Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 14748 Bom
Judgement Date : 8 October, 2021
J-LPA-406-11 1/13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.406 OF 2011
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.5672 OF 2010
Hindusthan Udyog Ltd.
(Previoiusly known as ACC Nihon Castings Ltd.)
A-1/2 Butibori Industrial Area
District Nagpur
Through its General Manager ... Appellant
-vs-
Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner,
132-A, Ridge Road, Raghuji Nagpur
Nagpur ... Respondent
Shri R. B. Puranik, Advocate for appellant.
Shri H. N. Verma, Advocate for respondent.
CORAM : A. S. CHANDURKAR AND G. A. SANAP, JJ.
Arguments were heard on : September 02, 2021 Judgment is pronounced on : October 08, 2021
Judgment : (Per : A. S. Chandurkar, J.)
This Letters Patent Appeal filed under Clause-15 of the Letters
Patent Appeal raises a challenge to the judgment of learned Single Judge
dated 07/07/2011 in Writ Petition No.5672/2010. By that judgment the
writ petition preferred by the respondent herein has been allowed and after
setting aside the order passed by the Employees Provident Fund Appellate
Tribunal, New Delhi, the proceedings have been remanded to the said
Tribunal to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law.
J-LPA-406-11 2/13
2. The facts giving rise to the present proceedings are that ACC
Nihon Castings Ltd. (for short, ANCL) is a Company incorporated under
Companies Act, 1956. Pursuant to an order passed on 01/04/2008 by the
Calcutta High Court, ANCL stood merged with Hindustan Udyog Ltd., the
present appellant. It is the case of ANCL that it is a subsidiary Company of
Associated Cement Companies Ltd. (for short, ACCL) which deals in
manufacture and sale of cement. ANCL was incorporated on 10/02/1992.
ACCL is one of the shareholders in the equity capital of ANCL. ANCL
constructed and erected its plant at Butibori in the year 1992-93. The trial
production of Alloy Steel Castings started from 24/11/1993 and its
commercial production started from 12/04/1994.
3. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner on 02/12/1996
informed ANCL that the provisions of the Employees Provident Fund and
Misc. Provisions of Act, 1952 (for short, the Act of 1952) would be applicable
to the establishment from 01/11/1996 on completion of infancy period
under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act of 1952. ANCL was accordingly issued a
Code number for complying with the provisions of the Act of 1952. On
02/12/1999 the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner issued a show cause
notice to ANCL stating therein that being a subsidiary Company of ACCL
which was exempted under para 27-A of the Employees Pension Scheme,
1952, it was likely that the subsidiary concern was enjoying unity of
J-LPA-406-11 3/13
ownership, management control, functional integrality and general unity of
employment with ACCL. According to the said Authority there was ground
to believe that the establishment should be covered from the date of
commencement of production which was 24/11/1993 in view of provisions
of Section 2-A of the Act of 1952. Hence ANCL was called upon to show
cause as to why its establishment should not be covered under Section 2-A of
the Act of 1952 from 24/11/1993. ANCL was accordingly called upon to
show cause to the aforesaid.
4. ANCL submitted its reply to the aforesaid show cause notice and
stated that it was wrong to conclude that ANCL and ACCL would constitute
"one establishment" under the Act of 1952. Various factors required for
determining the integrality of business were absent. Manufacture of Alloy
Steel Castings undertaken by ANCL was not connected with the cement
manufacturing activity of ACCL. Recruitment of employees was distinct and
separate and so were the terms and conditions of service, amenities and
benefits of employees of ANCL. Both establishments were independent and
there was no supervisory control nor any functional integrality between the
two Companies. It was further stated that ANCL was maintaining separate
balance-sheet and books of accounts. It was thus stated that in absence of
any unity in the business, management and control, ANCL and ACCL could
not be treated to be "one establishment". It was thus stated that the
J-LPA-406-11 4/13
provisions of the Act of 1952 were applicable to ANCL from 01/11/1996 and
not from 24/11/1993.
