and if not, whether their conviction could be
solely based on their so-called identification as a part of the mob of
70 -80 by PW1 to PW4 at the trial almost 5 years after the incident.
10 apeal-380-18final.odt
19. Admittedly, in the FIR which was lodged on 01.12.2011,
there was no reference to any person other than Fagnu Kallo (A1). No
doubt, there was a reference to 70/80 " unidentified Naxalites" in
addition to Fagnu Kallo (A1). Thus the FIR admittedly did not either
name or even describe the appellants herein. This is by no means fatal
to the prosecution's case but, this aspect assumes some significance
because PW1 to PW4, in their statements recorded before the police,
had neither stated that they were in a position to identify any of the
assailants nor did they offer any description of any of the assailants.
In none of the statements to the Police did PW1 to PW4 bother to give
even some rough description of the appellants and A-2.
20. There is also no dispute that the Appellants were arrested
on 02.12.2012 when the incident took place on 01.12.2011. Mr. Mirza
explained that the appellants were absconding and therefore, there
was a delay in apprehending them. This is an ordinarily acceptable
explanation. However, there is no credible explanation placed on
record by the prosecution about the basis of identifying the appellants
or concluding prima facie their complicity in the incident that took
place on 01.12.2011.
21. The explanation, if at all, offered by SDPO- Gajanan
Rajmane (PW18) was that the Appellants were already in custody in
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connection with another case i.e. Crime No. 65/2012 at Salekasa
Police Station. He stated that he obtained a production warrant and
thereafter questioned one of the appellants I.e. Budru (A3) on
19.12.2012 i.e. almost a year after the incident. PW18 has deposed
that Budru (A3) allegedly confessed that he was at the spot of the
incident that took place on 01.12.2011 and he would also indicate the
spot where the dead body of PC Binzade was left after the firing. The
learned Sessions Judge has taken into consideration the statement of
Budru (A3) by reasoning that the spot indicated by A3 after over a
year, was indeed the spot from where the body of PC Binzade had been
recovered.
22. According to us, the aforesaid can hardly be regarded as
some valid explanation. Besides, the learned Sessions Judge erred in
relying on the statement allegedly made by A3 to the SDPO (PW18) on
19.12.2012. The statement was admittedly made to a Police Officer
and therefore, was inadmissible in evidence. Secondly, the body of PC
Binzade had been recovered on 01.12.2011 itself i.e. almost a year
before Budru (A3) allegedly made a statement to PW18. Therefore,
such a statement can hardly claim immunity or admissibility under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore,
erred in relying on such a statement, inter alia, to convict not only
Badur (A3) but also A4 i.e. Dinesh.
12 apeal-380-18final.odt
23. Though, the appellants were arrested on 02.12.2012, the
TIP was held only on 07.01.2013 i.e. after almost 5 weeks from the
date of arrest. There is no explanation whatsoever brought on record
by the prosecution to explain this time gap. There are several lacunae
in the TIP to which we shall advert to hereinafter. Suffice to note that
in this case, PW1 to PW4 purported to identify the appellants in the
Court during the trial almost 5 years after the date of the incident.
24. Although Mr. Mirza is right in his contention that such
identification in the Court amounts to substantive evidence, the
question is about the weight that can be assigned to such substantive
evidence, in absence of corroboration employing timely and proper TIP.
Besides, in this case, we are concerned with the issue of identification
of the Appellants who were alleged to have formed a part of a mob of
70-80. The identification accepted by the learned sessions Judge is by
the constables, who claimed to have seen the mob from a distance of
50 meters and when the constables were running for their lives with
their backs to such mob. These constables have deposed that the
members of the mob were in green uniforms, in green fields beyond
which were dense green forests. All these crucial aspects deserved
consideration before accepting the identification of the Appellants by
the constables during the trial or whilst in the dock after almost 5
years from the date of the incident.
13 apeal-380-18final.odt
25. The learned Sessions Judge has observed that the
testimony of PW1 to PW4 is almost identical in material particulars.
Even, Mr. Mirza, learned A.P.P. had emphasized that there is
consistency in the testimony of PW1 to PW4. He points out that there
was no contradiction in the version deposed by PW1 to PW4. We have,
with the assistance of the learned counsel read and analyzed the
depositions of PW1 To PW4 in great detail. Their testimonies appear to
be similar in material particulars but the same are not quite identical.
Some additional and even quite relevant and material particulars have
been deposed to by PW2 to PW4 that were missed by the learned
sessions judge based on the premise that the testimonies of PW1 to
PW4 were identical. This is not however to suggest that there were
some inconsistencies in the testimonies of which some advantage could
be claimed by the Appellants. This is only to point out that some
relevant and material evidence in depositions of PW1 to PW4 was
overlooked on the premise that the testimonies of all the constables
were identical.
26. Ajay Bansode (PW1) has deposed that he along with 4
other constables went to the spot on two motorcycles where the
Naxalites had put up posters and banners. One of the motorcycles
carried, along with him, Raju Nandeshwar (PW4) and Santosh Chute
(PW3). The other motor-cycle carried Hasil Bhandarkar (PW2) and
14 apeal-380-18final.odt
Manoj Binzade (deceased). He deposed that after they removed the
posters and banners and were returning to A.O.P. Ganutola, Police
Station Chichgrah when they reached Nalla they saw about 70/80
Naxalites coming towards them from the opposite direction. He
deposed that the mob was armed and was shouting. He deposed that
they started firing on them. He deposed that they stopped their
motorcycles and left them there and ran to save their lives. He
deposed that one bullet hit Manoj Binzade (deceased) on his thigh and
he fell. He deposed that some Naxalites chased him. On 21.10. 2016,
in the course of his deposition, PW1 even identified Fagnu Kallo (A1),
who was present in the Court-dock.
27. Ajay Bansod (PW1) was recalled and re-examined on
09.12.2016. This time he identified A2-Prakash and the Appellants
who were present in the Court- dock. He stated that the Appellants
are the same persons whom he had identified at the TIP. In his cross-
examination, PW1 admitted that his first statement was recorded on
01.12.2011 and a supplementary statement was recorded on
24.04.2012. He admitted that he did not tell the Investigating Officer
(I.O.) while recording the aforesaid statements that the Appellants
were the Naxalites and that they ran towards him and fired on him.
The depositions of the Hasil Bhandarkar (PW2), Santosh Chute (PW3),
and Raju Nandeshwar (PW4) are more detailed than PW1.
15 apeal-380-18final.odt
28. PW2 has also deposed that when he along with other
police constables reached near Nalla, they were confronted by 70/80
Naxalites shouting slogans, hurling abuses, and firing at them. He
deposed to their reaction when the firing started in the following
words:-
"To protect our life, we started running, by leaving our bike there. P. C. Bansod ran towards field, I, P.C. Chute and Nandeshwar ran towards one side and P. C. Binzade went towards another side."
29. PW2 in his cross-examination admitted that he did not tell
the I.O. while recording his statement the age, height, and complexion
of the accused persons whom he had seen. He admitted that he saw
the mob of Naxalites from a distance of 50 meters. He admitted that
the moment the Naxalites saw them, they started abusing them, they
raised slogans and fired upon them. PW2 has then deposed that they
started running towards the opposite side. PW2 has also deposed that
this incident took place in the green field beyond which there were
dense forests. He admitted that all the Naxalites were in " green dress".
He admitted that he never told the I.O. that he can identify any of the
accused persons. He admitted that the I.O. had told him that he had
arrested the accused persons and even the name of the accused
persons were told to him by the police. He admitted that he had never
seen the assailants before the incident.
16 apeal-380-18final.odt
30. PW3 also deposed that he stopped his motorcycle almost
50 meters away from the mob of about 30/40 Naxalites, who started
abusing them and even opened fire. He also deposed that he along
with other police constables he left the motorcycle at the spot and
started running away. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he
had seen the assailants at a distance of about 50 meters; that the
assailants were in "green dress" and that on both sides of the spot of
the incident, there were fields and beyond them, there were dense
forests. He admitted that the moment he saw the assailants firing at
them, they started running in the opposite direction.