5. The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner in proceedings under
Section 7A of the Act of 1952 and after considering the submissions made on
behalf of ANCL held that ANCL was a subsidiary Company of ACCL. The
Provident Fund Rules of ACCL were applied to the employees of ANCL. The
Annual Report of ANCL for the year 1995-96 indicated that ACCL and NCC
Japan had invested an amount of Rs.8 Crore in the equity capital of ANCL.
It had also appointed one Shri K. K. Pathak who was earlier associated with
ACCL as Managing Director of ANCL for a period of five years from
01/02/1993. After noting the payment of provident fund bills from 1992-93
it was observed that there was unity of ownership, management of control,
finance, unity of employment and functional integrality between ANCL and
ACCL. On that premise an order under provisions of Section 7A of the Act of
1952 making the provisions applicable from the date ANCL started its
manufacturing process in the month of November 1993. ANCL was
accordingly called upon to pay provident fund contribution for the period
from November 1993 to October 1996 in respect of employees excluding
those who had been exempted under the Scheme by the Competent
Authority. The payment was directed to be made within a period of fifteen
days.
J-LPA-406-11 5/13
An application for review preferred by ANCL came to be rejected
by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner on 20/12/2001.
6. ANCL being aggrieved by the aforesaid order filed an appeal
under provisions of Section 7-1 of the Act of 1952 before the Employees
Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the only link
found by the Enquiry Officer in Section 7-A proceedings under the Act of
1952 was that ANCL was a subsidiary Company of ACCL. There was no
material or evidence discussed to establish the fact of unity of finance or
employment between the two establishments. The tests for clubbing two
establishments as one under provisions of Section 2-A of the Act of 1952
were not satisfied. On this premise the Tribunal held that the conclusion
arrived at by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner while clubbing
ANCL with ACCL was not in consonance with law and hence not sustainable.
On this count the appeal was allowed and the order dated 13/11/2001
passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner was set aside.
7. Being aggrieved, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner
challenged this order by filing Writ Petition No.567/2010. The learned
Single Judge held that the dominant and real test to be adopted to hold that
two or more units form part and parcel of the same establishment would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was not necessary
J-LPA-406-11 6/13
that in all cases the dominant test would be of functional integrality. In
absence of functional integrality the other tests such as unity of management
and control, unity of finance, unity of labour and employment would gain
significance. Reference was thereafter made to the aspect of entitlement to
infancy period as stipulated by Section 16(1)(d) of the Act of 1952.
Referring to the order passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner
the learned Single Judge found that reliance had been placed on the contents
of the annual report of ANCL and the Provident Fund Rules of ACCL. It was
then found by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner that ANCL was an
expansion of the activity of ACCL and thus covered by the provisions of
Section 2-A of the Act of 1952. This disentitled it to any infancy period of
three years as such benefit had been availed by ACCL. It was then found that
the Tribunal had failed to consider these relevant aspects and its findings
suffered from non-application of mind to the material available on record.
On that premise the order passed by the Tribunal was set aside and the
proceedings were remitted to the Tribunal to reconsider the appeal afresh in
accordance with law and in the light of observations made in the order.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, ANCL which is now Hindustan
Udyog Ltd. has come up in appeal.
8. Shri R. B. Puranik, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the learned Single Judge was not justified in setting aside the order
J-LPA-406-11 7/13
passed by the Appellate Tribunal and remanding the proceedings for fresh
adjudication to it. According to him the Tribunal had found from the record
that except the fact that ANCL was a subsidiary Company of ACCL, there was
no further material on record to establish the fact of unity of finance or
employment between the two. The requirements as prescribed for clubbing
both the establishments under provisions of Section 2-A of the Act of 1952
were also found to be absent and hence the order passed by the Assistant
Provident Fund Commissioner was rightly set aside. Referring to the
material considered by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner it was
submitted that said material would not establish unity of ownership or
functional integrality between ANCL and ACCL. Merely because both
establishments shared a common registered office with the same address or
the fact that employees of ANCL were members of the Provident Fund
Scheme with ACCL, it would not lead to a conclusion that there was unity of
ownership or functional integrality between them. On the contrary both the
establishments were independent entities and had separate existence. ANCL
was not dependent upon ACCL in view of the fact that ANCL was engaged in
Alloy Steel Castings while ACCL was in the business of cement. Placing
reliance on the decision in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and ors. vs.