31. Raju Nandeshwar (PW4) has also deposed that the
moment they saw 60/70 Naxalites in green uniform from a distance of
about 50 meters, they left their motorcycles on the spot and started
running towards the opposite side. He deposed that the Naxalites
were chasing and firing at them. He deposed that the motor-cycle
carrying Bhandarkar (PW2) and Binzade (deceased) was also coming
along with their motor-cycle and when they saw them running, even
Bhandarkar(PW2) and Binzade (deceased) left their motor-cycle at the
spot and started running along with them.
32. Even PW4 admitted that he had not described the height
and complexion of any of the Naxalites. He admitted that he had seen
17 apeal-380-18final.odt
them from a distance of 50 meters. He admitted that the
Naxalites/assailants were in a green uniform and were all standing in
the field beyond which were dense forests. He admitted that the
moment they saw the Naxalites at a distance of 50 meters, they
stopped their motorcycle and started running in the opposite direction.
He admitted that he had never told the I.O. that he can identify the
assailants. Significantly, he even admitted that since he had seen the
Naxalites from a distance of 50 meters, he could not describe the
assailants in his statement recorded on 02.12.2011. He admitted that
from 02.12.2011 to 24.04.2012, he never went to the I.O. stating that
he can identify the assailants.
33. Therefore, from the testimonies of PW1 to PW4, it is quite
clear that these police constables noticed a mob of about 60/70
assailants/Naxalites, standing almost 50 meters away from the spot
where these police constables left their motorcycles and started
running in the opposite direction. This is because this mob of 60/70
assailants/Naxalites started hurling abuses and even opened fire on
them. These witnesses have consistently deposed that they ran for
their lives in the direction opposite to that of the mob of 60/70
assailants/Naxalites, who were firing upon them. These witnesses
admitted that none of them described or were in a position to describe
any of the assailants/Naxalites. PW4 in terms admitted that this was
18 apeal-380-18final.odt
because the assailants were at a distance of almost 50 meters away
from them. All these police constables also admitted that the
assailants/Naxalites were wearing a green uniform and were standing
in green fields beyond which there were dense green forests.
34. The identification of A2-Prakash, A3-Budru, and A4-
Dinesh by PW1 to PW4 in the Court almost 5 years after the incident
will have to be therefore evaluated in the context of aforesaid
circumstances deposed to by PW1 to PW4 themselves. This is more so
because there was no TIP regards A2-Prakash and the TIP which was
held almost a year after the incident and five weeks after the arrest of
the Appellants also left a lot to be desired. Having regard to the
circumstances deposed to by PW1 to PW4 themselves as listed in the
above paragraph, the identification in the Court inspires no confidence
particularly since the same was not corroborated by TIP that inspired
some confidence. With respect, we think that the learned Sessions
Judge erred in relying on the identification of the appellants by PW1 to
PW4 in the Court-dock five years after the incident by disregarding
almost entirely the above crucial circumstances emanating from the
deposition of PW1 to PW4 themselves.
35. On the evaluation and analysis of the depositions of PW1
to PW4, we feel that these witnesses though at the spot, could not
19 apeal-380-18final.odt
have identified the Appellants from out of a mob of 70/80 assailants,
all of whom wearing a green uniform and were standing in green fields
beyond which there were dense forests, particularly, when PW1 to
PW4 claimed to have witnessed the assailants from a distance of over
50 meters or thereabouts. PW4 as noted earlier admitted that he was
not even in a position to describe any of the assailants in his
statements given to the Police because they were at a distance of over
50 meters from the spot. Besides PW1 to PW4 have deposed that when
they saw the belligerent mob at a distance of about 50 meters, they
simply left their motorcycles at the spot and fled for their lives in the
opposite direction since they were being abused and fired upon by the
mob. Based on a fleeting glance, if at all, the identification after a year
or five years can hardly inspire confidence or be held sufficient to
sustain a conviction for a capital offense. This crucial evidence has
been overlooked by the learned Sessions Judge and this, according to
us, renders the identification of the Appellants by PW1 to PW4 quite
unsafe to sustain their conviction.
36. The Appellants, in this case, were at least entitled to a
benefit of reasonable doubt similar to the one extended to A2-Prakash,
despite PW1 to PW4 having identified A-2 in the course of the trial.
This benefit was extended to A2-Prakash because, admittedly, in the
case of A2-Prakash the prosecution failed to even hold TIP. This benefit
20 apeal-380-18final.odt
was denied to the Appellants because in the case of the Appellants the
Prosecution held a TIP. According to us, however, even this TIP left a
lot to be desired and therefore offered no corroboration whatsoever to
the un-inspiring identification of the Appellants by PW1 to PW4 in
Court-dock almost 5 years after the incident.
37. Now, the TIP concerning the Appellants was held on
07.01.2013. There is a dispute as to whether this parade was held in
the building of the S.D.P.O. or the building of S.D.M. Deori. The
evidence is not quite clear but, there is no dispute that TIP in the
present case was not held in the jail premises where it was normally
required to be held, as admitted by Rajiv Yamavar, Naib Tahsildar
(PW12), who conducted the TIP.
38. PW12 deposed that he was informed that two accused
persons had to be identified at the parade to be held on 07.01.2013.
He deposed that to identify the two accused persons, a total of 14
persons of the same age, size, and complexion were arranged by the
I.O. He deposed that there was only one row of 14 persons and before
arranging this row, he asked the accused persons whether they want to
change their clothes or say anything.
39. PW12 has then deposed that firstly 12 dummies were
called and the identifying witnesses were asked to identify the accused
21 apeal-380-18final.odt
persons from amongst them. He deposed that thereupon the
identifying witnesses did not identify anybody. PW12 admitted that
this crucial aspect was not recorded in the TIP memorandum. PW12
further deposed that he then asked the identifying witnesses to go
back. After they went back, PW12 deposed that he called Appellant to
join the 12 dummies. He deposed that the Appellants stood in the
row with the dummies as per their choice. Thereafter, PW12 again
called in the identifying witnesses who then identified the Appellants.
This part was recorded in the memorandum of TIP and the same was
accepted in the evidence.
40. Apart from several breaches of the guidelines prescribed
for holding of TIPs, we fail to understand why PW12 first called in the
12 dummies and asked the identifying witnesses to identify the
accused person from out of these 12 dummies. After the identifying
witness allegedly failed to identify any of the dummies as the accused
persons, PW12 sent out the identifying witness and called in two
accused persons, and required them to join in the row along with the
very same 12 dummies. This means that PW12 virtually facilitated the
identification of two accused persons since in the earlier round, 12
dummies had been eliminated by the identifying witnesses. This was a
rather unusual procedure adopted by PW12 in the matter of TIP that
impacted the integrity of the process in the facts of the present case.
22 apeal-380-18final.odt
41. PW12 in his cross-examination admitted that he had not
noted down the complexions, age, height, and weight of the dummies
in the memorandum of the TIP. PW12 admitted that both the accused
persons are different in age, height, and health and yet he held a
common TIP and prepared a common TIP report (memorandum) in
respect of both the accused persons. PW12 admitted that there was a
main door in front of the place where identifying witnesses were
standing. He admitted that he did not make panchnama or
memorandum when the identifying witnesses were firstly asked to
identify the accused persons from amongst 12 dummies and they did
not identify them. PW12 admitted being aware of the guidelines for
the conduct of TIP. PW12 admitted that he had conducted only 3/4
TIP before the present TIP. This means that the infirmities in the
holding of TIP were brought to the notice of PW12 and he was allowed
to explain.
42. The Criminal Manual provides guidelines for holding TIPs.
Clause (h) under Chapter I provides that suspect should be placed
among persons (if practicable eight or more) who are as far as possible
of the same age, height, general appearance (including standard of
dress and grooming), and position in life. Two suspects of roughly
similar appearances should be paraded with at least twelve other
persons. Where, however, the two suspects are not similar in
23 apeal-380-18final.odt
appearances or where there are more than two suspects, separate
parades should be held using different persons on each parade.