ABS Spinning Orissa Ltd. And anr 2008 III CLR 580 it was submitted that ANCL
despite being a subsidiary Company had an independent existence and that
aspect would be of no relevance in the present proceedings. He referred to
J-LPA-406-11 8/13
the tests that were required to be satisfied for determining the true
relationship between ANCL and ACCL by relying upon the decisions in The
Associated Cement Companies, Ltd., Chaibasa Cement Works, Jhinkpani, vs. Their
Workmen AIR 1960 SC 56, Management of Pratap Press, New Delhi vs. Secretary,
Delhi Press Workers's Union Delhi Air 1960 SC 1213 and Isha Steel Treatment,
Bombay vs. Association of Engg. Workers, Bombay and Anr. 1987(1) CLR SC 232.
Both the establishments being independent and separate they could not be
termed to be different departments of the same establishment which was a
material fact as held in Sunder Transport and ors. vs. The Regional Provident
Fund Commissioner 1992 (2) CLR 977. He also placed reliance on the
decisions in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and anr. vs. Dharmasi Morarji
Chemical Co. Ltd. (1998) 2 SCC 446 and Noor Niwas Nursery Public School vs.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and ors. (2001) 1 SCC 1 . It was thus
submitted that no useful purpose would be served by remanding the
proceedings for fresh adjudication before the Tribunal. He also referred to
the order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal on 18/11/2011 by which
liberty was granted to the respondent to hold a fresh enquiry under Section
7-A of the Act of 1952 and the fact that despite that liberty the respondent on
24/07/2012 did not proceed further with those proceedings. Thus it was
submitted that taking an overall view of the matter the order passed by the
Appellate Tribunal ought to be restored by setting aside the judgment of the
learned Single Judge.
J-LPA-406-11 9/13
9. On the other hand Shri H. N. Verma, learned counsel for the
respondent supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge. According
to him no prejudice was caused to the appellant by the order passed by the
learned Single Judge in view of the fact that the proceedings had been
remanded to the Tribunal and the contentions now sought to be raised by the
appellant could be raised before the Tribunal. He referred to the
memorandum of appeal preferred before the Tribunal to indicate various
points raised by the respondent in the said appeal as well as the material
available on record. According to him the fact that ANCL and ACCL had a
common registered office and the fact that an amount of Rs. 8 Crore was
invested by ACCL and NCC, Japan in ANCL indicated a unity of ownership.
The fact that contribution towards provident fund was made by ACCL was
also reflected in the Annual Report of the year 1995-96. This indicated that
despite availability of sufficient material on record the Tribunal failed to
examine that material and allowed the appeal. This aspect was noticed by
the learned Single Judge and hence the proceedings were remanded for fresh
adjudication. In that regard the learned counsel placed reliance on the
decision in M/s L. N. Gadodia and Sons and Anr vs Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner AIR 2012 SC 273 and submitted that no interference with the
judgment of the learned Single Judge was called for.
10. In reply it was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant
J-LPA-406-11 10/13
that the notice issued under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 did not make any
mention to contribution being made by some employees of ANCL to the
provident fund account with ACCL. The notice was also silent on the aspect
of preponement of applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1952 to ANCL.
Mere fact that the two establishments shared a common address for their
registered office did not make any difference nor did the Annual Reports
show financial inter dependence between the two.