43. Similarly, Clause (i) provides that all members of a group
of suspects more than two should not be paraded together. There
should be more parades than one, each including not more than two.
Two suspects of obviously dissimilar appearance should not be
included in the same parade. The identification numbers should be
concealed.
44. From the testimony of PW12, it is evident that the two
Appellants i.e. A3 and A4 were dissimilar in their appearances, and yet
a common parade was held. The guidelines very clearly provide that if
a witness is unable to identify or there is misidentification then this
should be reflected in the memorandum of TIP. In this case, there is no
explanation as to why there was no reference to the curious procedure
admittedly followed by PW12 of first parading the 12 dummies
without two accused persons before the identifying witnesses and
noting that identifying witnesses had failed to identify any person from
amongst the dummies as the accused persons. There is no recording
about how identifying witnesses were sent out and the two accused
persons were then included in the row along with 12 dummies. This
process, according to us, facilitated the identifying witnesses to
24 apeal-380-18final.odt
identify the Appellants because, hardly a few minutes earlier, they had
an opportunity to eliminate the 12 dummies. In any case, all this had
to be at least properly recorded in the memorandum but, even the
same was not done.
45. Mr. Mirza is right in his submission that guidelines
contained in the Criminal Manual are only administrative and mere
non-compliance with the guidelines will not invariably vitiate the TIP.
However, these guidelines have been made to ensure that
identification parades are held fairly and in conformity with judicial
requirements. The guidelines have been made as a measure of fairness
in the investigation process. These guidelines provide that
identification parades should be fair and seem to be fair and therefore
every precaution must be taken to exclude any suspicion of unfairness
or risk of any erroneous identification through the witnesses' attention
being directed especially to the suspected person instead of equally to
all the persons to be paraded. [See: Guideline (b) Chapter I of
Criminal Manual].
46. Therefore, while the guidelines may not be binding as
such, they are not required to be ordinarily ignored. Rather, normally
the process should, by and far be guided by such guidelines unless
there is some good reason for substantially deviating from the same.
25 apeal-380-18final.odt
This is because, even if we ignore breaches of the guidelines, there is
no explanation as to why there was no true and faithful recording of
the process in the memorandum of TIP. There is no explanation as to
why some curious procedure, first requiring the identifying witnesses
to identify the accused persons from amongst 12 dummies was
followed and this was soon followed up by including two accused
persons along with the very same 12 dummies. Mr. Lingayat submitted
that this, to a great extent, amounted to directing the witnesses'
attention to the two accused persons, who were incidentally the only
two additional faces apart from 12 dummies, whom the identifying
witnesses had already eliminated a few minutes ago. Having regard to
all such factors, it would be unsafe to rely upon such a TIP to
corroborate the identification of the accused persons by PW1 to PW4
in the dock during the trial, particularly, since even the said
identification in the dock was itself not found to be quite credible or
safe to be relied upon.
47. Mr. Lingayat pointed out that in this case there is no
explanation whatsoever, for the delay in holding the TIP. The parade
was held almost 5 weeks after the appellants were apprehended or
arrested. This circumstance, by itself, may not amount to much.
However, if this circumstance is considered along with other
circumstances referred to above, then, same, assumes some
26 apeal-380-18final.odt
significance. Even independent of this circumstance, the TIP, in this
case, inspires not much confidence and offers not much corroboration
to the equally uninspiring identification of the Appellants in the Dock
almost 5 years after the incident.
48. In Subhas & Shiv Shankar Vs. State of U. P (supra) , the
accused persons or their names were not known to the identifying
witness. The names of the accused persons did not find a place in the
FIR. The TIP was not held promptly but, the parade was held after 3
weeks from their arrest. There was no explanation for this delay. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court, in such circumstances, held that there was,
therefore, room for doubt as to whether the delay in holding the TIP
was to enable the identifying witness to see the accused in at least
lockup area or in the jail premises to make a note of his features.
49. Besides, even in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
a sufficiently long interval of time i.e. almost 4 months had elapsed
between the date of occurrence and the date of TIP. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court also noted that identifying witnesses had not given
descriptive particulars of the accused and based on all these factors,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the absence of descriptive
particulars or statements of the witness during the investigation to
27 apeal-380-18final.odt
identify the accused person, it would be quite unsafe to act on the TIP
and the benefit of the doubt had to be given to the accused person.
50. In the present case, the TIP took place after almost a year
from the date of the incident for which the Prosecution cannot perhaps
be faulted. But the TIP took place almost 5 weeks after the date of
arrest of the accused. In this case, as well, identifying witnesses chose
not to give any descriptive particulars of the accused persons. One of
the identifying witnesses, in fact, deposed that no such description was
given because they allegedly noticed the assailants from a distance of
almost 50 meters when such assailants were part of a mob of 70/80
persons. There is evidence that members of the mob were all wearing
green uniforms and were in green fields beyond which were dense
green forests. The witnesses claim to have noticed the Appellants
when they were being fired upon and were running for their lives with
their backs to the mob. All these relevant circumstances have been
ignored by the learned Sessions Judge and the conviction recorded, is,
therefore, quite vulnerable.
51. In Musheer Khan @ Badshah Khan (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court noted that the identifying witness had an extremely
limited opportunity of seeing the accused person. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court noted from the evidence of one of the identifying
28 apeal-380-18final.odt
witnesses that he had only a fleeting chance of seeing the accused
person when they were obviously in hurry to board the scooter and
escape from the spot and further the identifying witness had not even
known the accused persons before the incident. In such a situation, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it would not be safe to act on either
identification of the accused person in the Court or even in TIP.
Incidentally, even in this case, one of the accused persons was arrested
on 05.12.2000, and the identification parade was conducted on
10.12.2000. Another accused was arrested on 22.12.2000 and the
identification parade was held on 24.01.2001. The date of the
incident was 29.11.2000. Based upon all these factors, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that it was unsafe to act on such TIP.
52. Upon cumulative consideration of the aforesaid
circumstance, we believe that it would be unsafe to accept the
identification of the accused persons by PW1 to PW4 during the trial or
for that matter, the identification at the TIP. This is even though we
agree with Mr. Mirza that holding of a TIP is not a rule of law but, rule
of prudence as was held in Sunil Kumar (supra). Normally,
identification of the accused in a TIP lends assurance so that
subsequent identification in the Court during the trial can be safely
relied upon. However, in the absence of TIP, identification in the
Court, can, in a given circumstance be relied upon if the witness is
29 apeal-380-18final.odt
otherwise trustworthy and reliable. In this case, no such credibility be
assigned to the testimony of PW1 to PW4, when it comes to their
identifying the accused persons in the Court-dock almost five years
after the incident and in circumstances adverted to earlier.
53. Incidentally, in Ms. S Vs. Sunil Kumar (supra) , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was concerned with the testimony of the prosecutrix,
who was subjected to sexual intercourse during the broad daylight. It
is in this context that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that by the very
nature of the offense, close proximity with the offender certainly
afforded sufficient time to imprint upon her mind the identity of the
offender. Furthermore, in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
the prosecutrix had gone to the extent of stating in her first report that
she would be in a position to identify the offender and she even gave
the particulars of his identity in her statement to the police. The
circumstances in the present case, as noted above, are entirely
different, The decision in Ms. S Vs. Sunil Kumar (supra), therefore,
cannot be of assistance to the prosecution.
54. Ajaykumar Sunilkumar Sharma (supra) was a case of
dacoity and the breach complained of was about including almost 20
unidentical dummies in the TIP instead of the normal seven similar
dummies. In this context, the Division Bench of this Court held that
30 apeal-380-18final.odt
such irregularity in the TIP could not be raised in defense, without
even proper cross-examination of the Magistrate, who conducted the
TIP. In the present case, the facts are quite different, and further, as
noted above, the Naib Tahsildar (PW12) was sufficiently cross-
examined. Therefore, even the decision in the case of Ajaykumar
Sunilkumar Sharma (supra) can be of no assistance to the prosecution.