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and
we have perused the material placed on record in the proceedings. At the
outset it may be noted that by the impugned judgment, the learned Single
Judge after finding that the Tribunal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction had
failed to take into consideration various relevant factors and had also failed
to consider the material on record concluded that the findings of the Tribunal
suffered from non-application of mind to the material available on record. It
is on that premise that the order passed by the Tribunal has been set aside
and after keeping all questions open including the question as to whether
ANCL was part and parcel of ACCL remanded the proceedings. While
examining the correctness of the order of remand, the reasons for remanding
the proceedings would be required to be kept in mind. If the reasons that
prompted the Court to remand the proceedings are found to be justified
coupled with the fact that the order impugned is one of open remand, the
J-LPA-406-11 11/13
appellate Court would be slow to interfere with such order. On the other
hand if it is found that the Court was not at all justified in remanding the
proceedings in view of the fact that the material on record was already
considered by the Court to which the proceedings have been remanded,
there would be scope to interfere with such order of remand. Further, only if
it is found that the order of remand was unwarranted would the question of
examining the merits of the dispute arise. Keeping these broad aspects in
mind we have perused the material on record in the light of the observations
made in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We are satisfied that
remand of the proceedings to the Tribunal was justified in view of the fact
that the material placed on record of the Tribunal was not considered by it
thus warranting re-consideration of the matter.
12. The order passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner
in proceedings under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 indicates that it was
found that ANCL was a subsidiary Company of ACCL. ANCL and ACCL had a
common registered office, the Provident Fund Scheme of ACCL as per its
Provident Fund Rules was applicable to the employees of ANCL and the
Annual Reports of ANCL indicated deposit of provident fund bills with ACCL.
It is on the basis of aforesaid material that the Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner while upholding the applicability of the provisions of the Act
of 1952 to ANCL directed payment of provident fund dues from November
J-LPA-406-11 12/13
1993 onwards.
In the appeal preferred by the appellant the aforesaid material
was referred to to urge that ANCL was a distinct establishment and it was not
liable to be clubbed with ACCL. When the order of the Tribunal is perused it
can be seen that in paragraph 4 thereof the only observation made was that
ANCL was a subsidiary Company of ACCL. It has thereafter been observed
that there was no material or evidence on record considered by the Assistant
Provident Fund Commissioner to establish the facts of unity of finance or
employment between ANCL and ACCL. Except this observation the material
available on record and relied upon by the Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner has neither been referred to and therefore not considered.
The grounds now raised in appeal by the appellant were also raised before
the learned Single Judge and after considering the same it was found that
relevant material was not considered by the Tribunal thus vitiating its order.
We find that the learned Single Judge was justified in holding so and
thereafter remanding the proceedings to the Tribunal for fresh consideration.
It is a clear case of non-consideration of material on record by the Tribunal
while deciding the statutory appeal. We therefore find that there is no
reason to interfere with the order of remand.
13. Though the learned counsel for the appellant by relying upon
various decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court sought to urge that the
J-LPA-406-11 13/13
order passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner was even
otherwise not sustainable in law, we find that as the learned Single Judge
while remanding the proceedings has kept all questions open including the
question as to whether ANCL was a part and parcel of ACCL, all aspects can
be considered by the Tribunal in the statutory appeal. We have therefore
not examined the applicability of the ratio of the decisions relied upon by the
learned counsel for the parties and that effort can be made before the
Tribunal. We also find that nothing much would turn on the fact that despite
liberty being granted to the respondent to hold a fresh enquiry under Section
7-A of the Act of 1952, the respondent decided to wait for the outcome of the
present proceedings. In any event the said aspect would not resurrect the
order of the Tribunal.
14. In view of aforesaid we do not find any reason to interfere with
the order of remand passed by the learned Single Judge. By clarifying that
observations made in the order passed by the learned Single Judge or in the
present appeal would not come in the way of either of the parties while
pursuing the proceedings before the Tribunal and keeping all questions open,
the Letters Patent Appeal stands dismissed. The parties shall bear their own
costs.
JUDGE JUDGE Asmita
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