55. Lawrence Dias (supra) was a case where only 4 dummies
were included in the TIP instead of 6 prescribed in the guidelines. It is
in this context the learned Single Judge of this Court held that
guidelines in the Criminal Manual are in the nature of administrative
instructions and mere non-compliance with the required number of
dummies being included in the TIP cannot vitiate the parade or render
it suspicious. The learned Single Judge also noted that the evidence
before him was replete to show that PW1 had sufficient opportunity to
see the accused person and to be with him for a sufficient period to
make the subsequent identification of the accused person trustworthy.
Therefore, even this decision, can be of no assistance for the
prosecution particularly, because the facts of the present case are
entirely different from the facts before the learned Single Judge in the
case of Lawrence Dias (supra).
31 apeal-380-18final.odt 56. In Ashok Debbarama @ Achak Debbarma (supra) the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that non-holding of TIP, itself, is not a
reason to discard the evidence of a witness if otherwise, such witness is
reliable and trustworthy. Identification of the accused person at trial is
substantive evidence whereas identification in TIP, though primary, is
used as only corroborative. Again, in the present case for the reasons
discussed, evidence of PW1 to PW4 on the aspect of identification of
the appellants can not be held to be reliable or credible on the aspect
of identification. This, coupled with serious irregularities in the
holding of TIP renders it quite unsafe to sustain the conviction
recorded against the Appellants. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, therefore, can be of no assistance to the prosecution in the
present case. Besides, in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
there was evidence that many accused persons were known to the
identifying witness.
57. Mr. Mirza is quite right in his submission that evidence of
identification in the TIP is not substantive evidence, but only
corroborative evidence. The TIP falls in the realm of investigation and
its purpose is to test the observation, memory, capacity to recapitulate
what identifying witness has seen earlier, to test the strength or
trustworthiness of the evidence of identification of the accused, and to
ascertain if it can be used as reliable corroborative evidence of the
32 apeal-380-18final.odt
witness identifying the accused at trial in the Court. If a witness
identifies the accused in Court for the first time after a long time then
such corroborative evidence would be safe to rely on. But, if the
witness is known to the accused earlier or the witness had a
sufficiently long opportunity to interact with the accused or have the
imprint of the identification of the accused then this position may be
quite different.
58. In the present case, it is not even the prosecution's version
that PW1 to PW4 ever knew the accused persons earlier. From the
evidence on record, it is difficult to accept Mr. Mirza's contention that
PW1 to PW4 had sufficient opportunity to witness the accused persons
at the spot of the incident. PW1 to PW4 were in a great hurry to flee
from the site and therefore, it is most unlikely that they would identify
the accused persons from out of a mob of 70/80 assailants, all wearing
a green color uniform, standing in green fields, beyond which there
was a dense green forest. PC- Binzade, who unfortunately died in the
firing received bullet injuries on his back. This indicates that he along
with PW1 to PW4 were running away from the spot with their backs to
the mob.
59. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jayan
v. State of Kerela LL, [2021 SC 582] reiterated that TIP is a part of the
33 apeal-380-18final.odt
investigation process and not substantive evidence and the question of
holding a TIP arises when the accused is not known to the witness
earlier. The identification by a witness of the accused in the Court who
has for the first time seen the accused in the incident is a weak piece of
evidence especially when there is a large time gap between the date of
the incident and the date of recording of the evidence. In such a case
the TIP may make the identification of the accused by the witness in
the Court trustworthy. However, the absence of TIP may not be ipso
facto sufficient to discard the testimony of a witness who has identified
the accused in the Court. In some cases, the Court may be impressed
with the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which is of sterling
quality. In such cases, the testimony of such a witness can be believed.
In the present case, however, for reasons discussed earlier, we cannot
say that the evidence of PW1 to Pw4 at least on the aspect of
identification of the Appellants is of sterling quality.
60. In Raja Vs. State [(2020) 15 SCC 562], the Hon'ble
Supreme Court undertook a survey of case law on the subject of TIP.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that if the material on record
sufficiently indicates that reasons for "gaining and enduring expression
of the identity on the mind and memory of witness" are available on
record, the matter stands in a completely different perspective. In such
a case even non-holding of TIP would not be fatal to the case of the
34 apeal-380-18final.odt
prosecution. Applying such test to the case which was being
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was concluded that the
assailants were quite close to the witnesses and each of them suffered
injuries at the hands of such assailants and therefore, the witness had
sufficient time and opportunity to observe the features of the
assailants. The Hon'ble Supreme Court then observed that "it is not as
if the witness has seen the assailants in a mob and over some distance.
Going by the injuries, contact with the accused must have been from a
close distance"
61. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is quite clear that the absence
of a TIP might not affect the identification of the assailants by the
prosecution witnesses directly in the Court where there is material on
the record of the witness gaining an enduring impression of the
identity on their mind and memory. By way of illustration, however,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself referred to the case of witnesses who
had seen the assailants in a mob over some distance meaning thereby
that such a case may have to be evaluated from a different perspective.
62. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Syed Umar Suyed Abbas
[(2016) 4 SCC 735], the Hon'ble Supreme Court was evaluating the
evidence of 5 eye-witnesses including the injured witnesses. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the incident of firing occurred in
35 apeal-380-18final.odt
circumstances wherein much time was not available for the witnesses
to clearly see the accused persons. In such a situation, it was much
more important that TIP was conducted without any delay. The TIP
was conducted almost 1 and ½ months after the incident and this was
held as insufficient to offer corroboration. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
noted that though the incident took place in broad daylight, time for
which eye-witnesses could see the accused persons was not sufficient
for them to observe distinguishing features of the accused, especially,
since there was commotion created after firing and everyone was
running to shelter from firing. Based on such evaluation, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court upheld the benefit of doubt extended by the High
Court to the accused persons.
63. In State of U.P. Vs. Wasif Haider [(2019) 2 SCC 303], the
Hon'ble High Court was concerned about the case where the accused
persons were convicted, inter alia, for the offenses under Sections 302
and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. These
accused persons were alleged to have been a part of a group of
200/300 rioters. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there was an
inordinate delay of 55 days in conducting TIP and for that, no
reasonable explanation was put forth. Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court
noted that out of seven eye-witnesses, who participated in the TIP, five
of them identified the accused persons with 100 percent precision.
36 apeal-380-18final.odt
Based on this, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such specific
identification from a group of 200/300 rioters, without mentioning
any distinguishing marks seems highly improbable considering the
distance of the witness from the place of occurrence. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court reiterated that suspicion, however grave cannot take
place of proof and that there is a long distance between " may be" and
"must be", which must be traversed by the prosecution to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. Incidentally, this was also a case
where the rioters had fired at the Police personnel resulting death of a
senior police official and injuring others.
64. In absence of any reliable evidence on the aspect of
identification of the appellants, we feel it would be quite unsafe to
sustain conviction recorded against the appellants. Thus, according to
us, this is a case where the appellants are entitled to benefit of
reasonable doubt. The learned Sessions Judge, in this case, has simply
accepted the TIP and the identification by PW1 to PW4 of the
Appellants in the Court during the trial as credible. The circumstances
adverted to by us were not adverted to, much less considered by the
learned Sessions Judge. This according to us, constitutes a serious
error in the evaluation of the evidence on record.
37 apeal-380-18final.odt
65. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set
aside the impugned judgment and order dated 17.05.2018 passed by
Sessions Judge, Gondia in Sessions Trial No. 77/2012 to the extent it
convicts and sentences the appellants herein. The appellants shall now
be released from custody if they are not required in any other case.
66. The Registry is directed to do the needful at the earliest.
(PUSHPA V. GANEDIWALA, J.) (M. S. SONAK, J.) RR Jaiswal
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